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This thesis examines various social and political organisations that represented rank and file  
nationalists in east Galway from  1914 to 1921 and how they mediated and interpreted the 
political upheaval o f  the revolutionary period. The activities o f  many, perhaps more prosaic 
movements such as the Town Tenants ' League and the Ex-Soldiers and Sailors Federation 
have received scant attention in the historiography o f  the Irish revolution which has focused  
overwhelmingly on the activities o f the Irish Volunteers and Sinn Fein and latterly on the 
demise o f  the Irish Parliamentary Party and the United Irish League. The historiographical 
emphasis on the principal political agents has been to the detriment o f  a fu ll understanding o f  
the complexities o f  the nationalist response to revolutionary upheaval. To gain a fu ll 
appreciation o f  the formative political and social dynamics from  which the Irish state 
emerged, a more comprehensive analysis o f  the evolution ofpublic opinion is necessary. In a 
radicalised county like Galway, where local political culture was characterised by the 
intensity o f  political rivalries, civic organisations such as the Gaelic Athletic Association 
played a crucial role in influencing local events as they became conduits fo r  rival groups to 
garner support and undermine their opponents.
The revolutionaries were a product o f  their environment and east Galway was a complex and 
fractious society in which the traumatic upheaval o f  the independence struggle continually 
defies a simplistic linear meta-narrative. A comprehensive study o f  these events reveals many 
surprising and frequently awkward conclusions fo r  local communities, which in retrospect, 
could not have been accommodated in the domain o f  conventional local history. The 
principal question which this thesis explores is the extent to which peo p le ’s social and 
political aspirations evolved during the period and the degree to which they found  expression 
in the respective campaigns o f  the IRA and Sinn Fein.
Introduction
1, The historiography of the Irish Revolution
Popular perceptions of the independence struggle were heavily influenced in the early decades 
of the state by the publication of numerous combatants’ accounts that tended to focus on what 
Desmond Ryan termed ‘the spirit o f the struggle for Independence at the height o f its glory, 
with all the incalculable fire of 1916 behind it and a rose misted future before it’.1 The 
accounts of the exploits of officers such as Dan Breen, Tom Barry and Michael Collins 
displayed similar motifs with a common emphasis on the dangers faced by the Volunteers, the 
heroism of their sacrifice, the cowardice of the Crown Forces and the magnanimity o f a united 
nationalist people.2 The paradigm of ‘Ireland’s Fighting Story’3 could even rejuvenate the 
somewhat questionable record of areas which had remained relatively dormant, as districts 
sought retrospectively to defend their revolutionary credentials in print.4
Whilst these works tended towards hagiography, there are many valuable insights to be found 
in combatants’ accounts. Peadar O’Donnell, Liam Mellows and Ernie O’Malley, in particular, 
left detailed accounts of seminal events, which despite gaining popular appeal, represented 
nuanced analyses o f the society which they had unsuccessfully endeavoured to change.5 Based 
on their own experiences, these writers questioned the common assumptions regarding the 
degree of popular support the IRA had relied upon, the conservative nature of the republican 
leadership and the degree to which the Sinn Fein had compromised their principles. 
Conscious o f the inherent divisions in Irish society during the revolution, O ’Donnell believed
1 Desmond Ryan, Sean Treacy and The 3rd Tipperary Brigade (Tralee, 1945), p. 5.
2 Dan Breen, My Fight fo r  Irish Freedom, (Dublin, 1924); Tom Barry, Guerrilla Days in Ireland (Dublin, 1949);
Batt O’Connor, With Michael Collins in the fight fo r  Irish Independence (London, 1929).
3 Ireland’s Fighting Story was a long running series o f articles which first appeared in the Kerryman newspaper
before being published between 1942 and 1961 as county based histories of the IRA, featuring Limerick, 
Dublin, Kerry and Cork.
4 For two conflicting assessments of the achievements of a single brigade, contrast Jim Maher, The Flying
Column; West Kilkenny, 1916-1921 (Dublin, 1988) and Ernie O’Malley’s account of the same brigade in 
On Another M an’s Wound (London, 1936), pp 221-35.
5 See in particular, Peadar O’Donnell, There Will Be Another Day (Dublin, 1963); Ernie O ’Malley, Army
Without Banners, Adventures o f an Irish Volunteer (Boston, 1937); On Another Man's Wound (London, 
1936); The Singing Flame (Dublin, 1978); Liam Mellows, Notes from Mount] oy Jail (London, 1925).
that the rural poor were exploited by the movement, ‘as the tyrannical aspects o f the [British] 
conquest were declared outside the scope of the struggle’,6 Likewise, Mellows wrote, ‘Sinn 
Fein, whilst nominally, a nationalist party was, in fact, a bourgeois party.’7 O’Malley was later 
to write bitterly of the lack of support for the republican cause: ‘much cannot be expected 
from a nation of slaves. There is no idea of honour, an indefinite sense of playing the game, 
no real courage and not sufficient bulldog grit’.8 Thus, the historical re-interpretation of the 
era, which began in the 1960s, had been preceded by writers with first-hand experience, who 
had already fundamentally questioned many popularly held assumptions.
The academic assessment of the Irish revolution evolved considerably in the 1960s with a 
number of important reinterpretations published.9 Historians such as F.X. Martin, William 
Irwin Thompson and F.S.L. Lyons questioned the degree to which interpretations of the 
period had been influenced by retrospective romanticism and the inherent necessities o f 
nation building. The so-called revisionist approach sought to detach, as it was perceived, 
historical myths from historical reality, irrespective of nationalist sensitivities. The emerging 
historical orthodoxy fundamentally questioned the a priori assumptions surrounding the 
period, with the reputations, abilities and rationale o f the republican leadership subjected to 
unprecedented historical scrutiny. Thereafter, Irish historians became less deferential, 
immeasurably more sceptical and fundamentally more dispassionate in their analysis o f the 
republican project. Ernest Rumpf and Anthony Hepburn’s pioneering study Nationalism and 
Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland represented a landmark in the academic investigation 
of the distribution of revolutionary violence.10 Rather than analysing Irish nationalism in terms 
of its own rhetoric, they stressed the diversity o f variables: geographic, agricultural, economic 
and cultural, which accounted for the emergence and pattern of revolutionary violence. While 
some of their conclusions have since been challenged, Rumpf and Hepburn’s approach, along 
with the bulk of their findings, have had a profound influence on later historians.
6 O ’Donnell, There Will Be Another Day, p. 12.
7 Mellows, Notes from Mountjoy Jail, p. 9.
8 Richard English and Cormac O’Malley (eds.) Prisoners: The Civil War Letters o f  Ernie O'Malley (Dublin,
1991), p. 36.
9 See in particular, F.S.L. Lyons, Culture and Anarchy in Ireland, 1890-1939 (Oxford, 1979); William Irwin
Thompson, The Imagination o f an Insurrection (Oxford, 1967).
10 Ernest Rumpf and Anthony Hepburn, Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland (Liverpool,
1977). Their conclusions are discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
The influence of this new historical approach, combined with the pioneering methodology of 
Rumpf and Hepburn is most evident in the work of David Fitzpatrick. Fitzpatrick’s seminal 
article, ‘The Geography of Irish Nationalism’," expanded the statistical analysis pioneered by 
Rumpf to examine three major manifestations o f nationalism: violence, voting and 
participation in political organisations. Employing a range of statistical data including judicial 
statistics, election results and the Crime Special Branch statistics of the RIC, Fitzpatrick 
provided a more thorough analysis of the variety o f republican violence than had previously 
been produced. He later employed his statistical approach and scepticism of the existing 
historiography to produce a major account of the revolution in a single county. Politics and  
Irish Life 1913-1921: Provincial Experience o f  War and Revolution12 examined the revolution 
in county Clare and was the first major analysis to challenge the common assumption that the 
rise o f militant nationalism represented a fundamental and radical break with the 
constitutional tradition of the National Party and the United Irish League. Rather than viewing 
the period as one o f fundamental political transformation, Fitzpatrick highlighted the 
profound continuity between the manipulation of social discontent and the romantic 
attachment to violent radicalism of the Parliamentary Party and the complementary tactics o f 
the ‘new’ revolutionaries which merely represented ‘old wine in new bottles’. Michael 
Wheatley has explored the demise of the Parlimentary Party’s local structures in the north 
west in Nationalism and the Irish Party: Provincial Ireland 1910-1916,13 Wheatley contends 
that nationalist political structures were neither in a state of decay nor unrepresentative o f 
provincial nationalism in early 1914. Rather, the IPP's decline after 1914 was inaugurated by 
Redmond's support for the British war effort.
Fitzpatrick’s ‘so-called revolution’ thesis has influenced a new generation of historians who 
have emphasised the emasculation of radical social forces within the new militant tradition, 
which became most obvious in the revolutionaries’ commitment to property values and their 
conservative stance on land redistribution.14 Fitzpatrick’s study emphasised the profoundly
11 David Fitzpatrick, T he Geography of Irish Nationalism’ in Past and Present, Vol 78, pp 113-44.
12 David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life 1913-1921, Provincial Experience o f  War and Revolution (Dublin,
1977).
13 Michael Wheatley, Nationalism and the Irish Party: Provincial Ireland 19 JO-1916, (Oxford, 2005).
14 See in particular, Joost Augusteijn (ed.) The Irish Revolution, 1913-1923 (London, 2002); ‘Accounting for the
emergence of violent activism among Irish revolutionaries, 1916-21’ in Irish Historical Studies, xxxi, (May
5local nature of the revolutionary experience and his conclusion that only detailed local studies 
can determine the relative importance (if any) o f the many factors which he had highlighted, 
was taken up by a number of younger historians.15 Peter Hart in Cork, Michael Farry in Sligo, 
Marie Coleman in Longford and Joost Augusteijn in a range of counties, have all examined 
the nature of political and social upheaval during the period 1913-1923 in one county.16
Fitzpatrick’s conclusions have attracted both supporters and detractors and he has 
subsequently been critical of historians ‘hankering after lost opportunities for social 
revolution’.17 Fergus Campbell challenged Fitzpatrick’s analysis o f continuity and change by 
examining the intersection between political and agrarian conflict in Galway. He emphasised 
the key influence o f the radical tradition as being of paramount importance in shaping events 
and public opinion, as opposed to the elitism of the constitutional traditions o f the Irish 
Party.18 Campbell’s study spans the period 1898 to 1921 and his analysis focuses on the 
revolutionary potential o f land hunger and land redistribution. Whilst his work provides an 
important interpretive paradigm, the key issues surrounding republican and state violence, 
sectarianism and the fate of minorities and the urban experience of revolution have not been 
examined in the west o f Ireland during the revolutionary period.19 Thus, despite Campbell’s 
research, east Galway still provides a compelling case study of continuity and change owing 
to the social, economic and demographic diversity o f the region.
2007), pp 237-45; David Fitzpatrick (ed.) Revolution?: Ireland 1917-1923 (Dublin, 1990); Tom Garvin, 
The Evolution o f Irish Nationalist Politics (Dublin, 1981); Charles Townshend, ‘The Irish Republican 
Army and the Development of Guerrilla Warfare, 1916-21’ in English Historical Review, xciv (1979), pp 
3 18-45; Political Violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance Since 1948 (Oxford, 1983).
15 These factors are discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
16 Peter Hart, ‘The Geography of Revolution in Ireland 1917-1923’ in Past and Present, Vol, 154 (1997), pp
142-73. Peter Hart, The IRA and its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-1923 (Oxford, 1998); 
The IRA at War, 1916-1923 (Oxford, 2003); Marie Coleman, County Longford and the Irish Revolution,
1910-1923 (Dublin, 2003); Joost Augusteijn, From Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare. The Experience o f  
Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War o f  Independence 1916-1921. (Dublin, 1996); Michael Farry, The 
Aftermath o f Revolution: Sligo, 1921-23 (UCD, 2000).
17 David Fitzpatrick, ‘Review; Fergus Campbell, Land & Revolution, Politics in the West o f  Ireland 1898-1921 ’
in American Historical Review, cxii, (2007), pp 281-2.
18 Fergus Campbell, Land & Revolution, Politics in the West o f  Ireland 1898-1921 (Oxford, 2005).
19 Michael Farry provides some information on Sligo in Sligo 1914-192: A Chronicle o f  Conflict (Sligo, 1992).
6The key challenge set by Fitzpatrick, to find out why some areas were more violent than 
others through a series of local studies which explored various social variables in order to 
elucidate the key themes of continuity and change, remains an unfinished task.20 The profound 
localism of the era, the stark differences in popular mobilisation and political organisation, not 
just between counties, but also between areas within the same county, demands the synthesis 
o f a greater number o f regional studies. The conclusions of studies based in one particular part 
o f the country cannot be extrapolated into nationwide conclusions until a greater synthesis of 
regional case studies has been achieved.
1. Key Thesis Questions
Despite the increasing sophistication of the literature, numerous profound lacunae remain in 
our understanding of the Irish Revolution. In spite of the range of historical enquiry 
investigated in Fitzpatrick’s seminal work on Clare, many subsequent historians have 
continued to rely on the collation o f statistical data to explain the regional variations of 
political violence.21 This has contributed to a trend, whereby political violence and the IRA in 
particular, have been analysed apart from the social milieu o f nationalist society. The 
revolution was fundamentally immersed in the under-articulated, yet profound social 
prejudices o f the era and political change was ultimately mediated through notions of 
legitimacy, deference and respectability. Hart and Augusteijn’s seminal approach has 
elucidated much of our current understanding of IRA violence. However, the evolution of 
public opinion defies a rigid statistical approach and a firmer contextualisation is required to 
take account of the many social forces and civic organisations through which both change and 
stasis were mediated. Hart recognised the importance o f these inherent tensions within Irish 
society and the subsequent need for greater historical analysis o f the insecurity created by the 
defeat o f conservative nationalism, noting, ‘We do have the materials for a new revolutionary 
history.’23
20 Fitzpatrick, ‘The Geography of Irish Nationalism’, p. 137. Campbell has contested Fitzpatrick’s conclusions in
‘The Social Dynamics of Nationalist Politics in the West of Ireland, 1898-1918’ in Past and Present, Vo! 
184, (2004), pp 175-209.
21 See Hart, ‘The Geography of Revolution in Ireland 1917-1923’; The IRA and its Enemies; Hart, The IRA at
War, 1916-1923; Augusteijn, From Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare.
22 Hart, The IRA at War, 1916-1923, p. 5.
Political revolutions necessitate a violent and traumatic process o f upheaval, and to succeed, 
require a significant degree o f communal solidarity. The brunt of the upheaval was not borne 
evenly by all sections o f society. The national solidarity required by the leadership of 
nationalist Ireland during the revolutionary era concealed a society that was fundamentally 
shaped by the divergent hopes and aspirations of various broadly defined social groups, which 
were often antagonistic or mutually exclusive. The tensions within nationalist society are 
examined in detail in this study and the degree to which the evolution of the republican 
movement generated profound insecurity and resentment amongst sections of the community 
is investigated. The creation of one political tradition required the destruction of another and 
the tensions within the broader nationalist community are a crucial aspect in understanding 
the revolution in Ireland. How this resentment manifested itself and how the republican 
movement eventually accommodated more conservative social forces defines the nature o f the 
Independence struggle and the new Irish state which emerged.
While agrarian unrest in the nineteenth century has received a considerable amount of 
outstanding scholarly treatment, the agrarian disturbances of the early twentieth century 
require further analysis. Both Fitzpatrick and Townshend have acknowledged the importance 
o f land in generating violence during the independence struggle.23 Terence Dooley has 
elucidated the seminal importance of land hunger as a social and political catalyst for many 
decades after the founding of the state.24 Nonetheless, the nature o f the relationship between 
agrarianism and political violence during the revolutionary era remains elusive. Fitzpatrick 
has pointed out that ‘rural unrest invites study, not only for its intrinsic value, but also for its 
significance as the manifestation, result or cause, o f more general relationships and 
processes.’25 This study provides a detailed classification of agrarian unrest during the period 
which avoids the homogeneity that contemporary labelling o f outbreaks inferred, and which 
historians have at times been too ready to accept. A systematic classification of agrarian 
unrest and its patterns has been constructed so that more sophisticated problems about 
political unrest can be answered. The extent to which agrarianism in Galway represented a 
uniform and persistent manifestation of crisis amongst the poor or simply a collection of 
localised and contrasting movements confined to specific parts o f the county, is of crucial
23 Charles Townshend, Political Violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance Since 1848, (Oxford, 1983), p.
238; David Fitzpatrick, ‘Unrest in Rural Ireland’ in Irish Economic and Social History, xii (1985), p. 98.
24 Terence Dooley, The Landfor the People: The Land Question in Independent Ireland (Dublin, 2004).
25 Fitzpatrick, ‘Unrest in Rural Ireland’, p. 98.
significance to many wider debates.
Arensberg and Kimball’s social model of rural society in the west o f Ireland highlighted the 
fundamental social divisions within the world of the rural town, as well as between the small 
town and its rural environs. These differences were barely concealed and ‘there are many 
kinds o f them [townspeople] beneath this sameness and to know them, one must know these 
variations and what they imply for life.’26 ‘For the average small farmer, the town is a strange 
unfriendly place. Even in the countryside, his security is rooted in his own locality and those 
living even a few miles away will be strangers to him.27
While the rural class dimension of the Irish revolution has not been fully explored, the 
cultural chasm between town and country has merely been alluded to.28 Whilst the militancy 
of the small tenant farmers during the same period has been the focus o f extensive research, 
the equally valid claims of town tenants has received scant attention. The issue of urban 
tenants’ rights has not been analysed because towns have largely been depicted as adjuncts to 
the rural world, where the defining national characteristics could be found. Thus, as Susan 
Hood and Brian Graham have concluded, ‘the nationalist rhetoric, which subsumed the labour 
issue, also absorbed the urban perspective in general and the theme of the small town in 
particular.,29 By examining the campaigns o f the local Towns Tenants’ League and other 
national organisations, this study explores how the cultural chasm between town and country 
was particularly pronounced during the revolution in east Galway. The IRA’s campaign was 
limited to distinct parts of the county and wholly confined to the countryside. Towns played 
little role in the independence struggle and remained hostile to the IRA throughout the era.
The chasm between the world of the small town and its rural environs and between tenant 
farmers and larger landowners was naturally reflected within nationalist discourse and the 
revolutionary struggle itself, and the .attempt to reconcile, at least temporarily, their 
conflicting political agendas was never fully successful. Sinn Fein and the Volunteers
26 Conrad Arensbeg and Solon Kimball, Family and Community in Ireland (Harvard, 1948), p. 316.
27 Arensberg & Kimball, Family and Community in Ireland, p. 406.
28 See Augusteijn, From Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare, p. 278; Fitzpatrick, ‘The Geography of Irish
Nationalism’, p. 130.
29 Susan Hood and Brian Graham, ‘Town Tenant Protest in Independent Ireland’ in Irish Economic and Social
History, (1994), pp 39-58.
9continually failed to make any inroads in the county's small towns, and the urban poor in 
particular, displayed a deep antagonism to the republican movement, which they correctly 
perceived as a solely rural movement, driven, until 1920 at least, by the agenda of the small 
tenant farmers. In the small towns of east Galway, the impact o f the revolution was minimal 
at best and all classes of urban society continually turned their face against political change. 
The rapid advances made by the Irish Farmers Union in the county in the initial years o f the 
revolution was no mere coincidence. The graziers and gentlemen farmers o f the county sought 
to match the organising zeal of their traditional social inferiors by forming their own 
combinations to stifle the growth and success of tenant agitations. The demise o f the local 
Town Tenants’ League and its failure to tackle serious issues around slum housing and 
exploitation by middlemen was indicative of the stagnant and reactionary political nature of 
Galway towns.
The issue of sectarianism during the revolution continues to fuel academic and popular 
controversy and the reputation o f the IRA has come under considerable scrutiny. His study o f 
West Cork led Hart to conclude that sectarianism was ‘embedded in the vocabulary and 
syntax o f the revolution’,30 Galway has not escaped the attention o f historians in this regard 
and Hart has asserted that ‘ethnic cleansing’ took place in the east Galway countryside. 
Noting the ‘dreary steeples of Bandon and Ballinasloe,’31 Hart concludes that Protestants in 
general were pursued and were targeted with rigour from 1920 onwards. The ‘ethnic civil 
war’ thesis highlighted the sectarian nature of the IRA and Hart has focused on the killing o f a 
number o f Protestant men in west Cork by the IRA. In areas where the Crown Forces were 
particularly active, relations between Volunteers and the general population clearly became 
more strained. This study examines a number o f crucial aspects to this debate, in particular: 
were Galway Protestants more likely to be informers than their Catholic neighbours? and 
were Protestants consequently pursued by the IRA? Secondly, were ‘outsiders’ such as ex- 
servicemen viewed with suspicion by republicans? and to what degree were they 
consequently targeted?
Despite the body o f  academic work which has been published over the last two decades, 
Fitzpatrick’s conclusions about separatism and social change merit re-examination in the
30 Hart, The IRA at War, 1916-192/, p. 240.
31 Ibid.
context o f the varying degrees of support for political violence which existed in different 
regions o f the country. This study makes a unique contribution to the body of knowledge 
surrounding one of the most turbulent periods in Irish history by scrutinising a broader range 
o f movements and organisations than have previously been the subject o f historical enquiry, 
in order to contextualise the sheer diversity o f nationalist opinion. The major agents o f 
political change can only be comprehensively analysed within the local milieu o f conflicting 
voices, contested interpretations and disparate expectations through which political change 
and social unrest were mediated. Hence, to study these groups in isolation or simply as 
components of larger forces o f change is to underestimate and misinterpret the true 
complexity o f nationalist opinion and the level of insecurity and hostility which political 
change generated. The revolution in Ireland did not evolve in isolation from the forces of 
conservatism and stasis. It had to convince and eventually accommodate entrenched privilege 
and established power relations,
3, East Galway
East Galway provides a compelling case study o f the revolution for a number o f reasons.32 
The social, geographical and demographic diversity o f the county, manifest in the profoundly 
different regions o f the county, contributed to a complex social structure, where intense 
political cleavages mirrored the diversity of political aspirations in a volatile local political 
culture. Galway, like most of the country in 1914, was an overwhelmingly rural society and 
the vast majority of people were either directly or indirectly reliant on agriculture for their 
livelihoods. This apparent uniformity concealed many contrasting cultural and social 
communities, reflecting wildly varying ways o f life, where, to many ordinary people, other 
parts o f the county could appear strange and perceptibly different from their own 
communities. Galway, west of the Corrib, comprised a unique landscape and culture, with its 
flat boggy coastal settlements and uninhabited mountainous centre. Clifden, in the northwest, 
an English speaking market town, comprised the only town west o f the Corrib, while the 
majority o f people, lived their lives in abject poverty in small costal communities scattered 
along the shores of Galway Bay. The largest of these, an Spideall, an Ceathur Rua, Rosmuc, 
Roundstone and Oughterard, remained small Irish-speaking villages, which continued to rely 
on remittances from overseas to supplement meagre incomes from fishing and the rearing on
32 See Appendix for map of Galway showing main towns and villages.
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small farms of sheep and cattle. The uniqueness o f these communities and their specific 
cultural, environmental and economic realities demand a separate study, distinct from the east 
o f the county. For this reason, this thesis focuses on the east o f the county, where little or no 
popular solidarity, concern or interest generally, was commonly felt toward fellow 
Galwegians in Connemara.
East Galway evades an absolute definition but for the purposes o f this study it is taken to be 
all o f the county, to the south and to the east o f Lough Corrib and including Galway town. 
East Galway was overwhelmingly English speaking, despite a small number o f native 
speakers in the Cammore, Oranmore and Clonbur districts and in the Claddagh village in 
Galway town. Despite becoming part of the Gaelteacht, these areas did not share the same 
social structure as Connemara with its extremes o f poverty and economic backwardness. East 
Galway itself is popularly conceived of in terms of the north and the south, with the dividing 
line generally held to be an imaginary frontier stretching from Galway town, across to the 
small village o f Monivea and on to Ballinasloe and the banks o f the Shannon. Ballinasloe, 
Loughrea and Gort comprised the largest towns in the south o f the county, with Tuam, the 
only relatively large town in the north. Galway town contained the county’s only small 
industries with the urban poor finding employment in the docks, the fertiliser factory, 
MacDonagh’s timber mills and Young’s mineral water factory, as well as in the town’s 
relatively large commercial sector.33
The quality o f farmland in east Galway varies dramatically between the rich grassland farms 
of the limestone plain, which stretches northwards from Gort in the south, as far as south 
Mayo, and eastwards from Galway town, as far as Loughrea. The centre o f east Galway, the 
hinterland between Athenry and Craughwell, contains highly fertile grassland for grazing 
sheep and cattle, as well as intensive dairying. To the east and north o f the limestone belt, 
stretching from the north Galway/Roscommon border, inwards from Ballinasloe as far as 
Loughrea, and south to the Slieve Aughty Mountains, soil becomes perceptibly poorer and 
wetter, and consequently, far less commercially viable, with sheep more predominant than 
cattle, cattle sold on at an earlier age, and less dairying activity generally. Thus, the dominant 
division in cattle rearing nationally, with young cattle reared in the poorer land of the west,
33 For a social history of the urban poor in Galway town, see John Cunningham, * A Town Tormented by the 
Sea’, Galway 1790-1914 (Dublin, 2004).
12
subsequently sold on to be fully reared in the east of the country before being exported, is 
partially replicated within Galway itself, with cattle reared in the wetter parts o f the county, 
often bought at mart, to be reared in the Athenry or Loughrea districts.
Intense localism was reflected in many other ways, most obviously, but not inconsequentially, 
in sporting terms. The north of the county was exclusively football territory, the south was 
exclusively hurling country. This is further complicated by contiguous areas in adjoining 
counties sharing agricultural, economic and family ties. In the south of the county, the Gort 
and Beagh districts for example, have strong cultural and kinship ties with neighbouring 
Clare, with many local people aspiring to educate their sons in St Flannan’s College, Ennis. 
Similarly, on the Galway-Roscommon border, in places like Ballygar and Mountbellew, 
people naturally orientate towards Roscommon town for commercial and social events, as the 
boggy land from which livelihoods are eked, recognise no administrative border. In the north 
of the county, places such as Milltown and Dunmore share many social and economic ties 
with communities like Ballinrobe in south Mayo, as the flat limestone drained grazing lands 
stretch northward into south Mayo. Far from being of purely parochial concern, the vast 
differences in the character of political mobilisation and popular participation between 
broadly conceived areas o f the county, as well as between social interest groups generally, 
reflected complex internal, social and regional variations.
Galway ranked near the top of all the standard economic indicators o f poverty nationwide. 
The population had dropped dramatically in every census year since 1841, with a total 
population of 182,224 by 1911.34 A significant minority of 7,811 people, the largest number in 
any county nationwide, still spoke Irish only, with the vast majority living in west o f the 
county.35 Emigration was also amongst the highest in Ireland with 32,224 people emigrating 
in 1910 alone.36 In religious terms, Galway had the second smallest per capita number of
Protestants, with 3,544 members of the Church of Ireland community, representing only 1.95
per cent o f the total population in 1911,37
34 Census o f  Ireland, 1911. General Report, with Tables and Appendix, Presented to both Houses o f  Parliament
by Command o f His Majesty (London, 1913), p. 64.
35 Census o f Ireland, 1911, p. 291.
36 Census o flr  eland, 191J, p. 291.
j7 There were only 495 Presbyterians and 152 Methodists resident in the entire county in 1911. Census o f  
Ireland, 1911, p. 211.
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‘The Royal Commission on Congestion in Ireland noted the poverty that rural tenants 
continued to suffer in east Galway and the precariousness o f their existence:
The Tuam rural tenantry were in great poverty, labour was scarce and m any people eked out 
an existence cutting tu rf from bogs and selling it in the town. They were industrious but under 
present conditions, it seemed mockery to exhort them to se lf help ... In three or four cases 
there was gombeenism with 100 per cent but was less flourishing then form erly.38
On the topic o f the bar on shopkeepers sitting on the parish committees of the Congested 
Districts Board, the Chairman was unapologetic and referring to the ‘mutual suspicions’ of 
‘the small man and his neighbours’, he believed, that it was ‘these qualities of the poor which 
prevented the formation of committees’:
The shopkeeper might favour his own custom er in the selection [o f grants] and grants from the 
Parish Com m ittee for improvements, which the tenant would otherw ise have paid for himself, 
might set free an otherwise unattainable sum for the paym ent o f  the shopkeeper ... The 
shopkeeper might have a collusive interest in where he got his m aterials.39
Anthony Varley pioneered the study of the social consequences o f land reform in the west of 
Ireland and his work has subsequently been complemented by Fergus Campbell’s study of 
agrarian unrest and the United Irish League.40 No comprehensive study of the 1914-1921 
period in the county has been published and the IRA campaign in the county has not been
38 Tenth Report o f  the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire Into and Report Upon the Operation o f  the Acts
Dealing with Congestion in Ireland: Evidence and Documents 1908-1908, H.C. (1908) Volume xlii, 4007, 
(The Evidence of Rev. Macken).
39 Eleventh Report o f  the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire Into and Report Upon the Operation o f the
Acts Dealing with Congestion in Ireland; Digest o f  Evidence, 1908-1908, H.C. (1908) Volume xliii, 273 
(The evidence of Peter O’Malley).
40 Anthony Varley, ‘Irish Land Reform and the West between the Wars’ in Journal o f the Galway
Archaeological and Historical Society, Vol 56, (2004), pp 213-33; Varley, ‘A Region of Sturdy 
Smallholders? Western Nationalists and Agrarian Politics During The First World War’ in Journal o f  the 
Galway> Archaeological and Historical Society, Vol 55, (2003), pp 127-55; The Politics of Agrarian 
Reform; The State, Nationalists and the Agrarian Question in the West o f Ireland (PhD dissertation, 
Southern Illinois University, 1994).
analysed.43 Galway was remarkable in the opening decades of the century for both the 
intensity o f agrarian unrest in the county and the volume of land transferred from large 
landowners to small tenants under consecutive Land Acts. Galway, Clare and Roscommon 
consistently featured in police statistics as the most violent centres, o f agrarian agitation. In 
1914, Galway was ranked tenth out of forty police districts for indictable offences.42 However, 
when the metropolitan cities of Dublin, Belfast, Derry, Waterford, Limerick and Cork are 
excluded from the statistics, Galway ranks fourth behind, Kildare, Tipperary south and 
Offaly. These statistics are revealing however, when the breakdown of offences is further 
analysed. In terms of crimes against property, from 1908-1912, Galway ranked second 
nationally, behind Clare, once the major metropolitan centres o f Dublin and Belfast are 
excluded.43 Furthermore, when the exact type of offence committed is contextualised, the 
remarkable level o f a particular kind of violence in the county becomes apparent. In 1914, 
Galway ranked first nationally for convictions for ‘intimidation by threatening letter’ with 
seventy convictions, with Mayo, the second highest having a mere eighteen convictions.44 In 
terms of malicious injury to property, Galway ranked second behind Belfast City with sixteen 
convictions. In terms of convictions for ‘Assaulting Dwelling houses by firing shots into 
them’, Galway ranked first nationally with nineteen of the forty-five convictions nationwide, 
occurring in the county. These types of crimes were associated with communal agrarian
41 Some information on the period can be found in Timothy G. McMahon (ed.) Padraig O ’Fathaigh's War o f
Independence; Recollections o f  a Galway Gaelic Leaguer (Cork, 2000). However, O’Fathaigh was quite 
elderly when his memoirs were compiled and some episodes described are confused. The same problem 
applies to an account of the 1916 Rising in the county by Matt Neilan published as ‘The 1916 Rising in 
Galway’, Capuchin Annual (1966), pp 324-27. There is also some information on the Rising in Galway in 
Desmond Greaves, Liam Mellows and the Irish Revolution (London, 1971). There is a chronology of events 
of the War of Independence in Galway in the appendix of Campbell, Land & Revolution. A number of 
events in the period are also discussed in Chapter Five of the book.
42 ‘Judicial Statistics, Ireland, 1912.’ Part 1. - Criminal Statistics relating to; Police - Crime and its distribution-
Modes ofprocedure fo r  punishment o f  Crime - Proceedings in Criminal Courts - Persons under Detention 
in Prisons and other Places o f Confinement for the year 1912. H.C. (1912), p. xvi
43 ‘Judicial Statistics, Ireland, 1912.’ Table E. - Geographical Distribution o f  Crime - Annual Average (¡90S -
19} 2) and Proportion to Population o f Indictable Offences, o f  Persons proceeded against for Drunkenness, 
and o f Suicides in each County in Ireland in ‘Judicial Statistics, Ireland, 1912. Part 1.- Criminal Statistics.’ 
H.C. (1912), p. xvii.
44 ‘Judicial Statistics, Ireland, 1914.’ Table 23 - Returns From The Several Counties - Indictable Offences -
Nature o f  Crimes Known To The Police in each County and County City in 1914 in Judicial Statistics, 
Ireland, 1914. Part 1. - Criminal Statistics. H.C. (1914), p. xv.
agitation and should not be extrapolated into an extraordinary propensity for violence in the 
county, as for other crimes such as larceny drunkenness, and riot, the figures for the county 
are relatively unremarkable.
In terms of the amount of land transferred by the state under the 1903 and 1909 Land Acts, 
Galway ranks a very clear first nationwide, when any number o f categories are considered. 
Under the 1903 Land Act, 166,507 acres o f land was transferred in the county by the state to 
tenants from November 1903 until March 1918.45 This equates to just under the entire amount 
transferred in the province of Munster at 169,988, or the amount transferred in all of Ulster 
and Leinster combined at 90,138 and 80,774 acres respectively. In terms of allotments of 
untenanted land, i.e. land previously given over to the grazing of sheep and cattle, the figures 
are even more remarkable. A total of £731,071 was advanced by the state under the combined 
1903 and 1909 Land Acts up to March 1918.46 Roscommon, where the next highest amount of 
money was allocated, does not even compare, with £118,188 spent by the government. In no 
other county was more than £100,000 spent by the government, other than in Galway and 
Roscommon, with Galway dwarfing even counties like Clare by a figure o f roughly ten to 
one. (There was £75,229 spent in County Clare, which still exceeded the figure for most 
counties.) Thus, as an active county in terms of political violence during the revolution, 
Galway presents a compelling case study. In terms of the nature o f the relationship between 
political violence and land hunger, as an exploration of the rural and urban dimensions to 
popular mobilisation, and for an inquiry into the nature of the sectional, sectarian and class 
components to the Irish revolution.
45 Table XII1:- Return of Estates Purchased by The estates Commissioners During the Period from 1st November,
1903 to 3 lsl March, 1918 in Report o f the Estates Commissioners from the Year from 1st o f April 1917, to 
March, 1918, and fo r  the Period From 1st November, 1903 to 31st March, 1918. H.C. (1918), p. 28.
46 Table XXI.- Return giving particulars of Allotment of Untenanted Land purchased by the Estates
Commissioners under the Irish land Acts, 1903-09 and vested in Purchasers, up to March, 1918. Contained 
in Report o f the Estates Commissioners from the Year from 1st o f  April 1917, to March, 1918, and fo r  the 
Period From 1st November, 1903 to 31st March, 1918. H.C (1918), p. 44.
4. Methodology and Sources
This study examines the activities of Sinn Fein, the United Irish League, The Irish Volunteers, 
the National Volunteers, the Gaelic Athletic Association, the National Gaelic Athletic 
Association, the County Galway Farmers Association, the east Galway Vigilance 
Committees, the Town Tenants’ Association, the Galway Rate Payers Association, the 
Galway Ex-Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Federation, local agrarian collectives and the Irish 
Republican Army. The Trade Union movement has not been examined, other than in passing, 
as it was so weak and disjointed in the county. Similarly the Gaelic League and the Ancient 
Order o f Hibernians, although strong in neighbouring counties, never had a similar impact in 
county Galway. (Both are discussed in reference to other aspects o f the evolution of 
nationalist politics in the county.)
The aspirations of the silent majority of people in any historical era are often less tangible 
than the researcher may wish to admit and interpretations of history are heavily influenced by 
the written record left by local elites. This study examines the competing narratives of 
ordinary people, conscious of the obvious prejudices and agendas inherent in the written 
sources that have formed the bulk of this research. A wide range o f sources have been used in 
this study with the largest number of references coming from the police reports contained in 
the Colonial Office Special Branch Files, the county’s four local newspapers and the Witness 
Statements of the Bureau of Military History. The RIC County Inspectors’ Monthly 
Confidential Police Reports for Galway form a significant archive o f the activities of all local 
social and political movements during the period. There were two administrative ridings in 
the county with two police inspectors submitting a large volume of reports to Dublin Castle 
each month. The reports contained intricate details not just on crime, but a wealth of 
information on civic and sporting organisations with lengthy reports of meetings, lists of 
suspects and a whole range of material recorded each month. Furthermore, the deterioration of 
the force’s relationship with the community and their exasperation at the position they found 
themselves in, is recorded in detail.
The War Office records, WO 35, ‘General administration o f the army in Ireland’, held in the 
National Archives at Kew have been extensively utilised to build a comprehensive picture of 
the activities o f the Crown Forces in the county. County Galway formed part o f the 5th
Division of the Crown Forces during the War of Independence and the War Diary of the 
Galway Brigade, the civilian court-martial records, intelligence files, individual files on 
suspects, and a number of other records have been utilised to gain a clear insight into the 
activities and mindset o f the British Military.
The vibrancy of local newspapers in Galway was remarkable, with four papers produced 
weekly. The Galway Express represented the views of the unionist constituency until 1918, 
when it was taken over by Sinn Fein, becoming the movement’s official paper in the county. 
The Connacht Tribune, which was founded by the National Party in 1909, represented 
conservative nationalist opinion and was the most widely circulated and influential paper in 
the county. Its editor, Thomas Kenny, promoted the idea o f Ireland as part of a British 
commonwealth as a solution to ‘the Irish question’. The paper remained implacably opposed 
to the republican project throughout the period and it remained convinced of its own moral 
authority on all developments locally, including promoting the British war effort and 
recruitment ‘to the colours’. Alongside these papers, the East Galway Democrat based in 
Ballinasloe and the Tuam Herald contributed to a lively newspaper culture with a wealth of 
local information published weekly.
Alongside these sources, the minutes of the Galway Urban District Council and the 
Ballinasloe Rural District Council contain many revealing insights into the colourful nature of 
local politics. The Diaries of Lady Augusta Gregory and the O ’Fathaigh papers, held at the 
National Library have been used to supplement these sources to provide personal insights 
from specific political viewpoints. A large number o f detailed maps have been used to 
illustrate the geographical distribution of a number o f relevant phenomena including the 
spatial distribution o f political violence, the location o f the Crown Forces, the distribution of 
fatalities and the location of agrarian collectivities. The Appendix also includes the precise 
details of all fatalities in the county during the War o f Independence, as well as details o f all 
attacks carried out by the Crown Forces and the IRA including relevant charts explaining their 
distribution.
Finally, the problem of definition needs to be acknowledged when one is dealing extensively 
with agrarian protest and the rural class component of the revolution. No definitive definition 
of a grazier is possible or even desirable: the term is relative to the local society in which the 
grazier or strong farmer lives. In this respect, a working definition of a grazier as a grassland
farmer with more than two hundred acres and a large dwelling house has generally been used 
as a loose rule o f thumb. However, Dooleynconcedes that in many parts o f the country, a 
farmer with much less than two hundred acres would be considered a grazier by the local 
community.47 East Galway falls into the latter category. In terms of peasants and the rural 
poor, the problem of definition is inherent. Theodore Shanin has noted that European 
peasants have variously been described by historians as both ‘the real autocrats’ and at the 
same time, ‘non-existing, historically speaking’.48 For the purposes of this study, the term 
‘peasant’ has been avoided, in favour of ‘small tenant’ or simply, ‘the rural poor’. Whilst a 
strict definition has not been attempted, small farmers and the sons of tenant farmers, the 
landless and labourers are all included in this category.
47 Terence Dooley, The Land for the People: The Land Question in Independent Ireland (Dublin, 2004), p. 30.
48 Theodore Shanin, ‘Peasantry as a Political Factor’ in idem, Peasants and Peasant Society (London, 1971), p.
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Chapter One: Agrarian Unrest, 1914-16
Carla King has noted that, ‘historically in Ireland the relationship between the people and the 
land has been both complex and intense’.1 The chapter explores the ‘agrarian disturbances’ for 
which parts o f east Galway had become notorious in the opening decades o f the century,2 This 
chapter attempts a precise classification of what was contemporaneously labelled by the 
authorities as simply ‘agrarian unrest’ without any attempt to analysis the nature, form and 
root cause of these disturbances and on their frequency in certain parts o f the country such as 
east Galway, Clare, Roscommon and Offaly. Rather than viewing agrarian agitation as simply 
the opportunism of an avarice peasantry, this study goes beyond the homogeneity with which 
contemporary commentators labelled these outbreaks and which historians have at times been 
too willing to accept. These manifestations of crisis amongst the small tenants concealed a 
level o f sophistication, co-ordination and negotiation which cannot simply be dismissed. The 
sheer complexities of the issues at hand and the range and number of disputes involved can be 
analysed once they are comprehensively studied.
The fundamental feature of agriculture in Galway has always been the scarcity of 
economically viable land. Whilst the 1903 and 1909 Land Acts are generally regarded as 
having resolved the land question, these reforms did not address the prevalence of 
uneconomic holdings and the persistence of land hunger amongst the rural poor in the west of 
Ireland. The new legislation did little to further the progress o f land purchase and the terms of 
the 1909 Act actually made land purchase less attractive to both landlord and tenant than it 
had been under the Wyndham Act,3 Terence Dooley has pointed out that the legacy of the Acts 
was that fanners did not get what they really required: ‘enough land to make their holdings 
economically viable.’4 Under the new Land Acts, the landed gentry retained vast amounts of 
land, usually demesne, home farms, woodlands and grazing farms.5 After 1909, the land issue
1 Carla King (ed.) Famine, Land and Culture in Ireland (Dublin, 2000), p. 1.
2 See Appendix for map showing agrarian collectivities in east Galway, 1914-16.
3 Fergus Campbell, Land & Revolution, Politics in the West o f Ireland 1898-1921 (Oxford, 2005), p. 121.
4 Terence Dooley, The Land for the People, The Land Question in Independent Ireland, (Dublin, 2004), p. 17.
5 By 1923, only 0.5 million acres of untenanted and demesne land had been sold, out of an estimated total of 2.6
million acres. Over 2 million acres of untenanted and demesne land was still being farmed by landlords in
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was only reconfigured with a sizable rural proletariat, unable to take advantage of the Acts, 
being further exploited by the emergence of the new class o f grazier farmers. The members of 
this class were often the agents or middlemen for the remnants of the old gentry who 
continued to dominate the east Galway countryside. According to the 1906 Return o f  
Untenanted Land in Rural Districts in Ireland\ Galway, with 161 mansions, had the highest 
number o f any county.6 Lord Ashtown’s estate in east Galway, which was the focus of 
significant agitation during the revolutionary period, comprised 4,000 acres of grazing land in 
1923 7 and Clanricarde’s various estates still comprised 52,000 acres in 1913. But, as 
Anthony Varley points out, the problem ran deeper, as much of the transfer of ownership 
profoundly changed the Irish countryside, the abundance o f uneconomic small farms and poor 
land meant that in the absence of major land redistribution, the benefits would always be 
heavily restricted in the west o f Ireland.9
Hence, far from being resolved by the Wyndham Land Act in 1903 and Birrell Land Act in 
1909, land hunger dominated rural society in east Galway, where the grazing system 
„.predominated, Following the earlier reforms, the social structure of rural society in east 
Galway altered radically A society previously united in opposition against landlordism 
fractured and a tripartite cleavage emerged with the rise o f the shopkeeper/grazier. This new 
agrarian class had the capital to outbid the small farmers each spring for available land under 
the eleven-month lease system, and thus accumulated large tracts o f grazing land. The rural 
poor blamed graziers for denying them access to land, valuing bullocks over people and they 
were bitterly resented by the small tenants.
The eleven-month land lease was synonymous with the grazing system and with the gradual 
process o f marginalisation of the rural poor.10 The regulations o f previous Land Acts only
the early 1920s. See, Terence Dooley, ‘Landlords and the Land Question, 1879-1909’ in Carla King (ed.), 
Famine, Land and Culture in Ireland (Dublin, 2000), pp 131-134.
6 Mary Walsh, ‘Galway Landlords and Country Houses’ in Journal o f  the Galway Archaeological and Historical
Society, Vol 42, (1989), p. 120.
7 Dooley, ‘Landlords and the Land Question, 1879-1909’, p. 134.
8 Connacht Tribune, 25 April 1914.
9 Anthony Varley, ‘Irish Land Reform and the West between the Wars’ in Journal o f  the Galway Archaeological
and Historical Society, Vol 56, (2004), p. 211.
10 The eleven month lease system was particularly dominant in Roscommon, Galway, Clare and parts of the
midlands. Occupiers could be evicted without notice, did not gain formal tenancy, and thereby could not
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applied to leases o f one year of more. Therefore, by leasing land for eleven months, the terms 
of the lease were excluded from the stipulations concerning fair rent and fixity of tenure. 
Thus, land under the eleven month system was leased at an inflated rate and since fewer 
people could afford to purchase a lease, more people were excluded from access to the land. 
A process o f economic marginalisation based on access to land led to an increasing 
concentration in the hands of a relatively small number of grassland farmers, commonly 
referred to as ranchers or graziers.
In 1915 Meath had the most land rented under the eleven-month system nationwide with 
73,038 acres but Galway was a close second with 72,801. Crucially, Meath did not have 
anything like the same number of small holders as Galway and agrarianism did not feature 
strongly in the county. Better comparisons with similar sized counties like Mayo with 30,449 
acres and Tipperary with 20,146 acres highlight the dominance o f the grazing system in 
Galway with over twice that number of eleven-month leases.11
The dominance o f this system in Galway, which excluded thousands o f small tenants from 
access to land, had historically been a major source of turmoil, violence and desperation. 
Campaigns o f mass agitation aimed against graziers were a recurring phenomenon in Galway 
during the opening decades of the last century.12 These campaigns frequently involved 
considerable violence, including intimidation, the maiming of both beasts and people, 
burnings and shooting, and were a major cause of concern for the police in east Galway.
The Chief Secretary’s intelligence notes for 1915 recorded the situation in Galway East 
Riding:
Speaking generally the Riding was in an unsatisfactory state during the year owing to agrarian 
agitation. The parts principally affected were the A thenry and Loughrea districts, where unrest 
was due to the greed for land, the jealousies existing over the division o f lands after sale, and the 
influence o f secret societies.13
avail of the rent fixing terms of the previous Land Acts.
11 'Return Showing the Results of Agitation against the Grazing System in May 1915’ in Brendan Mac Gioita
Choille (ed.) Intelligence Notes 1913-1916 (Dublin, 1966), pp 194-5.
12 For a discussion on the Ranch wars in Connacht, see Campbell, Land and Revolution, pp 85-166.
13 'Chief Secretary’s Office, Judicial Division, Intelligence Notes, 1915’ in Mac Giolla Choille, Intelligence
A common theme of the literature on peasant societies is that rural communities experience 
severe dislocation with the advance of agricultural commercialisation, which undermines 
traditional institutions including bonds between peasants and their masters. The period 
covered in this study should have been one of immense opportunity for the small tenants but 
ultimately it became one of heightened disappointment. This disappointment was 
compounded by the economic benefits o f the Great War, as the agricultural boom was 
confined to those with access to enough land to be able to sell surplus produce. The 
dislocation o f the small tenants, so obvious during the earlier Ranch War, had both economic 
and institutional aspects. This alienation and acute disaffection with the state was summed up 
by the banners of the Tullycross agitators, 'The road for the bullock and the land for the 
people.5 This alienation was most obvious in the widespread dissatisfaction o f the small 
tenants with the established state mechanisms for land redistribution: the United Estates 
Commission and the Congested Districts Board.
In understanding changes in popular collective action in Western Europe over the last three 
centuries, Tilly analysed the effect on collective violence of major structural transformations 
such as urbanisation and industrialisation.'4 As a result of these structural transformations, the 
social organisation o f groups contending for power in western European countries has 
changed over the past several centuries and the nature and targets o f their goals has altered 
accordingly. There has been a decline in collective violence by small communal groups, 
either struggling for power with one another or trying to resist the centralisation of power in 
nation states, in favour o f a transition to collective violence that erupts as broadly based 
interest groups, organised associationally and seeking to influence the state and make claims 
to rights not previously enjoyed. In the case o f Galway, local collectivities sought to regain 
access to land popularly perceived to have been enjoyed prior to the Cromwellian 
confiscations and the Williamite victory. In the peasant imagination, grazierism and 
landlordism had no legitimacy whatsoever and the community was simply righting an 
historical injustice perpetrated on their ancestors by an alien oppressor.
Writing about the Irish Land War of 1879-82, Clark applied Tilly’s model to rural unrest in
Notes, 19}3-1916, p. 151.
14 Charles Tilly, Rebellious Century, / 830-1930 (London, 1975), pp 17-23.
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nineteenth-century Ireland.15 He concluded that collective action had begun to change 
significantly in Ireland several centuries before the Land War. Nevertheless, a crucial part of 
the total transformation occurred in the nineteenth century. Active collectivities had became 
less local and more often national in their scope, less often re-active and more often pro-active 
in their aims, and less communal and more often associational in their organisational basis 
and structure.
Whilst both collective and communal action can be found in Ireland throughout the nineteenth 
century, a gradual movement toward broader associational action and away from more 
localised communal action is clearly detectable. The oath-bound agrarian combinations and 
feuding factions o f the pre-Famine period tended to be highly localised and confined to one 
county or one area o f a county. There is a noticeable transition away from this type o f local 
collective action to broader national collective action involving national movements such as 
the fenians and the Land League as the century progresses.
George Rude made a distinction between ‘forward looking’ and ‘backward looking’ crowds 
involved in popular disturbances.16 Tilly reformulated this distinction into one between pro­
active, re-active and competitive collective actions.17 Pro-active collective action refers to 
campaigns by a group to claim rights, privileges or resources, not previously enjoyed. Re­
active collective action refers to collective action defending rights, privileges or resources 
already enjoyed by the group but now under threat. Competitive collective action involves 
two or more groups in a struggle over access to resources or recognised rights and privileges.
Numerous examples of all three categories o f collective action identified by Tilly: 
associational, communal and competitive are evident in the widespread agrarian unrest 
between 1914 and 1916 in east Galway. Anti-grazier campaigns such as those in the 
hinterland around Athenry, rested on local communal bonds, especially those o f bordering 
townlands with inevitable overlapping bonds o f kinship. However, larger agitations that were 
associational in character were prominent in the hinterland of Ballinasloe, Loughrea and
15 Samuel Clark, Social Origins o f  the Irish Land War (Princeton, 1979), pp 350-71.
16 George Rude, The Crowd in History, A study o f popular disturbance in France and England, 1730-1848 (New
York, 1964), pp 48-55.
17 Charles Tilly, Rebellious Century, 1830-1930 (London, 1975), pp 17-23.
Portumna, further east in the county.18 Here a number o f different large scale, well organised 
agitations were ongoing for many years against landlords and graziers, with the largest 
campaign centred on the Ashtown, Clanricarde and Clonbrock estates, which were divided 
into numerous dispersed portions. These campaigns were organised by the local United Irish 
League branches and co-ordinated by their regional executives with parish priests and local 
MPs occupying central positions as spokespersons and lobbyists. Whilst both o f these modes 
of collective action involved cattle driving and boycotting as a key tactics, communal 
collectivities were characterised by their frequent use of violence against landlords and their 
employees. The violence involved in associational campaigns, on the other hand, whilst often 
involving crimes against property, such as the knocking of walls, remained largely sporadic 
and impromptu, such as when a cattle drives were forcibly disrupted by the police.
Competitive actions involving local, often semi-political factions engaged in violent feuding 
which had its origins in competing interpretations of rights and entitlements over access to 
land were also significant sources of unrest in the county. Feuds between organised factions 
took place at Boyhill and Graige Abbey near Athenry, in Lackagh village in the parish of 
Turloughmore, around the village of Craughwell, and in the Riverville and Bookeen districts 
that previously comprised the Dunsandle estate.19 These feuds over how land was to be 
divided, or had already been divided to the dissatisfaction o f local parties, involved the most 
violence, possibly aggravated by the fact that there were usually significantly more perceived 
legitimate targets than in anti-grazier campaigns. Thus, agrarian unrest that was competitive 
in nature could clearly be defined as reactive, rather than pro-active in nature.
The suspension of land division by the CDB for the duration o f the European conflict 
inflamed an already dissatisfied tenantry who already resented the slowness with which 
estates were being divided. The small tenants were incensed by the widespread practise of 
renting land to graziers on the eleven-month system whilst division was pending. In June 
1914, the Tuam District Council passed a resolution noting ‘Bullocks seem to get more 
consideration in this part of Ireland than people.’20 After being released from custody in 
Galway jail for a riot during an anti-grazier demonstration near Clifden, P.J. Wallace
18 These will be discussed in detail in this Chapter. See Appendix for map of agrarian agitation in East Galway, 
1916-16.
19 Ibid.
20 Connacht Tribune, 7 June 1914.
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announced, ‘All the CDB succeeded in doing was giving jobs to broken down military 
colonels and land agents and sending ladies around to teach people how to cook eggs, paying 
more attention to bulls, boars and rams than poor people.’2'
Discontent with the established state mechanism for land division was universal in the county. 
A resolution by the north Galway UIL, passed unanimously in June 1914 noted that:
Tenants w hose cases are complained of, have been treated unfairly and we believe in some 
cases this is because they took an active part in the land question. We consider such action 
unfair and vindictive and we cannot condone such treatm ent as partisan [sic] and if  such 
conduct is allowed to continue and the influence o f  the landlord, his agent and bailiff is taken 
as to who will get extra land and in what proportion: we call for the abolition o f the Estate 
Com m ission.22
William O’Malley, MP for Connemara, had been a trenchant and very public critic o f the 
CDB’s activities. In November 1914, when the new members o f the Board were being 
considered for their five-year term, he wrote to the CDB requesting that a Galway member be 
appointed. (O’Malley was hoping the Board would approach him to be their Galway 
representative.)23 Decrying the difficulties faced by tenants in what it described as the 
‘agricultural slums’ of Galway, the Connacht Tribune echoed Wallace’s earlier sentiments, 
with the editor complaining that the tenants were ‘too often made pawns of purely 
experimental measures by the Board’.
1.1 Communal Collectivities
Communal collectivities were organic communal groups which were organised on the tight 
bonds between neighbouring townlands and overlapping kinship. They sprang up on specific 
estates in frustration at local landlords’ refusal to sell up under the terms of the Land Acts. 
Thus, as in the case of a single parish such as Athenry, there were numerous different active 
communal agitations with the tenants targeting different landlords in their respective vicinity. 
The bounds of the communal collectivities never extended beyond neighbouring townlands
21 Connacht Tribune, 28 March 1914.
22 Connacht Tribune, 20 June 1914.
23 Connacht Tribune, 16 January 1915.
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and there is no evidence of co-operation between groups. Thus, the various ‘neighbourly’ 
campaigns, though all active within a single parish, were separate campaigns fought by 
different groups, sometimes only comprising a small number of families in one very small 
area.
Communal anti-grazier agitations in the years 1914-16 in county Galway were concentrated 
in the hinterland around Athenry with agitations active at Moorpark, Tiaquin, and 
Colemanstown. The police noted the tension in the area in the summer of 1914: ‘Land hunger 
is very keen around Athenry and the forces of disorder there are thoroughly organised and 
quite unscrupulous/24 The police noted ‘the unsettled state of these places is due to the 
existence of secret societies, members of which will resort to the use o f firearms at the 
slightest p re tex t/25 The source of this unrest was obvious: ‘there is much greed for land about 
Athenry where the forces o f disorder are thoroughly organised with the result that much 
dissatisfaction exists over the division of land in that neighbourhood by the CDB and Estates 
Com m issions/26
Fergus Campbell has written extensively o f the existence o f a centralising secret society, the 
‘Galway Secret Society1 which co-ordinated agrarian unrest in the county in the early years of 
the century.27 Agitations clearly had the support of the local IRB and clear overlaps in terms 
of membership existed. The police noted in February 1915, ‘these secret societies around 
Athenry and Loughrea, if  not actually IRB circles, are believed to be under the control o f that 
organisation and work in connection with the UEC and UIL in furthering agitation/28 That 
there were connections with the IRB is undoubted but as the police continually pointed out, 
the secret societies also worked closely with other groups when it was to their advantage, 
such as the local UIL and Estate Commissioners.
24 Cl monthly report, east Galway, July 1914, CO 904/94.
25 Cl monthly report, east Galway, March 1914, CO 904/92.
26 Cl monthly report, east Galway, June 1914, CO 904/93.
27 Campbell, Land and Revolution, pp 174-7.
28 Cl monthly report, east Galway, February 1915, CO 904/92.
Moorpark
A long running communal agitation had been active in Athenry against local landlord Frank 
Shawe-Taylor o f Moorpark. In March 1913, a deputation including the local parish priest 
requested a meeting to ‘convey the strength of feeling’ amongst the local small tenants that he 
should surrender his three hundred acres of untenanted grazing land to the CDB, in order that 
it be divided amongst them. He subsequently consented to sell two hundred and forty-nine 
acres of the farm to the Board, This offer was not accepted by the tenants who were resolute 
that the whole o f the farm be given up. The police noted at the time that ‘the people feel it 
wasn’t really a genuine offer, but made for the purpose of trying to fool them, hence his 
unpopularity.’29
Shawe-Taylor’s determination to resist the demands of the local tenants led to repeated threats 
against him and he was placed under constant police protection. As no local would enter his 
employment, his staff had to be brought in from outside the area and police were forced to 
keep track o f all changes of personnel on the farm. The threats of the local agitators were no 
idle rhetoric and in April 1914, a malicious fire destroyed several out-houses and farm 
equipment on his property.30 The subsequent claim for compensation, for what the local 
people claimed was not a malicious but an accidental fire, heightened the ill-feeling in the 
district and in June he sought £600 compensation at Tuam quarter sessions for losses 
sustained. The court was told that a man who sold oats to the landlord a couple o f years 
previously had subsequently had his house burned down and his brother’s home fired into.31
In March 1915, a herd in Moorpark was brutally assaulted in Athenry and a local man was 
subsequently sentenced to six months in Galway jail for the attack.32 The judge noted that he 
would have got twelve months but for the character reference provided for the defendant by
29 Cl monthly report, east Galway, January 1914, CO 904/92.
30 The police report o f the incident noted ‘numerous outrages have been committed in connection with this
dispute, ‘Broderick, the steward, is not above suspicion and if he succeeded in driving his master out of the 
place, he would be sure of getting a good share of the land. £600 compensation is sought.’ Cl monthly 
report, east Galway, April 1914. CO 904/93.
31 Shawe-Taylor was eventually awarded £450 compensation as the fire was deemed to be malicious. Connacht
Tribune, 20 June 1914.
32 Thomas Duggan, herd to Shawe-Taylor was walking home from Athenry, when he was repeatedly struck on
the head with stones. Cl monthly report, east Galway, March 1915, CO 904/96.
the RIC sergeant in Athenry.33 The willingness of the local police to stand as character 
witnesses for a defendant in an assault case where the victim sustained brain damage is 
remarkable and indicative of the sympathy on the part of the local police. Four months later, 
another o f the Moorpark workmen was viciously beaten whilst attending a hurling match in 
Athenry, being struck about the head repeatedly by a group of men with hurls while lying 
defenceless on the ground.34 Following these two assaults, the agitation died down for some 
time. However, workmen at Moorpark remained under police protection and Shawe-Taylor 
continued to be boycotted.
Unlike the larger associational campaigns in the east of the county, there was no clerical 
involvement in the Moorpark agitation, despite a priest being involved in the initial delegation 
and the UIL did not lobby on the tenants’ behalf. The dispute was noteworthy for its duration, 
which ended with the murder of Shawe-Taylor in March 1920, a full six years after the 
boycott commenced. In the ensuing period, the boycott was rigidly observed by the local 
community and the Shawe-Taylor family remained protected by a constant police escort. 
Their land could only be farmed with the assistance of the Property Defence Association, 
which provided workmen from the north of Ireland who lived constantly on the farm 
protected by a police hut. The boycott was punctuated by sporadic acts of violence and the
grim determination of the local agitation left the landlord in no doubt about his isolation and
vulnerability.35
1.2 Associational Collectivities
There were three major associational agitations active in east Galway in the period o f this 
study. These were directed against the county’s three major landowners, the Marquis of 
Clanricarde, Lord Ashtown of Woodlawn, Kilconnell and Lord Clonbrock of Ahascragh. All 
three agitations were supported by the local United Irish League, even though they involved 
low-level intimidation and sporadic battles with the police. It is instructive to examine the 
common features o f associational collectivities and the extent to which the impact of their 
protest was augmented by the threat of the unseen forces of disorder, which they were keen to
33 William Broderick, a steward for Shawe-Taylor, Connacht Tribune, 27 March 1915.
34 Cl monthly report, east Galway, July 1915, CO 904/97.
35 The murder of Shawe-Taylor is fully discussed in Chapters Four and Five.
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be regarded as holding in check. For the purposes o f this study the campaigns against 
Clonrock and Clanricarde are sufficient to demonstrate the key aspects of associational 
collectivities. It is important to note that as the three largest land owners in east Galway, 
Ashtown, Clonrock and Clanricarde were all held in low popular esteem with Ashtown and 
Clonbrock held in particular infamy. Ashtown earned the contempt of the whole spectrum of 
Irish society for his many character flaws, the nature o f his political views and his refusal to 
divide his estate amongst his tenants.36
Ashtown
Frederick Oliver Trench, Third Baron Ashtown (1868-1946) remained a vociferous opponent 
o f Home Rule, land reform and all facets of Catholic nationalism generally at a time when 
many of his peers recognised the legitimacy, or at least the wisdom, of a more conciliatory 
approach to modernisation. As L Perry Curtis has noted, ‘controversy followed him as closely 
as the police escort that kept would-be assassins at bay.’37 In 1900 he sacked all of his 
Catholic herdsmen, replacing them with Scottish planters.38 Nominally one o f the hundred 
wealthiest landowners in the country, Ashtown still owned over 24,000 acres across various 
counties in the early decades of the . twentieth century. Over 8,000 acres o f his estate was 
situated in east Galway, around the family’s large Italianate house, Woodlawn, situated at 
Kilconnell, twelve miles from Ballinasloe. His extensive ranching operation in County 
Galway consisted of a herd of cattle and sheep on a farm of over 4,000 acres, whilst he rented 
the remainder to graziers on the eleven-month letting system.39 As a champion of local 
graziers generally, Ashtown was the subject of an agitation for the break up of his estate 
during the ranch wars and his estate was the centre of agitation once again from 1918 
onwards.40
Clanricarde
Herbert George de Burgh, the second Marquis of Clanricarde, succeeded to the title o f the 
third Earl of Clanricarde in April 1874, following the death of his father. Clanricarde was a
1,6 See L. Perry Curtis Jnr, ‘The Last Gasp of Southern Unionism; Lord Ashtown of Woodlawn’ in Eire-Ireland 
(Vol 40), Winter/Fall 2005, pp 140-188.
37 Perry Curtis Jnr, ‘The Last Gasp of Southern Unionism’, p 141.
38 Perry Curtis Jnr, ‘The Last Gasp of Southern Unionism’, p 150.
39 Perry Curtis Jnr, ‘The Last Gasp of Southern Unionism’, p 143.
40 This will be fully discussed in Chapter Four.
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figure of intense hatred in county Galway, where his vast estate of 49,741 acres was divided 
across 128 separate plots, stretching from the Shannon to the sea. Clanricarde had never set 
foot in the county but his name remained infamous since the Plan of Campaign and the 
notorious Woodford evictions. The Connacht Tribune published ‘sensational shots5 o f the 
‘man behind the mask5 under the banner ‘Two Snapshots of the Loneliest Landlord Peer of 
the Realm5 in April 1914 proclaiming:
The studies are as remarkable as they are pathetic, although throughout Ireland, little 
sympathy will be fe lt... Still standing aloof, defiant, possessing not even the relenting powers 
o f the pharaohs o f old... He has driven a coach and horses through all laws, human and 
Divine.41
Clanricarde’s notoriety was due to his dogged refusal to sell any portion o f his vast estate to 
the CDB for division. Between 1886 and 1914, one hundred and eighty-six tenants on the 
estate were evicted for non-payment of rent. One hundred and twenty were reinstated in their 
old holdings or given new holdings with sixty-six o f the evicted tenants never re-instated.42 In 
December 1914, the House of Commons unanimously dismissed without costs, his final 
appeal against an order by the CDB for the purchase o f his estate under the compulsory 
purchase clause o f the Land Act. Clanricarde had sought to have it declared that the 
proceedings o f the CDB to purchase his estates in Galway were invalid and, as such, did not 
entitle them to acquire the land under their statutory powers. Their decision concluded a bitter 
struggle which had begun with the original Plan o f Campaign in October 1887.
The primary object of the compulsory purchase clause in the 1909 legislation had been the 
acquisition of the Clanricarde estate, after prolonged pressure from the Irish Parliamentary 
Party for additional legislation. The Portumna branch o f the Clanricarde tenants had first 
written to the CDB in February 1910, accompanied by a memorial signed by four hundred 
and forty-eight tenants, requesting that the compulsory powers of the Act be put into effect. In 
December, the board authorised its members to take all necessary steps to initiate proceedings 
for the compulsory purchase of the estate and in 1912, they sent a final offer o f £269,115. 
They received no co-operation from the marquis but Clanricarde was finally defeated and the
41 Connacht Tribune, 25 April 1914.
42 Connacht Tribune, 2 May 1915.
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court o f appeal eventually fixed the price at £228,000.43
Following the victory, the Connacht Tribune noted Clanricarde’s legal team ’s claims of 
‘cruel, unmerciful and unjust attacks on this man,’ pointing out that Clanricarde s 
intransigence had led to a scenario in parts o f east Galway where ‘the state of unrest and 
disaffection constantly hovered on civil war and rebellion. The unfortunate mystic, hated by 
his own class in Ireland’ was:
A standing menace to the peace with 56,000 acres including the town o f  Loughrea and other 
villages that he has never visited. Between 1879-83, 239 fam ilies were evicted, and his agent 
Joyce even w ent to court to clear his name o f  the stigma. At a time when nearly all the 
landlords o f  Galw ay were endeavouring to do their duty to the people, Clanricarde was issuing 
processes and ejectments and preparing the way hard and fast for another cam paign.44
Clanricarde, through his agent Edward Shawe-Tener had spent the year in advance of the 
outcome of his appeal to the House of Lords, pursuing back rents and going to the courts for 
notices o f eviction. Some tenants on the estate had been withholding rent for some time, in 
anticipation of a successful outcome for the CDB in the courts. At Derrybrien, near Woodford 
in south Galway, a combination withheld the rent and tenants were under notice of eviction, 
yet by February, the agitation had collapsed with the majority deciding to settle,45
Whilst the agitation against Clanricarde did not involve as much violence as the communal 
campaigns further west in the county, there was widespread low-level intimidation. In early 
1915, a process server was visited by masked men and ordered not to deliver anymore writs 
or processes on the Clanricarde tenants. The police noted ‘thirteen writs which were in his 
hands have since been served by a sheriffs bailiff. He is now under constant police
43 The price offered by the CDB of £228,000 was increased to £233,517 for the tenanted land and £4,694 for
untenanted land, meaning a total increase of £238,211 and the estate passed into the hands of the CDB. Cl 
monthly report, east Galway, July 1915 CO 904/97.
44 Connacht Tribune, 2 May 1915.
45 The County Inspector of the RIC noted in April 1914 that there were four evictions, but ‘there was no
excitement and everything passed off quietly, the tenants took repossession o f their houses that night. It is 
expected that a settlement will be made in this case and as a settlement had been made against twenty out 
of thirty six tenants for two years rents on the Looscaun estate’. Cl monthly report, east Galway, April 
1914, CO 904/93.
protection.546 Clanricarde’s land agent, Shawe-Tener had also been under constant police 
protection until his death in October 1915.47
The decision of the House of Lords in late 1914 was greeted with jubilation in east Galway. 
The tenants had been organised on the basis o f the local UIL cumainn, as well as the much 
larger ‘Loughrea Clanricarde Tenants Committee5 and the ‘Portumna Clanricarde Tenants 
Committee5. Following the announcement, a large meeting o f tenants was held in the 
Portumna Hibernian Hall. Father Corcoran thanked the leadership o f the Irish Parliamentary 
Party, whom he noted had so successfully lobbied for the Land Acts in the first place. The 
question of having an estate committee formed embracing Portumna, Killimore, Eyrecourt 
and Laurencetown was adjourned for the next meeting.
January 1915 saw a new phase of organisation in east Galway with the former tenants of 
Clanricarde organising themselves prior to the CDB beginning the process o f division. 
Outstanding issues included the status o f town tenants in relation to the distribution, the 
position o f evicted tenants and their eligibility for inclusion in the division, and conversely, 
the status o f ‘the Clanricarde planters5 who had taken evicted farms on the estate over the 
previous thirty years. Many tenants were still deep in debt from the original Plan of Campaign 
and it was these old debts that Clanricarde was pursuing through the courts. An impending 
division generated a new phase of organisation within communities and the potential for 
further conflict between tenants over entitlements began to loom. The purchase of an estate by 
the CDB was a cause of celebration but it also generated uncertainty and even paranoia, 
which, as will be discussed later in the chapter, could erupt into violence and recriminations.
A crucial and under-appreciated aspect of the land issue in Galway was the extent to which 
towns were affected by the sale of estates, as the ground rents in many towns were still owned 
by the gentry. Ballinasloe was owned by Lord Clancarty, Headford by the McDonnells, 
Loughrea by Clanricarde, and Ahascragh and Cappataggle by Clonbrock. Whilst the town 
tenants had achieved a strong degree of security thanks to the 1907 Town Tenants Act, 
municipal property such as town halls and fair greens became contentious once the estates to 
which they belonged were sold to the state. In May a meeting o f the Loughrea Town Tenants
46 Cl monthly report, east Galway, January 1915, CO 904/96.
47 Cl monthly report, east Galway, November 1915, CO 904/98.
was held to secure grazing lands for the tenants of the town. However, it was announced the 
following week that town tenants would be excluded from the sale. The proliferation of Town 
Tenants Associations in the county at the time attests to the capacity o f urban areas to 
organise in order to lobby for grazing rights with the expectation of the sale of large estates.
The issue of outstanding rents was complicated and problematic. In September, the police 
noted that:
A certain amount o f tension exists at present am ongst the tenants on the Portumna portion o f 
the C lanricarde estate. They have in the last few days been called upon by the CDB to pay one 
year’s rent, due last May. They consider this a hardship as they expected they would not have 
to pay any rent until the purchase annuities.48
Progress was evident on the issue of ‘planters’ whom the Board clearly did not wish to 
include in the division. ‘Most of the planters on the estate have just received a printed notice 
from the CDB asking if they would now accept compensation for surrendering their holdings, 
which the majority o f them promised the Estate Commissioners they would accept in 1908. 
Only a few planters have so far replied, expressing their willingness to accept compensation 
but the others have not yet fully considered the matter.’49 It was noted that ‘the planters will 
accept the compensation offered by the Board, but o f course they will try and get the best 
possible terms before giving up their holdings. Some of the planters are anxious to leave and 
no difficulty is expected.’50 The extent to which ‘the planters’ o f 1886 still remained outside 
of the pale o f local society and their own compliance in excluding themselves from the final 
division o f the estate reveals the depth of local historical memory over the estate.
The prominent role of the local clergy, political representatives and the UIL which co­
ordinated the campaign for the division o f the Clanricarde estate prevented the violence and 
intimidation associated with the Moorpark agitation in Athenry. The striking difference 
between how both campaigns were organised reflects the contrasting tactics employed by the 
UIL and the communal collectivities. However, in the face o f a determined landlord, buffered 
by numerous graziers on dispersed farms, a unified campaign was difficult to organise and
48 Cl monthly report, east Galway, September 1915, CO 904/98.
49 Cl monthly report, east Galway, October 1915, CO 904/98.
50 Cl monthly report, east Galway, October 1915, CO 904/98.
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maintain. The difficulty that even the most well organised or most violent campaigns faced 
when landlords refused to give in to them was in stark contrast to the scenario which later 
existed from 1919 onwards when landowners involved in similar disputes were in a far more 
dangerous situation owing to the collapse of the RIC.51
Clonbrock
Luke Gerald Dillon, 4th Baron Clonbrock (1834-1917) had inherited a sprawling estate 
scattered across north-east Galway. Due to falling income, he had no alternative but to sell up 
in 1909 and he sold the majority of his tenanted lands for which he received £250,000.52 The 
agitation on the Clonbrock estate demonstrates the sophistication o f associational agitations 
and their unwillingness to settle until their full demands had been met. As in the agitation 
against Shawe-Taylor, the local community in the Ahascragh-Caltra district refused to accept 
the initial offers made by the landlord and were determined not to settle until Clonbrock had 
been stripped of all his land and the graziers who rented from him forced into giving up their 
leases. They continually refused to accept any offers short o f their full demands and were 
quite willing to maintain their campaigns for a number o f years rather than opt for a quick 
settlement. The complexities involved in these campaigns demanded huge organisational 
work as portions of the estate were spread across many different parts o f the county, with 
numerous graziers leasing farms.
The sale o f most o f the Clonbrock estate did not lead to a reduction o f unrest in the district. A 
key feature o f collectivities was their capacity to evolve their demands by ‘raising the stakes’ 
if their preliminary agenda was not met in full. In the case o f the Clonbrock estate, the bulk of 
which was sold to the CDB by 1914, the local tenants under the leadership of the UIL carried 
out a campaign to force the remaining graziers on the estate to give up their farms, whilst 
refusing to agree to negotiations with the CDB until the remaining portions of the estate were 
included in the sale. The militancy of the tenants in pushing for all o f the Clonbrock estate 
resembled that o f the communal agitation at Moorpark where the boycott remained in place 
after Shawe-Taylor agreed to sell all but fifty acres o f his farm.
51 This is fully discussed in Chapter Four.
52 Terence Dooley, ’Clonbrock; History of a Big House’, an online document available as a PDF on ‘The Big
House Experience’, at www.askaboutireland.ie/bighouse/introduction/introduction.html
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In February 1914, an Estate Commissioners meeting for tenants of Clonbrock at Kilconnell 
was attended by delegates from Fohenagh, Ahascragh, Kilrickle, Mullagh, Killure, 
Quansboro, and Cappataggle.53 At the Quansboro estate in Mullagh, a large meeting was 
attended by ninety-nine tenants to discuss the terms of sale o f the Abbeygormican and 
Gurtymadden farms which consisted of five non-resident grass farms. The Mullagh UIL 
leaders advised tenants not to sign any agreement until they got all the grassland on the estate 
and the tenants unanimously agreed to a united policy,54 Later that month, the grazing farm at 
Abbeygormican had all its stock driven off and the police subsequently arrested twenty-five 
local men who were returned for trial.55 The arrest o f the Abbeygormican cattle drivers did not 
deter the agitation and the following month at Lonmore near New Inn, stock was driven off 
the grassland farm of Joseph Colohan at Ballyeighter.
In March, a second drive took place at Toormore following which five young men were 
arrested. Colohan was one of the biggest graziers in the east o f the county with large grazing 
farms at Ballyeighter, Killure, Toormore and Bellvue. Clonbrock had previously offered the 
Toormore farm to the tenants in 1907 but Colohan had prevented it.56 Later in the month, his 
stock was driven at Bellvue with ten local men bound to the peace.57 During the same month, 
the Killoran and Mullagh Estates Commissioners wrote to the owners of the Mullagh and 
Poppyhill farms asking if they were prepared to let these farms to the committee pending their 
sale to the UEC or CDB.58
The agitation on the Clonbrock estate soon spread to nearby farms. On 29 April, fifty men 
armed with sticks drove one hundred sheep off the grazing farm of Thomas Finn at Poppyhill, 
eight miles from Loughrea. As the arrested men were being led away to Galway Gaol, a party 
of 170 Irish Volunteers lined the platform at the railway station and jeered at the police.59 In 
June, in a significant local victory, Poppyhill farm was given over to the agitators on their
53 Connacht Tribune, 14 February 1914.
54 Connacht Tribune, 14 February 1914.
55 Cl monthly report, east Galway, February 1914, CO 904/92.
56 Connacht Tribune, 11 April 1914.
57 Cl monthly report, east Galway, April 1914, CO 904/93.
58 Connacht Tribune, 11 April 1914.
59 Cl monthly report, east Galway, April 1914, CO 904/93.
own terms by the owner but the agitation on the adjoining land continued.60 In August 1915, 
shots were fired into the home of a grazier who was holding a farm o f 185 acres at Poppyhill. 
He had previously surrendered fifty acres to the agitators in 1914 but the agitators were 
holding out for the entire farm. Throughout the agitation, the Loormore farm at New Inn and 
the Abbeygormican grazing farm at Gurtymadden remained under constant police protection. 
The local pressure was effective and January 1915 marked another significant victory for the 
agitators as Colohan had his police protection lifted after surrendering his farm to the CDB.6' 
In April, the Seagriff estate was also sold to the CDB and the trespassing sheep removed, 
‘signalling another major victory for the local people.’62
The Clonbrock agitation continued to spread to neighbouring districts and at a public meeting 
held in Laurencetown in July 1915, over six hundred tenants vowed to commence an 
agitation. The speakers urged that vigorous agitation on the Lawrence and Pollock estate 
should not to cease until the landlord and the grazier were driven from their midst. In 
November 1915, the Estates Commissioners divided nine-hundred acres of grazing land on 
the Clonbrock estate at Aughrim. The Toormore farm of 115 acres occupied by Joseph 
Colohan, which was driven several times during the previous four years, was also included in 
the division, with Colohan allotted a farm of 130 acres in lieu.63
The agitation surrounding the Clonbrock estate highlights the complexity of agitations on 
large estates and how the announcement of a sale to the CDB did not signal an end to 
agitation but rather the beginning of a new phase, if the terms of the sale did not meet the 
expectations o f the local people. Furthermore, the use o f intimidation, cattle drives and 
adverse publicity could be successfully allied to constitutional pressure to force grazers to 
give up their leases. The fluidity and adaptability of tenants’ campaigns continually forced the 
agenda for change upon a startling array of graziers across sprawling dispersed portions o f the 
estate. Some graziers were more determined than others but by applying pressure on the most 
vulnerable and varying their tactics where necessary, tenants could successfully intimidate 
numerous different graziers into giving up their leases.
60 Cl monthly report, east Galway, June 1914, CO 904/93.
61 Cl monthly report, east Galway, January 1915, CO 904/96.
62 Cl monthly report, east Galway, April 1915, CO 904/96.
63 Cl monthly report, east Galway, December 1915, CO 904/98.
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1.3 Competitive Communal Agitations
Local violent feuds between small tenants over land in Galway during 1914-15 were 
generally characterised by the willingness of semi-organised factions to resort to extreme 
violence including the widespread use o f firearms to settle disputes. These competitive 
agitations were reactive and can be further classified into:
1. Disputes within localities in advance o f a division o f land, where one party was perceived 
by another o f making an unfair claim. A dispute of this kind was ongoing on the Persse farm 
at Boyhill, Athenry.
2. Disputes between parties following a division of land made by the CDB, to the 
dissatisfaction o f certain parties who perceived that they had been treated unfairly in the 
distribution. Agitations o f this nature existed at Graige Abbey in Athenry, on the Skehard 
portion of the Pollock estate in Creggs and in the Riverville and Bookeen districts that 
previously comprised the Dunsandle estate in Killimordaly.
The Dunsandle Dispute
The Dunsandle estate had been the seat of the Daly family in County Galway, located 
equidistant between Loughrea, Athenry and Craughwell, in the area where secret societies 
were most active. The Dalys had been the dominant political faction in the county during the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. With the social and political transformation of 
Ireland in the latter half of the century, the family’s influence had waned.64 Along with 
Clanricarde, their name lived in infamy amongst the rural poor and local folklore attests to the 
disdain with which they were held. After the death o f Captain Daly, the Dunsandle estate was 
sold to the Estates Commissioners with large portions o f the district divided up amongst the 
local tenantry. Colonel Daly remained on at the family seat where he retained considerable 
demesne land which was given over to grazing.
Discontent over the manner in which the Dunsandle estate was divided by the UEC led to a 
bitter and lengthy feud in the area between semi-organised factions bonded by kinship and a 
shared conviction that they had been discriminated against by the local Estates Committee
64 John Cunningham, ‘A town tormented by the Sea' Galway 1790-1914 (Dublin, 2004), pp 212-25.
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who had favoured members of their own extended family in the division; giving them ‘more 
land than was good for them’. The Dunsandle dispute exposed the deep flaws in the workings 
o f the Estates Commissioners whose unsatisfactory handling of the division o f land in Galway 
frequently led to violence and feuding. Due to the machinations involved, rather than being 
directed at the state, discontent over land division was internalised within local districts. The 
nature o f the division process favoured by the UEC differed significantly from that o f the 
CDB. In divisions carried out by the UEC, local ‘upstanding and impartial’ farmers were 
selected by popular election to sit on local Estates Committees which decided on the 
allocation of plots locally. Problems frequently arose when the deliberations of the committee 
were perceived to have been unfair. In the Athenry region, the police continually alleged that 
secret societies worked hand in hand with both the local UIL and the Estate Committees and 
that they favoured local organised secret factions in their allocations.
Between 1913 and 1919, seven of the ten-man, Dunsandle Grazing Land Committee were 
wounded in separate gun attacks.65 Throughout the period, seven former members of the 
Killconieron and Killimordaly United Estates Committee, plus two of their supporters 
remained under constant police protection.66 The fact that so many people in such a small area 
were accompanied by police patrol twenty-four hours a day and that even these drastic 
measure failed to prevent attacks, attests to the determination of the agitators.
The best known incident of the agitation occurred in February 1914 when Brian Uniacke, of 
Riverville, was shot on his farm on the old Dunsandle estate, by his young neighbour Michael 
Malone. Uniacke had previously received a house and a thirty acre farm from the division by 
the Committee, of which he was treasurer. Malone's father, who had a tiny holding of ten 
acres, received only six additional acres from the Committee. At his trial in June, Malone was 
convicted of attempted murder and later sentenced to four years in jail.67 Initially the Jury
65 Anthony Varley, ‘A Region of Sturdy Smallholders? Western Nationalists and Agrarian Politics During The
First World War’ in Journa l o f  the G alway A rchaeological and  H istorical Soc ie ty , Vol 55, (2003), p. 127.
66 Peter Fahy, James Ward, Patrick Lally, Dermot Dempsey, Michael Kennedy, John Broderick, Bernard Ward
and Mary Finn, see, Cl monthly report, east Galway, July & August 1914, CO 904/94. There were two 
categories of police protection available at the time, protection by patrol and constant protection. Constant 
protection involved the individual being accompanied at all times by two or more policeman.
67 The evidence presented to convict Malone caused a sensation because of the nature in which the defendant
inadvertently incriminated himself. Malone’s conviction rested on graffiti that he had scrawled on his cell
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could not agree, forcing the Judge to move for a retrial in Dublin. This prompted the judge to 
remark that, ‘it is a disgrace to the jury system5, and his sincere hope ‘that there would be a 
jury of fair-minded and intelligent people in Dublin to try the case. 568 A similar sentiment was 
later uttered by Judge Boyd at the Summer Assizes in Galway in July 1915. Noting that there 
were thirty-four cases o f threatening letters, sixteen cases o f incendiary fires, and seventeen 
cases of crops being set alight, he concluded that ‘Galway juries have a fatal faculty for not 
acting according to the evidence.569
The police concurred with the view that the division at Dunsandle was unjust and noted that 
violence ‘is likely to continue until there is a proper division of the lands by the Estates 
Commissioners or the CDB. 570 The sheer volume of violent incidents in the district connected 
directly to the dispute clearly illustrates the depth of ill-feeling in the district and the passions 
provoked by hunger for land.
The readiness to resort to violence to resolve disputes was so widespread in this area, that it is 
often difficult to conclude with certainty to what dispute particular outrages were connected. 
In the Killimordaly and Kilconieron districts, the police were virtually powerless to prevent 
violence and intimidation and secret communal collectives exercised a control and authority 
which the law was simply unable to prevent. Whilst intimidation in the form of threatening 
letters, malicious damage to property and serious assault were tactics common to most 
communal agitations, the number of shootings and attempted murders during the Dunsandle 
dispute was remarkable. The propensity for these disputes to become significantly more 
violent than anti-grazier or anti-landlord agitations highlights the unsuitability of the United 
Estates Commission as a mechanism for distributing land. Small tenants were also much more 
vulnerable than large landowners who belonged to the elite o f local society. For the small 
farmers who travelled the local bye-ways on foot or by cart, the eyes o f their neighbours were 
never far away and local jealousies and resentments could explode at any time.
wall whilst in custody. The court heard that the prisoner had scratched a message during his incarceration 
which read, T will be out in five years time and then, will be in again before I’m 26, unless 1 get a sudden 
death, or God forbid, until some other one gets a sudden death first.’ The prosecution alleged that this was 
an admission of guilt, as well as an admission of Malone’s intention to get his revenge on Uniacke, whether 
he was found guilty or not.
68 Connacht Tribune, 20 June 1914.
69 Connacht Tribune, 17 July 1915.
70 Cl monthly report, Galway, June 1915, CO 904/93.
Pollock Dispute
A similar dispute on the Pollock estate on the Galway-Roscommon border near Creggs 
illustrates that not even the clergy were exempt from the ire of local congests when a division 
was deemed unsatisfactory. Friction had arisen in the area after the division of the local 
portion of the Pollock estate, with tenants divided into two factions, one under the Parish 
Priest, Canon Geraghty, and one under local farmer William Naughton. The latter group were 
disgruntled because they felt that the Canon had been improperly favoured in the distribution 
made by the local Estates Committee. As in the Dunsandle dispute, the division was clearly 
unfair, with the Canon getting an incredible three hundred acres, prompting even the 
Glenamaddy Board of Guardians to call for an inquiry into the sale.71 The local police 
concurred with this view also, noting ‘three large farmers who purchased their holdings on 
this property some years ago have been requested to surrender portions o f their lands for 
division among the local people. The priest pretended he wanted to keep the land to re-divide 
it but kept it for himself.572
Local outrage at the division led to repeated cattle-drives on the land belonging to Canon 
Geraghty at Skehard. On one occasion in May 1914, three hundred men and women, along 
with a fife and drum band, drove the Canon’s stock as far as Glenamaddy where the police 
baton charged the crowd, injuring several. As a consequence, constant police protection was 
necessary at the farm and twelve locals were prosecuted. Following the incident, a meeting of 
Skehard tenants at Kilbegnet chapel where the Canon explained that he had agreed to take the 
land in the division in order that it might then be divided up amongst the local poor. However, 
pending this division, he was entitled as the legal owner to set the farm to grazing.73 The 
situation remained tense in the area until the CDB took repossession of Canon Geraghty5s 
farm later in the year. The dispute at Creggs was not the only time the traditional authority of 
the clergy was challenged in such a fashion in a local dispute over land. Stock was driven off 
the land of the Franciscan monks at Newtown in Dunmore and shots were fired at the back 
door o f the Monastery in March 1915. A further attack took place later in the year after ‘one
71 Cl monthly report, Galway, east February 1914, CO 904/92.
72 Cl monthly report, east Galway, March 1914, CO 904/92.
73 Cl monthly report, east Galway, May 1914, CO 904/97.
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of the monks had called to the homes of local people unpopular with the local secret society 
asking for assistance with bringing in the harvest5.74
1.4 The County Galway Farmers’ Association
The local combinations of the rural poor influenced the formation of the County Galway 
Farmers’ Association (CGFA) in April 1914.75 The organisation represented the dominant 
rural class of large landowners and graziers in the county and was affiliated to the national 
Irish Farmers’ Union. Their official view was that survival in the present war circumstances 
depended on the formation of a powerful all-farmer organisation, capable of resisting a state 
intent on dictating what farmers should produce, how they should treat their employees and 
interfering with the rights of private property in a range of other unacceptable ways.76 In 
reality, the movement was established to protect the property rights o f strong farmers from the 
state and local congests and the association lobbied the government on behalf of graziers and 
landlords.
The association did not project an image of looking after the interests o f the farming elite
alone and were at pains to convey the notion that all farmers were being victimised by the
state and that the war-time disruption of agriculture, due to the increasing regulation o f the 
sector, needed to be addressed by all sections of the farming community. In reality, the 
leaders of the organisation were keenly aware that they needed the numerical strength o f the 
small holders, backed up by a countywide organization, to make a compelling case. If the 
leadership of the movement believed they could recruit the small tenants as the foot soldiers 
of their organization, however, they clearly underestimated the suspicion with which they 
were perceived by the rural poor.
The first president o f the movement was J.J, Smyth of Masonbrook, Loughrea. He was a 
member o f a prominent landlord family, who owned a number o f large grazing farms in the 
south of the county. Among the first vice-presidents were Frank Shawe-Taylor and Martin
74 Cl monthly report, east Galway, March 1914, CO 904/96.
75 The initial reason for the formation of the movement was the imposition of government restrictions on the
movement of cattle following an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in March 1914.
76 Anthony Varley, ‘The Politics of Agrarian Reform’, p. 169.
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Mor McDonagh. Frank Shawe-Taylor’s ‘appeal to the farmers of Galway’ in October 1915 
was a typical example o f how divorced from the reality on the ground the organisation really 
was. Shawe-Taylor, who was the subject of a long-running boycott in his own locality, wrote 
to the Connacht Tribune to appeal to farmers of Athenry to give up one sheep each to the Red 
Cross public auction for wounded soldiers. In his appeal he stated that ‘he was sure that the 
response will be both generous and liberal and he had no doubt but that a special train will be 
required to convey them [the donated livestock] to Dublin.’77 The prospect of the farmers of 
Athenry responding to the appeals of a local boycotted landlord to give away stock to help the 
British war effort was farcical.
The growth of the movement was slow and their initial activities few. After four years, 
membership still stood at only two hundred and fifty-four.78 However, the organisation 
continued to demand to be acknowledged by the state as a recognised representative group 
and be accorded consultative status by the government. Central to this policy was the belief 
that, by virtue o f representing the most prominent farmers in the county, the organisation was 
lobbying responsibly in the best interests o f the farming community as a whole, including the 
small tenants.
The achievements o f the association were few despite the movement claiming it had wrung 
concessions from the government on a range of issues including store cattle prices. They 
never actually succeeded in achieving anything close to consultative status and the roots of 
the movement in the farming elite hampered the organisation from the start. Despite their 
claims to represent the rural community as a whole, local congests and the landless were 
never recruited into the movement and the conflicting agenda of the poor and stronger farmers 
ensured that the notion of cross-class solidarity projected by the movement remained a 
transparent fiction, designed to buttress the inherent inequality in land ownership. The 
question of tillage, security of land tenure and a whole range o f other issues were far too 
contentious. The organisation simply could not counter claims that it was a grazier movement 
and the group never took up the case of the halting o f estate purchase by the state, which 
remained the central grievance of the small tenants. James Finn, the grazier at the centre o f a 
major dispute at Lisduff, which resulted in the arrest o f twelve local men following a cattle
77 Varley, ‘The Politics of Agrarian Reform’, p. 170.
78 Varley, ‘The Politics of Agrarian Reform’, p. 174.
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drive, was actually a former treasurer of the movement and the case was a cause celebre in 
the county for a number of months.79
Another spur to the growth of the movement was the declining local power o f the UIL which, 
although clearly acting on behalf of congests on most occasions, also served as a restraining 
force on the more violent and conspiratorial elements of the rural poor. With the UIL in place, 
the large farmers at least had an ‘honest broker’ to mediate with, protecting them from the 
worst excesses of the peasantry. However, with the UIL almost moribund, a dangerous 
political vacuum existed. The rise of Sinn Fein and the Volunteers in the intervening period 
simply made the formation of the organisation inevitable as the profoundly small tenant 
nature o f that movement became increasingly obvious. If the CGFA could influence the 
Congested Districts Board, who were already perceived as being class biased, then the 
organisation would have achieved something.
Conclusion: A War o f  Poverty Against Property?
The agrarian disputes which dominated life in many parts o f east Galway conformed to the 
modes o f reaction to economic crisis and exploitation observed in other contemporary 
transitional peasant societies around the world, as they found themselves increasingly 
excluded, once land became a commoditised resource, rather than a fundamental right.80 
Furthermore, the forms of association, violence and moral justification used by local 
collectivities in the county form part of an historical continuum of agrarian violence, which 
predated the Great Famine in the west of Ireland. What is remarkable about the situation in 
east Galway is the sheer ferocity and persistence of such violent agitations, that to many 
commentators were a feature of the previous century, an historical residue of more primitive 
economic conditions. Galway was, nonetheless, the most disturbed county in Ireland due to 
agrarian unrest throughout the first two decades o f the twentieth century, with Clare and parts 
o f Roscommon experiencing similar, though less numerous, outbreaks o f agrarianism. Just as 
the growth of ranching and the resultant expense and difficulty involved in obtaining conacre 
in pre-Famine Connacht was responsible for violence in the 1830s, and the persistence of
79 Varley, 'The Politics of Agrarian Reform’, p. 190.
80 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Peasants and Politics’ in idem, Uncommon People, Resistance, Rebellion and Jazz (New
York, 1998), pp 146-66.
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uneconomic holdings and fundamental lack of security fuelled the Land War in the 1880s, so 
the persistence o f the grazing system under the eleven-month system, severely limited the 
amount of land available to the small tenants, and was responsible for agrarian violence in the 
twentieth century. The temptation to view these local collectives as irrational or anarchic is 
too simplistic and in the context of transitional peasant communities worldwide, the modes of 
resistance used in east Galway are clearly rational survival mechanisms frequently employed 
by rural communities which find themselves excluded from the capitalist market for land.81
Agrarian crime in the pre-Famine era in the west of Ireland was underpinned by the 
distribution of land and the economic structure o f local society where the grazing system had 
taken hold.82 A local magistrate summing up the crisis pertaining to land in Roscommon in 
1846 noted:
A very fearful system o f combination among the peasantry exists directed almost exclusively 
against the holders o f  the land, more particularly the large grazing farmers who abound in it 
and who the people complain on, generally regardless o f  their condition; In fact it is a war o f  
poverty against property.83
Conacre became increasingly contentious as the poor were forced to compete with one 
another for a scarce resource that was increasing in price as new petty landlords played an 
larger role in the market for land. As land became scarce, outrages aimed at inducing farmers 
to make land available increased. The dynamics o f the pre-Famine conacre violence in places 
like Roscommon bear remarkable similarities to the agrarian violence of the twentieth century 
in east Galway, with the issues only slightly reconfigured. In 1914, an already alarming 
economic environment of exclusion was further exacerbated by the rising prices during the 
War which inevitably increased unrest and further accentuated social divisions.
It is clear that as a class, the rural poor had a low sense of 'classness’ compared to the 'high 
classness’ o f the urban poor of the large cities. The rural poor were intensely aware o f their 
distinction from, and their subaltemity to, the urban poor, whom they generally treated with 
distrust. This was most obvious in interaction with townsfolk, shopkeepers, the gentry, and of
81 Hobsbawm, ‘Peasants and Politics’, p. 157.
82 Anne Coleman, Riotous Roscommon, Social Unrest in the 1840s (Dublin, 1999), p. 18.
83 Coleman, Riotous Roscommon, p. 27.
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course, graziers themselves, all of whom were perceived of belonging to a conspiracy to 
oppress the small tenants and who stood above them in any social hierarchy.84 Whilst 
examining the political relations of transitional peasant communities world-wide to groups 
and institutions outside of their local community, Hobsbawm has noted the much higher 
degree o f collectivity, which tends to inhibit permanent social differentiation within the 
peasantry, which in turn facilitates or even imposes communal action on the group or sub­
group.85 This was clearly the case with the local collectivities in east Galway, who, despite the 
best efforts of the police and elements of civil society, always maintained a collective silence 
over acts o f violence committed as part of their campaigns, and it was extremely rare that any 
transgressors against this code of silence ever came forward to the police. Criminal 
convictions were notoriously hard to secure and this aspect o f agrarian violence remained 
unchanged since the 1830s, even in the face of the most heinous and indefensible crimes 
involving the elderly or the vulnerable.
The ‘little world’ o f the townland with its overlapping kinship bonds conforms to the model 
of peasant organisation world wide, as the rural poor belong primarily to the local, rather than 
the national. In Galway, the scattered communal collectivities, despite Campbell’s claims for 
an overarching co-ordinating structure, always acted autonomously, rather than as a 
component of a larger movement or ideal.86 The capacity or willingness o f these isolated 
groups to even accept or submit to outside leadership is questionable and this later became 
most apparent during the years 1919-21, when the rural poor rejected participation in the 
national struggle, in order to continue their campaigns against local landowners.87 The 
localised nature of the unit of identity and organisation was ultimately both a strength and a 
weakness. As already noted, the closed nature of these communities facilitated their 
frequently violent campaigns, frustrating both the police and outsiders, who may have wished 
to penetrate the local organisation. On the other hand, the failure of the rural poor to form 
broader based organisations to represent them ultimately precipitated their failure to achieve 
reform in land redistribution. With the decline of the UIL, whose semi-constitutional 
campaigns, harnessed the sheer force of the local community for cattle drives, land 
occupations and the knocking of stone walls, the small tenants lost a crucial arbitrator
84 Hobsbawm, ‘Peasants and Politics’, p. 149.
85 Hobsbawm, ‘Peasants and Politics’, p. 149.
86 Campbell, Land & Revolution, p. 174-7.
87 This is discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
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between them, the state and local graziers. Whilst the associational campaigns drew the line at 
violence against the person, the communal collectivities, were not bound by such concerns 
and tended to be far more violent, with arson, assault and even murder employed. The small 
scale of these groups and their isolation from each other meant that they could at least be 
contained, if  not defeated by police, and hence these struggles tended to be ongoing over a 
number o f years, with low intensity violence and local boycotting occasionally punctuated 
with violence. It was only with the collapse o f the RIC in 1919, that many o f these long 
running campaigns became very effective.88
Very large landowners, such as Ashtown and Clonbrock were shielded from the ongoing land 
agitations on their estates, as their land was parcelled out to numerous graziers in different 
parts o f the county. Hence, there were no estate-wide campaigns against the very large 
landlords; instead, smaller, isolated campaigns against local graziers on specific portions o f 
estates existed in different parts o f the county. The sheer size o f these estates and the nature of 
tenant organisation militated against any larger campaigns, which would have represented a 
much more serious threat to the landlord. The aim of these agitations was to make a particular 
portion of an estate impossible to lease, and if no grazier was willing to take on a farm, in the 
face of a determined local community, the landlord was eventually left with little option but 
to apply to the CDB for sale and subsequent division.
There was little that was random about the violence o f agrarian collectivités and a progressive 
escalation of hostilities would have been clear to all parties as disputes wore on. Agitations 
began with a delegation from the local community visiting the landowner to 'ask him to 
consider’ offering his land for sale to the Congested Districts Board, so that it could be 
divided up amongst local congests.89 Delegations always consisted o f representatives o f the 
immediate community around the disputed farm, rather than a parish-wide representation. 
This intense 'sm allness’ of the community was a key feature o f the campaigns, as larger units 
of association were problematic; there would simply be too large a number o f competing 
claims for inclusion in the division. Hence, only tenants whose plots adjoined the estate were 
considered as legitimate claimants. If the landowner consented to having his land divided up,
88 This is discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
89 Priests were often part of tenant delegations, although their influence was usually minimal if violence became
a feature of the campaign.
he was generally feted for his generosity as a friend of the community.
If landowners refused to give up their land, a choreographed escalation of events, which 
sometimes lasted for ten years or more ensued. The first step in any campaign involved the 
invoking of an immediate boycott of the landowner, including his workmen, his family and 
anyone who dared interact with them. The wider community generally observed these 
boycotts, forcing the landowner to import Property Defence Association workmen and farm 
supplies from outside the county. Cattle/sheep drives then formed communal events that 
frequently resembled festive occasions with 'rough music’ or a local fife and drum band 
accompanying the drivers, who frequently dressed in costume. Repeated cattle drives 
generally provoked a permanent police presence on boycotted farms which made open 
confrontation more difficult. At this point, the knocking of stone walls, the spiking of 
meadows, the gouging o f animals and the arson of outhouses or farm equipment was carried 
out under the cover o f darkness.
Whilst associational collectivities usually refrained from more serious violence, communal 
collectivities generally escalated their campaigns at this point, with threatening letters, the 
digging of graves outside homes and assault and even murder. Gun attacks were far more 
frequent in competitive agitations between small tenants and the standard practice in the 
county was to fire into houses at night with a shotgun. This practice was widespread in the 
county and even endemic in certain districts.90 The doggedness o f landowners was severely 
tested by the ferocity o f the sustained campaigns directed against them and many disputes 
were resolved when landlords agreed to give up substantial portions o f their estates, whilst 
maintaining a portion for themselves. Landowners such as Shawe-Taylor, who held out 
indefinitely, were faced with an infinitely more dangerous situation by 1919 and the 
consequent rush by graziers to give over their farms in early 1920 reflected the increased 
threat they now faced with the collapse of the RIC.
The normality o f 'criminal deviance’ in Ireland, relative to the rest o f the United Kingdom has 
been well established. Mark Finnane has recently argued 'that in spite of the frequent political 
and social turmoil o f Ireland in the nineteenth century, there is much evidence of Ireland’s
90 The feud between semi-organised political factions in Turloughmore is discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
"normality” as a society in the post-Famine period.’91 The violent crimes against the person in 
Galway were limited to spasmodic bouts of unrest in specific local districts. Whilst the feud at 
Dunsandle clearly revolved around land division and two other very violent feuds existed at 
Turloughmore and Craughwell between organised semi-political factions, violent feuds also 
existed at Clonboo and Cummer in north Galway.92 There were two murders and one 
attempted murder case tried in the county between 1914-15. The first violent death occurred 
as a result o f the mental illness of a deranged man and was not agrarian in origin,93 and an 
attempted murder occurred as part of the Dunsandle dispute, previously discussed. The 
second murder is significant in terms of the saliency of land hunger, the power and 
intimidation practised by communal collectivities and the ruthlessness o f their methods. In 
March 1915, the house of John Kelly, an eighty year old farmer, from Ballinderreen, was 
attacked with gunfire. Nine shots were fired into the cottage and the old man was shot and 
subsequently died from his wounds. The estate on which Kelly lived was in the process of 
being divided up by the CDB and he had surrendered twenty-three acres and in return 
obtained six acres from the division. The police noted, 'It was probably thought that he still 
held the twenty-six acres or someone coveted the six he received in exchange.’94 Three young 
men were remanded to Galway jail for trial; however, the police noted 'there is a difficulty in 
getting evidence, as even the relatives of the deceased may be described as hostile.’95
A week after the murder, Dr O’Dea, Bishop of Galway, addressed a public letter to Father 
Walsh of Ballinderreen to be read out at all masses in the parish. Anticipating a lack o f local 
co-operation with the police, the Bishop condemned the perpetrators as:
Outlaws worse than the blacks o f darkest Africa. If any o f  your people who know  the 
perpetrators o f  this shocking crime, they should at once hand in their names to the police and 
give evidence against them in court. I repeat that I hold your parish responsible until they 
show that they are Christians by protesting publicly the horror that they feel at such an outrage
91 Mark Finnane, ‘Irish Crime without the Outrage: the Statistics of Criminal Justice in the Later Nineteenth
Century’ in N.M. Dawson (ed.) Reflections on Law and History, Irish Legal History Society Discourses 
and Other Papers, 2000-2005 (Dublin, 2006), pp 201- 22.
92 These are examined in detail in the Chapter Three.
93 In Athenry, John Murphy of Bellville stabbed his wife to death before fatally turning the weapon on himself.
The police concluded that the tragedy was caused by temporary insanity.
94 Cl monthly report, west Galway, February 1915, CO 904/96.
. 95 Cl monthly report, west Galway, February 1915, CO 904/96.
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perpetrated in their m id s t.96
Despite the Bishop’s threats, there was no subsequent meeting of protestation at events in the 
area and the accused were released the following month due to lack o f evidence. Another 
case, only a month after the murder of John Kelly, bore similar characteristics of communal 
violence including widespread intimidation and the violation of taboos on the use of violence 
based on bonds of kinship, gender and age. In Loughgeorge in the parish of Claregalway, the 
house of Mrs Fox, a widow with a large family of young children, was fired into and her 
thirteen-year-old son wounded. Mrs Fox had been in financial difficulties following the death 
of her husband and was in danger of having to sell her small plot o f land. To relieve the 
situation, it had been arranged to marry the eldest of the Fox daughters to a neighbouring 
farmer, who agreed to provide financially for Mrs Fox and her young children, with her small 
farm constituting the dowry. The marriage was originally to take place the week after the 
shooting. According to the police the arrangement ‘did not suit the views of certain 
neighbours who expected, through her difficulties, to eventually secure the lands for 
themselves.’97 Threatening letters to Mrs Fox had earlier been signed by ‘Captain Moonlight’. 
A local tenant farmer with thirty acres was arrested and charged with the shooting. He was a 
cousin and close friend of Mrs Fox’s late husband. During the trial a neighbour who had 
initially claimed to have seen the accused fleeing the scene, gave evasive answers to evidence 
and retracted his earlier statements. The case now rested on the circumstantial evidence 
including Mrs Fox’s young son’s testimony that he had recognised his cousin on the night he 
was shot. Forde had hoped to come into the farm after the death o f his cousin and was 
apparently angry at the arrangement made by Mrs Fox. However, with the withdrawal o f the 
key witness, the accused had to be released because o f lack o f evidence.
Both of these cases highlight the difficulties that the courts had in gaining convictions even 
for the most heinous of crimes committed against the most vulnerable, due to the 
unwillingness o f local people to testify in court or offer help to the police. It was clearly not 
unique for bonds o f kinship to be over-ridden by desire for land and in one case police 
recorded in early 1915 that Thomas Hartigan, a publican from Ballinasloe received through 
the post a bullet accompanied by a threatening notice and a picture o f two coffins. Hartigan
96 Connacht Tribune, 13 March 1915.
9/ Cl monthly report, west Galway, March 1915, CO 904/96.
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was due to receive a farm from his deceased father’s will and the letter was signed by his 
brother.98
The critical functions performed by priests and townsmen in national movements in Ireland 
during the nineteenth century has frequently been observed by historians. Whilst the role of 
the local clergy was central to popular mobilisation during the O ’Connell era, the influential 
role of the ‘shopkeeper/publican/politician’ has frequently been noted as the post-Famine, 
Land War equivalent. The key positions in the broader associational campaigns in the east of 
the county were often occupied by prominent local UIL members as well as local priests, and 
they generally demonstrated the support of the broader community with large, well-attended 
public meetings whose official resolutions and deputations to the relevant state bodies 
received extensive local press coverage. In contrast, the key positions in the various 
communal campaigns, principally in the hinterland around Athenry, were believed by the 
police to be held by local fenians, and much o f the sporadic violence that characterised their 
campaigns went unreported in the local press. The complete absence of public demonstrations 
o f support by the community at large or by traditional local elites in communal campaigns, is 
indicative o f the divisive nature of agrarian agitation in the complex and highly fractured 
social structure inherent in the grazier belt of east Galway. The lack o f deference to social 
elites was a key characteristic and compounded the insecurity that land agitation generated 
amongst the traditionally stronger elements of rural society who had every reason to resent the 
stridence of their perceived social inferiors. Whilst collectivities are clearly not themselves 
social groups, nonetheless their composition is determined by the social groups from which 
they are drawn and these social groups were a product o f the integrative bonds and social 
cleavages in the overall social structure.
Whilst there was an obvious spatial dynamic to the concentrations o f both associational and 
communal collectivities, these divisions were far from absolute. The most striking rejection of 
traditional social authority occurred well outside of the Athenry hinterland, where secret 
societies were most active. On the Roscommon border near Creggs, when the local Canon 
was perceived to be taking advantage of congests to secure a grazing farm for himself, the 
tenants were quick to assert their grievance in the traditional manner. Similarly, in Cummer, 
in the north of the county, the traditional deference to the clergy counted for little when the
98 Cl monthly report, east Galway, February 1915, CO 904/96.
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local Franciscan monastery tried to hire boycotted men to help save the hay. Hence, in this 
district the traditional law of the land took precedent over institutional or even traditional 
deference to the clergy.
It would be an exaggeration to conceive of communal collective action, admittedly primitive 
at times, as being simply the inherent greed of a backward peasantry. As Clark pointed out in 
his study of agrarian unrest:
Since the most powerful active collectivities in modern society are associational, we have a 
tendency to, assum e that people in collectivities are ‘better’ organised than people in 
com m unally based collectivités.... What does appear true is that communal organisation is 
invariably stronger when it remains local than when it extends over wide areas. But it is 
simply ethnocentric for us to dismiss com m unally based unrest as unorganised turm oil."
The extent to which communal collectivities required associational assistance, be it from the 
UIL or the Catholic Church, is difficult to answer with any conviction. The character of 
collective action varied significantly according to whether or not the tenants had formed 
alliances with established elites in the church or national politics. The tenants on the 
Portumna portions o f the Clanricarde estate, for instance, were represented in negotiations 
with the Congested District Board by the local clergy. When the Marquis’s appeal was finally 
rejected in 1914 and the estate set to be divided, a resolution of thanks to the parish priest, 
Father Corcoran, was unanimously passed at a meeting of the local tenants.
The factors that compel collectivities to reject integration with local and national institutions 
are unclear. The social structure in both the communal groups in the centre of the county and 
the associational groups to the east were composed from similar if not identical social groups. 
The reason collectivities chose to form alliances with the physical force/Whiteboy tradition, 
as opposed to the nationalist/constitutional tradition, are not readily apparent. The presence 
and numerical strength of the Fenians and secret societies around Athenry is clearly an 
important factor.100 However, the absence of any obvious committed underground network in 
the county, east o f Loughrea, overlaps with the districts where major associational 
collectivities were active on the anti-grazier issue and where constitutional tactics generally
99 Clark, Social Origins o f  the Irish Land War, pp 350-77.
100 This will be fully discussed in the next Chapter.
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prevailed.
Clark distinguished two approaches to assessing the impact o f social change on rural 
communities, the ‘mobilisation’ and the ‘break-down’ models.101 He treated the action of 
collectivities as the assertion of power and solidarity by upwardly mobile communities, 
mobilising in search of economic advancement. Alternatively, in the ‘break-down’ model, 
unrest can be attributed to the collapse of some mutually tolerated relationship where tenant 
farmers in the post-Famine economy, mobilise in self-defence when their continued advance 
is perceived to be under threat by the withdrawal o f privileges. The diversity o f collectivities 
in Galway and their disparate nature, in terms o f organisation, evolution and adaptation, aims 
and composition, is such that no one model of structural dislocation can account for the 
diversity of processes at play and this study shows that distinct forms of unrest were fostered 
by equally different processes.
101 Clark, Social'Origins o f the Irish Land War, p. 353.
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Chapter Two: Popular Mobilisation & Political 
Organisation, 1914-16
1914 witnessed the pivotal developments that were to transform nationalist Ireland and lead to 
the emergence of the physical force tradition and the consequent collapse of the Irish 
Parliamentary Party. The outbreak of the First World War in the Summer of 1914, coupled 
with the militant resistance of northern unionism to the Home Rule Bill, created the 
conditions in which radical ideas, previously discredited by the overwhelming majority of 
nationalists, gained credibility and support previously unthinkable. One of the many 
repercussions o f the First World War was the demise o f the Irish Parliamentary Party. With 
the enactment o f Home Rule in 1914, the party’s raison d'être no longer existed and the War 
years saw a steady decline in the party’s credibility. As the War dragged on and Home Rule 
began to look more uncertain, many people began to believe that they had been misled by 
Redmond and the Party.
Nonetheless, the revolution in Ireland was neither inevitable, nor, in retrospect, could it have 
been predicted. The political climate of nationalist Ireland in the opening decade o f the 
century was primarily characterised by the absence of internal political debate due to 
widespread consensus on the national question and the overwhelming approval o f the tactics 
and leadership o f the Irish Parliamentary Party. As Charles Townshend has stated:
A t the com m encem ent o f the third Ulster crisis in 1912, Irish public opinion was rem arkably 
inert and unconcerned. In retrospect, advanced nationalists rem em bered this time as one o f 
‘de-nationalisation’. Irish farmers were interested (as they had always been, it may be 
suggested) above all in the transfer o f land and increasing agricultural prosperity. At this level, 
the ‘knife and fork’ philosophy o f constructive unionism seemed to  have w orked.1
In this atmosphere o f consensus, the words Sinn Fein ‘tended to generate ridicule rather than 
admiration or fear amongst ordinary nationalists.’2 Republican opposition to constitutionalism
1 Charles Townshend, Political Violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance Since 1848 (Oxford,
1983), p. 237.
2 David Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, 1912-1939, (Oxford, 1998), p. 16.
was ineffectual and diffuse. This chapter examines the political culture of east Galway before 
1916 and the extent to which the potential for revolutionary upheaval existed in any obvious 
sense prior to the Rebellion and how these factors may have influenced the later evolution of 
the revolutionary movement. Revolutions are not monocausal and the emergence of militant 
nationalism after 1916 emerged from the fissures o f a society defined by visceral social and 
economic cleavages. Rather than consensus, in east Galway, the bitter rivalry between 
nationalists and republicans dominated politics in a political culture of radical extremes. The 
violent nature of local rivalries was a frequent source of concern for the authorities with large 
scale faction fights and gun attacks between supporters of the National Volunteers and the 
Irish Volunteers in the villages of Turloughmore, Craughwell and Loughrea, as well as what 
was described as ‘guerrilla warfare on a small scale’3 breaking out in Galway town. The 
militancy of the small tenant farmers discussed in Chapter One was not matched by the 
political organisations representing the urban poor o f the towns. The ineffectual and diffuse 
branches o f the Town Tenants’ League, which were consciously modeled on the Land League 
of the previous century, tended to be dominated by a conservative urban elite whose concern 
for the rights of property frequently overrode their concern for the welfare o f the urban poor. 
The movement was dominated on a local level by the merchant elite o f the towns who 
frequently lobbied against other progressive organisations such as the co-operative movement 
and they were derided by the local press as being corrupt and purposely self-defeating.
Whilst the Irish Volunteers flourished in the rural parts of Athenry, Clarinbridge and Kinvara, 
the towns in the east of the county remained resolutely pro-British as the European conflict 
progressed. The antipathy towards Sinn Fein, particularly amongst the urban proletariat, 
remained profound throughout the period and local Fenians on occasion had their homes 
attacked in both Loughrea and Galway town. Martin O ’Regan joined the Irish Volunteers in 
Loughrea despite the fact that ‘Loughrea was one hundred per cent anti-national at this tim e’.4 
Thomas Courtney, who fought in the IRA, later told the Bureau of Military History, ‘thinking 
back over the years, I have come to the conclusion that Galway town was, and in my opinion, 
still is, the most Shoneen town in Ireland.’5 William Duffy MP, on the other hand, chastised 
local land agitators from outside the town as ‘our ungrateful country neighbours’ who would 
not join with the urban tenants to help them fight their own ‘Land War against baliffism and
3 Connacht Tribune, 17 October 1914.
4 BMH, WS 1,202 (Martin O’Regan).
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house-lordism5.0
To extrapolate the consensus between elites into a similar political docility at a local level 
represents a distortion of the intensity of political sentiment, an underestimation of the 
bitterness which political change engendered and a failure to recognise the polarity of political 
opinion within nationalist Ireland. The social fault lines of rural Ireland, though under- 
articulated, were obscured by the failure of the political elite to reflect the common culture of 
ordinary people, the unchallenged hegemony o f the Irish Parliamentary Party and the distaste 
for sectional politics which the desire for nationalist solidarity inculcated. Contrary to often 
made assertions about the consensual nature o f nationalist discourse therefore, there were in 
fact clear indicators o f widespread social and political disillusionment with the political 
establishment in a society characterised by violent political extremes. The Galway M Ps’ 
growing contempt for the common culture, their attitude to recruitment in particular, allied to 
social disaffection generated by a land hunger fostered deep social division, and an urban 
culture which clung to a vague conception o f nationalism, buttressed by an ambivalent 
allegiance to the British state, fostered an increasing cultural chasm between the urban world 
of the town and its rural hinterland. The simmering resentments between town and country 
were not new. They were, however, to be greatly exacerbated as a result o f World War One 
and the rise of militant nationalism.
To dismiss the years leading up to the Rebellion as simply being part o f a larger era 
characterised by political complacency and general consensus represents a simplistic analysis. 
The motivation for political participation and the visceral nature of popular mobilisation 
reveals the stark wounds of a society where social inequality nurtured deep resentments and it 
was inevitable that these would be reflected in the popular movements o f the time. The social 
disaffection that generated the widespread land agitations discussed in the Chapter One was 
mirrored by the influence wielded by the IRB and the Irish Volunteers in certain parts o f the 
county. In the world o f the town, the potential for revolutionary upheaval simply did not exist 
owing to the conservative nature of the urban proletariat and with the reactionary instincts of 
the local merchant elite. The latter effectively stifled any progressive movements such as the 
first co-operative society in Galway town.
5 BMH, WS 447 (Thomas Courtney).
6 Connacht Tribune, 5 June 1915.
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The electoral collapse of the Irish Parliamentary Party in the county in the 1918 general 
election had its origins in the party's growing alienation from the mass of its constituents, and 
this estrangement was apparent long before the national advance o f Sinn Fein. The obvious 
gulf that existed in terms of the social and political outlook of the local party elite and the 
aspirations o f the rural masses, simply discredited the party in the eyes of too many ordinary 
people. This phenomenon was further aggravated by local representatives' unwillingness or 
inability to reflect the prevalent urban or rural sentiment as expressed through local protest 
movements at the time. This failure on the part o f the National Party contributed to a situation 
where a party that was increasingly divorced from the day-to-day concerns o f its constituents 
was ripe to be rejected by the electorate once a credible alternative, more reflective o f popular 
sentiment, emerged after 1916. Rather than looking to post-Rising Ireland, a close analysis of 
the pre-1916 period and in particular the early years of the War, is crucial to any clear 
understanding of social dynamics which fostered revolutionary change.
2.1 The Political Culture of East Galway
Michael Wheatley has described the political culture of the National Party at the beginning of 
the revolutionary era as being eminently respectable, conservative and un-revolutionary with 
distinctly local political horizons.7 The craving for respectability by small town 
conservatives, which Wheatley has identified, is broadly analogous to the local political 
culture o f the UIL in east Galway, with one significant difference. In the five counties of 
Roscommon, Leitrim, Westmeath, Longford and Sligo studied by Wheatley, systematic land 
purchase and rising farm incomes had taken the steam out o f the land agitation that had driven 
nationalist activity for many years and this was a direct cause of political apathy amongst the 
rural masses.8 In east Galway, on the other hand, the situation was radically different as land 
hunger continued to dominate both politics and local society in many parts o f the county. As a 
result, politics in east Galway was characterised by a greater degree o f polarisation and 
radicalisation than other counties where land hunger and agrarian agitation was no longer a 
major factor. Although the UIL was in decline in other parts o f the country, it was still
7 Michael Wheatley, Nationalism and the Irish Party: Provincial Ireland 1910-1916 (Oxford, 2005), p. 
252.
8 Wheatley, Nationalism and the Irish Party, p. 253.
57
representative o f rural society. In a more complex social structure like Galway’s, the natural 
conservative instincts of the party tended to manifest themselves at times of local political 
crisis or unrest as reactionary outbursts aimed at local political rivals and their supporters. 
Whilst the secret society tradition was radicalised by the dominant system of land tenure, the 
political outlook of the local respectable elite was similarly radicalised by the strident 
militarism of their traditional social inferiors.
The National Party was only partially representative o f rural society in Galway and their 
rivals from the Fenian tradition undermined the more conservative local elite by eschewing 
the support of the local National Party representatives or the guidance of local clergy in their 
campaigns against the grazing system. The consequent insecurity of the local leadership of the 
UIL and their antipathy towards republicans was fuelled by the fear of violent local secret 
societies and a natural rural/urban cultural chasm, as much as by the political threat of Sinn 
Fein. Whilst the party was clearly an umbrella organisation for many strands and classes of 
society, in Galway, there were in effect, two UILs in existence. The UIL of the towns tended 
to be conservative, socially respectable, vociferously pro-War and at times, reactionary. They 
dominated local groups such as the Town Tenants’ League to stifle any progressive 
movements such as the co-operative societies gaining a foothold in the county. They 
campaigned and canvassed the towns of the county with vigour to recruit soldiers for the War 
effort and they frequently resorted to condemning the farming community as a whole for 
lacking the moral courage to fight in the European conflict. Local urban elites tended to be 
educated, mercantile and self consciously cosmopolitan and the fawning reception given to 
Lord Wimborne, the lord lieutenant in Galway town in January 1916 defined their self 
conscious sense o f loyalty and subservience to the political establishment.9
The rural UIL, on the other hand, tended to spring up around associational land agitations, 
particularly in the east of the county and represented a clear welding of the rural tradition of 
mass agitation and the threat of violence to semi-constitutional campaigns directed against 
grazierism. Although these campaigns were frequently led by local priests and MPs, they 
were content to employ intimidation and the threat o f force by the rural poor where necessary. 
Cattle drives, the destruction of property and the boycott o f local farmers and their families 
formed part of an intricate web of rural intimidation aimed at individual ranchers. The rural
9 See Connacht Tribune, 5 February 1916.
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U1L shared none of the jingoism of their urban counterparts in relation to the War and tended 
to a large extent to avoid national politics and focus on infinitely more local concerns. 
Crucially, the rural wing of the party tended to co-operate with the local secret societies in 
powerful local alliances against large farmers. In contrast to their urban counterparts, they 
were content to employ the obvious threat that the secret society represented whilst acting as 
the respectable brokers in any potential settlement, it was a tactic that gave the local party 
powerful leverage without incurring the censure that direct involvement in violence would 
draw from the party elite. The rewards that a successful division brought gave the party a 
relevance they might otherwise have struggled to assert.
Galway had a parliamentary representation of five MPs with Stephen Gwynn, representing 
Galway town, Richard Hazelton, north Galway, William O'Malley, Connemara, William 
Duffy, south Galway and James Cosgrave representing Galway east. O f the two strands 
within the party, Galway MPs Stephen Gwynn, William Duffy and William O’Malley 
belonged to the urban UIL tradition and James Cosgrave to the rural. The county’s public 
representatives at Westminster during this period shared the party’s more conservative 
instincts, but they differed significantly in both background and approach to their profession. 
In different measures and for different reasons, at least three of Galway’s MPs remained in 
both political outlook and cultural leanings, significantly divorced from the culture o f the vast 
majority o f their constituents. In retrospect, these were obvious factors in their electoral 
collapse in 1918, when all the party’s incumbents failed to hold on to their seats.
William O’Malley was bom in Ballyconnelly, near Clifden, on Connemara’s north western 
shore. He moved to England in his late teens to attend the Hammersmith Training College for 
Teachers but spent his working life as a journalist in London, Brighton and Hove, before 
becoming manager o f The Star newspaper.'0 He married Mary O ’Connor, the sister o f T.P. 
O ’Connor. Their only son William was killed in action in France in 1917. He became 
chairman o f the Connacht Tribune shortly after it was founded in 1909, to which he 
contributed a weekly article, Letter from  Westminster. O ’Malley expressed himself in his 
articles through English, rather than through Irish, the first language of the majority o f those
10 For biographical details of O ’Malley’s life see, William O ’Malley, Glancing Back, 70 years: 
Experiences and Reminiscences o f a Press man, Sportsman and Member o f  Parliament (London, 
1933).
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of whom he represented in Parliament and it is not clear if he could actually speak the 
language. From a well-known and relatively powerful local merchant family, O’Malley was, 
for all intents and purposes, an absentee representative for Connemara, preferring to spend his 
time at Westminster rather than in his impoverished constituency with its chronic problems of 
congestion and backwardness. First elected in 1895, his main political gripe was the 
Congested Districts Board and its perceived inefficiency was the subject of consistent and 
sustained criticism throughout the county. Whilst he was genuinely echoing the feelings of his 
constituents on this matter, O’Malley’s oratory may also have been influenced by his very 
public disappointment at not having been selected as a representative o f the Board when its 
trustees were selected for their seven-year term in 1915.
Settled permanently in England, O’Malley crucially underestimated the strength of local 
feeling in a famous local dispute over grazing land at Tully, near Clifden in 1915. His initial 
condemnation of the Letterfrack UIL over the agitation, whilst a number o f local members 
were incarcerated in connection with the dispute, indicated just how divorced he became from 
local sentiment. His failure to support the local community over such a major cause celebre 
provoked a stinging rebuke from local UIL representatives and forced him to travel to Galway 
to explain his remarks before a meeting of the Connemara executive o f the UIL." Unlike his 
colleague James Cosgrave, in the east of the county, he did not campaign directly on behalf of 
his imprisoned constituents, nor did he attend any of the many demonstrations connected with 
the dispute.
A moderate, cultural nationalist, Stephen Gwynn constituted an uncharacteristically 
cosmopolitan figure in the somewhat dour local political scene in Galway town. The son o f a 
Church of Ireland clergyman and a grandson on his mother’s side o f the nationalist William 
Smith O ’Brien, Gwynn entered politics in 1906 when, after a decision that was not 
universally popular within Galway political circles, he was imposed on the local party 
organisation by the leadership, who it seems, feted him because o f his cultural leanings.12
Gwynn had grown up in Dublin and Donegal and had studied literature at Oxford. He 
published on an array of Irish topics including history, biography, travel guides, personal
" Cl monthly report, west Galway, January 1914, CO 904/92.
12 He was the only nationalist candidate in the election, defeating his opponent, an independent unionist
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recollections, novels and literary criticism. His political writings are fewer, but he did outline 
his personal views in a review article entitled An Argument Against an Irish Republic in 1918, 
having been asked by John Redmond to write The Case fo r  Home Rule in 1911. In a later 
collection of ‘colourful anecdotes,’ he described canvassing for election as ‘a disgusting jo b ’ 
and his successful election for Galway borough as a ‘comic saga.” 3 Like his colleagues, 
Hazleton and O ’Malley, Gwynn chose not to live in his constituency and spent much of his 
time in London. Gywnn was extremely active in the recruitment campaign for the British
army. Regularly appearing on platforms in the town, Gwynn was amongst the most active
recruiters in the west of Ireland. The extent to which his political outlook differed from that of 
his constituents can be gauged by a speech he gave in Loughrea in July 1915, in which he 
outlined his views on the issue of conscription:
While you and I would prefer to serve in an army voluntarily recruited, I would sooner have 
conscription than national defeat, humiliation, ruin and disaster. If men could not be got by
voluntary appeal, they would have to be got by compulsion and I would not oppose it, if it
came of necessity.14
Gwynn was eventually rewarded for his endeavours by being made the western representative 
on the government’s ill-fated Recruitment Board. He was one o f only five Irish MPs to enlist, 
serving on the Western front with the Connacht Rangers, even though he was, by then, well 
into his fifties. His constituency was abolished following the boundary changes for the 1918 
election and he failed to be elected in the Dublin University constituency.
William Duffy represented grassroots political leadership and as MP for south Galway since 
1900, he controlled a large local political organisation from his base in the town of Loughrea. 
South Galway IRA officer Patrick Coy recalled that ‘Duffy had a big following composed of 
a mixture o f the well to do and the stone and bottle throwing type.” 5 Through trusted local 
lieutenants such as Martin Ward, Duffy’s organisation dominated local civic bodies, such as 
the local Town Tenants’ League and the Urban District Council and ensured that when the 
Volunteer movement split in 1914, all but a handful from the town stayed loyal to John
J.L. Wanklyn from Bradford, who lost with 203 votes.
13 Stephen Gwynn, Experiences o f  a Literary Man (London, 1926), p. 273.
14 Irish Timest 5 July 1915.
15 BMH, WS 1,203 (Patrick Coy).
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Redmond. In this context, Loughrea represented the antithesis o f its neighbour Athenry, from 
where the IRB and the physical force tradition dominated local politics in the surrounding 
countryside. The rivalry between the two towns was bitter and lay at the heart of a number of 
other seemingly unconnected controversies.16
Duffy also became extremely active in the recruitment campaign and he held many public 
meetings across the county. The antagonism between his organisation and the local separatists 
in Athenry was intensified by his frequently biting remarks on the perceived moral cowardice 
o f the farming community. Following his failure to gain re-election in 1918, rioting erupted in 
the town as ballot boxes were brought in from outlying areas, necessitating the drafting of 
troops to protect local republicans from mobs o f Duffy’s supporters,17 After the split in 1914. 
the main National Volunteer parades were generally held in Loughrea and organised by Duffy 
himself, often in direct response to parades by the Irish Volunteers, which were usually held 
in Athenry. Later, when the GAA in the county split along political lines, the new 
Redmondite, National Gaelic Athletic Association, held its meetings in Loughrea and were 
chaired by UIL councillor Martin Ward, whilst the original county board of the GAA, which 
was dominated by IRB men, continued to meet in Athenry and was chaired by local Fenian 
leader, Tom Kenny.
Remarkably, Duffy secured a small farm from the CDB in the Closetoken area in 1915, when 
a farm was redistributed by the local branch of the UIL. Duffy had personally handled the 
transfer o f the land from the state on behalf o f the tenants and his subsequent acquisition of 
the farm was severely criticised by Sinn Fein supporters. So incensed were some locals that 
Duffy’s property was attacked and walls knocked down in a series o f night raids in 1915. 
Duffy was unrepentant and claimed that he left it to the Closetoken UIL Committee to decide 
what to do with the land and that only after satisfying the needs o f local congests, did he come 
into possession of the farm.
James Cosgrave won his seat in east Galway in a by-election in 1914 caused by the death of 
the sitting MP, the old Land Leaguer, John Roche. Roche was a tenant farmer from the
16 The split in the GAA is discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
17 See BMH, WS 1,203 (Patrick Coy). Despite his failure to be re-elected in 1918, he was one of the 
few representatives of the National Party to be re-elected to the Dail in 1927 as a National League 
Party representative.
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Clanricarde estate and a revered local figure, having been jailed for his activities in the 
original Land War. He, in turn, had been preceded by another famous Land Leaguer, the 
Fenian Matt Harris, who had been a close associate of Michael Davitt. Hence, unsurprisingly, 
unlike William O’Malley, Cosgrave was very active in the campaign in east Galway to have 
the estate o f the Marquis of Clanricarde divided up amongst the tenants. This campaign was 
the struggle that his predecessors had fought and it was the issue that defined politics in the 
countryside south of Portumna and Loughrea, The east Galway seat essentially remained a 
‘Land League seat’ until 1915 and politics was centered around lobbying the Congested 
Districts Board for the break up of the estate, as well as other smaller grazing farms.
A native o f Portumna, Cosgrave appeared on several platforms addressing tenants’ meetings 
and acted as secretary to the Portumna Clanricarde Tenants Association. While he never 
actively advocated civil disobedience in public, he did not condemn the cattle drives that were 
an important feature o f the campaigns that he led. He was also predictably vocal in the 
campaign for the release of a number of local prisoners arrested after a riot in Loughrea, when 
cattle drivers fought a pitched battle with police in 1915.18 Along with Duffy, Cosgrave was 
also very active in recruitment to the armed forces in the east Galway area and this may have 
undone much of his hard earned popularity with the local small farmers, as the tone of 
recruitment meetings became more and more scathing o f their perceived cowardice. 
Nevertheless Cosgrave was genuinely committed to his constituents and their needs, and he 
elevated local politics with his genuine efforts on behalf o f Galway tenants. His decision not 
to stand in the 1918 general election was a major blow to the party and left a void in local 
politics. Following his decision, the Parliamentary Party was unable to persuade anyone else 
to stand for the constituency, leaving Liam Mellows to take the seat unopposed.
Richard Hazleton, MP for North Galway was first elected in 1906 and spent an inordinate part 
of his tenure, defending his reputation and livelihood through the courts.19 He did not confine 
his political interests to Galway alone and he did not actually live in the county, continuing to 
live in Blackrock, county Dublin, where he chose to stand in the 1918 election. He also stood 
unsuccessfully in the north Louth constituency in the 1910 election, where he was defeated by 
T.M. Healy by just over one hundred votes. Following the result, Healy managed to petition
18 See Irish Times, 1 May 1914.
19 Irish Times, 18 July 1914.
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Hazleton for his costs and in the process tried to force him to retire his seat due to his 
bankruptcy.20 A claim for £2,000 in costs was made and Healy and his followers started 
proceedings in the English courts with the objective o f making him bankrupt, and therefore 
unable to continue as an MP. In anticipation of the court’s findings, Hazleton decided to retire 
his seat in Galway in June 1914. The English courts subsequently overturned the original 
bankruptcy decision, which had forced the subsequent by-election and he once again secured 
the support o f the party and was automatically re-elected unopposed. Whilst he made frequent 
speeches on the land situation in the north of the county, Hazleton seems to have involved 
himself less in his constituency as his financial problems mounted, and he was not as 
prominent in the recruitment campaign as his colleagues, opting not to defend his seat in the 
1918 election.
The complacency o f the National Party elite and the disconnection that this fostered with the 
local UIL and people in general is borne out by the history o f the Galway borough. Stephen 
Gwynn was the only candidate, of the five Galway MPs, that had ever actually beaten an 
opponent in an election in the county. On both occasions, he successfully defeated two 
unionist candidates, J.L. Wanklyn, a Bradford industrialist and a local unionist John Shawe- 
Taylor. The borough had not been represented by a native Galwegian since Martin Morris, 
later Lord Killanin in 1901 and Gwynn’s two predecessors were actually both foreign 
nationals, with Arthur Alfred Lynch, the Australian anti-imperialist succeeding Charles 
Ramsey Devlin, who was later elected to Parliament in his native Canada.
Complacency also characterised local elections in Galway and in the 1914 elections eighteen 
of the sitting candidates were re-elected in Galway town with ‘no unusual heat shown in the 
town at any tim e’.21 With no Sinn Fein representatives standing, only two Labour candidates 
were elected, with the UIL providing the remaining seats.22 The Galway Express referred to 
Sinn Fein supporters at the time as ‘the pro-German section of our community’ and expressed 
surprise at Labour’s electoral efforts, noting that leading local merchant Martin McDonagh 
‘was the best commercial friend of the worker in Galway’ and ‘that traders were the backbone 
of the country’.23 The small signs of Sinn Fein growth, however, did not escape the paper’s
20 Irish Times, 18 July 1914.
21 Connacht Tribune, 17 January 1914.
22 Martin Halloran and William O’Halloran.
23 Galway Express, 7 November 1914.
64
attention and the editor noted early in 1916 that ‘there is today a spirit to be noticed growing 
amongst the people, like the weed which insidiously grows and if not dealt with, destroys the 
crop’.24 The editor of the Galway Express, local unionist, F.H. Fischer, later noted ‘Sinn Fein 
cannot be tolerated, they must be absolutely put down ... if traitors are in the country, they 
can only expect the fate o f same’.25
Despite the fact that there was only one branch of Sinn Fein in the whole county, the local 
political domination by the UIL was not as complete as it might seem. The police constantly 
warned the authorities that there were well-organised and dangerous secret societies in the 
Loughrea and Athenry districts that worked in conjunction with the UIL and United Estates 
Committee, Commenting on the state of the IRB nationwide, the authorities in Dublin Castle 
noted that ‘the IRB and Sinn Fein have very little weight just now except in Galway, where 
they are formed into secret societies which are mainly responsible for the violence of local 
agitation.’26
1914 began on an ominous note in the county with shots being fired into the parochial. Hall in 
Gort on the night of the 14 January. The local Ancient Order o f Hibernians were holding a 
dance in the hall at the time and the police reported that, ‘this society has only recently been 
started in Gort and is backed up by the priests, but the secret society men are opposed to it. 
The police know who fired the shots on this occasion, but they have no evidence.’27 The 
particular source of antagonism on this occasion is not recorded. The AOH were closely 
connected with the United Irish League in terms of an overlap of members and mutual 
support. Firing into houses was a common tactic in cases where feuds and disagreements 
developed between semi-organised groups in the county and was frequently resorted to in a 
number of violent disputes between various political factions in the county.28
Whilst the IRB and the local secret societies in Galway were initially separate organisations, 
the IRB had been closely involved in land agitation for many years. The police described the 
main area of influence of the secret society at this time as 'all along the Railway line right up
24 Galway Express, 1 January 1916.
25 Galway Express, 29 January 1916.
26 Chief Inspector’s monthly report, May 1914, CO 904/93.
27 Cl monthly report, west Galway, January 1914, CO 904/92,
28 The violent feuding following the split in the Volunteers is discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
to Tuam and for a few miles on each side of the line. Then again in Galway, just touching 
places along the line to Clifden and fairly active at Leenane and Letterfrack.'29 Fergus 
Campbell has stated that the Galway secret society owed its origins to an offshoot o f The 
Invincibles started in Galway in 1881 and was blamed by police for a number o f agrarian 
murders in the county in the 1880s.30 Under Thomas Kenny, the society grew to have a 
presence throughout the county and its influence clearly became considerable as, in the early 
part of the 1900s, it became closely associated with the IRB. However, the society’s main aim 
remained the redistribution of grazing land among the rural poor and such was its prestige that 
the IRB apparently allowed the organisation to continue its agitation and still be subsumed 
into the movement. Through all manner of intimidation, including attacks on property and 
animals, and frequent assaults and even murders, the society exercised a great deal o f control 
in the east Galway grazier belt, particularly in the hinterland between, Athenry, Craughwell 
and Loughrea.3' Whatever about the exact chronology of events, Kenny’s society represented 
a continuum in the centrality of agrarian secret society influence in Galway from the land 
struggle in the nineteenth century through to the struggle for independence in the twentieth. 
Mick Newell from Castlegar recalled that when he joined the IRB, ‘the principal matters 
discussed at meetings were the recruiting of new members and land division... The IRB took 
a leading part in agitation and carried out numerous cattle drives, also the breaking down of 
walls on the farms of landlords and grabbers, whose houses were fired into also.’32
The Connacht Tribune, which constantly denounced secret societies in Galway, whilst 
supporting the United Irish League’s campaign against ranching, conceded that land agitation 
was the source of much unrest, but warned against the mixing of agrarian and separatist 
sentiment:
The second main factor [after drunkenness] that leads to unrest in the county is the delay in 
the agrarian settlement o f  certain districts. U nfortunately this leads to evils by no m eans 
directly connected with the land problem, for there is no disguising the fact that instances have 
occurred where reckless, irresponsible men, have m ade so-called agrarian em ancipation, the
29 Cl monthly report, west Galway, November 1914, CO 904/95.
30 Campbell, L and  a n d  Revolution, p.175.
31 Tom Kenny aligned himself with the IRB sometime in 1909 with regular visits by Major MacBride 
and Sean MacDermott to Athenry at this time. See Campbell, L and  and  Revolution, p. 175.
32 BMH, WS 342 (Michael Newell).
Every locality in east Galway had a local branch of the United Irish League, with many 
parishes having several, that were, in theory at least, active. The overwhelming dominance of 
the UIL in the county had remained unchanged for many years and, possibly as a result, the 
party structures had become increasingly dormant in many districts. At the beginning of the 
year, the United Irish League existed throughout the county but was completely inactive in 
most districts. The districts that comprised the Clanricarde and Ashtown estates in the 
hinterland between Portumna, Loughrea and Ballinasloe remained the exception. In areas 
where there were ongoing associational campaigns, the UIL tended to be resuscitated by local 
activists 34
The gradual decline of the party had become a source of concern for the party leadership and 
a national re-organisation commenced in August 1915. As part o f the initiative, a national 
committee was to be formed with each area nominating representatives. As ever, William 
Duffy MP o f Loughrea led the crusade, noting at a meeting in his home town that ‘a mild 
form of coercion would be needed’ as the party was now in a ‘moribund condition in some 
places as people were inclined to be apathetic’ owing, he believed, ‘to the feeling created in 
the county by the W ar’.35 The Loughrea meeting was the first in a series o f meetings of local 
branches throughout the county that, judging from the tone o f the local press, were at best, 
embarrassing for the party leadership. At a meeting in Kilkerrin, for instance, the local parish 
priest, Fr Colgan, described the party as being ‘in a state o f suspended animation’.36 The 
Galway town branch, however, remained busy with sports days, daily excursions and amateur 
dramatics, ensuring, if nothing else, that the organisation continued to provide social events 
for its members and their families.
The visit of the Lord Lieutenant, Lord Wimboume to Galway in January 1916 provided a 
much-needed boost to the organisation. With the main streets o f the town suitably bedecked 
in red, white and blue, the procession of dignitaries was received at the train station by a 
guard o f honour from the Craughwell Company of the National Volunteers, from where they
33 C onnacht Tribune, 27 March 1915.
34 See section on communal collectivities in Chapter One.
35 Connacht Tribune, 10 August 1915.
36 Connacht Tribune, 10 August 1915.
cloak for acts of outrage that bring disgrace and shame upon the whole community.33
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proceeded under the royal standard and union jack flags that bedecked Eyre Square. With a 
banner proclaiming ‘One Life, One Navy, One Throne’ holding pride o f place, the dignitaries 
were officially welcomed at a reception attended by an exhaustive list o f local prominent 
citizens/7 There is no evidence of any local discord surrounding the visit and the occasion 
represented a massive boost to the United Irish League and its supporters in the town. As 
ever, the Connacht Tribune was on hand to record the event. The tenor o f its coverage left the 
reader in no doubt o f the majesty of the occasion:
The event made a curious appeal to the public and for some weeks, strenuously, for some 
days, all classes o f  the community contributed intelligent effort and hearty goodwill toward 
making it a success, whatever their private leanings. Is there som ething in the people o f 
Galway, which easily disposes them to a deferential recognition o f  the claims o f high 
authority and glittering prerogative? 38
2.2 Popular Mobilisation
The Galway section of the Volunteers were founded at a public meeting in late November 
1913.39 Following the customary speeches and the election o f a provisional committee, local 
men were invited to enroll in the organisation. Frank Hardiman later estimated that over six 
hundred men promptly joined up, noting, however, that most o f these new recruits never 
became active. Thomas Hynes later recalled 'that was all we ever heard o f them'.40 In the New 
Year, a series o f meetings was held around the county to organise local companies and a 
notable feature of these public occasions was the large number o f men who signed up on each 
occasion with the vast majority never actually taking their involvement any further.41 The new
37 Connacht Tribune, 5 February 1916.
38 Connacht Tribune, 5 February 1916.
39 Roger Casement and Eoin MacNeill were sent from headquarters and the night provided quite an 
occasion for the small band of local IRB men. A procession of students with torches accompanied by 
the brass Band of the St Patrick's Society along with the Bohermore Fife and Drum Band met the 
Dublin leaders at the train station in Eyre Square and escorted the group through the town.
40 BMH, WS 714 (Thomas Hynes).
41 In January 1914 over 200 men were enrolled at a meeting in Athenry, 350 at Tuam, 150 at Loughrea 
and over 600 men at Ballinasloe. However, John Broderick from Athenry estimated that his company 
had only about seventy members at this time and Micheál O'Droighneain recalled having only twenty- 
four active members in Spiddall.
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movement's rural roots in the secret society/IRB tradition was obvious, however, as the 
organisation flourished in the very districts where communal land agitations were ongoing 
and where there was a strong local fenian organisation. Peter Howley later noted that he had 
little trouble in recruiting eighty men from around the Ardrahan district for the new force as 
'there was a continuous war being waged against the landlords and the RIC in county Galway, 
right up to the formation of the Volunteers in 1914.'42 These rural companies were generally 
formed by senior local IRB men who travelled into neighbouring districts and set up meetings 
with other IRB contacts to enroll new members, with drill and training almost universally 
carried out by ex-servicemen. There was little that was actively conspiratorial about the new 
organisation's activities and all training exercises were carried out in full view of the 
authorities. It is probable that many of the ex-servicemen saw their efforts as a way of 
persuading local men into eventually joining the British army.
The most active IRB men in the county at this time were in the Athenry area, with Dick 
Murphy the acting head centre for the county.43 Along with Murphy, Jack Broderick, Larry 
Lardiner and Stephen Jordan from Athenry were very active in setting up companies around 
the south and east o f the county. Also prominent at this time, was Tom Kenny, who had been 
replaced by Murphy as head centre, who along with Eamonn Corbett and Patrick Callanan 
from Craughwell, Tom Ruane and Mick Newell from Cammore, Michael O’Droighneain 
from Spideall, Liam Langley from Tuam, Joe Howley from Oranmore, and George Nicholls 
from Galway town, comprised the county's leading IRB men. Gilbert Morrissey of the 
Rockfield Company explained how the local IRB operated:
I think K enny’s main concern was to keep the spark o f  nationality alive in us until the 
opportunity came. This was not so difficult in county Galw ay, as in a sense, arms were never 
put away. If people were not fighting against the British Forces proper, they were m aking a 
fair stand against its henchmen, the tyrant landlord class, their agents, and bailiffs, who were 
backed up and protected by the R .I.C .44
The strong concentration, in terms of the centre and south of the county and local involvement 
at both a leadership and grassroots level with the GAA, and hurling in particular, was
42 BMH, WS 1,379 (Peter Howley).
43 BMH, WS 714 (Thomas Hynes).
44 BMH, WS 1,138 (Gilbert Morrissey).
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apparent even at this stage of the organisation's development. Another striking feature at this 
time was the small number o f clergy who played significant roles in organising local 
companies. At Kinvara, Fr O ’Meehan was central to the formation of the local company and 
whilst not officially a member, went so far as to supply the company with caps and suitable 
reading material at his own expense. Fr Feeney of Clarinbridge was central to the organisation 
of the company in his area, with his parochial house used on many occasions for IRB 
meetings. Fr Connolly o f Garbally College, Ballinasloe was also frequently consulted by the 
IRB leadership in the county regarding their plans.45
The local companies at this time began to occupy themselves with route marches at weekends 
and drill generally practiced on weeknights. The movement still had practically no arms and 
this led to frequent problems with boredom and indiscipline as recruits quickly found the 
excitement that they had anticipated simply not materialising. Officers were elected by the 
rank and file and this may also have contributed to incompetent or uncommitted men being 
elected for reasons o f popularity rather than suitability. In March 1915, the IRB decided to 
send Liam Mellows, with Alfie O’Monachain as his assistant, to the county to help organise 
and train the Galway Volunteers. Predictably, Mellows took lodgings in the town of Athenry, 
the heart o f the land agitations and set about organising the Volunteers on a more professional 
basis.
The police only began to take serious notice o f the Volunteers in Galway in May 1914 when 
the movement was subsumed by the Remondite organisation, and even then their opinion of 
the force was not high. At a grass roots level, the Redmond take-over involved local AOH and 
UIL members joining their local Volunteer branches and in most cases, taking over the 
running of the branch or setting up new ones. In Galway town, the Connacht Tribune 
announced in early May that a meeting had been held in order to To devise a means o f placing 
the movement in the city on a more sound basis’.46 The Volunteer committee now attained a 
vastly different character, with leading local merchants, prominent citizens and members of 
the Galway Corporation among the new leadership and at the next council meeting a 
resolution was unanimously passed that the council was sympathetic with the aims o f the new 
movement.
45 See BMH, WS 383 (Fr Fahy).
46 Connacht Tribune, 23 May 1914.
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In the countryside, as ever, the situation was somewhat different. The existing companies in 
the county were dominated by Fenians who were not going to be dislodged by the local UIL, 
who in many cases, were either sympathetic with their aims or under their control anyway. 
The militant companies in Clarinbridge, Athenry, Castlegar, Killeeneen, Ballycahalan, 
Ballinderreen, Tuam and Ardrahan remained under secret society control throughout the 
period. The next two months saw the rapid expansion of new companies as the movement 
began to spread like wildfire. New companies now sprang up in every parish virtually 
overnight and all under the guidance and leadership o f the local UIL. Within a few weeks of 
the initial re-organisation process, the police noted that the movement now had a strength of 
3,033 men across thirty branches, and was spreading rapidly.47 The police noted: Tn the 
towns, the ranks are recruited from shop assistants and labourers with a small proportion of 
shopkeepers and tradesmen, and in the country localities, farmers and farmers’ sons dominate 
the ranks.... The force is badly organised however and with not much discipline.’48 The rapid
expansion of the movement was suddenly becoming a major source o f concern and in a far­
sighted note o f warning, the Chief Inspector of Police for Ireland, noted, with concern, the 
enlargement o f the movement following its endorsement by Redmond in May 1914:
The rank and file o f the Irish Volunteers are drawn from the very class with whom the police 
have frequently come into collision during agrarian disturbance. In Ireland the training and 
drilling o f the male population is a new departure, which is bound, in the not too distant 
future, to profoundly alter the existing conditions o f  life. Obedience to  the law has never been 
a prom inent characteristic o f the people. In tim es o f  passion or excitem ent the law has only 
been maintained by force and this has been rendered practicable ow ing to the want o f cohesion 
among crowds hostile to the police. If the people become armed and drilled, effective police 
control will vanish. Unless the population which is now being drilled and armed is placed 
under some responsible leadership or control, these trained bands o f  men will be used for 
cattle-driving or other similar illegalities49
The enlargement of the Volunteers brought individuals into the movement who would 
previously have made extremely unlikely supporters and who took differing motives and
47 Cl monthly report, east Galway and west Galway, May 1914, CO 904/93.
48 C1 monthly report, east Galway, May 1914, CO 904/ 93.
49 Chieflnspector RIC, monthly report, May 1914, CO/904/93.
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agendas with them into the organisation. Two groups who appear to have exercised a 
significant role during this brief period in the county were the younger clergy and the 
remnants of the landed gentry. Following the public approval o f the movement by the 
Archbishop Hoctor o f Tuam, the authorities believed that the clergy were joining the 
movement in order to moderate the organisation.50
The role of the Galway gentry in this phase of the movement was not insignificant. A number 
of Galway’s old landed families were either members or active supporters o f the movement 
and at least two companies were captained by members o f the old landed elite. Colonel 
Philips, late o f the Connacht Rangers, was captain of the Dunmore Company and James 
Reddington of Clarinbridge and Kilcolgan was captain o f the Ballycahalan Company. Frank 
Shawe-Taylor, Henry Grattan-Bellew, Captain Cheevers and even the Earl of Clancarty, all 
publicly gave their support to the new force and .were often prominent in attendance at 
Volunteer reviews. The police reported in July that, 'members and leaders o f the local gentry 
in Athenry and Mountbellew who were formerly looked upon as unionists are foremost 
members and leaders and have subscribed large sums of money towards the purchase of arms 
and equipment.’5! The gentry may have seen the movement as a possible future component of 
the British war effort and their attempts to influence the movement in that direction were quite 
obvious, if their views were not widely shared.
The rapid rise of the Volunteers had other unexpected consequences, with the police 
recording that the county was becoming more peaceable. This was partially attributable to 
'the national Volunteer movement which has given the people something else to think 
about’.52 The police cautioned that the riding cannot be described as peaceable as it was 'in 
the grip of the Volunteers movement recruited in nearly every branch by moonlighters and 
other seditious and undesirable characters’.53 In July, police were fired at on three separate 
occasions at Clarinbridge.54 The authorities noted 'these people seem to be under the 
impression that all law has been abrogated in this area because they are Volunteers and that
50 Cl monthly report, east Galway, June 1914, CO 904/93.
51 Cl monthly report, east Galway, July 1914, CO 904/94.
52 Cl monthly report, west Galway, July 1914, CO 904/94.
53 Cl monthly report, west Galway, July 1914, CO 904/94.
54 Cl monthly report, west Galway, July 1914, CO 904/94.
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they can indulge in the amusement of firing at the police without fear of consequences.’55 An 
extra police hut was eventually placed near the village and manned by twelve police. The 
violence and intimidation of the police at Clarinbridge was replicated in Athenry where 
"dangerous criminals’ carried their rifles openly in defiance o f the RIC. Both cases served to 
highlight the fact that while the Volunteer movement may have taken on an entirely new 
character in the county, in the areas dominated by secret societies, the old ways and threats 
remained the same. By August the growth of the movement had clearly reached its limits and 
the dire lack of arms remained a key problem. Only a small minority of companies had even 
wooden rifles to practice with and very few recruits ever got their hands on an actual weapon, 
let alone fired one. By the time of the eventual split in September, only five companies at 
Cullaigh and Creagh, Portumna, Loughrea, Athenry and Woodford had actually obtained any 
firearms at all.56
June and July of 1914 marked the highpoint of the enlarged Volunteer organisation in the 
county with rapid progress having been made in terms of numbers and companies. The public 
reluctance o f some sections of nationalist opinion to openly support the movement had now 
passed and the Redmondite element had completely eclipsed the separatist influence 
nationwide. The Volunteer review at Athenry in July 1914 represented the high point o f the 
organisation and gave the newly organised companies a chance to compete with one another 
in terms o f numbers and equipment. The Connacht Tribune called it ‘unquestionably the most 
historic and impressive event that has taken place in Connacht in the last fifty years with 
5,000 men present to watch the 2,000 Volunteers’.57 The overwhelmingly rural character of 
the organisation was obvious, with the paper noting that, ‘Galway city was well represented 
but when the question of population is considered, it lost badly in comparison with the county 
contingents and in fact the little village of Craughwell had as many members.’ 58
There was now a nominal command structure set up in the county consisting of ten battalions: 
Galway city, Tuam, Loughrea, Ballinasloe, Gort, Athenry, Portumna, Clifden, Mountbellew 
and Glenamaddy.59 In theory at least, these battalions consisted of seventy-eight companies,
55 Cl monthly report, west Galway, August 1914, CO 904/94.
56 Cl monthly report, east Galway, September 1914, CO 904/94.
57 Connacht Tribune, 4 July 1914.
58 Connacht Tribune, 4 July 1914.
59 Connacht Tribune, 4 July 1914.
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with the company based on the parish or the half-parish. However, it is obvious that these 
figures were aspirational rather than a reflection of the reality on the ground. For example, 
only twenty-eight o f these areas were actually represented at the county review at Athenry 
and it is likely that most existed only on paper.
2.3 The Split in the Volunteer Movement
The national split in the Volunteers resulted in the immediate and spectacular collapse o f the 
movement in Galway. The overwhelming majority o f companies in the county declared in 
favour of their leader. However, they also voted in favour o f not joining the War effort by 
immediately leaving the movement in such vast numbers that the larger National Volunteer 
force collapsed virtually overnight. Following Redmond’s declaration, most Galway 
Volunteers ceased drilling almost immediately and where drilling was still carried out, the 
numbers greatly diminished. The situation was not helped by the fact that most experienced 
drill instructors had rejoined their regiments in the British army. Only weeks after the split, 
the police estimated that drilling was continuing at a rate o f only fifteen per cent of its 
previous level.60 A number of parades were held in the county during September but the 
numbers were so low as to serve only to embarrass the leadership o f the organisation. The 
police noted:
The extraordinary falling o ff o f enthusiasm , with which the Volunteer movem ent was 
conceived, is undoubtedly due to the fact that the m embers will not enlist in the army and they 
believe that if  they go on drilling, they w ill in some way or another be forced to enlist for 
services at the front. They make a great parade o f  their eagerness to defend the shores o f 
Ireland, knowing that there is very little danger o f  them being called on to do so, but their 
warlike ardour vanishes rapidly at the idea o f  fighting against Germ any abroad or indeed 
against anybody e ls e 61
The decline of the Volunteers resulted in a scenario where the original IRB, controlled 
companies at Athenry, Clarinbridge, Castlegar, Killeeneen, Ballycahalan, Ballinderreen, 
Tuam and Ardrahan remained intact, as the ninety or so new companies quickly disappeared. 
These companies were ‘bitterly opposed to Redmond’s announcement and are bitterly
60 Cl monthly report, west Galway, September 1914, CO 904/94.
61 Cl monthly report, east Galway, September 1914, CO 904/94.
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disloyal and will do all in their power to prevent recruiting’.62
The National Volunteers now became dramatically less active as each month passed and, 
tellingly, the police now listed their membership figures as nominal only. By October, every 
Volunteer company in the west Riding, comprising 4,892 men, had declared for Redmond; 
compared to only six hundred and eighty-five Irish Volunteers.63 In the east Riding, fifty-six 
branches o f the movement, comprising 4,712 men declared in favour of Redmond, with only 
three hundred and sixty ‘known Sinn Feiners’ remaining, and the bulk of the minority group 
coming from the Athenry district.64
The split in the Volunteer movement in October 1914 in Galway town became particularly 
unpleasant. A tense meeting to respond to the dilemma now facing the national movement 
which the war created was held in the Town Hall. The power lines to the hall were cut the 
previous night by members of the IRB and the meeting itself quickly degenerated into 
mayhem. As people arrived at the hall, they were heckled by republicans outside and several 
serious scuffles had to be broken up by the large body of police called in to keep order. As 
soon as order was restored again, the room was plunged into darkness as the electricity was 
again cut and sulphuric stink bombs set off, sending the hall into a panic, with people 
charging out through the doors and windows.65
The meeting was eventually reconvened on a makeshift platform outside, and after hurling 
William O’Halloran, the secretary of the local Labourers’ Union off the platform into the 
crowd, Stephen Gwynn MP addressed the meeting. After denouncing ‘Eoin MacNeill and the 
self-elected leaders of the provisional committee o f the Volunteers,’ the speaker declared the 
allegiance o f the Galway Volunteers to Redmond and the War effort. Amid raucous scenes, 
Gwynn closed the meeting by ‘asking the assemblage to repeat after him, God save the King, 
and this was done with spirit and gusto and a voice in the crowd echoed, God save Ireland.’66 
Following the affair the Connacht Tribune announced:
62 Cl monthly report, east Galway, September 1914, CO 904/94.
63 Cl monthly report, west Galway, October 1914, CO 904/95.
64 Cl monthly report, east Galway, October 1914, CO 904/95.
65 Connacht Tribune, 3 October 1914.
66 Connacht Tribune, 3 October 1914.
75
Sinn Fein has hitherto been treated with generous tolerance in the city; it has grossly abused 
that tolerance and the great majority who consider them selves free to act as sane and practical 
men, in order that they may reap to the full the benefits which the Irish Parliamentary Party 
has won, now take the attitude that tolerance has reached its limit. The puny plotters have only 
them selves to b la m e /7
This display of republican contempt for the town’s elite could not be let pass unchallenged, 
however, and it ultimately precipitated the collapse o f the Irish Volunteers in the town. The 
next week, the Irish Volunteers were drilling in their hall in Williamsgate Street when an 
angry mob gathered outside. As men arrived for drill practice, they were subjected to abuse 
and threats and by nine o’clock the crowd had swollen to over three hundred people. 
Determined not to be intimidated, about sixty Volunteers emerged in formation from the hall 
with dummy rifles on their shoulders and marched toward Shop Street, where a riot duly 
erupted. Many Volunteers received beatings with the fighting raging up and down the town’s 
main thoroughfare. The angry crowd then turned their attention to premises connected with 
individuals with republican sympathies. Windows were smashed all along the street and shops 
looted, before the rampaging mob moved out o f the town centre to attack the homes of known 
republicans. Describing the event as ‘guerrilla warfare on a small scale,’ The Connacht 
Tribune reported ‘Every house in the city, the occupants o f which were known to have been in 
sympathy with the Sinn Feiners was visited and had its windows put in by stones.’68 Volunteer 
John Hosty recalled ‘After this, the remnants o f the Galway company as a unit, ceased to 
function.’69 The small local republican element struggled on but they never recovered their 
strength in the town and often had to rely upon the neighbouring Castlegar company for much 
needed muscle in their frequent clashes with their rivals.
The enmity between the two sides continued to manifest itself over their opposing positions 
on recruitment to the British army. Volunteer Thomas Courtney recalled, ‘the whole town 
went recruiting mad, it wasn’t a case of whether you were joining up, but when.’70 The Irish 
Volunteers concentrated their energies on an anti-recruitment drive, while the National 
Volunteers led a vigorous campaign of propaganda and they continued to attract the support
67 Connacht Tribune, 3 October 1914.
68 Connacht Tribune, 3 October 1914.
69 BMH, WS 373 (John Hosty).
70 BMH, WS 447 (Thomas Courtney).
76
of the town council and the majority of the town’s merchant and social elite. The Irish 
Volunteers’ rival campaign involved young members putting up posters, disrupting 
recruitment meetings and organising rival ones. Their campaign did not endear them to the 
townsfolk and Thomas Hynes stated that ‘we got beaten up eighty per cent of the time, as the 
population of the town was very hostile.’7' On one occasion, Volunteer Thomas Courtney 
managed to get hold o f a pile of recruiting forms for the British army. He, along with other 
republicans went to the houses of those who had signed up to leave for the front and tried to 
dissuade them from going. When this proved unsuccessful, Courtney filled out the remaining 
blank forms in the names of prominent supporters o f the recruiting drive in the town. He later 
recalled ‘some had to go, but others got off. It was noticeable how some of them cooled off in 
their recruiting efforts after that.’72
In the years following the split, Sinn Fein and the Irish Volunteers consistently failed to make 
any inroads amongst the labouring classes in Galway town. Hostility to republicans amongst 
the urban working class was due primarily to the large number o f young men from the city
serving in the British army. Galway had a strong tradition o f service, Renmore Barracks being
the headquarters o f the Connacht Rangers. There was also a particularly strong Navy tradition 
among the fishing community of the town, particularly in the Claddagh and between 200 and 
250 young men from the small fishing village served in the Royal Navy during the First 
World War. Clashes between ‘separation women’ and Sinn Fein supporters had been a 
frequent feature o f life in the town since the beginning of the War and with so many of the 
urban poor dependent upon an army stipend to survive, the Volunteers’ German sympathies 
increasingly isolated the republican element from their natural constituency,73
The civil and political affairs of the town continued to be dominated during the war years by a 
conservative merchant elite, foremost among whom was the larger-than-life figure of Martin 
Mor McDonagh. Originally from humble peasant stock, McDonagh’s father had succeeded in 
dragging himself and his family out of poverty in Connemara by working as a middleman for 
local landlords. By marrying wisely and investing in land and cattle, he laid the foundation for
71 BMH, WS 714 (Thomas Hynes).
72 BMH, WS 447 (Thomas Courtney.
73 Separation women, as they were known, were the wives of soldiers fighting at the front who received 
a separation allowance. The term tended to be used somewhat pejoratively as the urban wives of 
soldiers at the front unjustly gained a popular reputation for licentious behaviour.
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his son's business empire. Thomas McDonagh & Sons, consisted o f a large fertiliser factory, 
general stores and numerous other commercial ventures. McDonagh was the primary 
employer and businessman in the town and was chairman of the local Urban District Council, 
amongst numerous other bodies. In 1929, he was ruthlessly parodied as the archetypical 
gombeenman in Liam O’Flaherty’s banned novel, The House o f  Gold. O ’Flaherty provided 
the following description of his central character, Tn every little town in Ireland, you will find 
a man like Ramon Mor, a grabber, who makes his money by worse usury than Shylock ever 
practiced.’74
Whilst O ’Flaherty’s novel is fictional, there is very little doubt about whom he is describing 
and it is clear that McDonagh accumulated much of his own land and animals in the form of 
unpaid debts from unfortunate clients and that his monopoly in business allowed him to 
dominate commerce in the town and surrounding areas. In 1911 he formed the Galway 
Employers’ Federation to counter the founding of a fledgling union of dock workers in the 
town, the ‘Galway Workers and General Labourers’ Union.’ During a strike at the docks in 
March 1913, he brought over strike breakers from Liverpool to handle his stock at the quays.75 
The strike eventually ended in a compromise but the episode amply demonstrated 
McDonagh’s conservatism. That he was also chairman of the National Volunteers in Galway 
is an indication o f the movement’s antipathy toward the socialist leanings o f their smaller 
rivals the Irish Volunteers.
On the centrality o f patriotic self-sacrifice in the national interest, both the constitutional and 
radical traditions were in firm agreement. However, what actually constituted patriotic duty in 
the first place and whether that meant joining the British army to fight in Europe or staying at 
home with the Irish Volunteers to strike a blow against the empire, the competing traditions in 
Galway were bitterly divided. In what passed for political debate in the county, both sides 
consistently referred to themselves as the true patriots and attacked their opponents for being 
motivated by mere self-advancement.
The perception that the UIL was becoming increasingly moribund was somewhat tempered, 
and also partially explained, by the tireless involvement o f its elected representatives in the
74 Liam O ’Flaherty, The House O f Gold (London, 1929), p. 18.
75 John Cunningham, ‘A town tormented by the Sea’ Galway 1790-1914 (Dublin, 2004), pp 241-2.
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recruitment campaign for the British army.76 In the first three years of the War the efforts of 
the local organisation at recruitment ‘to the colours’ is notable for the remarkable energy 
displayed by party figures and their seemingly tireless performances on public platforms. In 
this respect, neither William Duffy nor James Cosgrave could be held responsible for the 
almost total failure o f their efforts to enlist the young men of Galway. In Galway town, the 
campaign was ably organised by the Urban District Council with James Reddington, Philip 
McDonnell and Martin McDonagh to the fore.
It is. noticeable how quickly the rhetoric o f recruitment meetings became antagonistic, 
however, as speakers increasingly resorted to insulting the integrity o f their audiences, with 
general attacks on the character of local farmers relentlessly bellowed from public platforms. 
At the Galway summer assizes in 1915, for instance, Judge Boyd, noting that only eight 
hundred men had joined the army, commented that ‘the local populace lack manliness in this 
crisis’.77 At a recruitment rally in Eyre Square, Martin McDonagh rounded on a group of 
agricultural labourers waiting to be hired nearby:
I ’ll hire you, [amidst loud laughter and applause from the crowd] and I will give you more pay 
than you will get from the farmers. Why do ye not go? Perhaps ye were thinking that on the 
lands that ye were going to there would be no German bullets, well ye will be in as much 
danger on the bogs from G od’s lightening as on the battlefield from Germ an b u lle ts .78
As if to rub salt in the National Volunteers’ wounds, as the War dragged on, the Irish 
Volunteers began to consolidate their support across the county. At a review in Athenry in 
November, seven hundred men paraded around the town from ten companies with rifles and 
pikes being carried by a number officers. Six local clergy were present on the platform in the 
town along with Laurence Ginnell MP and The O’Rahilly. Whilst the Connacht Tribune
76 As part o f a nationwide drive to re-invigorate the National Volunteers at grass-roots level, a series of 
inspections and local consultations began in the summer of 1915. As part of the process, Colonel 
Philips commenced a tour of inspection of the nominal battalions in the county. Only five companies 
attended at Loughrea. A week later, a visit to the second strongest battalion in Portumna could only 
muster an attendance of 240 men. The situation was worse in the Connemara battalion and only one 
company replied to a communication from Headquarters to nominate a representative to a newly 
established Galway county board.
77 Connacht Tribune, 25 July 1915.
78 Connacht Tribune, 25 July 1915.
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believed that the ‘bungling administration is largely to blame for the Athenry meeting,’79 in 
Loughrea, the National Volunteers seemed equally determined to show that they still 
represented a force to be reckoned with. At a National Volunteer meeting in the town, held 
the following week, three hundred men paraded around the streets and the press reported that 
‘strong feelings of resentment in Loughrea pervaded the ranks of the National Volunteers in 
consequence of some statements made at the meeting in Athenry, composed of a 
miscellaneous group of political free thinkers and cranks.’80 William Duffy later assured the 
assembled crowd of the patriotic credentials o f their diminishing force, adding that, ‘Loughrea 
could be relied upon to keep the lamp of patriotism and nationality aflame. Loughrea men 
sheathed the sword in ’79 and honestly at the bidding of Michael Davitt and Matt Harris.’ 
Following the meeting, elements in the crowd attacked a number of homes in the town 
belonging to republican sympathisers, breaking windows and hurling rocks at the occupants.81
The collapse of the National Volunteers and their subsequent difficulty in recruiting men to 
the British army represented a deep humiliation for many of the local elite in Galway, who 
were overwhelmingly pro-war. Crucially, many of the county’s leading recruiters such as 
Martin McDonagh and Frank Shawe-Taylor were also members o f the County Galway 
Farmers’ Association. Conversely, many of the leaders o f the Irish Volunteers in the county, 
men such as Dick Murphy of Athenry and Tom Kenny of Craughwell, were also leading 
secret society men and heavily involved in the communal agitations that were ongoing in the 
Athenry and Loughrea Districts. Thus, Dick Murphy would have played a leading role in the 
boycott against Shawe-Taylor in Athenry, as well as actively campaigning against the 
National Volunteers’ recruitment drive. Similarly, Martin McDonagh, who was the head of 
the National Volunteers in the county, also had a mansion at Monatigue in Craughwell and his 
grazing farm was boycotted by the local secret society from 1919 onwards. The agitation was 
organised and led by local fenians, who were also heavily involved in the Irish Volunteers. 
McDonagh was forced to give up the farm following the campaign against him and his 
mansion was subsequently burnt down.82 McDonagh was later to chair the ‘Committee for 
Public Safety’ in Galway which had been organised to ‘defend the town from invasion5 by the
79 Connacht Tribune, 10 July 1915.
80 Connacht Tribune, 10 July 1915.
81 Connacht Tribune, 10 July 1915.
82 See Chapter One for campaign against Shawe-Taylor in Athenry, Chapter Four for anti-grazier 
agitations in 1920 and Chapter Five for the murder of Shawe-Taylor.
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rural companies of the Irish Volunteers in 1916.
The militancy of the Irish Volunteers represented a defiance of traditional social deference, 
and the overlap in membership with secret society agitators added another dimension to the 
already volatile political scene in the county. The mixing of potential armed insurrection with 
violent tenant agitation gave the traditional farming elite added incentive to make common 
cause with the police and others to oppose the republican movement. The antagonism was 
now personal, economic and political, and both sides were simply awaiting an opportunity to 
strike at the other. That opportunity would eventually come, with the rebellion in Easter Week 
1916 and once again in the 1919-23 period. By 1915 the scene was very firmly set for a bitter 
showdown between the two and for the strong fanners in the east of the county, the Irish 
Volunteers simply had to be stopped before the tenant farmers became even more militant.
2.4 The Town Tenants’ Association
If rural society in Galway was deeply riven by an under-articulated antagonism between large 
and small farmers, then the cultural chasm between town and county added another dimension 
to a complex society. The degree to which the modes of political organisation, efficiency and 
determination differed between the tenant farmers and the urban poor is best illustrated by the 
fortunes of the Town Tenants’ League. Furthermore, the failure of their campaigns also 
illustrates the reactionary nature of the urban UIL and its inherent ability to frustrate social 
progress. In an important article on the cultural chasm between small town and rural Ireland, 
Brian Graham and Susan Hood argued that the necessary functional interdependence that 
existed between town and countryside in rural Ireland in the later nineteenth and early 
twentieth century ‘should not be extrapolated into an assumption of a long term synonymity 
o f small town and rural interests.5 As Hood and Graham pointed out:
The possibility o f  a cultural chasm between town and country has been precluded, whilst 
tow n-country tensions are depicted as petty and trivial within the context o f the overwhelm ing 
issue o f land. If  urban history has been neglected then, this m irrors the general neglect o f 
urban dwellers and their claims for fair rent and fixity o f  tenure.83
83 Susan Hood and Brian Graham, 'Every Creed and Party: Town Tenant Protest Late Nineteenth and Early
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Thus, whilst the militancy of the small tenant farmers during the same period has been the 
focus o f extensive research, the equally valid claims of town tenants has received scant 
attention. The issue o f urban tenants’ rights has not been analysed because towns have largely 
been depicted as adjuncts to the rural world, where the defining national characteristics could 
be found. Thus, as Hood and Graham have concluded The nationalist rhetoric, which 
subsumed the labour issue, also absorbed the urban perspective in general and the theme of 
the small town in particular.’84
Town tenants’ rights first became an issue following the passing of the radical land legislation 
that transformed rural Ireland from the late 1870s onwards. Whilst individual Town Tenant 
Associations had sprung up around the country, it was not until 1904 that a national all- 
Ireland Town Tenants’ League was founded. The aim of the organisation was to secure for 
town and village dwellers the same rights that tenant farmers had secured. In particular, the 
association campaigned for fair rents, fixity of tenure and compensation for improvements 
made to rented accommodation. In response to the association’s demands, the Town Tenants 
Act was passed in 1906, which went some way toward providing for the three Fs and 
constituted the first Act of its kind in the United Kingdom.
The Town Tenants’ League was initially very successful and quickly established a branch in 
every county in Ireland, with a weekly national executive meeting in Dublin. Local groups 
would also campaign on specific cases where they arose. In Athenry, for instance, Stephen 
Jordan recalled that the IRB men in the town joined the association en masse in 1906 against 
IRB rules, when a dispute over the allocation of houses in the town arose:
The Town Tenants Organisation, by agitation and agrarian outrages, succeeded in forcing the 
sale o f  the houses to tenants and also the division o f the adjoining lands in what was called 
accom m odation plots to each tenant purchaser. This led to a series o f  activities for the division 
o f  lands in all areas bordering Athenry. As the R.I.C. failed to get any info, it turned very 
nasty.85
The Athenry agitation reached a climax in 1907 with local graziers being persuaded to bow to
Twentieth Century Ireland’ in Journal o f Historical Geography, xxiv, (1998), pp 170-88.
84 Hood & Graham, ‘Every Creed and Party’, p. 171.
85 BMH, WS 346 (Stephen Jordan).
the weight o f local public opinion and give up their grazing on four farms bordering the town. 
The tactic o f the town dwellers in this instance was instantly familiar, with large groups of 
townsfolk making their way to the farms in question and forcibly removing the objectionable 
stock. The Irish Times observed Tn casting up the prospect of agrarian peace in Athenry, it 
should not be forgotten that the present settlement looks remarkably like the direct reward of 
lawlessness.586
The success of the agitation in Athenry was not replicated elsewhere in the county and in this 
context the Loughrea Town Tenants were some years behind their more militant Athenry 
neighbours. A crucial and under-appreciated aspect of the land issue in Galway was the extent 
to which towns were affected by the sale of estates, as the ground rents in many towns were 
still owned by the remnants o f the old gentry. Ballinasloe, for example was owned by Lord 
Clancarty, Headford by the McDonnells, Gort by Lord Gough, Loughrea by Clanricarde, and 
Ahascragh and Cappataggle by Clonbrock. There were seven local Town Tenants branches in 
the county in the period of this study but the only active branches were in Loughrea, 
Ballinasloe and to a lesser degree Galway town.
Martin Ward, who acted as chairman of the Loughrea Branch, was a charismatic figure and 
his house in the town was the scene of a famous incident in 1903, when he, along with a 
group of supporters refused to vacate the property from which he was being arbitrarily evicted 
by Clanricarde's agent, Edward Shawe-Tener. The issue was eventually resolved somewhat 
tamely, thanks to intervention by William Duffy and the local parish priest, with the result 
that Ward and his supporters gave up the property peacefully. 87 Tenants of Clanricarde from 
the Loughrea parish met under the leadership o f William Duffy early in the New Year to 
organise themselves for the pending division of the estate. It was noted during the course of
86 Irish Times, 1 September 1907.
87 Ward himself, as this incident suggests, was more inclined toward direct action than his affiliation 
with William Duffy would suggest, and in a bizarre incident in 1907 he was charged with maliciously 
tarring the house of another Town Councilor. Shots had been fired by the owner of the house during the 
incident and Ward was lucky to escape from the scene unharmed. He subsequently denied the charge 
but the fact that he was apprehended fleeing the scene in possession of a tin of tar and a paintbrush 
made his claims of innocence unconvincing. The prosecutor in the case noted that daubing messages 
with tar on the front of someone’s home with whom you have a disagreement was a common tactic in 
the town of Loughrea. (In his defence, Ward claimed that it was also common in the Loughrea area to 
run away when one heard shots in the middle of the night.)
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the meeting that many tenants were still deep in debts from the original plan o f campaign and 
Cianricarde was pursuing these old debts through the courts. At the meeting William Duffy 
described the CDB as ‘a disturbing force in the county’ and warned that ‘the government 
should not waste one hour in taking all steps to expedite purchase.’88 It was announced later 
that month that town tenants would be excluded from the sale.
At the AGM of the Loughrea Town Tenants’ Association in March 1915, Martin Ward 
outlined to the audience the potential of the Cianricarde sale for town tenants, reminding them 
that they stood ‘on the eve of events that would be o f great importance to the town.’*9 The 
stated aim of their Association, he assured his audience, would be to secure the grazing lands 
adjacent to the town that would be included in the up-coming sale. The attendance does not 
seem to have filled everyone present with confidence with the speaker interrupted by a call 
from the floor that ‘we do not have as many as we should have here’. Thomas Sweeney told 
the gathering:
In the Land War, which extended over thirty years, the towns o f Ireland played an important 
part. I am not afraid to say that the brunt o f  the war had been borne in large measure by the 
men living in the towns. While they looked unceasingly and unselfishly after the interests of 
the tenant farmer, they unfortunately often neglected their own affa irs/"
The CDB subsequently wrote to the Loughrea Tenants stating that they could not and would 
not be considered in the redistribution.91 In relation to the alleviation o f rents, however, the 
Association fared better. Ward told the gathering that ‘he was glad to say that in almost all 
cases, where demanded, middlemen had given a reduction o f from twenty per cent to twenty- 
five per cent.’92 In relation to the outstanding cases, James O ’Loughlin drew applause from 
the audience when he assured them that ‘there was nothing so useful as a little agitation.’93 
The anger at their treatment was palpable, as is the speaker’s disappointment at the failure of 
the UIL leadership to prioritise their claims. Thomas Sweeney, one of the more militant
88 Cormachi Tribune, 25 March 1915.
89 Connacht Tribune, 25 March 1915.
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91 Connacht Tribune, 5 June 1915.
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Loughrea members, proposed in conclusion, ‘that something like a Plan of Campaign was 
needed and a reduction o f twenty per cent to twenty five per cent demanded from the head 
landlord.’94
The Portumna Town Tenants were not slow to realise the significance of the Cianricarde sale 
either. The association met in July 1915 ‘to discuss at length the large rents they are paying at 
present’/ 5 At the meeting, it was suggested that the owners should be approached with a view 
to obtaining abatements and a list of parties who would require land was forwarded to general 
secretary in Dublin. Lacking the militancy of their Loughrea neighbours and without the 
direct support of the local UIL, however, references to the Portumna Town Tenants quickly 
became scarce after their first and seemingly only meeting.
Following their success at securing rent abatements and their failure to be included in the 
division of the Cianricarde estate, the Loughrea Town Tenants changed tactics somewhat and 
took up the cause of those tenants who were living in the town but who had been evicted from 
the Cianricarde estate during the original plan o f campaign. In January 1916, the association 
received a letter from the CDB stating that they would not deal with any evicted tenants in the 
town and did not intend restoring them to their former holdings. The Board stated that they 
could not deal with any claims of eviction that were not previously investigated and 
recommended to them by the Estates Commissioners. At a meeting in Loughrea, an angry 
Martin Ward declared that ‘the tenants had no option but to take a course of action likely to 
renew the old troubles that Loughrea had been afflicted with since the beginning o f the great 
agitation/96 A defiant resolution was then passed stating that no settlement would be 
recognised by the local community that did not recognise the evicted tenants ‘and more 
particularly the Plan o f Campaign tenants’/ 7
At the same meeting Martin Ward highlighted a new issue, which had been particularly 
troubling the branch. For some time, the Loughrea Town Tenants had been highlighting the 
lack o f support both the local UIL and the leadership o f the Parliamentary Party had been
giving to the cause of the town tenants. In the view of the Loughrea Branch, the leadership of
94 Connacht Tribune, 5 June 1915.
95 Connacht Tribune, 31 July 1915.
96 Connacht Tribune, 1 January 1916.
97 Connacht Tribune, 1 January 1916.
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the tenants’ movement was also culpable for not being militant enough in their dealing with 
the leadership of the Parliamentary Party. At their January meeting, Ward emphasised the 
recurring theme of the abandonment of the townsfolk by their ungrateful country neighbours, 
telling the gathering:
Town tenants had gained nothing in proportion to what the towns had contributed to other 
m ovem ents and since last May, he was determ ined to see the movement reformed. A strong 
and vigorous movement was required and it needed to have the Irish Parliamentary Party 
behind it.98
At a meeting in March, Francis Glynn continued the militant theme and asked ‘Look at 
Athenry, why could the town of Loughrea not get up and fight for themselves as they had 
done for the tenants formerly? We have our MP [William Duffy] here tonight and I would 
like to see what he has to say on this matter.’99 Duffy later claimed that the criticism was 
politically motivated and noted that ‘Sinn Feiners were conspiring to bring discredit on his 
name, and that it was most ungrateful on the part of country people who should and did know 
differently to listen to attacks so grossly unfair and uncharitable.’100 He was defended, 
however, by the Loughrea Town Tenants with Mr. Glynn concluding that secret society men 
had engineered the controversy:
With the lessons taught to people in our day, by people who should know better, and who 
should be Christian and charitable in their teaching and example, it is no wonder some men 
practiced the reprehensible doctrines taught them and thoughtlessly committed crim e upon 
their tried and trusted friends.101
Duffy himself then went even further, noting at a branch meeting that ‘the agricultural tenants 
were now free but the town tenant had to struggle on in slavery’/ 02 Thomas Sweeney noted in 
agreement that, ‘they [Loughrea Town Tenants] had beaten down landlordism, baliffism, 
grazierism, and even Clanricarde, but today they were faced with a worse type than ever
98 Connacht Tribune, 1 January 1916.
99 Connacht Tribune, 11 March 1916.
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before and that was the CDB.’103 Noting with satisfaction that the grazing had been 
surrendered at nearby Tully Hill, the delegates nonetheless expressed concern over who 
would now get the farm. As ever, Martin Ward was in no doubt who should get it, claiming 
that they would see to it that the original evicted tenants would be restored to Tulla. Ward 
concluded that ‘those who fought for it should get it and not those who criticised them and sat 
by the fireside at home1.104
Whilst rent abatements and inclusion in the division o f local estates preoccupied the town 
tenants in Loughrea, the Galway town branch had a somewhat different target. At a meeting 
in early January, the growth of the co-operative movement in the county generated heated 
discussion. Noting that co-operatives had been opened in Moycullen and Loughgeorge and 
that others were being started in Spidall, Headford and Oranmore, a resolution condemning 
the co-operatives as a growing evil was proposed by Chairman W.J. Silke, who repeated the 
theme of the abandonment of the rights of townsfolk by their ungrateful country neighbours. 
Silke, from one of Galway’s most prominent merchant families, commented that ‘it was a 
very poor recompense to the townspeople, who in the past assisted the country people, that the 
latter should be starting these co-operative stores.’105 The resolution specifically condemned:
That such societies are being run and financed by country landlords, middlemen and well paid 
officials, who derive large profits from the pockets o f  tenant farms, who patronise same, and 
accordingly it is m anifestly unjust and unfair to legitim ate traders and merchants in cities and 
towns that such societies be subsidised from the public purse, for the benefit o f  the few at the 
expense o f  the m any.106
The resolution created some heated debate and highlights an important conflict o f interests 
for the organisation, between looking after the interest o f the urban poor, as opposed to the 
local ‘shopocracy’. The secretary of the Galway town branch, Mr. Simon, proceeded to speak 
in defense of the co-operatives and pointed out that ‘if they affected the traders then the 
traders should form their own society to look after their interests’. He went on to say that he 
did not see why a branch of the Town Tenants ‘should take up anything like that. Mr. Hoare
103 Connacht Tribune, 5 June 1916.
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intervened to support his colleague adding that the ‘co-operative stores are alright, we are 
supposed to be looking after the interests of the town tenants’. He then went on to refer to a 
case where wool that cost 4s 6d in Galway could be bought for 2s 3d at the Moycullen store. 
The chairman W.J. Silke then intervened to say that the speaker ‘was not looking at things 
properly. It was detrimental to the markets of the town and which were going down greatly 
and they as citizens should support them.’ However, Mr. Simon remained resolute stating that 
‘for the life o f me I can’t see why we should take up this case’. Despite the opposition 
however, the motion was carried by 9-3 with only Hoare, Philips and Simon dissenting.
In 1914, the Clancarty tenants in the vicinity o f Ballinasloe were in the process of purchasing 
their farms under the 1903 Land Act, spurring the local town tenants to organise their branch 
of the Town Tenants to try and take advantage of the situation. At the inaugural meeting of 
the Ballinasloe Town Tenants League, the audience was told that
In no town in Ireland is this organisation so wanted, as not more than a dozen houses belong 
to the County Council, the vast majority belonging to the property middlemen, most o f whom, 
to say the least, are anything but an improvement on the ‘Lord o f  the S oil’.107
Fr T.J. Joyce told the tenants that he hoped that town tenants would not be forgotten and that 
the sale o f the towns would be included in the sale o f the estates and that a judicial body 
would be set up to fix fair rents and save the town tenants from arbitrary action. He then 
proposed the course o f action which was the cry of the tenants in Loughrea, ‘We should do 
what they did in Athenry and buy out the town.’108 Another speaker went on to ask, ‘How can 
we can have a Town Tenants’ Association, if we have slum landlords on the committee?’ The 
speaker was quickly assured that, ‘There are no such men on the committee as care was taken 
to exclude them.’ The inaugural meeting concluded with the recurring theme that it was 
crucial that the town tenants and the local UIL be combined.
The Ballinasloe League went on to pass a resolution requesting the Urban Council to call 
upon the owners o f slum property in the town which was already condemned by the sanitary 
officer, to immediately put the property into sanitary condition or else exercise their powers to 
close the houses. A member of the committee, Mr. Dunne, even went so far as to say that he
107 East Galway Democrat, 14 February 1914.
108 East Galway Democrat, 28 February 1914.
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would be only too happy to see these houses pulled down. However, on the subject of the 
rents currently being paid for labourers’ cottages built by the local council, the views of the 
local ‘shopocracy’ rather than the local urban poor, whom the association claimed to 
represent, was expressed by the Committee. Mr. Rothwell put his view forward, he claimed, 
‘as a large rate payer,’ stating that ‘it was the opinion of rate ratepayers that they would not 
complain if they had to put their hand in their pockets and pay for bona fide  labourers, but the 
ratepayers have very reasonable grounds for complaint when they have to pay for people who 
are paid good salaries.’ Many of those occupying the cottages in the town were, he claimed, 
.‘quasi-gentlemen’ whom they would not be paying to build mansions’.109
In a strongly worded editorial in July, the East Galway Democrat backed the local tenants’ 
demands for rent reduction, noting that ninety per cent of the houses in the town were in the 
hands of middlemen, the editor declared that ‘the landlords are bad, but the middlemen are the 
devil.” 10 In relation to the town’s slums, it was claimed at a large tenants meeting in October 
that ‘if the town tenants never did their bit but pave the way for the elimination of those un- 
nameable dens, it would have justified its existence.’111 Claiming that four-fifths of the 
houses occupied by labourers were unfit for human habitation, Fr Joyce concluded that ‘these 
abodes are an insult to God and they degrade men and women made to His image and 
likeness, herded together in these wretched dens to the level o f brutes.’112
A resolution was subsequently passed calling for four major changes in the renting of 
property in the town, namely, the establishment o f a fair rent tribunal by the local authority 
that would be empowered to fix rents; a general and substantial reduction in rents in all 
properties in the town; that all ‘hovels’ in the town be closed; and finally that no-one was to
take a house from which a tenant was unjustly evicted.153 At the next meeting in the town,
there was controversy over the resolution and in particular the demand for a general reduction 
of thirty per cent on all rents in the town. A resolution was put forward vetoing the previous 
one and proposing instead that a supplementary committee be appointed to reconsider the 
issue. The committee then proposed that rent reductions be considered on an individual basis
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only, rather than calling for a general reduction across the board.114
The committee’s dramatic U-turn created bitter recriminations, with one delegate declaring 
that ‘this meeting looks like a landlords’ meeting. There is more being said on the landlords’ 
side than the tenants.’115 Officers countered that only tenants with a grievance would be dealt 
with individually and the secretary of the Branch, Mr. Nicholson, was told by the committee 
that his objections were unfounded, as contrary to earlier testimony, ‘there are not five tenants 
in Ballinasloe that are rack rented.’ The decision to rescind the earlier resolution was 
eventually passed by a margin of eleven to three. However, the local press immediately issued 
a condemnation o f the decision and the Chairman W.J. Ward, in particular. Noting with grim 
sarcasm that ‘the town tenants have been fortunate in the choice of some of their officers,’ 
they proclaimed their ‘utter disgust’ with the chairman’s recent action and asked:
Are tenants to be thrown back on their landlords individually? For what purpose was the 
Town T enants’ League started? What has brought about this wonderful change o f opinion in 
some speakers since the July meetings or are these men really as unstable as the shifting 
sands? 116
Despite the U-turn by the committee, by the end of the year, Mr. Nicholson, who had 
supported the previous campaign for rent reduction in the town, succeeded in passing a new 
‘no rent’ resolution stipulating that until all rents were reduced by twenty per cent, no rent 
would be paid in the town. The move, however, does not seem to have garnered any popular 
support and a no-rent strike was never actually initiated. Immediately after the decision was
taken the most publicly criticised members o f the committee, Ward and Moffett, resigned and
whilst they gave no reasons for their departure, it is safe to assume that it was brought about 
by a desire not to be associated with the new demands of their branch and possibly to 
sabotage it. It is very noticeable that following their departure, general apathy seems to have 
gripped the branch with small attendances at meetings indicating a clear lack o f appetite for a 
campaign. It was eventually decided to visit all tenants with the view to getting them to sign a 
petition committing them to a no-rent strike. However, following the original proposal there 
are no further references to the decision and reports of branch meetings in the local papers
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eventually cease altogether.
The failure o f the Ballinasloe Town Tenants’ League to agree on a united policy to alleviate 
what were genuine social and health issues concerning housing in the town has echoes in the 
problems experienced by the league in both Loughrea and Galway town. Whilst the league 
seems to have had greater success in approaching individual landlords for rent reduction in 
Loughrea, the leadership of the branch, William Duffy in particular, was accused by his own 
members of acting in his own best interests in the case o f the redistribution of a local estate. 
Duffy had handled the redistribution of a farm by the CDB in the Closetoken area and had 
subsequently been allotted a farm of land on the estate himself. This criticism appears to be 
justified by the fact that as an MP, Duffy would have been entitled to an income of at least 
£400 in expenses per anum and the case bears witness to his lieutenant, Martin Ward’s 
dictum, that ‘land should be given to those who fought for it, and not for those who sat at 
home by the fire and criticised them.’117 Allied to this episode was the constant frustration of 
all three branches that the UIL was not interested in lobbying for the town tenants and had 
never offered them its full support, as it had done so vigorously for the rural tenants in 
previous generations.
The actions o f the Galway Town Branch in denouncing local co-operatives was heavily 
criticised even within its own branch and it was correctly demonstrated at a committee level 
that the local urban poor could purchase vital commodities for significantly less at a co­
operative store than in the local shops in the town. In all three towns, the integrity o f the 
decisions taken by local branch leaders were questioned by both members and the local press, 
as not being in the genuine interests of local tenants. It is also interesting to note that the 
resolution passed by the Galway Branch condemning co-operatives was proposed by local 
merchant William Silke and the resolution overturning the decision for a no rent strike that 
led to the collapse of the Ballinasloe branch was proposed by Mr. Rothwell, who was also 
from a local merchant family and who owned the largest furniture store and auctioneering 
business in the town, and by William Moffett, whose family owned the largest local drapers 
in the town. It is clear that the decisions of the local branches frequently represented the best 
interests of the local mercantile elite, rather than the urban poor, for whom the branch was 
supposed to be acting.
117 Connacht Tribune, 6 June 1915.
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Conclusion
The character o f popular mobilisation and political organisation in east Galway was as diffuse 
as it was factional. Tension between rival political movements was frequently exacerbated by 
a quick recourse to violence that exacerbated a polarised and volatile political culture. When 
issues o f immediate rural concern such as a dispute over a local estate developed, the U1L 
could effectively mobilise as a functioning organisational structure. Furthermore, the party 
still had the power to mobilise vast numbers of men to join local Volunteer companies and 
participate in tiresome drill and other exercises that demanded a considerable degree of 
personal commitment. The majority o f recruits to the movement were small tenants who did 
not succumb to secret society influence and who remained loyal to the infinitely more 
respectable elites o f the UIL. The Party leadership’s commitment to the War effort, more than 
any other single factor, was a bridge too far for ordinary members and proved that whilst the 
party could wake from its slumber, the same catalyst was a fatal development.
The humiliation that the demise of the National Volunteers represented and the violence in 
towns over recruitment to British regiments, allied to the tenor of recruiting meetings that 
frequently degenerated into denunciations of the entire local community, left many ordinary 
people disillusioned with conventional politics. Furthermore, the sheer energy displayed by 
the local elite in the party and their personal commitment to pushing the recruitment agenda 
was a factor in their own personal demise and neither Stephen Gwynn, James Cosgrave or 
Richard Hazleton opted to stand for re-election in the county again. Only the stubbornness of 
William Duffy, buffered by a loyal and tempestuous following in the town of Loughrea and 
the self-confidence o f William O’Malley insulated from mass opinion in England, could 
escape the reality that by 1917, they were finished as a political force. By 1918, there was 
simply very little remaining of the original party structure and even if ordinary people wanted 
to support the party, there was little left to support.
Whilst many more small tenants joined the National Volunteers than the Irish Volunteers, the 
key leadership roles o f local IRB men in the latter and their involvement with communal 
agrarian agitation, gave both movements an obvious rural class dimension, as well an even 
greater rural/urban character. ‘Men of substance’ simply did not join Sinn Fein or the Irish
Volunteers and although there were individual Volunteers in most towns, there were no active 
companies prepared to attack the Crown Forces in urban areas. (The Galway town company 
killed one member o f the Crown Forces in September 1920 and this will be discussed in the 
next Chapter.) This dual dimension to the evolution of politics in the county represented the 
exacerbation of pre-existing cleavages rather than a new development. Class tension had 
always been a feature o f rural society, albeit one often obscured in the face of a perceived 
outside aggressor. Padraig Lane has argued that the homogenised version of the Land War 
perpetuated by the eventual victors, the rural middle class, o f a united struggle by all rural 
classes against landlordism has glossed over the innate tensions that existed within the Land 
War between the rural proletariat and the farmers.118 As F.S.L. Lyons points out, following the 
Land Acts ‘the gulf between the farmer and the landless man came to mirror all too faithfully 
the gulf that had formerly existed between landlord and tenant.’1,9
If the prevailing social dynamics fundamentally defined the Volunteers’ means, objectives 
and targets, it also defined from whom they could draw support. The pivotal role that the IRB 
played in agrarian unrest defined how the movement was perceived locally and from which 
broadly defined social groups they could draw support. If the lives of the rural poor were 
inherently insecure due to their obvious economic vulnerability, their agitation against the 
grazing system introduced a key theme that influenced attitudes towards the physical force 
movement. The more respectable elements in farming society were suddenly faced with the 
stark realisation that their own land, which they had consolidated over decades through a 
mixture of shrewd marriages, economic conservatism and hard work, could become ‘fair 
game’ for the land hungry smallholders, should the Irish Volunteers continue to gain in 
strength and support. The economic insecurity o f the ‘middling’ farmers manifested itself in 
their social and political conservatism which resisted the overwhelming tide of political 
change, later witnessed in other counties after the Rising, as active support for the republican 
cause in the county remained limited to rural tenants.
The Volunteers were perceived with contempt by all classes in the towns and the movement 
in turn had little to offer urban tenants other than mutual suspicion. The towns were to remain 
onlookers to the future political upheaval o f the period as the agents of political change
1,8 See Padraig Lane, ‘Agricultural Labourers and the Land Question’ in Carla King (ed.) Famine,
Land and Culture in Ireland (Dublin, 2000), pp 101-13.
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remained resolutely rural in character. The urban tradition of recruitment to the army was later 
reflected in an enduring loyalty to the R1C, despite the virtual collapse of the force in rural 
areas in 1917. The chasm between small town and countryside was to be exacerbated by the 
events of Easter Week 1916 when the National Volunteers mobilised to ‘defend their towns’ 
from invasion by the Irish Volunteers and a co-ordinated civil defence force was raised to 
come to aid the security forces. Whilst Campbell has stressed the radical' nature of rural 
political mobilisation in Galway, he has not explored the crucial rural/urban divide in the 
county, the reality o f the dual wings of the UIL reflecting this cultural chasm and the 
reactionary nature o f the urban UIL generally. It was inevitable that the social divisions in the 
county would find expression in political organisation and popular mobilisation. The rural 
wing of the party could be subsumed into the republican movement’s various component 
parts in the future and except a small number o f districts there was little to separate the aims 
and culture o f the two movements. The emergence of the physical force tradition could not 
encompass the urban political tradition, with its inherent conservatism, antipathy towards 
progressive tendencies and the growing level o f personal antagonism.
Whilst Fitzpatrick has stressed the continuity which existed between the UIL and republican 
movement in Clare and Longford respectively, the reality of the existence of an urban/rural 
divide has not been investigated to the same extent as that which emerges in Galway.120 There 
was only a small amount of agrarian agitation in Longford, but Clare ranked next to Galway 
for anti-grazier unrest. Whereas he acknowledges the importance o f anti-grazer activity, 
Fitzpatrick does not identify the exact nature o f the relationship between agrarian unrest and 
popular politics and discerns no cleavage within local politics reflecting this reality. Both 
studies treat towns as minor components within an overwhelmingly rural world with social 
cleavages precluded as defining influences on popular mobilisation. This tendency to treat the 
urban world o f the town as merely a sub-section o f a resolutely rural universe fails to 
appreciate the nuances of rural society and the seminal antagonisms which define it.
Peter Hart has concluded that the IRA in west Cork was predominantly comprised of the 
lower middle classes and upper working classes of the towns; the corner boys and shop
119 F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (London, 1926), p. 26.
120 Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life, pp 192-230.
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assistants commonly sneered at in police reports. 121 In his study of the Volunteer movement, 
Augusteijn came to a similar conclusion about the urban roots of the force.122 In Galway the 
picture was very different, with the IRA remaining a completely rural organisation throughout 
the period and towns generally remaining disinterested in the organisation. Whilst the 
Volunteer movement flourished in urban areas during the Redmondite phase of the 
organisation, following the spilt, the town companies virtually collapsed overnight. Whilst 
there were small numbers of individual Volunteers living in the towns from 1917 onwards, 
there were simply not enough in each district for there to be any appreciateable organisation 
or obvious indications of republican activity. This situation did not change significantly as the 
conflict progressed, although individual Volunteers from the towns were involved in the 
IRA.123
Although there was some anti-grazier activity in each county, the radicalisation of the rural 
IRB and its involvement in anti-grazer activity created the foundation for the growth of 
militant nationalism. Whilst the IRB remained a strongly urban phenomenon in the rest of the 
country, in Galway its rural character was overwhelming. Whereas Hart’s findings have been 
supported with comprehensive statistical research on this issue, which involved the collation 
o f data on the social background of hundreds o f Volunteers, Tom Barry’s subsequent 
impressions o f the conflict emphasised the rural urban/divide and he described the people of 
Union Hall, Bantry and other ‘garrison towns’ as ‘lickspittles’ for their perceived 
subservience.124 While there is a sectarian undertone to Barry’s remarks, similar sentiments 
were to become common in the Galway Express newspaper after it was taken over by Sinn 
Fein in 1918. The paper continually lambasted townspeople in general and labelled Galway 
town ‘a sickening old city inhabited by the garrison and its hangers on’.125 Thus, the inherent 
value o f local studies o f the revolution becomes amplified as different regions of the country 
demonstrate the variance of regional factors and the complexity of social forces which 
compelled young men to join the IRA.
121 Hart, 'The Geography of Revolution in Ireland 1917-1923 \  p. 161.
122 Augusteijn, From Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare, p. 334.
123 For instance, Seamus Quirke, Sean Mulvey, Thomas Courtney, Joseph Togher were active in 
Galway town and Larry Lardiner and Dick Morrissey were from the town of Athenry.
124 Tom Barry', Guerrilla Days in Ireland (Dublin, 1949), p. 6.
125 Galway Express, 9 August 1918.
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Chapter Three: 1916: A crisis in Local Politics
In the historiography of Easter Week 1916, events outside Dublin have until recently received 
scant attention and most standard works on the topic have generally focused solely on the 
capital.' The national aspect of the Rising has been neglected, to the detriment of a full 
appreciation of the aims of the Rebellion’s planners. Charles Townshend has stated, ‘we have 
no idea if there was a plan for a nationwide Rising.’2 This chapter examines the events of 
Easter Week in east Galway in their broader social and political context in order to reveal the 
full extent o f the republican leadership’s plans for the country as a whole. The Rising in the 
county has been described by one historian as a skirmish.3 However, an analysis o f events in 
county Galway illustrates the potential for civil disorder which clearly existed outside o f the 
main urban centres and which warrants further analysis. This chapter explores the events of 
Easter Week to reveal how the leadership of the movement planned to co-ordinate the Rising 
outside the capital, the scope of their ambition for country units, and the degree to which they 
seriously conceived of having any realistic chance o f success.
The local Rising set in motion a revealing series o f reactions and recriminations by 
nationalists across Galway, who mobilised to ‘protect their towns from rebel invasion’. A 
detailed study of the Galway Rising and counter-Rising in its proper social context exposes 
the depth of political divisions which existed during the opening decades of the last century 
and the pervasiveness of social antagonism in rural Ireland. In a radicalised county like 
Galway, political enmities ran much deeper between republicans and the elites of the National
1 A conference at National University of Ireland, Galway, entitled ‘1916, Local Dimensions’ held in 
May 2006 has been the only attempt to examine the issue. Two brief accounts of Easter Week in the 
county have been published as chapters in much larger studies. In 1971 Desmond Greaves published an 
account of the Rising in Liam Mellows and the Irish Revolution. More recently Fergus Campbell 
included a detailed account of the Rising in his study, Land and Revolution: Nationalist Politics in the 
West o f  Ireland, 1891-1921, pp 205-18. Whilst Greaves’ account is a useful introduction, Campbell has 
provided much valuable research on the role of Sinn Fein and the Volunteers in agrarian secret society 
activity and the rise of Sinn Fein the county.
2 Quoted from a lecture given by Townshend at the National University of Ireland, Galway, 19 May 
2006.
3 Michael Laffan, The Resurrection o f  Ireland, The Sinn Fein Party, 1916-1923 (Dublin, 1999), p. 43.
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Party than elsewhere and the potential for civil unrest between the two groups on a scale 
inconceivable elsewhere was only narrowly averted.
The response o f nationalists across the county who mobilised in large numbers to ‘defend5 
their districts from the ‘peasant army’ roaming the countryside has not previously been 
examined.4 Nonetheless, the nationalist counter-Rising in Galway elucidates a number of key 
debates in the historiography of the era and was a crucial episode in souring the already 
poisonous political atmosphere in the county. The potential which existed for civil conflict in 
Ireland and the role o f class as a motivating factor in the revolutionary period has been 
contested by historians. Whilst Rumpf has stated that civil conflict was a distinct possibility 
during 1919, Fitzpatrick and others have stressed the continuity between nationalism and 
republicanism and the emasculation of social divisions and radical agitation/ It is clear, 
nonetheless, that in Galway local politics was immersed in a dual antagonism across an 
urban/rural and small tenant/strong farmer divide and rather than simply dismissing the rural 
dimension to Easter Week, the Rising ultimately became the defining event in the political 
culture in the county.
Opposition to the rebels was most vociferous in Galway town, where a co-ordinated public 
response to the crisis was organised by a hastily formed ‘Committee for Public Safety5, and a 
citizen militia, the ‘Special Constables’.6 Alongside the National Volunteers, these 
organisations were active throughout the week in monitoring and arresting any potential 
sympathisers in the town, and in aiding the military preparations for an expected ‘invasion’ by 
the rebel force. The National Volunteers also came out in force in the town of Loughrea and 
in the villages of Turloughmore and Craughwell, where they manned the local barracks 
alongside the RIC.7 The extreme diversity of responses from within the county, ranging from 
widespread support amongst the rural poor, seeming indifference in most towns, to intense 
hostility in the city indicates that Galway was a highly fractured and complex society during 
the formative years o f the Irish revolution.
4 Campbell’s analysis of events is confined to rural areas only.
5 See Fitzpatrick^ conclusion in Politics and Irish Life, pp 192-231, for an analysis on revolution and 
social change in county Clare.
6 Special constables were appointed in Dublin and other parts of the country during Easter Week.
7 This will be fully discussed in this Chapter.
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Contrary to the national experience, the failure of the Rising in Galway represented a 
fundamental blow to the long term development of the republican movement in the county. 
Many Volunteers later reflected bitterly on the events o f the week when so many local people 
conspired with the Crown Forces against them. The failure to provide adequate arms meant 
that the rebels were in a hopeless position before they even went out and the almost farcical 
elements of the Rising could not be easily glossed over by the insurgents. Rather than 
becoming the catalyst for a radical resurgence, the Rising marked the high point of militancy 
amongst the small tenants in the east Galway grazier belt. Disillusioned with the movement 
and the response o f sections o f the local community, the Rebellion represented another bitter 
episode on a continuum of disappointments for many local agitators. Beginning with the 
failure of the new Land Acts to accommodate the marginalised in rural society, followed by 
the economic boom o f the Great War which disproportionately benefited the stronger and 
middling farmers, the Rising and imprisonment afterwards formed the prelude to the exit from 
the national movement for most of the Volunteer companies in east Galway. During the 
chaotic years of the War of Independence, the former republican stronghold around Athenry 
remained largely aloof from the national struggle as the tenant farmers once again refocused 
their anger on the grazier and the landlord and away from the Crown Forces.8
3.1 The Plan for the Rising
It is pretty plain now [May 1916] that the rebellion was precipitated and if it had been deferred
until later when all was ready, it would not have been confined to the Districts o f Galway and
Gort, but would have embraced the whole county and we could not have held i t .9
The plan for Rising in Galway was predicated on the successful delivery to the county of 
three thousand rifles from The Aud  during Easter week. When the arms landing failed, the 
prospects for the Rising in Galway ended. The large number o f men who mobilised had such 
a small number o f rifles that they could never match the firepower of the Crown Forces as 
hundreds o f the men went out with no arms at all and many carried only pikes. The course of 
events during the week can only be understood in this context. The plan for county Galway is
8 No Crown Forces were killed during the course of the War o f Independence in the east Galway 
grazier belt. The only landlord killed during the whole period nationwide was Frank Shawe-Taylor of 
Moorepark, Athenry. This will be analysed in detail in Chapter Four.
9 Cl monthly report, west Galway, May 1916, CO 904/100.
98
instructive in terms of what the IRB leadership intended for other rural parts of the country. 
When one examines the plan in detail, and looks at what actually happened in the county 
during Easter week, one cannot avoid the authorities’ conclusion at the time, that had the arms 
been landed safely and distributed around the country effectively, the Rising in the 
countryside would have been an extremely serious situation for the authorities. Furthermore, 
given Mellows’ deputy Ailbhe O’Monachain’s close connections to the Casement landing, the 
plan for county Galway is credible.10 O’Monachain believed that the county was seen as 
crucial to the leadership’s plans, ‘GHQ had reasons for having Galway very specially 
organised and equipped for the coming Rising.’11 The plan for the county had two distinct 
phases: Firstly, local companies were to be armed at central points in the county before 
returning to their districts and attacking all police barracks in their local areas. They were then 
to unite and proceed as a larger group into the heavily garrisoned and generally hostile, 
Galway town. Ailbhe O ’Monachain later explained:
It had been arranged that 3,000 o f the rifles from The A u d  were to reach Galway, and there 
was a man in Galway ready for each rifle. Everything had been planned with men on the 
railway to take the rifles at Kerry and distribute them all along the line right up to Galway, but 
the accidental drowning o f three Volunteers in Kerry, my brother Cathal O ’M onachain, Conn 
Ceitinn and Donal O ’Sheehan, and the failure to land the arms and the capture o f Roger 
Casement, upset all those plans.12
Michael Fogarty was present at a Volunteer meeting in Limerick on Palm Sunday when he 
was first told o f plans for the Rising.13 Fogarty was originally from county Clare but worked 
as a railway signalman for the Great Western Railway Company. He later explained that 
Paddy Brennan was in charge of landing arms from two sloops at Carrigaholt, some of which 
were to be loaded onto a railway carriage and sent north to be used in Galway. Fogarty’s job 
was to try and make sure the railway lines were kept open and the train delivering the 
weapons arrived safely in Athenry. Local companies would then mobilise to central depots
10 O ’Monachain’s brother Cathal, was one of the Volunteers sent by the leadership to Kerry to organise 
the unloading and distribution of the rifles from The Aud. He drowned in a freak accident that week, 
when the car he and his comrades were travelling in drove off a pier in Kerry.
11 BMH, WS 298 (Ailbhe O ’Monachain).
12 BMH, WS 298 (Ailbhe O ’Monachain).
13 BMH, WS 673 (Michael Fogarty).
99
along the railway line to receive their supply o f weapons. In south Galway the arms would be 
distributed at Gort, Athenry and Tuam.14 Thomas Nohilly, adjutant Tuam Company, 
substantiates Fogarty and O ’Monachain’s account and explained that he was told that his men 
in north Galway would receive their weapons from the train at Tuam, which was going to be 
commandeered by the IRB.
Having carried out the initial two phases of the plan, the next step for the Volunteers was to 
link up with other midlands companies along the Shannon. Tomas O’Maoileoin, who was in 
command of the Westmeath Volunteers in 1916 recalled ‘We were to wreck the rail link to 
the West and then we were to march to Shannon harbour and effect a link with Liam 
Mellows’s force holding Ballinasloe.’ 15 Patrick Callanan, recalled that a few months before 
the Rising, Padraig Pearse visited Athenry and asked him whether in the event of a Rebellion, 
they ‘could hold a line to the river Suck in Ballinasloe’. Callanan told him ‘that it would be a 
very weak line and would not hold for any length of time’.16 Mellows had extended the area of 
his command eastward as far as Daingan in Offaly, and somewhat more loosely as far as 
Westport in 1915. The notion of holding a line along the Shannon is corroborated by 
Desmond Greaves in his biography of Mellows. It seems that as soon as Mellows had united 
his forces his intention was to move towards the Shannon, raising the country as he w ent.17
The plans for the Rising were highly aspirational and in reality they would have been 
extremely unlikely to have been successful. They demanded effective communications over a 
wide area, including many districts that had few Volunteers as well as areas that were actively 
hostile to the rebels. That the plan envisaged by the leaders was extremely optimistic is clear. 
Nonetheless, a plan did exist and the local leaders were aware o f it. Furthermore, given the 
subsequent reaction of the RIC in the county during the week and the number of Volunteers 
that actually turned out, had the arms arrived from Kerry, the Volunteers would have 
genuinely represented a major threat to the rural RIC. Two important factors need to be 
considered: the Volunteers were remarkably unsuccessful in the attacks which they did carry 
out on police barracks during both Easter week and later during the War of Independence.
14 BMH, WS 1,164. (Michael Manning); BMH, WS 373 (John Hosty).
15 Uinseann MacEoin, Survivors, The Story o f Ireland’s Struggle as Told Through Some o f Her 
Outstanding People (Dublin, 1980), p. 78.
16 BMH, WS 347 (Patrick Callanan).
17 Desmond Greaves, Liam Mellows and the Irish Revolution (London, 1971), p. 90.
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However, despite their incompetence, when news reached the RIC of the early stages oi the 
Rising, all rural barracks in the county were evacuated and the police flooded into central 
depots in Ballinasloe, Tuam, Galway town and Ballinasloe. Thus, it is highly likely that the 
Volunteers would have had a number o f days when they could have consolidated their 
positions and generated support across the county. In Athenry, the police remained inside the 
barracks for the whole week, despite the events going on around them. Only a couple o f small 
parties o f RIC even approached the rebel force, who were, in effect, given the run of the east 
Galway countryside. Looking back after forty years, O ’Monachain believed that the county 
could easily have been taken, ‘the large force o f R.I.C. did not suspect anything. If the 
original plan had been carried out, all barracks in the county would have been taken without a 
f ig h t/18 In the end, however, the force o f over six hundred men went out armed with only 
about twenty .303 service rifles, a few miniature rifles and about three hundred shotguns.19 In 
retrospect, the determination of the Galway men to ‘come out’ seems somewhat bizarre. The 
personal determination of Mellows to make a stand, come what may, was probably never in 
doubt but in Galway he was fortunate in that he commanded men who were undoubtedly 
more desensitised to violence than in most parts o f the country and to whom a tradition of 
resistance to the state had never subsided since the original Land War. Cattle driving and 
various forms of ‘moonlighting’ would certainly have familiarised many with the use of pike 
and shotgun. Ailbhe O ’Monachain later recalled:
The Galway Volunteers, when they were out, did not do anything big. Badly armed as they 
were, their only hope was to bottle up the British garrison and divert the British from 
concentrating on Dublin. This they succeeded in doing. There w ere about 600 square miles o f 
Galway Free County, from Galway city to Ballinasloe, Tuam to G ort.20
18 BMH, WS 298 (Ailbhe O ’Monachain).
19 BMH, WS 344 (John Broderick).
20 BMH, WS 298 (Ailbhe O ’Monachain).
101
The 1916 Rising in Galway took place in the context of the increasing political fractiousness 
that resulted from the 1914 split in the Volunteers. This also lay behind a number of other 
seemingly unconnected disputes in the county. Violent feuding was taking place between 
semi-organised political rivals in Turloughmore and Craughwell, as well as frequent 
outbreaks o f violence between republicans and nationalists in Galway town and Loughrea. 
The split also resulted in a very damaging schism for the GAA in the county with a rival 
National Gaelic Athletic Association founded in the south o f the county by United Irish 
League supporters in response to the prominent role of local Irish Volunteers on the county 
board o f the GAA. In the context of the vehemence of the language used in the split in the 
GAA, along with the actual violence in towns across the county, the Rising became perceived 
by many o f the combatants as a showdown between the two groups: The rural tenant farmers 
of the Irish Volunteers based around the town of Athenry, versus sections of the urban poor, 
many of whom had relatives fighting at the front, combined with the noticeably more 
respectable local elites of the UIL whose strength was based in the towns of Loughrea, 
Galway and Ballinasloe. The sheer intensity o f the ill-feeling that the split exposed in parts of 
the county partially explains the ferocity of the reaction to the rebels in the same areas and it 
was widely believed that the rural Volunteers were marching across the countryside to take 
control o f the towns. For many nationalists, the Volunteers’ strength and the belief that they 
were heavily armed and intent on occupying the garrison towns presented a very frightening 
scenario given the depth of local enmities, Hence, the belief that they had to be defeated by 
any means necessary, lest they look to settle old scores with their bitter rivals. In reality, the 
situation was somewhat different than later described by the nationalists of Galway and given 
Mellows’s command it is highly unlikely that local people would have been harmed in any 
way. The psychological effect that the threat posed to the respectable elites of the towns 
explains their alarm and paranoia but their reaction also reflected a significant degree of bluff.
In early 1915 the police reported that ‘Cummer and Turloughmore are in a state of 
disturbance and terrorised by secret society and moonlighting gangs.’21 Whilst secret societies 
were no doubt active in the area, the situation had become volatile due to the fall out over the 
split in the Volunteer movement and the subsequent bravado of some local leaders in
21 Cl monthly report, west Galway, February 1915, CO 904/96.
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provoking a number o f riots and shootings. Local tensions exploded early in the New Year 
when a riot broke out in Turloughmore after publican and district Councillor Patrick Murray 
proclaimed himself a pro-German at a social gathering in the village, subsequent to which the 
police were attacked and fourteen men sent for trial for rioting and assault. Some of Murray’s 
supporters were shot at on the way home, with two men sustaining wounds and three houses 
attacked by armed men.22 In the months following the disturbance, numerous gun attacks took 
place in the district, with violence peaking in March when the police reported that ‘a strong 
faction has been organised to crush Murray and William O ’B rien /23 The provision of extra 
police merely contained the situation, and the authorities later noted that whilst 
‘Turloughmore has been kept in order by the large force o f police, the elements o f disorder 
are there and the slightest relaxation of police watchfulness will result in crim e/24 The riot 
had a sequel known locally as T he battle of Murray’s Fort’ when police were caught in a riot 
in Turloughmore village as rival Volunteer companies attacked each other from their 
respective public houses. The RIC were forced to fire over the heads o f the groups and police 
and rioters suffered severe head injuries as stones, hurls and other objects were used as 
weapons. Once again, a large number of Murray’s supporters were later arrested and sent for 
trial. The number o f extra police in the area had to be greatly increased in the ensuing months 
with the county inspector later noting that ‘at Turloughmore and Cummer, the peace is only 
protected with incessant police vigilance, and no less than two head constables and fifty extra 
police have been drafted into an area o f a very few square m iles/25
At Craughwell police had been closely monitoring a long running feud between the local UIL 
and land agitators led by Fenian, Tom Kenny. The feud had involved numerous gun attacks 
over a number o f years and had been the source o f intense bitterness, virtually dividing the 
community for many years.26 The dispute had its origins in a disagreement within the local 
UIL over the boycott of a local grazier with the more moderate faction opposing the strident 
campaign of the local secret society. The row had involved a series o f gun attacks, faction 
fights and boycotting and continued for a number o f decades afterwards. By 1915, the 
permanent presence of extra police in the area had tempered the violence. However, in the
22 Connacht Tribune, 13 February 1915.
23 Cl monthly report, west Galway, April 1915, CO 904/96.
24 Cl monthly report, west Galway, May 1915, CO 904/96.
25 Cl monthly report, west Galway, May 1915, CO 904/97.
26 See Campbell, Land and Revolution, pp 161-62.
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fallout from the dispute the local UIL had been split, with a rival Sinn Fein cumann founded 
and the village and parish torn apart by the bitterness on either side.
The GAA in county Galway also broke into rival organisations following the split in the 
Volunteer movement. The dispute was prompted, it was claimed, by the secessionists, owing 
to the undue influence of secret society men on the County Board of the GAA. The reality had 
more to do with the intense bitterness, particularly in the Gort and Loughrea areas, over the 
role o f the Athenry Volunteers’ involvement in secret society activity and resentment at these 
individuals’ subsequent control of the GAA in the county. The administration of the GAA in 
Galway, and hurling in particular, was strongly influenced at an administrative level by 
members o f the IRB, who were also senior Irish Volunteers. Following the split in the 
Volunteer ranks, the bitterness in the county resulted in the majority o f clubs and officials in 
south Galway breaking away in late 1915 to join the short-lived National Gaelic Athletic 
Association, which had a small number of registered clubs, mainly from Wexford and Dublin, 
who had also split from the GAA for political reasons.
In 1915 the county board of the Galway GAA consisted of ten men, six o f whom were 
amongst the most prominent IRB men in the county. (It is very possible, if not highly likely, 
that the remaining four men were also IRB members.) Patrick Murray of the Turloughmore 
dispute, William Cannon of Tuam, Stephen Jordan and Larry Lardiner o f Athenry, and 
George Nicholls o f Galway Town, were all committee members as well as prominent Irish 
Volunteer organisers and the Chairman of the Board, Tom Kenny, the former head centre of 
the IRB in the county.27 There had been heated exchanges at county board meetings for a 
number o f years, as south Galway members in particular, resented the role o f Kenny and the 
authority he exercised over the organisation. This resentment cannot be detached from local 
political wrangling and the fact that Kenny’s main detractors were from the Loughrea club, 
where the UIL still had considerable local support, was no co-incidence. The split in the 
movement was precipitated by the failure of any of the south Galway executive to attend the 
AGM of the County Board in Athenry, thus excluding themselves from any representation on 
the board for the coming year. The following month a letter appeared in the Connacht Tribune 
that was to begin a lengthy and bitter exchange o f views. Noting that the National Gaelic 
Athletic Association had held their initial meeting in Wexford a representative o f the rebel
27 Connacht Tribune, 7 April 1915.
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south Galway executive wrote, ‘latterly we have watched with the heartiest approval their 
efforts to rid the association of an incubus, which is steadily and surely ruining it.’28
Shortly afterwards, the south Galway executive announced that they were taking steps to 
arrange a match against the Dublin NGAA club Kickhams, to be played in Loughrea. At a 
following meeting, Martin Ward, of the Loughrea club, who was also a UIL town councilor, 
head of the Town Tenants Association and close associate o f William Duffy MP, told a 
gathering o f delegates:
The old enthusiasm  for the game was gone, owing to the way it was run by one or two men in 
county Galway. This was not to be wondered at, as the principal it was m anipulated under was 
wrong; using their position to inculcate into the minds o f  young men doctrines, which at this 
crisis in our history, should not as much as be mentioned am ong th e m .29
The Galway affiliate o f the NGAA was officially founded in early August, comprising ten 
south Galway clubs. Whilst the county board o f the GAA was clearly dominated by the IRB, 
the ‘rebel’ executive was dominated by representatives o f the UIL. O f the seven member 
executive, at least four men were prominent UIL representatives, with Martin Ward, Thomas 
Coen and James Mulkerrins, all Rural District Councillors and Brendan Cawley, a prominent 
UIL activist from Craughwell, acting as treasurer. The ten clubs involved in the breakaway 
group continued to play matches exclusively amongst themselves for a number of years 
afterwards, although the movement died out in 1918. On a national level only a small number 
of breakaway clubs from Sligo and Kildare ever joined with the Wexford, Dublin and Galway 
clubs, and the association folded a number o f years later. However, the ten clubs that did 
break away in Galway represented a serious challenge to the association in the county and the 
lasting bitterness of the affair soured an already tense situation, which added extra vigour, as 
if more were needed, to local political rivalries.
28 Connacht Tribune, 29 May 1915.
29 Connacht Tribune, 10 July 1917.
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That the Sinn Fein insurrection was so quickly put down and that it was confined to so few 
districts outside the metropolitan area, must be ascribed to the fortunate arrest o f Sir Roger 
Casem ent and the failure o f the German ship to land the required arms and am munition. There 
is no reason whatever to believe that if these arrangem ents had not miscarried, the Irish 
Volunteers in any county would not [sic] have held back. In fact, the evidence is all the other 
way.**
The first shots o f the East Galway Rising were fired at 7.20 a.m. on Tuesday morning when a 
group of rebels numbering up to one hundred men attacked the police barracks at 
Clarinbridge. On reaching the village, the Clarinbridge and Killeeneen companies were 
reinforced by Volunteers from Gort. They immediately cut telegraph poles, blocked the main 
road through the village and partially destroyed the bridge in the town. A group of Volunteers, 
some as young as seventeen, rushed the door o f the police barracks and successfully gained 
access. The four policemen remained upstairs and managed to reinforce the first floor o f the 
building and the young inexperienced Volunteers, uncertain of what to do next, gave the 
defenders enough time to load their weapons and open fire, forcing a partial retreat. The local 
parish priest, Fr Tully, who was saying mass in the village when the attack began, pleaded 
with Mellows to call off the attack, but he refused and called for the barracks to surrender. 
After a few hours o f sniping at the building, Mellows realised the attack was futile and the 
main body of rebels moved about seven miles further up the Galway road to Oranmore, 
leaving a small force behind, keeping the building under intermittent fire all day. They took 
with them three local R.I.C. men who had been caught unawares whilst out on patrol.31
As the rebels approached the village of Oranmore, they were joined by the local Oranmore 
and Mar.ee companies. When word reached the town of the large group approaching the 
village, the four local constables barricaded themselves into the barracks. About thirty-five, 
rebels approached the building and tried to rush the door and were greeted with a fusillade of 
rifle fire from the reinforced windows above. When Mellows approached the door and
30 Cl monthly report, east Galway, May 1916, CO 904/61.
31 Constables Malone, Donavan and Manning became the first prisoners of the rebel force. Constable 
Manning had attempted to escape when confronted by the Volunteers and had received shotgun 
wounds to the face, which were later treated in the convent in Clarinbridge.
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demanded their surrender, he was greeted with more revolver shots. The building was then 
kept under intermittent fire all afternoon, until Sir Andrew Armstrong and a contingent o f the 
Connacht Rangers arrived by special train, along with a section o f Special Constables and 
RIC to relieve the beleaguered barracks. A five-minute fire fight ensued as the security Forces 
charged down the main street at the rebels’ position and wounding a Volunteer in the thigh.32 
At this stage the Volunteers had commandeered a number o f motor cars, vans and traps, as 
they had been stopping and commandeering any vehicles that approached the barricades all 
day. The drivers were usually taken prisoner before being released after a short time. The 
rebels brought Constable McDermott, whom they had managed to seize in the town, along 
with them. Rather than face the infinitely better armed troops, they evacuated the village in 
their vehicles and retreated toward Athenry.
Meanwhile, companies from Derrydonnell, Newcastle, Athenry, Cussaun, Rockfield, 
Kilconieron, Kiltulla, and Killimordaly, had been turning out in large numbers at the Town 
Hall in Athenry and over three hundred men were now milling about preparing bombs and 
equipment. Frank Hynes, Captain of the Athenry Company explained:
They called in all the peelers from the outlying stations and occupied ail the houses in the 
vicinity of the barracks and made an attack on the barracks impossible. The only thing we 
could do was prepare to defend ourselves in case of an attack. About one dozen armed men 
remained in my house during the night. On Tuesday night we decided to retreat towards 
Oranmore and meet Mellows and his contingent and leave it to him to decide what was best to 
do.33
Mellows decided that they should move their camp a couple o f miles west of the town to the 
Athenry agricultural college, cutting telegraph wires in the area, tearing up a section of 
railway track and commandeering foodstuffs on the way.34 As the rebels regrouped at their 
new camp, they heard the first boom from big guns o f The Gloucester in Galway Bay. The
32 In his brief account of the Rising for the 1966 edition of Capuchin Annual, Mattie Neilan states that 
Ryder later died from his wounds. Neilan was a prominent Volunteer who took part in the Rising, later 
becoming a Fiannia Fail TD. Ryder does not appear to have been deported afterwards and I have so far 
failed to find any other information on him. However, Neilan was quite elderly by then and there are 
several inaccuracies in his account, Capuchin Annual (1967), p. 324.
33 BMH, WS 446 (Frank Hynes).
34 BMH, WS 344 (John Broderick).
shelling o f the coast between Oranmore and Castlegar, which continued all week, began on 
Tuesday afternoon. The shells were landing harmlessly in open country but the effect on the 
atmosphere in the rebel camp and the people in the countryside was immense. The rebels 
believed that their ‘gallant German allies’ had actually arrived and that the booming that they 
could hear was the sound of a naval battle between German U-boats and the British Navy.35
The new rebel camp was now a hive of activity, and morale amongst the men was high with 
Cumann na mBan putting on a dance show for the men at night.
Many men who had not been in the Volunteers at all joined up to fight and all were in the best 
of humour and full of pluck. Several priests, including Fr Daly of Athenry, visited the farm 
and heard the men’s confessions. Food was plentiful, and the people of the county were very 
generous in supplying baked bread, milk, e tc.36
Frank Hynes, an IRA officer from Athenry, explained the Volunteers’ actions at this point:
Anyone reading this account would be inclined to think that we were acting in a rather 
cowardly manner -  why did we not attack the barracks in Athenry? Why did we keep 
retreating, etc? The Volunteers who were out in Galway numbered between five and six 
hundred. We had about fifty full service rifles and about thirty rounds for each rifle, about one 
dozen pikes and a good many were not armed at all, so that if we wasted our ammunition on 
attacking the barracks, we had nothing to fight with after that.37
Meanwhile, about six miles east o f Galway town, the Claregalway and Castlegar companies 
billeted for the night at the small village of Cammore to await orders from Mellows at 
Athenry. When news of the rebels gathering at Cammore crossroads reached Galway town at 
around four o ’clock on Wednesday morning, a large group of Special Constables and RIC 
formed a convoy of fourteen cars and drove to Cammore to confront the rebels.38 As Colonel 
Bodkin, and DI Heard arrived, they were immediately fired on. The confrontation at 
Cammore pitted many of the men from either side o f the Volunteer divide in Galway town
35 BMH, WS 298 (Ailbhe O’Monachain).
36 BMH, WS 298 (Ailbhe O’Monachain).
37 BMH, WS 446 (Frank Hynes).
38 BMH, WS 714 (Thomas Hynes).
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that had been involved in the original violence following the split in 1914. Mick Newell 
recalled the scene:
The enemy advanced up to the cross roads and Constable Whelan was pushed by District 
Inspector Heard up to the wall which was about four feet high, the District Inspector standing 
behind Whelan and holding him by the collar of his tunic. Constable Whelan shouted, 
6surrender boys, I know ye all.’ Whelan was shot dead and the District Inspector fell also and 
lay motionless on the ground. They got back into the cars and went in the direction of 
Oranmore.39
Following the skirmish, the insurgents made their way to Athenry joining up with their 
comrades before they marched south. They took with them Constable Walsh, whom they had 
captured at the police hut at Lydecan. Late on Wednesday, over six hundred rebels marched in 
military formation from Athenry to Moyode castle, located between Athenry and Loughrea, 
arriving around seven or eight on Thursday morning.40 The camp was a hive of activity, with 
local visitors coming and going and parties of Volunteers heading out to investigate the local 
countryside for intelligence and supplies.
However, the officers were unhappy with the capacity o f the old mansion to withstand an 
assault, as the group now numbered around six hundred and fifty men, and they were 
beginning to have difficulty keeping everybody fed .41 Hunger began to affect morale, forcing 
Mellows to address the men on Thursday night, asking anybody who wasn’t happy to leave. 
‘Some men for whom there was no arms, decided to go home and one whole company went 
away.’42
The earlier euphoria was beginning to fade as the sobering realisation sank in that it was only 
a matter o f time before they would have to face infinitely better equipped British troops.43 
Their chances of putting up any kind of defence with so few arms were hopeless and rumours 
were circulating in the camp of the imminent arrival o f heavily armed troops. These were
39 BMH, WS 342 (Michael Newell).
40 BMH, WS 343 (Janies Barrett).
41 BMH, WS 344 (John Broderick).
42 BMH, WS 298 (Aiibhe O’Monachain).
43 BMH, WS 344 (John Broderick).
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taken even more seriously when the source of many of them was Tom Kenny himself. Kenny 
had been riding to the rebel camp all week with dispatches. Frank Hynes explains:
We will give the bearers of these false rumours the charity of our silence, but one in particular 
who was responsible for most of them was a very prominent republican and a member of the 
l.R.B. up to Easter Week. This man did his best to get us to give up and go home and have 
sense. We called an officer meeting and I’m afraid that one or two of our officers were 
anxious to take him seriously and take his advice and go home. Liam got disgusted and said he 
would not disband his men. He handed over command to Larry [Lardiner] but Larry would not 
disband them. Liam, after about an hour took over again.44
The battle for the hearts and minds of the men was now under way between the outsider 
Mellows, and the Fenian, Kenny, and by this time, Kenny was deeply resentful of his new 
adversary. Nonetheless, the train lines had now been repaired and it was obvious to the 
military that a nationwide rebellion was not going to occur. They could now afford to spare 
troops from the capital and on Friday heavily armed companies o f the Sherwood Foresters 
began arriving at Loughrea. Late on Thursday night the rebels left Moyode and marched south 
to Limepark, an old shell of a big house, near Peterswell. On Friday night, the Volunteer 
command decided to change camp and go towards County Clare and attempt to join up with 
the Clare Volunteers. It was rumoured that large forces o f British troops were concentrating in 
Athenry and Galway, intending to surround Moyode.45 Fr Feeney, who had been with the 
Volunteers all week, was now joined by Fr Fahy from Maynooth, and the pair pleaded with 
Mellows to disband his men before the military encircled them.46 When Mellows refused their 
pleas, Fr Fahy managed to persuade him to allow him to put his case to a meeting o f brigade
44 BMH, WS 446 (Frank Hynes).
45 On the way past Craughwell, some of the rebels entered a local house and dragged Edward Willis 
from his bed. Willis was an employee of Christopher Kearns, a ‘gentleman farmer’ from Oranmore, 
who had boarded The Gloucester to help direct the shelling of the coast. Willis was most likely in the 
town to glean information on the rebels’ movements with the help of the local National Volunteers 
Willis actually lived in Oranmore and his presence in Craughwell would have raised the Volunteers’ 
suspicions that he was staying with local National Volunteers to gain information on the situation in the 
countryside in order to report back to the authorities. He was taken prisoner and brought to Limepark, 
where he was later released unharmed. The Galway Express, 6 May 1916.
46 Fr Fahy who was based at the College in Maynooth, was visiting the area and had been staying in the 
Esker Monastery, near Athenry. Fr Fahy was a republican and remained active in the republican 
movement all his life.
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officers. Michael Kelly later recalled the scene: ‘A discussion then arose mainly between the 
priest and Mellows. The priest was trying to convince the meeting that, as the Volunteers in 
Dublin had surrendered, the Galway Volunteers should disperse, as their position was 
hopeless in the circumstances.’47
After Fr Fahy spoke, Mellows as officer commanding, addressed the men. He said he would 
not order them to disband without a fight, but that he was willing to put it to a vote and let 
them decide their own fate. Only Mellows and his deputy O’Monachain voted not to 
disband.48 Mellows accepted the decision of his men to leave but he refused to the end to give 
an official order to do so. Fr Fahy remembered, ‘Mellows was very depressed, the news from 
Dublin upset him greatly.’49 Frank Hynes recalls the final conclave:
There was terrible confusion but in the midst of all of it, the rifles were thrown here and there 
on the ground. When Liam had bidden goodbye to all of them he came up to me, ‘Goodbye 
Frank’, he said. My only fear was that he would object to me staying with him. I said, ‘Pm 
staying with you.’ The poor man took my hand in both his and said, ‘God Bless you’. I knew 
he appreciated it very much because I think I was the only one who bothered about his fate.50
The Rising in the county had ended up in an undignified farce with Mellows’s men 
abandoning his command and returning home. The Volunteers had generally respected both 
private property and local people throughout the week but their spirits were broken by the 
prospect of facing fully armed British regiments against which they had no hope. The 
humiliation for the men involved was immense and the episode became a source o f ridicule 
by their rivals in the county for many years to come. Events beyond the control o f the large 
force controlled their destiny from the beginning and the feeling of hopelessness at the end of 
the week would shortly turn to anger at their betrayal by others in the community. The sheer 
size o f the Galway Volunteer force and their unchallenged control o f the countryside could 
not prevent their detractors from accusing the Galway force o f simply opting not to attack the 
central barracks in the county, choosing instead to wait aimlessly in Athenry whilst a large 
garrison of police remained isolated only a mile or so away. Despite combatants’ later claims
47 BMH, WS 1,564 (Michael Kelly).
48 BMH, WS 383 (Rev Thomas Fahy).
49 BMH, WS 383 (Rev Thomas Fahy).
50 BMH, WS 447 (Frank Hynes).
mthat lack of arms dictated the course of events, the group were unwilling to attack other 
garrisons in the area and those they did attack in Clarinbridge and Oranmore, they were 
unable to take.
Despite having a detailed picture of events in the county, and whilst acknowledging the 
potential possibilities inherent in the Volunteers’ plans, the degree to which Mellows could 
have pushed his men into outright insurrection remains seriously doubtful. The key issue 
relates to the degree to which the Volunteers were genuinely prepared to carry out a serious 
offensive insurrection. The evidence strongly suggests that, apart from Mellows and a handful 
of officers, the Galway Volunteers were not committed to enduring the dangers of a sustained 
campaign and many of the men were completely unaware o f Mellows’ intentions when they 
mobilised. Once the consequences of his aspirations for the Rising became clear, rank and file 
Volunteers simply lost their appetite for violence, deserted Mellows and returned to their 
homes. The affair became, in every sense, a bitter episode for all those involved.
3.4 The Nationalist Response
The course o f events in Galway town during Easter Week highlights the extreme diversity of 
reactions to the Rising from within the county. When Pearse's mobilisation order arrived late 
on Easter Monday 1916, the town company, racked with anxiety and confusion, was simply in 
no state to mobilise.51 On Tuesday morning, the police moved quickly and arrested any 
known republicans including most o f the Volunteer officers and senior IRB men in the town. 
Thomas Hynes remembered, ‘as far as the city was concerned it was too late to do anything.’52 
Thomas Courtney, who had been racing around the town trying to get his men out, found 
fellow Volunteers were unwilling to obey his orders, and many could not be found.’53 When
51 Frank Hardiman recalled, ‘When the Rising took place, the Volunteers in Galway city were in such a 
weak position, that it was almost impossible for them to act as a unit. The uncertainty of the Rising 
coming off, left the Volunteers without an opportunity of arranging to link up with the country units.’
BMH, WS 406 (Frank Hardiman).
52 Only three men from Galway left to join Mellows at Carnmore, a boy named McDermott, James 
Corbett and one other. The strong IRB cel] in the college did not take part in the Rising, as they were 
home on their Easter Holidays. BMH, WS 714 (Thomas Hynes), .
53 He later recalled, ‘I think it was on Wednesday evening, I am not sure, I went to the house of the 
Captain of the Galway Company and asked him to go as far as Castlegar for me, as 1 had to go to
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the news o f the rebel activity in the countryside reached the town on Tuesday morning, it 
created a sensation amongst the townsfolk. Finding themselves cut off by rail and road from 
the rest o f the country and telegraph lines cut, rumour and mild hysteria quickly took over. 
The vast majority o f the people had little sympathy with the rebels and as word spread that the 
Volunteers were massing in Oranmore, they were viewed by many as a hostile invading force. 
The Connacht Tribune reported that 'on a muggy day, [with a] dry atmosphere and serene 
sky’:
All in all, one had the vague sense that one was living through an historic hour. That for a day, 
the town was recalling the stirring days of Emmet and Lord Edward Fitzgerald and the men of 
’67, with this taking of police barracks, these conjectural Risings and marchings and the same 
dependence on primitive methods, the dispatch rider and rumour, which characterised the 
happenings of those times, as if we were not living in the days of motorcar, telegraph and 
telephone.54
All premises closed their doors and all work in the town came to an immediate stop. Amid 
fears o f a repetition o f the events in the capital, the post office was placed under armed guard 
by the military and a notice of martial law was posted in the window stating that 'all licensed 
premises in the urban district of Galway were to remain closed forthwith and all persons were 
to remain indoors between the hours of five p.m. and eight a.m.’ Members of the National 
Volunteers were explicitly exempt from the emergency regulations. The military curfew was 
greatly resented by the townsfolk and added to the sense of hysteria in the air.
Men were no longer able to concentrate their.minds on their business, and all and sundry fairly 
took to the streets. Comfortable merchants went about and the streets were filled. Preparations 
were made for meeting and repelling the invasion and anxious people found themselves 
drifting towards the Square and looking in the direction of Oranmore and keeping a close eye 
from Foster street.55
Spiddal. He refused, I then asked him to get some of the Galway Company to just take a message for 
me. He said he would not and told me I was a fool and did I think I was mad. My younger brother
called at the home of three Volunteers and asked them to come to my home. Each said he would, but
none of them came. On Thursday evening before 1 was taken to the barracks, 1 saw one of them 
deliberately avoid me.’ BMH, WS 447 (Thomas Courtney).
54 Connacht Tribune, 29 April 1916.
55 Connacht Tribune, 29 April 1916.
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The situation was further inflamed by misleading reports in the Connacht Tribune and the 
Galway Express. The two papers repeatedly reported the number o f insurgents gathered at 
Athenry as being in the region of two thousand men, with reports of multiple deaths at 
Carnmore and Oranmore. The sense of isolation from the rest o f the country was heightened 
by the barricades on the country roads to the east o f the town. The Volunteers at Oranmore, 
Clarinbridge, Kilcolgan and Athenry had been hijacking motorcars and horses since Tuesday 
morning preventing reliable news from the surrounding countryside coming into the town, 
and dissuading motorists from the town venturing into the countryside. The situation was 
further compounded when a section of the train line to Dubjin was ripped up near Oranmore 
by members o f the Athenry company.56
On Tuesday afternoon, a public meeting was called by the Urban District Council and 
attended by over one hundred people in the Town Hall. Originally convened for the council 
chambers it was moved to a larger venue to facilitate the large crowd that turned up. A 
‘Committee for Public Safety’ was formed to liaise with and support the security forces and to 
organise a concerted civilian response to the crisis. The Committee was chaired by Martin 
McDonagh and citizens were urged to offer themselves for enrolment as Special Constables, 
or ‘in any way the authorities may consider, they may be useful in the present crisis’. The 
‘Specials’ as they were known, acted as a reserve force for the police all week and were 
armed and under military command. The Galway Express later thanked forty-seven local men 
whom they claimed were on duty that night and ‘did much to relieve the police and give the 
latter a well deserved and much needed few hours’ rest.’57 Numerous speeches were then 
made about the crisis enveloping the town and a series o f fiery diatribes denouncing the rebels 
delivered. Significantly, Thomas Kenny began by decrying that ‘they had been plunged into a 
civil war,’ before going on to compare the actions o f the rebels with the bravery o f the Irish 
soldiers at the front. O f the Dublin Rising, he informed the audience:
A whole lot of men had, according to rumour, tried to hold up the public offices, the post 
office and places like that in Dublin. What on earth effect that could have in ten or twenty 
years as regards the government of this country? Was it not a million times better to allow
56 Connacht Tribune, 29 April 1916.
57 Galway Express, 29 April 1916.
Another speaker continued ‘Irishmen as a rule are not fools but unfortunately a large number 
of young men throughout the country were led astray by gentlemen who should know better 
and he for one did not blame the ignorant countrymen’.59 The Reverend Davis agreed, adding 
‘They have been led into a trap and it is only afterwards when a settlement is reached, that 
they will realise what a mistake they have made in supporting the hot heads of the country.’60 
Another speaker then expressed the widespread sentiment that the rebels were 4a movement 
not for the benefit o f Ireland but for Prussia and the leaders must be taught a lesson they’d 
remember for ever.’6' Professor Kinkead also saw the hand of the Germans at play in the 
county and believed, ‘the whole thing was engineered with German money, for German 
purposes.’62 Thomas McDonagh, who could not understand the actions of the rebels, was 
quick to point out that ‘the farmers of this country were treated better than those o f England 
and Scotland. Just now the tenant farmers of Ireland were more prosperous than the farmers in 
any other part of the world and yet they rose up in rebellion, it was lamentable.’63
Throughout the week, meetings of the ‘Committee for Public Safety’ were held on a daily 
basis at the Town Hall as the security operation in the city passed from the police to the 
military under the supreme command of Major Craig.64 As the week progressed there began to 
be growing concern and anger at the perceived isolation o f the town and much debate centred 
around potential food rationing measures, with talk o f an impending bread famine should the 
town remain cut o f from the rest of the country. Later that night, a group of National 
Volunteers under Captain J.P. McNeill donned their old uniforms and a column of forty men 
marched around the town in military formation with rifles and bayonets, which had earlier 
been provided by the military. As the week progressed, police reinforcements who had 
evacuated the surrounding countryside, poured into the town. Their numbers were later 
boosted with the arrival on Thursday of cars carrying one hundred and fifty RIC men, who
58 Connacht Tribune, 29 April 1916.
59 Connacht Tribune, 29 April 1916.
60 Connacht Tribune, 29 April 1916.
61 Connacht Tribune, 29 April 1916.
62 Connacht Tribune, 29 April 1916.
63 Connacht Tribune, 29 April 1916.
64 Connacht Tribune, 29 April 1916.
things to go on the way they had been and not try and take the law into their own hands.58
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had been sent from Belfast. Groups of citizens were now responding to the crisis as best they 
could. Dr Sandys, divisional surgeon and Mr O ’Dockery, Superintendent, in conjunction with 
St Johns Ambulance Brigade, took over houses, and a full staff o f trained nurses and 
assistants were in readiness, day and night, to attend any injured troops that may be brought 
in.65 The Galway Express in an article entitled ‘Our Citizen Army’ reported midweek that 
‘One of the brightest spots in the present lamentable affair is the manner in which Galway 
civilians have risen to the occasion. A fine citizen army of special constables, dispatch riders, 
assistants in first aid, etc, have cheerfully given their service to the local authorities in their 
hour o f need.’66
Volunteer Thomas Courtney remembered ‘Specials’ following him about wherever he went, 
so much so, that, he had to enlist a ‘young buck’, teenager Michael Heffernan, to report to 
him the movements o f the Crown Forces. Courtney recalled, ‘All roads were guarded, they 
would not let a boy o f four out of the town, everybody was on the streets talking about a rebel 
army that was to march on the town. It was rumoured that rebel villages were to be shelled 
from ships in the harbour and that a submarine with arms was to land in Rosmuc.67 By 
Wednesday, the RIC in the city aided by the Special Constables had rounded up a motley 
crew of any republicans they could find in the town. Michael O ’Droighneain, the IRB 
organiser from Furbo; solicitor George Nichols, IRB centre for Galway; Frank Hardiman of 
the Town Hall; Padraic O’Maille, later Ceann Comhairle of the First Free State Dail; and 
Professor Steinberger, a German linguistics professor from the College, were among the most 
prominent. The men were tied up and loaded onto open top vehicles before being paraded 
around the streets for the entertainment of the local people. Frank Hardiman remembered 
being set upon and beaten by ‘rowdies’ at a number o f places and O ’Droighneain recalled 
being frequently abused and pelted with mud by passers by.68
On Tuesday afternoon, a Navy vessel, The Gloucester began bombarding the coastline and the 
sound o f the first four-inch shells increased the already heightened sense o f anxiety in the 
town. The boom of the big guns could be heard by the rebels twelve miles away in Athenry, 
further fuelling rumours that Oranmore and other ‘rebel villages’ were being bombarded.
65 Galway Express, 29 April 1916.
66 Galway Express, 29 April 1916.
67 BMH, WS 447 (Thomas Courtney).
68 BMH, WS 374 (Michael O’Droighneain); BMH, WS 406 (Frank Hardiman).
Another rumour, that a naval battle was taking place between German U-boats and the British 
Fleet was widely believed. In fact, the shells were deliberately targeted at open countryside 
and were never used on civilian or urban targets as the authorities lacked any concrete 
intelligence on the rebel activity in the countryside. The shelling provoked terror in the 
communities living around Galway Bay and people quickly began to flee to the perceived 
safety o f the town. The Galway Express reported, ‘Even as we write, streams of peasant 
refugees are fleeing from their once peaceful homes in the tranquil countryside from 
Oranmore to Castlegar and vicinity to seek the shelter denied to them by the folly of their own 
friends and neighbours.’ The paper later reported that the village of Oranmore ‘is being 
gradually deserted until now it is a veritable wilderness’. Thomas Kenny, editor o f The 
Connacht Tribune assured his readers, ‘The citizens can now rest in perfect security ... this 
vessel could easily turn its guns, not only on Oranmore, but on Athenry, with the most 
effective results.’69
As the week progressed more British Naval vessels arrived in the Bay and on Wednesday a 
man-of-war arrived carrying a company of Royal Munster Fusiliers. The men were given an 
official welcome at the quay by members of the ‘Committee for Public Safety’ before making 
their way to Renmore barracks amid the cheers o f the townsfolk and by Friday, there were 
five Navy vessels in the bay and the prisoners from the town were put on board the cruisers.70 
On board The Gloucester was another group of prisoners including a group of unlucky Aran 
Island men had been dragged out of the water and taken prisoner when their currach was 
overturned whilst bringing turf out to the islands. On Friday the prisoners, minus the island 
men, were transferred to the sloop, The Snowdrop and brought to Cobh before being deported 
to England.
Later that week, Thomas Courtney recalled being told by a sailor that the Navy and ‘the 
specials’ had worked out a trap for the rebels, that had it worked, would have resulted in 
massive loss of life. Although the shelling of the coastline had a serious psychological impact, 
it had not resulted in any actual devastation.71 Stark, who was on the Cruiser, told Courtney, 
‘The shells they were firing were only four inches. It was a trick to cod the shinners, to make
69 Connacht Tribune, 29 April 1916.
70 The Sayonara, The Guillemot, The Gloucester, The Laburnum and a sloop ship, The Snowdrop.
BMH, WS 714 (Thomas Hynes).
71 The Connacht Tribune did report that a cow had been 'knocked out’ in Ballindooley.
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them think that they had not the range to hit the Dublin road.’ 72 In fact, the cruiser had larger 
shells on board which had the range to hit the village and the surrounding countryside, 
including the Galway road. The plan was that after continuous firing along the coastline, the 
rebels would be lulled into a false sense of security and believe that they could safely advance 
into the town. The cruiser had the larger shells trained onto the road in anticipation o f the 
Volunteers falling into their trap.
Frank Hardiman, who was a prisoner aboard The Laburnum , confirmed Courtney's story in 
his account o f his ordeal.73 He stated that the firing was being directed on the ship by two 
special constables, Christopher Kearns, from Oranmore, and Leslie Edmonds from the town. 
Using their local knowledge of the area, the men were picking out the most obvious approach 
route the rebels might take, to allow the military to get their range in advance of an approach. 
Meanwhile, another group of Special Constables were on the roof of the Railway Hotel in 
Eyre Square. Using the panoramic view of the bay that the roof of the hotel afforded, the 
‘Specials’ were relaying back to the cruiser the accuracy of their firing and any rebel 
movements on the horizon.
On Wednesday ‘The Committee for Public Safety’ passed a resolution calling for the 
‘crushing, by every means possible’ of the men, who for many of them, had been their former 
comrades in the Volunteer movement:
That we, this public meeting declare the action of ill advised persons in the county, who have 
at a time when the valour of the Irish troops has done so much to shed glory on the Empire, 
chosen to shock and outrage public opinion by bloodshed and civil strife. That we now declare 
our opinion, that the advice of Mr John Redmond indicates the course which true political 
wisdom shows to be right and we call on all the authorities and the people of Galway to crush 
by every means possible, the efforts of the disaffected fanatics and mischief makers.74
The lack o f solidarity for the country ‘refugees’ in the ‘besieged’ town was now emerging in 
other ways:
72 BMH, WS 447 (Thomas Courtney).
73 BMH, WS 406 (Frank Hardiman).
74 Connacht Tribune, 29  A pril 1916.
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A new type o f  blockade has been established in Galway. Country people coming from the 
direction o f the recent Volunteer activities have been forbidden to bring any provisions or 
household supplies home, lest any o f these com m odities would find their way to the enem y’s 
camp. The procedure appears to be an effective one.75
By Friday, people began to return to work and the market resumed as usual in the Square. On 
Saturday public houses were given permission to open and schools were ordered to resume on 
Monday. In the morning, a reconnaissance force of ‘specials’ ventured out in twenty-five 
motor cars alongside seventy-five Royal Munster Fusiliers and fifty RIC.76 Using their local 
knowledge o f their old comrades and their villages, they ventured as far as Kilcolgan and 
Cammore, picking up anyone suspected of involvement in the Rising. By the weekend, the 
military had ventured to Athenry and found it deserted by the rebels. At the daily meeting of 
the ‘Committee for Public Safety’, a telegram of thanks was read out from the military police 
and the committee was updated on the ‘round-up’ operation now in progress. A clearly 
relieved Martin McDonagh declared ‘We are with the authorities in this unfortunate matter.’77
Like the press nationwide, local newspapers were uniform in their condemnation of the 
Rising. The Tuam Herald described it as ‘a melancholy exhibition of midsummer madness’ 
and the rebels as, ‘degenerate sons.’78 In an editorial ‘Poisoning the Well’, the Connacht 
Tribune explained, ‘The reason we are not all rebels is that we are fortunately sane enough to 
see that the dreams of Ireland as a sovereign state is hopeless. Attached to England, we must 
remain.’79
Organised support for the authorities was not limited to the city. At Craughwell, 
Turloughmore and Loughrea, the National Volunteers came out in force to aid the local RIC.80 
Forty National Volunteers manned the barracks in the village in shifts throughout Easter 
Week and the Tuam Herald commended ‘The Craughwell men's loyalty to Ireland,’ and 
claimed the locals ‘knew well little mercy would be shown some of them, if those lunatics got
75 Galway Express, 6 May 1916.
76 Connacht Tribune, 29 April 1916.
77 Connacht Tribune, 29 April 1916.
78 Tuam Herald, 20 May 1916.
79 Connacht Tribune, 27 May 1916.
80 Galway Express, 6 May 1916.
into the village’. The paper concluded that the rebels had been frightened away by the loyal 
Craughwell men as ‘cowardice would not allow those German hirelings enter where they 
knew a warm reception awaited them’. The paper seemed rather surprised at this turn of 
events, noting that Craughwell was ‘previously considered a hell on earth by men who knew 
it not’.®1 At Turloughmore, an area ‘not noted for its loyal sentiment’ the Galway Express 
reported, ‘not withstanding its reputation, the village and district of Turloughmore were quiet 
during the Rising. The local Corps of National Volunteers armed themselves and placed their 
services at the disposal of the police. 582 Similarly in Loughrea:
The National Volunteers met and helped the police and but for them, the town would have 
been handed over to the crowd for m ischief and worse. Their conduct is eminently credible, 
for it was a trying and courageous act on their part. Great credit is due to M r William Duffy 
M.P. and his local and patriotic helpers for having got his men to show themselves true 
National Volunteers and not the advance guard o f  looting and m urderous G erm ans.81
The Rising in Galway is significant because o f the counter mobilisation of nationalists which 
it inspired as well as for amount of men who remained under M ellow’s command for the 
whole week. There were other mobilisations nationwide but they did not generate the same 
level of support or opposition, although there are clear echos o f the situation in Galway 
elsewhere in the country. The most significant o f these were at Wexford, Kerry and in county 
Meath, although many towns such as Tyrellspass, Drogheda and Coalisland witnessed smaller 
mobilisations.84 In Wexford, a smaller, although clearly analogous scenario to Galway 
developed, when six hundred Volunteers mobilised in Enniscorthy taking possession of the 
town and declaring it a republic. Communications into the district were severed and the 
Wexford to Arklow train held up by armed men. The men were armed with about two 
hundred shotguns and proceeded to search homes in the area in pursuit of arms, whilst 
provisions were commandeered from local stores. The police remained inside their barracks 
throughout and no concerted effort was made to capture the building or its defenders. 
Meanwhile at nearby Wexford town, over two hundred ‘Hibernians, National Volunteers and
81 Tuam Herald, 20 May 1916.
82 Galway Express, 13 May 1916.
83 Tuam Herald, 20 May 1916.
84 See Townshend, Easter 1916, pp 214-43.
85 Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland, p 82.
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Unionists’ collected and took possession of the police barracks in anticipation o f an attack
or
from Enniscorthy.
In Kerry two constables were shot and wounded at Firies RIC hut near Farranfore by a local 
Volunteer acting alone. At Tralee, over three hundred Volunteers assembled awaiting orders 
from Austin Stack. One hundred army reinforcements were sent for from Dublin and when 
arms failed to materialise the men simply dispersed.87 Police reported ‘great unrest’ in the 
Tralee and Caherciveen districts during the week, necessitating, the drafting of extra police 
into the area. Meanwhile, in north county Dublin, the Dublin Brigade’s 5th Battalion led by 
Thomas Ashe engaged Crown Forces at Ashbum after aggressively pursuing a police 
convoy.88 The small column managed to pin down a mobile detachment o f RIC men killing 
eight, whilst sustaining two causalities themselves.
In April 1966, a few weeks after the IRA blew up Nelson’s Pillar on Dublin’s O’Connell 
Street, a small plaque erected to the memory of Liam Mellows and his comrades who took 
part in the 1916 Rising in the west was destroyed in a small explosion at Limepark in South 
Galway.89 The destruction of the plaque served as a stark reminder that even fifty years later, 
the Rising remained a contentious issue for some sections o f local society. Earlier in the year, 
the Connacht Tribune had published a series o f vitriolic letters questioning the patriotic merits 
of the local insurgents.90 The reputation of one local leader in particular was attacked and in 
turn vigorously defended with claims and counter claims o f fascist and communist sympathies 
on the part o f the antagonists. The fact that the Rising in the county still provoked intense 
local debate was indicative of the competing interpretations that still existed in the popular 
memory.
86 Royal Commission on (he Rebellion in Ireland, p 83.
87 Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland, p 81.
88 See Townshend, Easter 1916, pp 214-21.
89 Connacht Tribune, 23 April 1966.
90 During April and March of 1966, ‘Moyode man’ wrote to the paper questioning the contribution to 
the rebellion of the people of the town of Loughrea and whether a planned parade to commemorate the 
Rising was appropriate. In reply ‘Loughrea man’ contrasted the ‘true patriotism’ of the Redmondites of 
the town with the ‘brain washed communists’ who ‘slaughtered a cow for Ireland above at Moyode.’ 
The debate prompted a number of replies from ex-combatants over the course of the next two months.
Conclusion
The Volunteers who went out in 1916 in Galway were overwhelmingly drawn from the land 
hungry small tenant class. In a study of two hundred and eleven o f the Galway insurgents in 
1916, sixty-nine per cent were small farmers or their sons, with the next largest group being 
skilled and unskilled labourers.91 Thus, it was not incorrect to label the Rebellion, as local 
commentators did at the time, as an uprising o f the small farmers.92 The rural class component 
of the Irish revolution is not merely a sub plot to a greater narrative o f the independence 
struggle. In ascertaining what stance members o f the different rural social groups would be 
likely to adopt on the issue of redistributive land reform, Anthony Varley identified three 
main groupings in east Galway.93 Graziers and shopkeepers were the dominant economic 
force in the county and along with the remnants o f the landed gentry they formed what he 
termed the Targe scale/estate agricultural class’. Below the capitalist land class came the 
‘rising tenant farmer class’ composed of fanners who had benefited from earlier Land Acts 
and in many cases consolidated their holdings over time through cautious management of 
their resources. At the bottom of the social ladder came the peasantry, eking out a harsh 
existence on small plots of economically unviable land. Within this group further distinctions 
can be drawn between subsistence peasants, commercial peasants, herds, labourers, landless 
labourers and so on.
Land has always had a value far beyond its economic potential in rural society. The struggle 
fought for the land in previous generations provided a crucial folk memory that motivated and 
guided the Volunteers in Galway in 1916. As Fitzpatrick notes, ‘the forms of liberation sought 
by potential social revolutionaries were likewise influenced by various visions o f history. The 
campaign for tenants’ rights and land purchase assumed that the current occupiers of land 
were entitled to recognition as proprietors on the grounds that their ancestors had been 
expropriated by planters and forcibly reduced to the status o f insecure tenants... The rhetoric 
affirming communal sovereignty over the nation’s soil and all its resources was a
91 Campbell. Land and Revolution, Tables 13, 14 and 15, pp 186-7.
92 Connacht Tribune and Tuam Herald, both, 29 April, 1916.
9j Anthony Varley, The Politics o f  Agrarian Reform; The State, Nationalists and the Agrarian Question 
in the West o f  Ireland (unpublished PhD Thesis, Southern Illinois University, 1994), p. 96.
122
commonplace o f radical nationalism.’94 In Galway, the Land War had a double significance, 
as David Jones has stated, 'the significance of the Land War was that it created an elaborate 
and sophisticated organisational structure within the peasantry.95 Due to the unresolved nature 
of the land question in Galway, it was the inheritor o f these structures, the Galway secret 
society, which had been assimilated by the IRB in the county, which was then subsumed into 
the Volunteers, that 'went out’ in 1916.
Class tension was always a feature of rural Ireland and whilst the cultural carnage of the Great 
Famine has been well documented, some aspects of the countryside had not changed as 
radically as one might expect. As Padraig Lane points out, 'in the 1890s Redmond, Dillon and 
William O ’Brien regarded any labourers’ movement as a divisive element in national 
affairs.’96 'Lane argues that it was this attitude toward the labourers by the rural middle class, 
the tenant farmers and their political representatives, which lay at the heart o f the matter and it 
can be seen that throughout the various stages of the land struggle, their attitude was in the 
main inimical to the labourers.97 With farmers increasingly enmeshed in the market system, 
the rural poor were becoming more reliant on shopkeepers whose increasing prominence in 
political life had serious repercussions for the rural poor. While the stereotype of the rural 
‘Gombeen m an’ has often been portrayed in Irish fiction, it has received less academic 
attention. Liam Kennedy has explained that the rise of traders was one o f the most significant 
features of post famine rural Ireland.98 Caught on one hand by their inability to challenge the 
stranglehold o f the graziers on available land and yet reliant for credit on shopkeepers who 
were also often graziers themselves, the rural poor felt an increasing antagonism toward the 
mercantile elite. The antagonism manifested itself in the campaign o f the local UIL in Galway 
town against the local co-operative movement who threatened the livelihoods of the traders in 
the town.
94 David Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands (Oxford, 1998), p. 30.
95 David Seth Jones, ‘The Cleavage between Graziers and Peasants in the Land Struggle 1890-1910’, in 
Samuel Clark and James Donnelly Jnr (eds.) Irish Peasants: Violence and Political Unrest, 1780-1914 
(Dublin, 1988), p. 386.
96 Padraig Lane, ‘Agricultural Labourers and the Land Question’, p. 109.
97 Lane, ‘Agricultural Labourers and the Land Question’, pp 112-3.
98 Liam Kennedy, ‘Farmers, Traders and Agricultural Politics in pre-Independence Ireland’ in Clark 
and Donnelly Jnr, (eds.) Irish Peasants (Dublin, 1998), p. 342.
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This lack of solidarity within rural society was a defining feature of the revolutionary era in 
Galway. The fiction of tenant/labour unity during earlier struggles was of paramount 
significance during the revolutionary era, albeit reconfigured as a cleavage between the 
middle and strong farmers, and the small tenants and landless. During the Land War there was 
a conviction among the poor that the fanners had come into their inheritance due to the toil of 
the labourers, and a belief among the farmers that the labourers would undermine their hard 
fought security. The rural poor, who were the foot soldiers in the UIL’s campaigns of 
agitation in the 1890s and again during the ranch wars of 1906-1909, believed that the 
graziers had come into their inheritance on the backs of the small tenants and that the 
accumulation o f large grazing farms was fundamentally immoral. It was the small tenants 
who then formed the backbone of the Volunteers and the suspicion of the movement prevalent 
among the larger farmers and merchants was fuelled by their particular interpretation o f the 
Rising and their adversarial positions in relation to grazing system, as much as from any 
particular political ideology or conviction.
The War had a number of serious repercussions for those on the economic margins of rural 
Ireland. The suspension of emigration dashed any hope of escape from the grinding poverty of 
the countryside for many young men, putting serious pressure on already hard-pressed 
families. Secondly, land purchase was effectively stopped as the work of CDB was put on 
hold. The Board withdrew its impending offers for 159 estates comprising 267,5000 acres and 
subsequently either rented some of this land to graziers or simply left it idle." For those 
whose hopes rested on consolidating their holdings from this land, it represented a grave 
disappointment. Furthermore with the economic boom which was generated by rising prices, 
demand for land increased and because land was now more valuable, eleven-month leases 
became more expensive. In addition, ordinary people increasingly had to pay exorbitant prices 
for their foodstuffs as profiteering became a serious problem.100 Thus, the economic boom that 
the European conflict brought to the stronger farmers and traders further exacerbated the 
ongoing economic marginalisation of the rural poor which was an inherent product of the 
grazing system.101
"  Dooley, The Land For The People, p. 32.
100 Reports of the prosecutions of shopkeepers for selling food stuffs, eggs and potatoes in particular, 
for more than the maximum price set by the government abound in local papers during the period. The 
profit reward was more than enough to offset the government fines.
101 The two most prominent members of the ’Committee for Public Safety’, Martin McDonagh and
Following the Rising, Mellows, O’Monachain, and Kenny managed to make it safely to the 
U.S. Most of their men had no option but to return to their homes and await the inevitable 
round up by the Crown Forces, In the course o f the following week over four hundred men 
were picked up and interned in Galway jail before being transported to Richmond Barracks in 
Dublin. Eventually three hundred and twenty-eight Galway men were deported to Frongoch, 
with the vast majority released at Christmas 1916. In other parts of the country the prisoners 
who returned home after the Rebellion were received with a rapturous welcome in an Ireland 
utterly transformed. In Galway, this was not the case and many of the men and their families 
suffered genuine hardship upon their return. Martin Dolan, who knew many of the men 
involved, interviewed surviving veterans of the Galway Rising for the fiftieth anniversary 
edition of the Connacht Tribune. He noted ‘No bonfires awaited them, the Galway men 
returned almost unnoticed and made their way quietly to their homes.’102 Thomas Ruane of the 
Claregalway Company was granted early release from Lewis prison on the grounds of ill 
health. His police file notes, ‘there was no one to meet him off the train in Oranmore, just a 
couple o f family members but no supporters.’103 Frongoch had been an ordeal for many of the 
men and Patsy Furey from Oranmore and Martin Rooney o f Kilcolgan both died within a few 
weeks of their return.104 Like so much of what went on in Galway, their stories were not 
recorded in any history o f the Rebellion.
In Athenry when the men returned they were subjected to a boycott enforced by the local 
shopkeepers and the large farmers. Gilbert Morrissey O/C Athenry Company put the 
subsequent inactivity o f his area during the War o f Independence down to demoralisation 
following the Rising;
Many o f  the Volunteers suffered a great deal o f  hardship subsequent to the Rising o f  1916. At 
that time, a great many o f  them were in poor circum stances. M any o f  them were breadwinners 
for their families and, when they were imprisoned after the Rising, the families suffered. The 
neighbours at that time were not as sym pathetic as they becam e as the fight progressed, and 
there were no funds out o f which provision could be made towards the amelioration o f their
Joseph Young were both substantial traders who benefited from the war time economic boom.
102 Connacht Tribune, ‘The Stoiy of the Easter Rising in Galway’, 24 April 1966.
103 Dublin Castle Special Branch Files, CO/904/214/388 (Thomas Ruane).
104 Connacht Tribune, ‘The Story of the Easter Rising in Galway’, 24 April 1966.
conditions. M any o f  them belonged to the farming class. At the time they were not as well o ff 
as they becam e two or three years later. They could not afford to pay hired men and their 
crops w ere left unattended until the general release in Decem ber 1916.105
The fact that crops were left unattended while prisoners were in jail is startling and Morrissey 
is surely playing down the issue in his account. Small farmers would not have paid people to 
work their land as the seasonal work of the farm would have been carried out by neighbours 
and relatives. Thus, the local people either would not help or were prevented from helping in 
the usual way. It must also be remembered that the vast majority of these men would have had 
extended local family connections and it is inconceivable that their relations would not help 
unless physically prevented from doing so. Athenry also had a history o f this type of boycott 
and a sustained campaign was previously carried out in the town against the foundation of a 
local co-operative.106 When questioned about the attitude of some o f the people of Athenry to 
the returning prisoners, one man whose father and uncle were deported angrily told this 
researcher, ‘that’s what they were like round here, they didn’t want any change at all in the 
way things were’.107 As discussed in Chapter Five, the area between Athenry and Loughrea, 
which, according to police reports, had continually been the most disturbed part of the Ireland 
between 1908 and 1916, was virtually quiescent during the War of Independence. During the 
entire conflict, no member of the crown forces was killed in the east Galway grazing belt and 
there were no engagements between the security forces and the IRA in the districts of 
Clarinbridge, Killeeneen or Athenry during the entire course of the struggle for Independence. 
However, in contrast, between 1913 and 1919, seven of the ten-man ‘Dunsandle Grazing 
Land Committee’ were wounded in separate gun attacks in the Athenry countryside.108
Whilst the reason for this dramatic turn around is complex and will be fully discussed in the 
proceeding Chapter, disillusionment was a major factor as Dick Morrissey explained. The 
Fleming family from Clarinbridge illustrate the cynicism and sense of defeat which followed
105 BMH, WS 1,138 (Gilbert Morrissey).
106 Interview with Dermot McNamara, Ballydavid South, Athenry (11 January 2005).
107 Interview with P.J. Moran, Park, Athenry (15 December 2005).
108 Anthony Varley, ‘A Region of Sturdy Smallholders? Western Nationalists and Agrarian Politics 
During The First World War’ in Journal o f  the Galway Archaeological and Historical Society, Vol 55,
(2003), p, 127, Daly of Dunsandle was the archetypical bad landlord of Irish folklore. Dunsandle is 
located roughly equidistant between Loughrea, Athenry and Craughwell, coincidently, the secret 
society’s main stronghold.
Easter Week. Michael Fleming Senior was an old Invincible and secret society member who, 
when news o f the Rising arrived, dug up his private store o f weapons and joined Mellows at 
Killeeneen, along with his six sons. Following the Rebellion, all seven were deported to 
Britain and on returning home, two of his sons, Joseph and Tom, had to emigrate to the U.S. 
to find work, becoming active in the American labour movement, never returning home. John, 
Patrick and George remained in Ireland but took no further part in the struggle for 
independence leaving just young Michael, ‘The Rover’ active with the Volunteers after 1916. 
Michael fought on the republican side during the Civil War and like so many of his comrades 
was forced to emigrate to England in the early twenties. He died from a fall on a building site 
and remains buried in an unmarked grave in Middlesbrough. For the rest of his life, Michael 
Fleming Senior never discussed the Rising with his family.109
Political rivalries in the county were permanently poisoned as a result of the events of Easter 
Week. The previous antagonisms between the two groups now became further intensified and 
it ultimately negated any chance that republicans would attract or indeed court the support of 
the urban UIL in the coming years. Thomas Kenny o f the Connacht Tribune and other local 
UIL leaders were never forgotten for their role in aiding the authorities and the tenor of their 
statements denouncing the insurgents. Leslie Edmunds, who directed the shelling of the 
Oranmore coastline from the British cruiser, in an attempt to lure the insurgents onto the 
Galway road, was eventually shot dead by the Castlegar IRA on 23 July 1922 and his body 
dumped in the same area where the shells had originally landed. The Irish Times which 
recorded the murder wrote that Edmunds was simply unlucky to drive into an IRA ambush set 
up for the Free State army and was mistakenly killed in the belief that he was an army 
officer.110 The reality was, of course, very different, and Edmonds had remained a wanted man 
by the local IRA since the Rising. The Rising was a bitter, local dispute which earned them 
the contempt and ire of the local respectable elite. The general attitude amongst some in 
Galway to the men and women of 1916 is best illustrated by a remark overheard by Frank 
Hynes while on the run after the Rising with Mellows. Whilst hiding in the thatch of a 
sympathetic farmer’s cottage, a local farmer who was visiting commented upon Mellows and 
the rebels, ‘that’s the kind of them around here, the first gobshite that comes around and that
109 From an interview with Mrs Lou Early (nee Fleming), Greystones, Co Wicklow (25 September 
2006).
1,0 Edmunds was a senior inspector for the CDB for Galway and Clare. He was an Englishman, a 
Protestant and a professed loyalist. See Irish Times, 28 July 1922 and 1 August 1922.
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Chapter Four: Social and Political Change, 1916- 
1920
This chapter discusses the growth of Sinn Fein and the IRA following the 1916 Rising and 
examines the evolution of the movement in the context of a resurgence o f agrarianism 
between 1918 and 1920 and the prevalence of sectarian intimidation in certain districts o f the 
county. The police were ostracised earlier in Galway than in other parts o f the country and the 
boycott of the RIC became widespread in the spring o f 1918. The collapse of the RIC in rural 
areas created a brief window of opportunity for those harbouring resentments against local 
graziers to use all manner of intimidation to force the division of estates. In this context, 
Townshend has stated, The real dynamism which underlay the national movement remained 
the pressure o f population on land and land hunger exacerbated by the cessation of emigration 
seems to have remained the only forces which generated large scale popular action.” 
However, whilst Dooley has examined the extent o f what he has termed the ‘New Land War’ 
nationwide, the degree to which it impacted upon the growth of the republican movement has 
not been fully explored.2 Whilst the Volunteers benefited from the militancy of the rural 
tenants in 1918, the sheer scale of the wave of agitation in 1920 forced republicans to create 
local mechanisms for resolving land disputes. The consequent shift in the movement’s stance 
from being at the heart of small tenant agitations, to essentially playing the role o f ‘honest 
broker’, ultimately cost republicans the active support o f sections of the community who 
increasingly turned away from the national struggle.
Deep seated resentments resurfaced across both urban and rural divides and the Protestant 
community in the east of the county was subjected to a sporadic campaign of intimidation in 
the town o f Ballinasloe. The precise role o f elements o f the republican movement in this 
campaign was not always clear but both republicans and traditional nationalists contributed to
1 Townshend, Charles, Political Violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance Since 1948 (Oxford, 
1983), p. 339.
2 Terence Dooley, The Land for the People, The Land Question in Independent Ireland (Dublin, 2004) 
pp 26-56; See also, Fergus Campbell, Land and Revolution, Politics in the West o f Ireland, 1898-1921 
(Oxford, 2005), pp 240-57.
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an increasingly menacing atmosphere, where local Protestants became unjustifiably identified 
with the extremism o f northern loyalism. A number of Protestants had their property attacked 
with many others receiving threatening notices warning them to leave the district. In the face 
o f such hostility, a number of families fled, some eventually resettling in the north of Ireland. 
The intimidation did not amount to a systematic campaign of violence, although it is possible 
that some events which took place in the town have not come to light.
Whilst religious antagonism was confined to one part o f the county, violence directed against 
petty landlordism was widespread, concerted and part o f a co-coordinated pattern of unrest. 
This conflict only ended with the intervention of the republican movement, who effectively 
came to the rescue o f many larger farmers in early 1920. The new land arbitration courts 
attracted support from all groups in society, although it was the small tenants who were often 
the most dissatisfied with their rulings. The success of the courts, along with the party’s new 
conservative stance in relation to trade unionism and the co-operative movement represented 
a decisive period o f transition for republicans and their supporters in Galway. From March 
1920 onwards the movement began to gain the respectability and cross-class support that the 
national leadership required. The increasing endorsement of Sinn Fein, as opposed to the 
IRA’s campaign of violence, became dependant on the movement restoring ‘law and order’ 
and protecting the traditional rights of property. The irony was not lost on the small farmers 
that the ultimate success of the movement which they had created now depended upon the 
leadership jettisoning the pre-eminent agenda of the tenants: the fight for the land.
In the context, the 1918 election in Galway represented a triumph for the local over the 
national, the rural over the urban and the small tenant over the large farmer. The most striking 
aspect about the election result, apart from the margin o f Sinn Fein’s victory, was its 
inevitability. The UIL collapsed in 1917 as Sinn Fein spread rapidly across east Galway. The 
destruction of the National Party generated intense bitterness within the urban wing of the 
movement who could not conceive of republicanism as a legitimate political force. The most 
respectable sections o f local society now faced the stark realisation that the new politics of 
Sinn Fein was not going to go away and the old party was gone for ever. Writing in his 
memoirs in 1919, William O’Malley, former MP for Connemara, described the 1918 election 
as ‘the treachery and ingratitude of a people’.3 ‘I felt humiliated as an Irishman... the Irish
3 William O ’Malley, Glancing Back: 70 years' Experiences and Reminiscences o f  Press man,
people are essentially a jealous and an envious people.’4 O’Malley had lived in Brighton since 
the 1890s but he was adamant that many of the original Sinn Fein supporters in Galway 
sprang from T he English garrison -  that is the parties that got all the government jobs, from a 
judgeship to a police inspector, they were the sons of policemen, land agents, grass farmers or 
land grabbers.’5 The motivation for the radicals was clear to O’Malley and he had no illusions 
about the ‘truth’ behind the revolution:
If you are a m em ber o f  some secret society, you can pay o ff  some old score you owe to some 
o f  your friends. You can shoot a policeman, who sent you one time to ja il for some offence, o f 
which, o f course, you were perfectly innocent. And if  you are sufficiently intelligent to 
appreciate the high policy o f the intellectualists who run Sinn Fein, you will be able to satisfy 
all and sundry that you are a patriot o f the first order.6
O’M alley’s memoirs reflect many of the motifs which became commonplace amongst 
nationalists who remained appalled at the rise of the Volunteers. The legitimacy of the new 
movement was never accepted by many in Galway whose opinion was often coloured by 
social snobbery and republicans’ perceived lack o f deference towards established social and 
political institutions, which suggested an immoral and criminal conspiracy bent on social as 
well as political upheaval. Stephen Gwynn’s memoirs illustrate similar themes and his 
bemusement at the political culture of the ordinary people of his Galway constituency often 
bordered on contempt. Like his fellow Galway MPs, Hazleton and O’Malley, Gwynn chose 
not to live in the west and he later regretted his involvement in nationalist politics and was 
dismissive about the extent of his original ideological commitment:
I found during the first days o f our Galway election the old hands looking at me 
apprehensively and I gathered from them afterwards that they were waiting for the m om ent 
when I should walk away in disgust and say that this was no work for a man o f letters. Perhaps 
they were right. Later on, I had ample acquaintance with disgust. But at this first encounter, 1 
felt m yself to be pleasantly diversifying the experiences o f  a literary m an.7
Sportsman and Member o f Parliament (London, 1933), p. 188.
4 O ’Malley, Glancing Back, p. 138.
5 O ’Malley, Glancing Back, p. 134.
6 O ’Malley, Glancing Back, p. 141.
7 Stephen Gwynn, Experiences o f a Literary Man (London, 1926), p. 304.
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Aloof from the ordinary nationalists of Galway and often contemptuous o f their political 
opinions, Gwynn and O’Malley exemplified many of the less attractive traits of the Irish 
Parliamentary Party that were to contribute to their ultimate demise. The roots of Sinn Fein’s 
victory in Galway were not to be found in any post-1916 nationalist ebullience; the Rising had 
provided republicans few added kudos and left them open in some quarters to ridicule. The 
events o f Easter Week were constantly used to taunt republicans and they were often derided 
by their opponents for their perceived lack of ‘manliness’. The real impetus for the republican 
revival following the Rising came from a small dedicated IRB leadership who were able to 
build up a genuine grassroots party structure, which successfully filled the political and 
cultural void left by the Nationalist Party as they became increasingly divorced from the 
common culture o f ordinary people.
That Sinn Fein, through less than two years o f local organisation were able to politically 
transform the county, was indicative of the moribund state o f the National Party. If the new 
party was decidedly proletarian, it was no more representative than the rural UIL had been 
and they had consistently provided genuine representation for the small tenants in the past. 
The difference now, however, was that whilst Sinn Fein’s enemies had been regarded as 
‘shoneens’ and ‘transistionists’, ‘the garrison and its hangers on,’ the National Party and its 
supporters were now increasingly associated with pro-British policies such as recruitment to 
the British army and more pointedly, with the conscription threat. The tenuous links between 
the urban and rural wings o f the UIL and the obvious tensions and contradictions therein had 
been strained to breaking point by the changed political reality brought about by the War and 
for many people, concerned with day-to-day farming issues, the National Party had in many 
respects, forgotten which side it was supposed to be on. The War was the greatest disaster that 
could have befallen the party due to the threat o f conscription and the cessation of land 
purchase by the state. The UIL elites became increasingly concerned with the conduct of a 
War for which ordinary people had little sympathy or understanding. The party’s 
abandonment of the local at the expense of the national and international left them vulnerable 
to any legitimate nationalist challengers.
The conscription threat and to a much lesser extent, the German plot were factors in the rise 
of Sinn Fein, but they were not seminal ones. The Parliamentary Party, in the eyes o f many 
local rural political activists, simply no longer represented their views. Stephen Gwynn’s 
opinions on conscription, discussed later in this chapter, graphically illustrate this point. The
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moribund state of the local organisation was, in many ways, a natural result of a particular 
stasis that their dominance of national politics had created. More particularly, however, the 
increasing chasm between the Parliamentary Party and the reality o f constituents’ opinions 
represented a betrayal of ordinary UIL activists who had provided tireless local leadership, 
which had in many ways, been abused by the party elite. People had moved on in terms of 
their aspirations both for themselves and for their country and the National Party was no 
longer capable o f reflecting that reality. During the 1918 election, the dichotomy between the 
old and the new was constantly emphasised. The Tuam Herald concluded that the National 
Party’s failure was a result of ‘an absence o f legislative performance, the presence of 
questionable transactions, the stoppage of land redistribution and the failure of the Home Rule 
settlement:’8
The country was certainly getting ahead o f the old men and old minds, which o f late 
controlled its policy and regulated its destiny. Their methods o f  m anaging matters was not 
calculated to inspire public confidence and their manipulations o f  elections by the m achinery 
o f so-called conventions, o f which we had wretched instances in this county were bound, 
sooner or later, to be resented by the people whose trust was sorely abused. The closed 
borough arrangem ent under which no independent young man dared to attem pt to get into 
their ranks o r was likely to be accepted by their party bred a sort o f ‘work incapables’ who 
were fast losing public confidence.9
Sinn Fèin’s success was not merely handed to them by the political establishment and the 
party’s strength was that it genuinely represented rural people’s aspirations, although 
generally ill defined, whilst many of their elected representatives had little connection or 
interest in the common culture of ordinary people. What was remarkable in Galway, however, 
was the ease with which Sinn Fèin completely replaced an admittedly exhausted and 
moribund party. The 1918 election represented the démocratisation o f local politics in the 
county as the local now became centre stage in politics and ordinary people connected with 
politics in a meaningful way. When local Sinn Fèin leader George Nichols was elected 
Chairman of the Galway County Council in June 1920, the event had a deeper significance 
than similar occasions in other counties. The very first action of the new County Council was 
to rescind the original Council resolution condemning the local rebels who went out in 1916.
8 Tuam Herald, 4 January 1919.
9 Tuam Herald, 4 January 1919.
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Nichols began his speech amid a respectful silence that quickly erupted into thunderous 
applause when his audience could no longer contain their joy. He began his speech by noting 
in emotional terms: T h e  ignorant country boys have learned a lot since 1 9 1 6 /10
4.1 The Rise of Sinn Fèin
The strategy of the republican movement in Galway evolved considerably in 1917 following 
the return of over three hundred prisoners from Frongoch. From a situation prior to the Rising, 
where many Volünteer companies continually defied and antagonised both the local police 
and the elites o f the local political establishment, the movement now adopted a less visible 
approach with drilling and parades practically ceasing and public disorder avoided, as far as 
possible. The new emphasis amongst the leadership now switched to the building up of the 
Sinn Fèin organisation in advance of the 1918 election, whilst drawing as little attention to 
itself as possible. This work was principally organised by a small number o f energetic officers 
led by Stephen Jordan from Athenry, who traveled around the county organising local 
meetings to found parish cumainn. From having only one cumann at Craughwell at the 
beginning of the year, by December 1918, there were fifty-one in Galway with a total 
membership of 3,044." The GAA, also led by Jordan as County Chairman, played a crucial 
role in energising the party with hurling matches and other GAA competitions allowing 
republicans to defy the police and military regulations and hold recruitment and 
organisational meetings under the guise o f Gaelic games.
The police noted the connection between Sinn Fèin and the GAA, and hurling in particular, 
believing The GAA is only a cover to advance the interests o f the Sinn Feiners,’12 and ‘it is 
most disloyal and it gets at the young as no other organisation d o e s /13 The degree to which 
the GAA could also be used as a vehicle for all manner o f local disputes, however, is 
illustrated by a hurling match held in Corofin in April 1917. Peter Glynn, a member o f the 
IRB, assembled hurling teams from Anabally and Annaghdown, without letting the police 
become aware of the meeting beforehand. The game was held in order to show the authorities
10 Galway Express, 26 June 1920.
11 Cl monthly report, west & east Galway, December 1917, CO 904/104.
12 Cl monthly report, west Galway, May 1917, CO 904/103.
13 Cl monthly report, west Galway, May 1917, CO 904/103.
that he could assemble men without the knowledge of police and to let other tenants who got 
farms from the CDB on the Blake property at Corofin see the strength of his following. Glynn 
wanted to acquire a farm on this property but he failed to do so ‘on account of his history and 
antecedents5.14
The GAA in the county had suffered a serious blow following the Rising with the deportation 
o f many of the organisation’s leading members. At the start o f 1917, the police noted that ‘the 
GAA has not regained its old activity and importance since the Rebellion’.15 However, in only 
a matter of months, the organisation was growing in parallel with Sinn Fein, in a manner 
previously unheard of. The authorities initially interpreted the lack o f Sinn Fein activity in the 
early months o f 1917 as fear amongst the Volunteers of being re-arrested and District 
Inspector Rutledge noted:
The released Sinn Feiners are keeping out o f sight, having a great dread o f court martial. But 
they are still anti-British and would rise again if the Germ ans landed on this coast, not 
otherw ise, as they recognise the futility o f coming into conflict with the British Army without 
the solid backing o f German soldiers.16
The belief that a German landing in Galway was a real possibility and that the local 
Volunteers were preparing for such an event was firmly held by the local RIC who 
continually warned Dublin Castle that the Volunteers were quietly preparing for an invasion 
following their defeat in 1916. District Inspector Rutledge wrote to Dublin Castle in February 
1917, warning that ‘the rebels must have some information that the Germans are about to 
attempt a landing because that alone would move them now after the lessons they learned in 
April 1916.’17 The newly returned officers held their first meeting in April in the home of Fr 
O ’Meehan o f Kin vara where the movement was completely reorganised and the decision to 
adopt more subtle tactics seems to have been taken. The actions of the younger ‘Sinn Fein 
clergy’ became a source of much unease for the authorities at the time who noted;
The num ber o f  Sinn Feiners is growing in this county and younger members are beginning to
14 Cl monthly report, west Galway, April 1917, CO 904/102.
15 Cl monthly report, east Galway, January 1917, CO 904/102.
16 Cl monthly report, west Galway, January 1917, CO 904/102.
17 Cl monthly report, west Galway, February 1917, CO 904/102.
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show a spirit o f  defiance, egged on to it and stirred up by the younger members o f the Roman 
Catholic clergy. This policy at present is to supplant Redm ond’s party and they will succeed in 
Galway as they have succeeded in Roscommon and Longford ... They recognise the futility o f 
open rebellion but they think that much may be accom plished in other ways by a strong and 
determ ined party once the military law has been w ithdraw n.18
The District Inspector’s conviction that Sinn Fein would successfully supplant the National 
Party at the next general election is remarkable. At this time, in April 1917, there were still 
only two Sinn Fein cumainn in the entire county, one at Craughwell and a second one which 
had just been founded in Mountbellew. The ease with which a small number of Sinn Fein 
organisers could supplant Redmond’s organisation is indicative o f the moribund state o f the 
United Irish League, which was now practically non-existent, and in particular, the attitude of 
its local leaders. William Duffy and James Cosgrave, who actually lived in their 
constituencies, probably did more harm than good to their party in the long term. With his 
constant condemnations of the moral fibre of the farming community due to their reluctance 
to join the British army, Duffy became clearly associated in the popular mind with the 
conscription threat and he could eventually only command the support of his small loyal 
group o f supporters in the town of Loughrea. James Cosgrave, on the other hand, was far less 
active in local politics from 1916 onwards and he had possibly decided to retire from politics 
at this time. Gwynn, O ’Malley and Hazleton, as absentee representatives, neglected their own 
local party structures as they concentrated their energies elsewhere.
With the British government contemplating conscription for Ireland, the National Volunteers 
were by now practically non-existent. The National Volunteers in north Galway had refused 
to attend a public UIL meeting in Dunmore in January 1917, ‘for fear of drawing attention to 
themselves as recruits for the army.” 9 With police reporting that ‘recruiting for the army 
could not be worse’20 the conscription threat clearly provided a major boost to the republican 
movement and police believed that ‘it is the bedrock of the Sinn Fein movement, fear of 
having to join the army and fight in the war. It is this which attracts the young men in such 
numbers and keeps them together.’21 By July 1917, the UIL was ‘losing ground every day’22
18 Cl monthly report, west Galway, April 1917, CO 904/102.
19 Cl monthly report, west Galway, January 1917, CO 904/102.
20 Cl monthly report, west Galway, January 1917, CO 904/102.
21 Cl monthly report, Galway, July 1917, CO 904/106.
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and in September, the organisation was finally pronounced ‘practically dead in influence5.23
The intense bitterness between the rural companies o f the Irish Volunteers and the supporters 
of William Duffy in Loughrea town persisted and at a variety performance organised by the 
local ‘Sinn Fein clergy’ in May 1917, Duffy’s supporters disturbed the proceedings by 
‘chanting for the red, white and blue of England and by denouncing Sinn Fein’.24 The 
performers were then followed to their lodgings by a hostile crowd ‘shouting loyal 
expressions’. The manager of the company was eventually arrested after drawing a revolver 
on the advancing mob and sentenced to two months’ incarceration. Tense relations between 
the priests and the people of the town resulted from the incident.
Local political activists from both parties had to contend with the threat o f violence from their 
opponents, however, and in June 1917:
The dwelling house o f Martin Donnelan, M oycullen was fired into. No one was injured. The 
motive was to prevent Donnelan, who is a District Councillor from voting for M ichael 
M cNeill, Redm ondite candidate for the Chairm anship o f  the Galway District council in 
opposition to the Sinn Fein candidate, Thom as Ruane, Carnm ore, who took an active part in 
the Rebellion. McNeill was afraid to go on with his candidateship and withdrew and Ruane 
was elected Chairm an.25
The events o f Easter Week remained fresh in many people’s memories across the county and 
old scores remained to be settled. In December 1917, Luke Flynn was shot by raiders in his 
home near Galway. He had refused to hand over a shotgun to the Volunteers during Easter 
Week and Flynn had threatened to shoot the first man who tried to take it from him, A note 
from his sister to the police at Carnmore was subsequently found by the rebels who 
intercepted the girl as she made her way across country. Flynn was shot in the abdomen at 
close range and was lucky to survive the attack.26
22 Cl monthly report, west Galway, July 1917, CO 904/106.
23 Cl monthly report, east Galway, September 1917, CO 904/110.
24 Cl monthly report, east Galway, May 1917, CO 904/106.
25 Cl monthly report, west Galway, July 1917, CO 904/103.
26 Cl monthly report, west Galway, December 1917, CO 904/ 104.
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By July 1917, the Sinn Fein movement was spreading rapidly in the county with local 
cumainn springing up on a weekly basis. The engine of the movement remained young rural 
men guided by the younger local clergy, leading GAA officers and older Volunteer officers 
who were also IRB men. The growth of the movement was still limited to the rural poor, with 
‘no responsible men or persons with a stake in the country attending their m eetings/27 The 
police believed that the growth of the movement intimidated those who had not previously 
countenanced joining:
W hat is bad about the situation at present is that the older and more respectable people are 
getting afraid not to be Sinn Feiners. It m ust be rem em bered that these people have to live 
am ongst the Sinn Feiners, who are going through men and young priests and for the most part 
are bullies. The Sinn Fein policy here is to get a good grip o f  the county and when their 
num bers are very strong, they will see what they can do, and they can do a good deal by 
shooting at night. That is the Galway habit, firing at persons and firing into dwelling houses.28
The party received a further boost in September when, through some sleight of hand, they 
managed to acquire the unionist Galway Express newspaper. It was purchased by a party 
representative presenting himself as a unionist from county Monaghan.29 The confidence 
within the movement was now starting to manifest itself in new ways with the Volunteers 
being asked in secret meetings whether they would be willing to participate in future attacks 
on police barracks and lists of the willing compiled for the local leadership.30 In December, 
raids for arms began across the county with eight houses raided in Gort alone during the 
month and the District Inspector calling for military reinforcements to be sent to the area to 
‘eliminate the danger of an attack on Gort barracks, which I apprehend might take place on 
some favourable opportunity’.31
27 Cl monthly report, east Galway, November 1917, CO 904/104.
28 Cl monthly report, west Galway, July 1917, CO 904/103.
29 Cl monthly report, west Galway, September 1917, CO 904/104.
30 Cl monthly report, west Galway, November 1917, CO 904/104.
31 Cl monthly report, west Galway, December 1917, CO 904/104.
Conscription
As will be discussed in the next section, by April 1918 a new Land War was emerging across 
the east of the country, with cattle driving and forcible ploughing becoming common. In April 
much of this unrest ceased as ‘fear of conscription became the one subject occupying people’s 
minds-.32 Conscription quickly provided a new impetus for nationalist solidarity at a time 
when local society was at a turbulent crossroads, as Laffan has noted, ‘not since the days of 
O’Connell had Ireland been so united’.33 Now ‘all sections of nationalists joined together at 
conscription meetings and the most violent and seditious language was used’.34 The ‘ferment 
about the application o f conscription’ now meant that ‘all other matters have sunk into 
insignificance before this question and it has greatly upset the ordinary routine of life in many 
places. The people are all pledge-bound now to resist it by every means in their power,’35 In 
April alone there were eighty-two anti-conscription meetings across Galway and the general 
strike on the 23 April was rigidly observed throughout the county. As the crisis gathered 
momentum, the ranks o f the Volunteers became swollen with new recruits, many of whom 
had previously stood aloof from the movement. Sean O ’Neill recalled that the mercantile 
section of society in the Mountbellew area began to join the movement which they had 
opposed since the original split in 1914:
The well to do and former supporters o f Redmond and pro-British types were all now looking 
to the V olunteers and Sinn Fein for a lead. Bank clerks, excise men and such would come to 
me and discuss conditions in the trenches o f  Flanders and Gallipoli. A very large num ber o f 
‘would not be soldiers’ flocked into the local Volunteer Company. Indeed many o f  my new 
recruits were philosophers; they deemed it wiser to take their drill instruction from me, rather 
than from a British officer. And then there was the possibility that their skins might be saved. 
But when the threat o f  conscription passed, these footmen, land stewards, gardeners and 
servants, faded away like a freak snow shower in m idsum m er.36
The conscription crisis further alienated ordinary people from the state and as recruits
32 See next Section on the new Land War in 1918.
3j Laffan, The Resurrection o f Ireland, p. 134.
34 Cl monthly report, east Galway, April 1918, CO 904/105.
35 Cl monthly report, west Galway, April 1918, CO 904/105.
36BMH, WS 1,219 (Sean O ’Neill).
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continued to flock to Sinn Fein and the Volunteers, younger clergy became more prominent in 
denouncing the government. By June the conscription fear began to recede and cattle driving 
and forcible possession of land resumed on its previous scale and Sinn Fein now had a cadre 
o f revolutionary priests in the county who preached the benefits o f independence from the 
altar. Fr Brennan of Caltra was not an exception when he warned his flock not to have 
anything to do with the RIC, whom he referred to as ‘pimps and spies and a disgrace to the 
country that produced them5.37 Sinn Fein remained heavily involved in local agitations and 
although the rate of growth of the party slowed somewhat, it steadily increased throughout the 
year.
In May a further boost was provided to the movement with the arrest o f a number of leading 
local Sinn Fein members for the so-called ‘German Plot’. The ‘German plot1 involved the 
arrest of leading republicans across the country in connection with an alleged plot to enlist 
German aid for the independence struggle. Most of the men were deported to England under 
the Defence of the Realm Act and allowed to live openly. Many absconded and quietly made 
their way home. Most ordinary people saw through the government’s weak attempts at 
fabricating a counter insurgency plot and the authorities’ claims became a damaging exercise 
in public relations. Laffan has noted, ‘there was widespread scepticism in Britain and a total 
disbelief in nationalist Ireland, where the idea of a German plot was seen as outlandish and 
comical.’38 The Galway republicans arrested were George Nichols and Dr Bryan Cusack, 
Galway; Colm O’Gaora, Rosmuc; Thomas Ruane, Cammore; Stephen Jordan, Athenry; 
Michael Trayers, Gort; and Brian Fallon of Loughrea. Despite the lack o f credibility which 
the government’s claims engendered, the arrest o f the men and the subsequent deportation to 
England provided Sinn Fein with a boost in popularity.
j7 Cl monthly report, east Galway, May 1918, CO 904/106.
38 Laffan, The Resurrection o f Ireland, p. 145.
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As the summer of 1918 progressed and the fear of conscription passed, an increased military 
presence in the county ‘had a sobering effect’ and life returned to normal although the police 
still found it difficult to get the necessities of life in many places, ‘where local priests were to 
the fore as they attempted to make the RIC’s lives unbearable’.39 However, much of the tide 
of unrest had passed and ‘respectable people feel relief that the growing strain of Sinn Fein 
intimidation is broken.’40 The Sinn Fein party was now busy preparing for its first major 
election and optimism was high, ‘they appear to think that after the next general election they 
will have it their own way and that the people will rule.’41
Election meetings were held up and down the county amid almost total apathy on the part of 
the Parliamentary Party. This resignation on the part o f the established party was mirrored 
across the country where many sitting MPs decided the party’s cause was hopeless and chose 
to desert a sinking ship.42 The police noted that over 1,000 people attended a Sinn Fein 
meeting to hear Frank Fahey plead the case for a republic in Loughrea in November. The 
decision to hold his meeting in the ‘anti-republican’ town was a direct challenge to William 
Duffy who a few weeks later could only attract one hundred and fifty people to an election 
rally.43 A selection convention was called for the East Galway constituency but the party 
could not convince any party member to go forward, eventually leaving Liam Mellows 
standing unopposed. To observers in Galway, there was nothing surprising about the result of 
the 1918 election as the Sinn Fein landslide in the county, was apparent very early in the year 
and the United Irish League was a spent force before Sinn Fein began to mount a serious 
challenge. From having only 3,394 members at the start o f the year, the party had 7,486 
members across eighty-three cumainn by the time of the election and crucially their activists 
had a youthful vigour which their opponents simply had no appetite to match.44
The 1918 Election
39 Cl monthly report, east Galway, June 1918, CO 904/106.
40 Cl monthly report, west Galway, July 1918, CO 904/106.
41 Cl monthly report, west Galway, October 1918, CO 904/107.
42 Laffan, The Resurrection o f Ireland, p. 156.
43 Cl monthly report, east Galway, November 1918, CO 904/107.
44 Cl monthly report, east & west Galway, November 1918, CO 904/107.
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Attacks on Sinn Fein in the local nationalist press such as the Connacht Tribune and the Tuam 
Herald became more vitriolic as the election loomed. The tone of the criticism was generally 
vulgar and intended to ridicule and humiliate Sinn Fein and the Volunteers. It is instructive to 
briefly analyse the motifs of insult and petty humiliation employed by both sides. Anti-Sinn 
Fein rhetoric can be classified into four main categories. Republicans were:
1. Derided for their proletarian roots in the rural poor.
2. Accused of being too young and too immature to have legitimate political opinions. (It 
was continually pointed out that most followers of the new movement were too young to have 
played any role in the original Land War.)
3. Accused of being manipulated as part of a wider conspiracy by ‘pro-British reactionaries’ 
and were merely the puppets of ‘the crowbar brigade/ ‘freemasons’, ‘tories’ and the Orange 
Order.
4. Labelled physical cowards who lacked the courage o f their convictions as evinced by their 
opposition to the War effort and the events of Easter Week 1916.
At a meeting o f the Ballinasloe Board of Guardians, Mr Lynskey exhorted his colleague, 
Timothy Killeen, who had declared his support for Sinn Fein ‘to get rid o f these undesirable 
men in the Sinn Fein ranks who were making with them and voting with them, for these are 
the fellows that will sell you and sell Ireland and bring down bitter ruin. Put them in prison 
and hang half them.’ Mr Cahill then told the meeting that ‘Sinn Fein are only a crowd of 
gossoons who play football and hurley and now think they can run the country.’ 45 Following 
his victory in the South Roscommon by-election, the Galway Express labelled Count 
Plunkett, ‘a Tory and an Orangeman’ and ‘a silly old man who is dividing the people’46 whose 
victory was ‘achieved by an unlikely alliance o f Orangemen and freemasons.’47 The East 
Galway Democrat set a similar tone, noting that despite the best efforts o f ‘that Englishman 
Mellows,’ ‘the old leaders and the old methods will prove that the currency of idiots will not 
pass as genuine coin.’48 Prominent local UIL councillor P.S. McDonnell praised the people of 
Galway at a public meeting in April 1918, who ‘unlike the diehards, did not live in a balloon
,45 East Galway Democrat, 1 July 1917.
46 Galway Express, 17 March 1917.
47 East Galway Democrat, 1 April 1917.
48 East Galway Democrat, 30 November 1918.
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or go on chasing rainbows.149 At a meeting of the National Club in the town, O'Donnell 
referred to a previous remark by Louis O'Dea in which he called the members o f the National 
Party ‘slaves, place hunters and job seekers,5 noting that the munitions factory in Galway 
‘was stem full of those posing as hillsiders and heroes, the Prospect Hill gang. 550 The Galway 
Express hit back by labelling the National Party, ‘conscriptionists, treacherers, reactionaries, 
Tories, Orangemen and Dillonites.151 The East Galway Democrat described Sinn Fein as ‘the 
descendents of castle Catholics, rent office hangers on, toadies, flunkeys, grabbers, policemen 
and disappointed office seekers.152 The paper warned against the release of the Galway 
prisoners following the Rising noting that ‘the mad mullahs represented a danger to the 
country1.53 The paper later published an editorial on the rise of Sinn Fein under the headline, 
‘Suckling Youths1:
Big noises m ay be heard nowadays by suckling youths who have not so much brains as the 
head o f a pin. Entering into politics and trying to put political opinions down the necks o f  the 
people is becom ing sickening. A well-to-do farm er mentioned to us some time ago that he had 
changed his business from Ballinasloe to another town on account o f the babbling nonsense o f 
one o f  the class we have ju st referred to ... In our town, the wings o f shoneenism were always 
extended and under these wings clustered the brood o f the backboneless, fearing a fight at any 
time, they turned and scut. Is it to the care o f  such that our future is to be trusted? 54
The level o f bitterness in local political debate continued to centre on the Rising. At a meeting 
of the Loughrea Town Commissioners in 1920, a heated debate took place over whether or 
not to rescind the councifs original motion condemning the 1916 Rising. Local republicans 
argued for the motion to be allowed to stand, as it would ‘remain as a record of the treachery 
of, and as an indelible stigma on, the proposer, seconder and their supporters1. Martin Ward, 
who had been the original proposer, remained unabashed and claimed that ‘it was a good, 
practical resolution.1 ‘Practical treachery‘, came the reply, ‘it is sickening to be listening to a 
kaffir of your sort,1 retorted Greene. ‘I never went out marauding at night, as you did, Mr
49 Connacht Tribune, 6 April 1918.
50 Connacht Tribune, 13 April 1918. The Sinn Fein Hall in Galway was in Prospect Hill, Eyre Square,
Galway.
51 Galway Express, 25 June 1918.
52 East Galway Democrat, 28 April 1917.
53 East Galway Democrat, 23 June 1917.
54 East Galway Democrat, 8 September 1917.
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Greene,’ replied Ward, to which Green bellowed, 'you should be tied up in a sack and let go 
with the tide. You are not fit to be a member o f this council, you bloody bastard.’ Ward, 
however, was not to be outdone in the shouting match declaring, 'w e all know you, you are a 
night marauder.’55
The 1918 elections in Galway saw the final and absolute destruction of the Parliamentary 
Party. Sinn Fein’s margin was impressive and the National Party lost all five of its seats in the 
county. The abolition of the Galway Borough which represented the city reduced the number 
of seats in the county from five to four and denied the Parliamentary Party a safe seat. In the 
end, there was no city candidate put forward for election and the town was subsumed into the 
Connemara constituency where William O’Malley lost his seat and Stephen Gwynn chose to 
stand for the Dublin University seat. The party could not find a candidate to replace James 
Cosgrave in east Galway and in north Galway William Hazelton chose not to contest the 
election, in favour o f standing for a seat in his native South Dublin. In retrospect, it is clear 
that the elite o f the local Irish Parliamentary Party foresaw the electoral landslide and opted 
not to stand. In Munster seventeen of the twenty-four available seats were returned unopposed 
for Sinn Fein as the party endured its greatest humiliation.56
Sinn Fein won all four seats with Liam Mellows standing unopposed in the east Galway 
constituency. O f a total of 40,496 votes cast in the three contested constituencies, Sinn Fein 
won 31,271 votes to the National party’s 9,225.57 For the National Party, Thomas Sloyan, a 
merchant from Tuam, took a credible 31.01 per cent o f the votes in North Galway, William 
O ’Malley took only 22.85 per cent of the votes in Connemara and William Duffy took only 
14.10 per cent o f the votes in South Galway. Thus, for Sinn Fein, Thomas O ’Maille 
triumphed in Connemara with 77.15 per cent o f the vote, Frank Fahey won south Galway with 
85.90 per cent and Michael Cusack won the North Galway constituency with 68.99 per cent 
of the votes. All four elected MPs were former prisoners and all had been deported after the 
Rising (apart from Mellows who had gone on the run). Furthermore, all of the victorious Sinn 
Fein candidates, except Mellows, were born and raised in the constituencies in which they 
were victorious.
55 Connacht Tribune, 6 March 1920. East Galway Democrat also referred to Sinn Fein as ‘nocturnal 
ramblers’ on 4 August 1917.
56 Laffan, The Resurrection o f Ireland, p 164.
57 B.M. Walker (ed.) Parliamentary Election Results in Ireland, 1801-1922 (Dublin, 1978), p. 7.
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4.2 1918-A New Land War
The authorities were convinced that the Sinn Fein party would become ‘dangerous if allied to 
some popular land campaign’ and the land war o f 1918 provided republicans with the vehicle 
they needed to generate increased popular support.58 The European War had provided a major 
boost to graziers in Ireland, and in Galway, ‘farmers were never in their lives in more 
prosperous circumstances owing to high prices for their stock and farm produce.’59 The 
confidence o f the Volunteers reached a peak in early 1918 and in many districts the police 
were virtually helpless as people began to treat them with open defiance. The IRA 
increasingly came out into the open again for the first time since Easter 1916 and:
The police, in moving about are treated with contempt and are jeered  at. No one is allowed to 
speak to them and information as to the recurrence o f  outrages has to be dragged out o f the 
injured persons. The opinion is prevalent that the police cannot do anything and would not be 
allowed to do anything. At night the lives o f  the police are in danger all the time while on 
patrol and I am in daily fear o f hearing that some man has been shot by means o f  some foul 
and cow ardly treachery. All this is due to the Sinn Fein rebels who went out in 1916.60
The most significant impetus for the new militancy was the movement’s involvement in 
ongoing land agitation in the county and the R1C noted that ‘Sinn Fein is now being worked 
as an agrarian movement for the forcible repossessing of land. Land is being openly 
commandeered for grazing and for personal occupation. This new phase of Sinn Fein will 
bring many young men into the movement which previously held no attraction for them .’61 
The county was now firmly in the grip of a land war, as many tenants became involved in 
cattle drives, forcible ploughing of land, public meetings and deputations, aimed at forcing 
landowners to surrender their holdings to the CDB for division. Unlike the previous 
campaigns, however, the UIL was now exercising very little influence and the involvement of 
Sinn Fein presented a much greater threat to property rights. A heightened sense of insecurity 
and fear prevailed for many landowners as the police were powerless to prevent farms from
58 Cl monthly report, east Galway, December 1917, CO 904/104.
59 Cl monthly report, west Galway, April 1917, CO 904/102.
60 Cl monthly report, west Galway, January 1918, CO 904/105.
61 Cl monthly report, east Galway, February 1918, CO 904/105.
being taken over. DI Ruttledge believed that ‘were it not for the presence o f troops in Galway 
and Gort and the operation of aeroplanes at Oranmore, it would be difficult for the police to 
keep an upper hand’.62
Sinn Fein cumainn now sprang up around local agitations and former UIL members were 
often prominent at cattle drives and land seizures. The absence of priests or MPs as tenant 
representatives was notable as Sinn Fein and the Volunteers acted as stewards and organised 
deputations to landowners and the phenomenon of cumainn spontaneously forming to 
facilitate agitations as ‘agrarian emancipation’ had long been part o f the modus operandi of 
the UIL. Sinn Fein flourished as the tide of agrarianism swept the county in the first four 
months o f the year, ‘muttering discontent and preaching sedition and disloyalty, secretly 
encouraging outrage and appealing to the basest elements of an irreconcilable people.’63 The 
Galway secret society, which had been relatively inactive since its leader, Thomas Kenny, 
fled to the U.S. following the Rising, was now absorbed into Sinn Fein as the party openly 
involved itself in the land struggle. The wave of agrarianism that swept the county at the end 
of the decade occurred in three main phases. The first wave of violence came in January until 
May 1918 and the second phase took place from January until May 1920. Whilst agrarianism 
was a factor in 1919, the operations of the newly formed Dail departments and their initial 
efforts to resolve the issues over land led to less violence as the rural community anticipated 
some form of Dail-led initiatives to resolve the issues. The crucial difference between the land 
agitation of 1918 and 1920 was that during the first wave, Sinn Fein and the Volunteers were 
heavily involved in local agitation, whereas in 1920 party members and Volunteers were 
officially forbidden from taking part and sophisticated local arbitration courts were in place to 
defuse the violence and resolve disputes. There was no agitation in 1921 due to the heavy 
military presence but agrarianism emerged once more in 1922 and 1923 during the 
convulsions o f the Civil War.
As the new Land War erupted across East Galway from January to May 1920, it posed very 
difficult questions for the republican movement as its leaders increasingly sought to assume 
the mantle o f the legitimate protectors of law and order. The local press declared that ‘never 
has the land agitation, either before or since the days o f the Land League reached such a
62 Cl monthly report, west Galway, February .1918, CO 904/105.
63 Cl monthly report, east Galway, April 1918, CO 904/105.
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height as at present times5.64 The campaign was mainly concentrated in the south east of the 
county and was centred on the Kilconnell-Ahascragh-Woodlawn districts. In the previous few 
months, it was estimated that 300,000 acres had been cleared o f stock with 40,000 sheep and 
cattle dispersed and a list of twenty-nine local graziers who had been targeted appearing in the 
local press.65 Deputations of tenants had visited all the major landowners in the district 
including Smyth at Colemanstown, Hutchinson in Donnane, Major Persse at Kilchreest, 
O’Hara-Trench at Clonfert and Lord Ashtown at Woodlawn asking them to give up grazing 
lands to the Estates Commissioners for division.66 Captain Henry Dudley Hodgeson had a 
lucky escape when he found fourteen sticks o f primed gelignite that had been buried into the 
outer wall o f his residence at Oughterard, which failed to explode. P.K. Joyce, a Clifden 
merchant, was not so lucky and his home was severely damaged when a bomb exploded in the 
town in March. His family had just purchased Clifden demesne against the wishes of the 
community who had being agitating for some time to have the property sold to the Estates 
Commissioners,67
With the police now almost completely withdrawn to the larger barracks in the main towns, 
the climate was at its most dangerous for those whose land was coveted by the rural poor. At 
the end of March, all o f Lord Ashtown’s stock was cleared in one night in a large and well 
organised drive, which saw many animals decked out in the national colours. By early April, 
with the annual yearly auction approaching, all but one of Lord Ashtown’s graziers had 
agreed to sell up and even he had committed to give up his grazing the following October.68 In 
addition, Smyth at Colemanstown promptly agreed to give up his 1,000 acres near Athenry. 
Large scale social disorder was only prevented in April 1920 by two developments, one 
sponsored by Sinn Fein and the other brought about by the agitators themselves. An 
extraordinary conference o f graziers and tenants’ representatives was held in Hayden’s Hotel 
in Ballinasloe in early April. One motive for the agitators was the belief amongst tenants that 
much of the land then presently owned by the CDB was to be used by the government to 
resettle ex-soldiers who had fought in the War. Whilst praising the sacrifice o f the local troops 
at the front in a lengthy speech in the House o f Commons, William Duffy warned against any
64 Galway Express, 10 April 1920.
65 Galway Express, 10 April 1920.
66 Galway Express, 28 April 1920.
67 Galway Express, 20 March 1920.
68 Galway Express, 10 April 1920.
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measures the government was believed to be contemplating regarding land for ex-servicemen 
in his constituency. The people, the local press claimed, now saw that peaceful means were 
useless and ‘moderate persuasion’ would need to be applied,69 From a tenant’s point of view 
the conference was clearly a success, with thirteen graziers coming to an agreement with a 
local solicitor who negotiated on behalf of the small farmers. It is not apparent who organised 
this conference. None of the local partisan papers claimed any credit for their respective 
parties and each gave the conference only minor consideration. The success of the conference 
and the fact that it happened at all, demonstrated the crucial juncture that had been reached in 
the Land War; the law of the land was now clearly operating without reference to the 
established laws of property rights and neither the republican movement nor the state had any 
power to stop it.
The Ballinasloe conference offered only temporary respite for large landowners and as the 
land epidemic raged, Sinn Fein was forced to act. In May a ‘Land Conference’ was held by 
various representatives of the republican movement to develop a more effective system of 
arbitration which could gain the support of all sections o f the community.70 Land arbitration 
courts had been active since early March 1918 in the county. However, they were incapable of 
coping with the demands presented by the new spate o f agitations. The conference agreed on 
a range o f issues concerning mechanisms to resolve and administer local disputes. Issues of 
court procedure, fees, expenses, and so on, were codified and a standardised structure for the 
county agreed. A new, more sophisticated and standardised arbitration system emerged, based 
on the ten poor law divisions in the county, with fifteen arbitrators selected for every division, 
with at least one priest to be included on each. A quorum of three representatives from the 
panel was now necessary and every court had jurisdiction over three parishes at a minimum. 
The conference was organised under the auspices of Sinn Fein and all delegates were selected 
from local cumainn and Comhairle Ceanntar delegates.
From May onwards, the arbitration courts were regularly held in Portumna, Loughrea and 
Ballinasloe, the three main urban centers in east Galway.71 The courts were held openly in 
local hotels and they often struggled to accommodate the number o f people who wished to be
69 G alw ay Express, 10 April 1920.
70 G alw ay Express, 10 April 1920.
71 See C onnacht Tribune, 22 May 1920.
148
present to hear the deliberations. The pronouncements of the courts were then printed in detail 
each week by the local press. They were attended by all sections o f local society with 
landlords, Protestant rectors, former Irish Parliamentary Party MP, William Duffy and 
professed loyalists such as the Due Du Stacpole attending.72 Following the expansion of the 
courts, police reports testified to their widespread success and acceptance by all sections of 
the population and they led directly to the collapse o f the Crown assizes, which ceased to 
function until the winter of 1920, when the republican movement was once more driven 
underground. As a direct result of the success o f the courts, the Galway Assizes collapsed in 
July as no jurors could be found to deal with cases and witnesses, plaintiffs and defendants 
chose to take their cases to the Sinn Fein courts, whose decrees were enforced across the 
county by the Volunteers.73
The wave of agitation which had gripped the east of the county was now brought to a halt as 
both large and small farmers brought their cases to the new courts for arbitration. The social 
control that Sinn Fein had so desperately needed and which it looked highly likely that it 
would not be able to command, had at the last gasp been restored and the movement could 
now realistically present itself to all sides as the protectors o f both property and civil rights in 
the county. The very real potential for widespread civil disorder which would have been 
beyond the control o f the revolutionary cadre was now averted. From proclaiming 'Hail 
Russia’ just a few months previously, the Sinn Fein controlled Galway Express was now 
denouncing 'Bolshevism in Kinvara by manly men’ since any remaining agrarianism beyond 
the movements control was by now intolerable. In an editorial entitled, ‘The Lowering of an 
Ideal’ the paper decried that, T he men of the west have wrapped the green flag around them 
and gone forth to conquer land. We cannot agree that the means used by our young men are 
honourable in every case.’74
The agitation over Menlo Woods encapsulates the complexities o f the situation in relation to 
land and the difficulties it posed for the republican movement. Menlo demesne had been the
72 See Connacht Tribune, 23 April 1920.
73 The Galway Grand Jury in July, 1920 comprised Pierce Joyce, JM Meldon, Martin MacDonagh,
Major T Wilson-Lynch, Francis Blake, Captain James D’Arcy, Walter Joyce, Captain Walter Lambert,
Burton W Persse, Colonel CP Doig, John Baggott, N.A. Lushington-Tullock, Francis J.S. Tumley,
James Cooke, Arthur Jackson, Martin Hynes.
74 Galway Express, 3 May 1920. The murder of Ward is fully discussed in Chapter Five.
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subject o f a violent agitation for some time to force Sir Thomas Blake to sell his land to the 
Estates Commissioners. A herdsman on the estate, James Ward, was shot dead in February as 
'feeling against him was imputed to his continued employment with the landlord, whose 
retention of the land is held to be an injustice.’75 Sinn Fein and the Volunteers in Menlo and 
Castlegar were at the forefront of the agitation and Brian Molloy, who acted as their 
spokesman, was justifiably regarded as one o f the few very committed IRA officers in the 
county. His company in Castlegar was possibly the best organised and most committed in the 
county and while the agitation over the woods was ongoing, Molloy and his men carried out 
attacks on the police at Oranmore, where an RIC constable was shot dead, and an assault on 
Loughgeorge RIC barracks completely destroyed the building.76
The position became even more difficult for Sinn Fein when it was announced in 1920 that 
the Galway County Council, with its strong Sinn Fein representation, had purchased part of 
the demesne in order to develop a civic amenity for local people. When the first delegation 
from the council arrived in Menlo, they were unceremoniously greeted by the local agitators 
who, armed with ash plants, made their feelings abundantly clear. At the next council 
meeting, a decision was unilaterally taken not to proceed with the purchase o f the Wood and 
the idea was not raised by the council again.77 Following the incident William Flaherty, the 
former Labour representative on the Council, noted ‘buy it today and get a bullet tomorrow.’78
Local republicans took a leading role in the agitation which was responsible for the murder of 
Ward (who was not an outsider as many herds were in these circumstances, but came from the 
area). Their subsequent intimidation of the elected representatives o f the town, including 
those from their own party, may have been a further catalyst in forcing Sinn Fein into creating 
some kind of semi-autonomous mechanism whereby such disputes could be settled. The fact 
that the Menlo case was never brought before a Sinn Fein court, even though the agitation was
75 G alw ay Express, 14 February 1920. Ward was shot dead on 6 February in the presence of a 
neighbour and his son. He had survived two previous attempts on his life. The inquest returned a 
verdict of murder and his wife Julia was awarded £100 at Galway Quarter sessions in July 1920.
Connacht Tribune, 1 May 1920 and 10 July 1920.
76 The Castlegar Company was also responsible for the death of Constable Whelan in Easter Week 
1916.
77 G alway Express, 10 April 1920. The property had been bought for £1,500 from Sir William Blake.
78 Irish Times, 17 April 1920.
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led by the IRA, shows just how much power a strong local leader could command and that 
ultimately local IRA companies were prepared to ride roughshod over Sinn Féin rulings, 
especially where land was concerned. Menlo proved to be an exception and despite 
agrarianism remaining a factor throughout the summer o f 1920, the success o f the land 
arbitration courts gave republicans a new standing amongst land owners in the county. The 
Volunteers now enforced the decrees of the local courts, which had a strong clerical and 
professional influence, regardless of where their own sympathies lay.
4.3 Sectarianism
The reputation of the IRA as a non-partisan force has come under considerable scrutiny in 
recent years with a study of West Cork leading one historian to conclude that sectarianism 
was ‘embedded in the vocabulary and syntax of the revolution.’79 Galway has not escaped the 
attention o f historians in this regard and Hart has asserted that a campaign o f ethnic cleansing 
took place in many parts of the country including the east Galway countryside. Noting the 
‘dreary steeples of Ballinasloe’, he concludes that, ‘as revolutionary violence spiralled 
upwards, more and more of its victims were civilians and more and more of them were 
Protestant.’80 Hart’s assertion is based on an article in the Church o f  Ireland Gazette in June 
1922 which described a campaign of intimidation being waged against the minority 
community in the town o f Ballinasloe. The paper noted:
The campaign is carried out in the night time by unnam ed persons who give no reason for 
their actions. The system which usually follows is, at first, the dispatch o f  an anonym ous letter 
giving the recipient so many days or hours to clear out. If  this notice is disregarded, bullets are 
fired at night through his windows, bombs are thrown at his house or his house is burned 
dow n... the list o f  those prescribed is added to constantly and every Protestant is simply 
waiting for their turn to com e.81
The intimidation in Galway was carried out by local people. However, there was no active 
IRA unit in the town (although there may have been individual members who were not active, 
living in the town) and Ballinasloe had consistently proven hostile to the republican
79 Hart, The IRA at War, p. 240.
80 Hart, The IRA at War, p. 234.
81 Church o f Ireland Gazette, 16 June 1922.
movement. Nonetheless, a number of Protestants fled the town and, as will be discussed, local 
elected representatives inflamed the situation with blatantly sectarian rhetoric which 
contributed to the climate o f hostility. A local historian later recalled, ‘fearing reprisals, a few 
Protestant businessmen left Ballinasloe and retired to the north but those who remained were 
not molested.’82 Far from being a republican stronghold, Ballinasloe had the highest level of 
recruitment to the British army in the county and twenty men from the town joined the local 
Black and Tan regiment in January 1921.83 Thus, whilst Ballinasloe was generally hostile 
towards the IRA, it could equally become the focus of religious intolerance against 
Protestants. It is not inconsequential to note that Ballinasloe also won the county Gaelic 
football championship for a record six consecutive times from 1914 onwards, a feat never 
since repeated in county Galway. Thus, a tradition o f service in the Crown Forces and 
persistent hostility towards the IRA, could co-exist within the same local culture which also 
fostered both persistent sectarianism and achievement in Gaelic games.
Galway had one of the smallest Protestant populations in the country, with 3,544 members of 
the Church of Ireland community representing only 1.95% of the total population in 1911 and 
only 495 Presbyterians and 152 Methodists resident in the entire county.84 The Protestant 
community were concentrated in the Ballinasloe hinterland, in Galway town and in south 
Connemara. In May 1918, the conscription crisis proved to be a trigger for latent sectarianism 
in Ballinasloe and a campaign of intimidation was sporadically carried out in the town over 
the proceeding four years. The Board of Guardians debated the statement of the Presbyterian 
Assembly o f Ireland in 1918 which had advocated conscription and a resolution condemning, 
not just the actions o f the Presbyterian leadership but also the local Protestant community for 
their perceived support for their Church leaders’ stance was passed. The subsequent 
statements of local nationalist and republican politicians were sectarian in both tone and 
content- and the local Protestant community was publicly threatened with retaliation should 
conscription be enforced. UIL Councillor A.D. Cahill informed the meeting:
You have people at home in Ballinasloe refusing to sign against conscription. And in fact,
advocating that the conscription Act should be enforced. I have it on the utmost reliable
82 Rev P.K. Egan, The Parish o f  Ballinasloe: Its History from the Earliest Times to the Present Day 
(Dublin, 1960), p. 293.
83 Connacht Tribune, 21 January 1921.
84 Census o f  Ireland, 1911 (London, 1913), p. 211.
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authority that the majority of Ballinasloe Presbyterians are supporting conscription. They are 
only fifteen families altogether but little or much, they made well by their connection with the 
Ballinasloe people. We will know what to say and what to do when the time comes.
Every single one of these families has thrived, got rich and was protected and trusted in every 
way by the people of Ballinasloe. They were treated as our own brothers and here is their 
gratitude and compensation. I think we ought to strongly condemn the Ballinasloe 
Presbyterians as well as the Belfast people. They have motor cars, land and horses now which 
they had not when they first got here.... We should know who is for us and who is against us. 
The time will come when we will defeat this crisis and we will be able to show those people 
what way and manner we look on their conduct. The records of the conscription pledge should 
be kept, so afterwards we will know who’s who.85
The ill feeling towards the local minority community did not recede as the threat of 
conscription passed, although the language of retaliation from politicians, in public at least, 
subsided for another two years. 1920 saw a dramatic increase in gun crime in the district as 
the new tide o f agrarianism swept east Galway. At the Galway Assizes in March, there were 
five murders, and robberies with arms, malicious injuries cases, cases o f firing into dwellings 
and cases of intimidation rose from forty-two such cases during the previous year to a total of 
two hundred and eighty-one cases.86 Amidst the climate o f intimidation generated by the 
ongoing land agitation in the countryside around the town, elements in Ballinasloe were 
clearly intent on generating sectarian ill-feeling, possibly motivated by resentment over the 
relatively privileged economic status of the local Protestant community.
The loyalist pogroms in Belfast in 1920 initiated a second period of recriminations toward 
Protestants in the town, as once again they were perceived by some in the community as not 
being vocal enough in condemning the actions o f their co-religionists in the north. 
Nonetheless, in September a local Protestant, Edmund Hill, wrote to the Connacht Tribune 
suggesting that ‘the Protestants of Galway come together and publicly denounce the sectarian 
acts being carried out in Belfast.’87 The paper welcomed the sentiments, noting that that ‘there 
is little likelihood that anything of this nature will ever blight the lives o f people who have
85 Connacht Tribune; 8 May 1918.
86 Irish Times. 23 March 1920.
87 C onnacht Tribune, 11 September 1920.
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always lived on good terms with one another.’ The Protestant community responded to Hill’s
idea and at a subsequent meeting of various Protestant denominations in Ballinasloei a
resolution was passed:
Condemning the victimisation and intimidation of Roman Catholics that is taking place at the 
current time in the north of Ireland and no provocation caused by other outrages could justify 
such a policy. At all times the most friendly relationship and goodwill have been extended to
us by the Roman Catholic community in this town and district. Religious intoleration is
unknown in this part of Ireland.88
However, the unequivocal action of the Protestant community did not satisfy some local 
politicians. UIL stalwart Thomas Costello o f the Tuam Board o f Guardians asked ‘why the 
Protestants of the west, who never got insult from a Catholic majority because of creed, did 
not speak out and condemn the actions of their co-religionists in the north. The Protestants of 
the West are absolutely silent.’89 The following week, a local Protestant, James Elder, 
presided at a meeting in the Town Hall to devise a means of helping the Belfast Catholics and 
a local subscription fund was set up to aid the victims.90 Elder subsequently wrote to the local 
paper urging all local people to join them in their endeavours.91 At the Galway Urban Council 
a motion was proposed that Galway employers should be asked to sack their Protestant 
workers in retaliation for the Belfast riots. However, it was quickly dismissed and a resolution 
supporting the Belfast boycott endorsed instead.92 In the subsequent edition of the Connacht 
Tribune, another letter from ‘A Galway Protestant’ testified to ‘the tolerance experienced 
between Galway Catholics and Protestants long resident in this city.’ The letter went on to say 
that a circular condemning the actions of loyalists in Belfast was currently being circulated 
amongst the community and would soon be published.93
Both communities contained individuals who were intent on stirring up sectarian ill-feeling. A 
Galway Protestant, William Oliver, wrote to the local press in September rebuking the earlier
88 Connacht Tribune, 9 September 1920.
89 Connacht Tribune, 11 September 1920.
90 Elder was previously chairman of the Ballinasloe Board of Guardians, see Connacht Tribune, 21 
June, 1913.
91 Connacht Tribune, 18 September 1920.
92 Galway Express, 14 August 1920.
93 Connacht Tribune, 18 September 1920.
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efforts o f Elder and other local Protestants and promoting the idea of a local Protestant 
Association for the county:
W hich would safeguard their interests and those o f their fellow Protestants. This would be 
m ore dignified than dealing back-handed blows to their co-religionists in the north. Is it not 
time that we heard their voices in cold condemnation o f  the m urders in our m idst... things are 
beginning to look ugly and unless there is a little more com m onsense and toleration on all 
sides, goodness knows how it will all end.94
For their part, the IRA leadership in Dublin was adamant that such action should cease and 
they were clearly referring to the west of Ireland when they warned:
The IRA has found it necessary to take drastic m easures in the enforcem ent o f law and order 
in various parts o f  Ireland, evil disposed persons have endeavoured to take advantage o f  the 
disturbed situation resulting from the present warfare to indulge in an unauthorised 
interference with the rights o f individuals. The activities o f  certain persons motivated by land 
greed or the desire for personal advantage have had their activities firmly put to an end,95
Sectarian tension remained a problem in Ballinasloe, however, and in November a riot broke 
out between rival groups. The Galway Express subsequently gloated that the ‘orange 
ascendancy gang have showed their bigotry by cursing the Pope in the streets, some today 
have a colour other than orange on their skulls.’96 A similar riot took place in 1917 when local 
soldiers clashed with republicans in the town and a three-hour fracas ensued. Sticks and 
bottles were used and a girl was badly beaten by local separation women. The riot had begun 
when a crowd of people defied a group of republicans to take down a Union Jack which they 
had erected in the town square and only the intervention of Fr Joyce eventually restored 
peace.97
Bitterness towards the Protestant community only found full expression in Galway following 
the truce with the Crown Forces in 1921, and the uncertainty which the prelude to the Civil 
War generated, fostered an unprecedented level of attacks against ex-RIC men, Protestants
94 Connacht Tribune, 25 September 1920.
95 AntOglach, 1 May 1920.
96 Galway Express, 17 November 1920.
97 East Galway Democrat, 28 July 1917.
and the gentry. It was not IRA violence, per say, which was responsible for the victimisation 
of these sections of society, but the lacuna in law and order which encouraged long- 
simmering resentments to erupt into violent recrimination, behind a veil of idealism. In 
Loughrea and Athenry, the homes of a number of RIC men were attacked with gun-fire in 
June 1922, ex-sergeant John Kelly was kidnapped, and a number o f men ordered to leave the 
district.98 In this environment an unprecedented resolution was passed in April 1922 and 
signed by the entire Ballinasloe Rural District Council. This ‘desired to bring under the notice 
o f the Public the following’:
• The failure o f non-Catholics in Ballinasloe and District to take any action in connection 
with the atrocities in Belfast.
• The non-Catholics here, as in other parts o f Ireland, are amongst the most prosperous in 
the community.
• It is time a Conference of the leading people o f Southern Ireland was held with a view to 
making an exchange of the Catholic Workers on Belfast for some of the large non-Catholic 
landowners and businessmen, or as an alternative that families be migrated from Belfast and 
billeted on non-Catholic families outside the Six County Area, as this seems to be the only 
remedy to avoid the possible extinction of the Northern Catholics."
Sectarian violence formed another strand of resentment that fed into a complex web of social 
unrest in the area. Violence against Protestants took place in an environment where graziers 
and landlords were being intimidated on a wide scale, the vast majority of whom were 
Catholic. Republicans were attacked on a number o f occasions in the streets of Galway, 
Loughrea and Ballinasloe and in the villages o f Craughwell and Turloughmore. The general 
atmosphere o f uncertainty during the period facilitated the settling of old scores as a window 
of opportunity arose where base motives could be concealed behind a transparent veil of 
ideology. In this context there was a gloomy inevitability that sectarianism would rear its head 
at some point, however, it remained isolated and confined to one district. Thus, the experience 
in Galway was considerably different from that which Hart investigated in west Cork. The 
Galway experience largely conforms to the situation described by Michael Farry in Sligo and 
David Fitzpatrick in Clare; with The IRA refraining from sectarian impulses despite the
98 Irish Times, 17 June 1922.
99 East G alw ay Democrat, 19 April 1922.
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growing prevalence o f religious animosity and what might be termed ‘sectarian opportunism’ 
within the community at large.100 These impulses reached a peak during the climate of 
uncertainty and insecurity which characterized the first six months of 1922, as the country slid 
into civil war. The grim reality presents itself however, that had the IRA aggressively pursued 
the resources o f the minority community in east Galway, they many well have garnered a 
greater degree o f popular support amongst sections of the local community.
Similarly, the burning of big houses, whilst a feature of the War of Independence in Galway, 
also reached its peak during the Civil War as another sustained campaign of agrarianism 
swept the county. The motivation for these attacks was for perceived military reasons during 
the War o f Independence but for a mixture of agrarian and military reasons during the Civil 
War. Whilst the land surrounding big houses was coveted by tenants, mansions were only 
burned by the IRA when it was suspected that the Crown Forces were to be stationed there. 
When the gentry fled in terror from local agitators, their mansions were targeted by the state 
as billets for troops and it was for this reason they were then burned by the IRA. Lady 
Gregory recorded the terror that spread amongst the ascendancy as the tide of rural unrest 
gathered momentum in early 1920:
An exodus from county Galway. The Goughs leave this week and Lough Cutra is to be shut 
up, until they see how things are... Lord Killanin has dismissed all his guards and gone to 
London. The Lopdells, because o f their motors being put out o f action the night they were 
going to the Roxboro dance are going to live in England. The big houses are fa lling .101
Castlelambert House in Athenry was burned down on 8 September 1920 when it was 
rumoured that the military would be stationed there. Tyrone House, the home of the St 
Georges at Ballinderreen, unoccupied at the time, was burned down in August and the home 
of C.D. O’Rourke was burned down at Birmingham, near Tuam in July. Moyode Castle and 
Tallyho House in Athenry and Monatigue House in Craughwell were all burned down for 
similar reasons in early 3921. Both Castlelambert, Bermingham House and Monatigue were
100 See, Michael Farry, ‘Sligo Protestants after the Revolution’ in Aftermath o f Revolution; Sligo, ¡921- 
23 (Dublin, 2000), pp 177-201; Fitzpatrick, ‘Protestants and Unionists’, in Politics and Irish Life, pp 
40-71.
101 Lennox Robinson, (ed.) Lady Gregory's Journals, 1916-1930 (New York, 1947), entry for 22 
January 1920.
also the subjects o f long running agrarian agitations and this was a factor in their demise. 
Thomas Hannon, O ’Rourke’s land agent, was shot dead by the IRA as an informer in April 
1921.102 With arms raids taking place on a weekly basis in the county, local privileged elites 
became targets for those who coveted land, goods and firearms. The Galway Lawn Tennis 
Club, which was burnt down in July, was one of the social centres of the local elite and the 
Athenry Cricket club and the Tuam Golf club were burned down for similar reasons in 1922. 
There were other attacks on the gentry during the period and the Volunteers ambushed a 
number o f vehicles on their way to a ball at Major Persse’s house at Roxboro near Loughrea 
in January 1921.'03 At Athenry, Walter Lambert received the support o f the local community 
including the Sinn Fein cumann when he was threatened by local men posing as the ‘Irish 
Republican Killing Squad’. The men had warned him to give up his demesne land so that it 
could be divided amongst local tenants, and his employees were warned not to return to work 
on the estate. Following word of the threats a delegation of republicans visited the local men 
involved, warning them to cease their activity and the workmen returned to their 
employment.104
With the RIC helpless to stem the tide of unrest spreading across the countryside, it was 
inevitable that local groups would take it upon themselves to try to counter the activities of 
the Volunteers and land agitators. In early 1918, Martin Egan of the Galway Farmers 
Association advocated the establishment of Vigilance Committees ‘in every parish to prevent 
the perpetration o f criminal injuries to people and property for which the rate payer has to 
pay’.105 The Connacht Tribune which claimed to have originally devised the idea, 
congratulated Egan, calling it ‘an encouraging sign of the times’, Athenry was the first area to 
form a committee and Thomas Kenny dedicated an editorial to the topic, noting that the work 
of the new committee was not going to be for the fainthearted:
Athenry has earned the congratulations o f all righteous and courageous men. It has established 
a Vigilance Committee which is composed o f all classes in the little township. The com m ittee 
is not to be an organisation for the passing o f  pious resolutions and the paying o f unctuous 
com plim ents. It is to be an active and virile force. Its prim ary object is to rid the district o f  the
102 This will be fully discussed in Chapter Five.
103 Freeman's Journal, 16 January 1921.
104 Connacht Tribune, 17 January 1920.
105 Connacht Tribune, 12 January 1918.
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m auvaises forces that bring disgrace and discredit upon law abiding citizens. Soon the 
m idnight prow ler for unlawful purpose, the coward who fires into his neighbour’s home or 
crim inally injures his property7, the ruffian who dares stoop to unspeakable crimes that should 
not be mentioned among righteous men, will find him self in moral Coventry. Athenry will 
becom e too hot for him, for in all crimes, the committee will aid the police to run the criminal 
to earth .106
Ultimately the Vigilance Committees were a short lived expression of the frustration and 
impotence felt by strong farmers and shopkeepers in the face of the unrest and they were 
confined to the Oughterard, Loughrea and Athenry districts. Whether the local committee was 
a factor or not, the papers were keenly aware of the formative influence of local businessmen 
during the period:
Perhaps few towns in Ireland have kept their heads, so to speak, as well as Athenry during 
these days and weeks of crisis. The storm centre of the old land league days and the period of 
fitful and agitation that followed, having solved its domestic problems to its own satisfaction 
settled down to enjoy a well earned peace. Storms may rage around but the common sense and 
shrewdness of the Athenry businessman asserts and I hope will continue to assert itself.107
Conclusion
Whilst the party clearly retreated from the its radical, although under-articulated, stance on the 
land question, Sinn Fein never became truly conservative. However, by 1919 social 
considerations were overwhelmed by the need to ensure support for the movement’s political 
aims from all sections o f nationalist society. The irony of the Irish revolution lies in the fact 
that it remained socially conservative despite being driven by small farmers and workers. The 
evolution o f the movement’s social agenda in the county was most obvious during the new 
Land War, but a softening of the party’s previous denunciations o f those whom it had 
unceremoniously labeled ‘enemies of the Irish people’ had been ongoing. From 1918 to 1919, 
the Galway Express printed a series of editorials denouncing the character and moral fortitude 
of the county’s urban dwellers and the merchant class in particular. The vitriol used to 
condemn all classes o f town dwellers for their lack of nationalist fervour reached fever pitch
106 Connacht Tribune, 2 March 1918.
107 Connacht Tribune, 6 November 1920.
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in 1919 in a series of articles on the Irish language, the co-operative movement and the 
perceived role of the local merchant class in ‘supporting the British’.
Following the small attendance at a Feis Cheol in Galway town in May 1919, the paper 
attacked the attitude o f townspeople to the national language. The editorial went on to note 
that in the county with the highest number o f Gaelic speakers, eleven of its towns lacked a 
Gaelic League Branch.108 The paper went on to question the moral fibre o f townspeople 
claiming ‘the transitionists o f the more favoured and anglicised centres, so long imitated the 
foreigners’ language and civilisation that they have now become lost in imitation and are now 
neither themselves or those whom they attempt to ape.’109 Galway town was later labeled ‘a 
sickening old city’ inhabited by ‘the garrison and its hangers on’, ‘what is wrong with Galway 
that it never interests itself in anything Gaelic? There is no city in Ireland less Gaelic in 
spirit.” 10 As well as Gaelic culture, the paper devoted frequent editorials to the merits of the 
co-operative movement as a means countering the profiteering o f the town merchants. In 
November, the editor queried, ‘Why Mr. McDonagh and the merchant class are so anxious to 
show their goodwill towards the government, while showing their ill will to the majority of 
the Irish people.” 11 The paper had previously condemned the national educational system for 
not encouraging scientific farming methods, as ‘to be a farmer is an honourable profession, 
but our national schools are now preparing our young men to become shop boys.” 12
In November 1919, Sinn Fein declared its unequivocal support for the co-operative movement 
as a means of countering the influence of the merchant classes:
If the co-operative movement threatens to elim inate the m erchant class from the economic life 
o f Ireland, the merchants have only them selves to blame. If the m erchants take sides against 
S inn  Fein, which is nothing more or less than against the Irish people; if the m erchants 
support the English government in its fight against the Irish People, then they can hardly 
expect the Irish people to support them. It is true than many honest merchants are m embers o f
108 Ballinasloe, Tuam, Mountbellew, Athenry, Portumna, Dunmore, Oranmore, Clarenbridge, 
Oughterard, Spiddal and Moycullen.
109 Galway Express, 10 May 1919.
110 Galway Express, 9 August 1919.
111 Galway Express, 8 November 1919.
112 Galway Express, 8 October 1919.
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Sinn Fein. These merchants however are in the minority and so have been only able to exert a 
small influence on the economic policy o f Sinn Fein. The majority o f merchants are 
supporters o f  the English government in Ireland and opponents o f  the great majority o f  Irish 
people. If the Irish m erchant supported the Irish people then the Irish people would support the 
Irish m erchant.1'3
Sinn Fein's attacks on the mercantile elite were greatly tempered during the following month 
with a sharp retreat from their earlier strident support for the co-operative movement. Leading 
with a front page editorial condemning the co-operative movement on moral, theological and 
economic grounds:
He (AE, editor o f  the Ir ish  H o m es te a d )  m ust surely admit that the sudden and immediate
establishm ent o f  co-op stores all over the country would partake o f the nature o f an immoral
act unless shopkeepers and their employees are absorbed wholesale into the m ovem ent and 
guaranteed a m eans o f living equal to that which they presently enjoy . 114
Having previously noted that the co-operative movement was opposed ‘by people in high 
places’ in the town, the paper later condemned the smashing of the windows of the new co­
operative store in the Galway.115 If the movement was moving away from its uncompromising 
criticism of the local merchant elite, its position in relation to land agitation and the rural elite, 
was also evolving and the strike of farm labourers on the Pollock estate in east Galway and 
the dispute over grazing on the Martyn estate in south Galway, both in late 1919, illustrated 
the volte face  the organisation was prepared to make.
In August o f 1919, Sinn Fein described the tenants on the Tulira estate o f Edward Martyn as 
‘political renegades and traitors to the Irish Republic.’116 Martyn was one of the leading 
cultural nationalists o f the decade and had been one of Sinn Fein first public supporters. He 
had disavowed the movement by the time the Irish Volunteers were formed and did not 
involve himself with any section of the movement after 1914. The tenants had drawn the 
wrath o f the republican movement by their refusal to abide by the decree of a local Dail land
113 Galway Express, November 1919.
1,4 Galway Express, 13 December 1919.
115 Galway Express, 15 November 1919.
116 Galway Express, 3 August 1919.
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court that the auction o f land belonging to the Tulira estate be allowed to proceed unmolested 
and that an agitation to compel Martyn to offer his land for re-distribution amongst his tenants 
cease immediately. The tenants’ refusal to abide by the ruling and their forcible disruption of 
the auction o f the farm earned them a stark warning from the IRA that This disloyal and 
rebellious act of humiliation o f Sinn Fein will be shown no toleration.’117 Martyn had shown 
contempt for the proceeding throughout and did not attend the land court which was held in a 
Loughrea hotel in front of a large audience. The dispute had the potential to embarrass the 
movement, nationally and locally, as Martyn remained a well known figure in literary circles 
and the decision incensed local tenants.
A similar, though somewhat more serious dispute, illustrated Sinn Fein’s new disposition later 
in the same month, when an eight-week strike of farm labourers on the Pollock estate in 
Clonfert and Laurencetown collapsed after demobilised soldiers were brought in to smash it. 
A group calling itself the ‘East Galway Employers’ and Farmers’ Association’ recruited, the 
local papers claimed, from ‘the ascendancy class’ successfully brought in over one hundred 
strike breakers, whilst refusing to negotiate with the farm labourers who were demanding an 
increased wage. The labourers were forced to go back to work without any of their demands 
being met and at no point did Sinn Fein or the Volunteers become involved in the dispute. 
Timothy Killeen noted at the Ballinasloe Rural District Council that the ‘men were badly 
beaten and there is discontent all round’.118
Whilst there was some activity displayed by the ITGWU in the county during the later part of 
the revolutionary era, at no time was it supported in any meaningful way by Sinn Fein or the 
Volunteers. Despite the Galway Express declaring its support for the one big union and even 
going so far as to proclaim ‘Hail Russia’ in 1919, this apparent enthusiasm did not develop 
into active support for trade union activists.119 In June o f that year, two local men were 
sentenced to jail in Gort after being prosecuted for marching behind the red flag during a 
transport workers parade in the town. Noting that the ‘the green flag is not good enough for 
you, you must use the flag of bloody revolution and terrorism,’120 the Judge granted bail o f £5 
and £10 each. However, the men were forced to serve their sentences because, as they told
117 Galway Express, 3 August 1919.
118 Galway Express, 6 August 1919.
1,9 Galway Express, 22 November 1919.
120 Galway Express, 26 June 1919.
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the court 'there is no one in Gort who will bail us.’121 The unwillingness of Sinn Fein to 
support the men and the inability of their union to do likewise, graphically illustrates the 
unfortunate position of any labour activist unlucky enough to be arrested.
Sinn Fein continued to make ambiguous statements in defense of organised labour and a 
councillor told the Ballinasloe Rural District Council, 'Poor men were always at the back of 
every great movement, the Land League, the Tenant Defense Association and Sinn Fein. 
Some very great changes are coming and they might yet get better terms and be their own 
masters.’122 The reality was somewhat different as during the same month Frank Fahey 
warned the rural poor through the pages of the Galway Express that ‘lawlessness and injustice 
would not be sanctioned by the South Galway Comhairle Ceantar of Sinn Fein and the 
organisation must prevent disunity and disruption by counseling patience, for the enemy 
would give much to break Ireland’s solidarity.’123
The relatively conservative nature of the republican counter state was an understandable 
manifestation by the leadership of the conservative rural communities from which they 
sprang. The Volunteers simply had to reflect the innate social conservatism of rural Ireland, if 
they were to garner popular support. Emie O ’Malley, the foremost republican intellectual the 
revolution produced, recalled that, ‘at the beginning it was the poor who stood by us’:'24
The people were conservative; they had a hatred of change. They had been driven in on 
themselves too long, clinging for centuries to Gaelic usage in land and law, and suspicious of 
changes that had been forced on them by the.conquerors. What was good enough for their 
fathers was good enough for them.125
Liam Mellows interpreted this aspect of the revolutionary leadership in stridently Marxist 
terms:
Sinn Fein, while nominally a non-class nationalist Party, was in fact a bourgeois national
121 Galway Express, 26 June 1919.
122 Galway Express, 5 July 1919.
123 Galway Express, 26 July 1919.
124 Emie O’Malley, Army Without Banner: Adventures o f  an Irish Volunteer (Boston, 1937), p. 143.
125 O ’Malley. Army Without Banners, p. 141.
party. The fact that it included the bulk of the advanced workers did not make it any the less 
bourgeois in character. It represented bourgeois interests. Its non-class appearance carefully 
cultivated a piece of camouflage behind which a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie was 
established.126
Contemporary radicals were keen to stress the formative role that class antagonism played in 
the evolution o f the struggle for independence. The Voice o f  Irish Labour pondered what the 
outcome of the War of Independence held for ordinary workers in the country:
Need we argue that in Ireland our shopkeepers, farmers and mill owners, from the meanest 
hucksters to the chairman of the big limited company is indefinitely divorced in outlook and 
sympathy from the working class. Probably in no other country in Europe is the conflict of 
interest between the least of the small property owner and those who own no property so 
apparent.127
Even the greatest patience has its limits. The time is coming when those men and women will 
take ways and means of keeping their souls in their bodies, ways and means which will not 
commend themselves to the most pacific minded people.128
Dan Breen recalled the sudden change in people’s views as the revolution turned toward an 
inevitable settlement. Venturing into the town from his base in the Tipperary countryside, he 
and his comrades were ‘everywhere welcomed and acclaimed as heroes, even by the people 
who, two years before, had been describing us as murderers and assassins.’129 Peadar 
O ’Donnell was even more strident: ‘the middle classes, which lurked in the shadow of the 
republican movement from its rise to popularity, were no part of the freedom forces, they had 
no aim that could not be realised within the Home Rule Empire.’130 To O ’Donnell and his 
comrades on the republican left, the revolutionary activities o f the republican movement took 
place in what he later termed ‘the climate of innocence” 31 as the eradication of the social and 
economic institutions which the state had engendered were put aside by the leadership in
126 Liam Mellows, Notes from Mountjoy Jail (London, 1925), p. 9.
127 Voice o f  Labour, 29 October 1921.
128 Voice o f  Labour, 3 December 1920.
129 Dan Breen, My Fight fo r  Irish Freedom (Dublin, 1924), p. 239.
130 Peadar O ’Donnell, There Will Be Another Day (Dublin, 1963), p. 11.
131 O’Donnell, There Will Be Another Day, p. 12.
favour o f preserving nationalist unity, Liam Mellows believed that the British had 'destroyed 
the republic by exploiting the contradictions that existed within the national movement. These 
contradictions were class contradictions’:’32
The medium sized Irish bourgeoisie deserted Imperialism, joined the national movement and 
took control of it. They were satisfied with the imperialist concession of Dominion status as it 
permitted them to become the ruling class in Ireland... Thus while the Anglo-Irish War was 
fought by the working class and the petty bourgeois, it was fought in the interests of the 
bourgeoisie.133
The revolution in Galway was not fundamentally sectarian and it would conceivably have 
attracted more support had the Volunteers actively targeted the disproportionate wealth of the 
minority community. Galway town, which had a similar number o f Protestants as Ballinasloe, 
had no history of sectarianism of any kind. The latent sectarianism in east Galway reflected 
the popular resentments o f the period and the collapse o f the RIC gave elements in society the 
opportunity to target those whose resources they coveted and to which they felt they were 
entitled. It was a frightening time to be a petty landlord or a Protestant and to be both could 
leave one open to being raided for arms or having one’s property and land seized by local 
tenants. The Presbyterian community could be perceived as a more legitimate target for 
sectarian intimidation when the legitimacy o f their perceived political opinions, could be 
linked to lingering historical resentment at their generally more enhanced economic status, 
vis-à-vis their Catholic neighbours. Nevertheless, the exodus of the gentry in early 1920 had 
its roots in the agrarian land seizures rather than any ethnic or religious imperative and their 
homes were not burned by an anarchic peasantry, but by the IRA, and for perceived military 
reasons. In Ballinasloe, Protestants who were targeted were amongst the town’s leading 
merchants. Their perceived unionist sympathies was simply an excuse to terrorise the local 
merchant elite, who had suddenly and unexpectedly become vulnerable. The majority o f the 
local community were not actively republican and the prospect o f an exodus of merchants, 
many of whom had long established credit arrangements with local customers, was a 
significant factor. No Catholic businessmen were targeted in a similar fashion in the town, 
underlying the fundamentally sectarian impulses which could legitimise attacks on property, 
which would otherwise have been viewed as unacceptable by the community.
133 Mellows, Notes from  Mount]oy Jail, p. 7.
133 Mellows, Notes from  Mount] oy Jail, p. 10.
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In the context o f the humiliation that the 1918 elections represented for UIL supporters and 
their very public ‘misgivings5 about the legitimacy of the republican movement, the new Land 
War gave both sides the opportunity each needed to move their political constituency to the 
centre and expand their influence and support base. For former UIL supporters, the land 
arbitration courts and republican police provided them with the opportunity to have a role in 
the new movement, whilst moderating the social agenda of the more radical elements of 'the 
movement. Without losing face, former UIL members could now support the new forces of 
‘law and order5 which were seen to be contributing to restoring ‘normality5 to the countryside. 
From being abruptly shut out of the political process, respectable elites like William Duffy 
now attended arbitration courts and made favourable comments on their findings. Thomas 
Kenny, arch-conservative and editor of the Connacht Tribune, gave ample coverage to the 
courts5 findings and highlighted their effectiveness in quelling what was developing into a 
revolutionary transfer o f land ownership in the east o f the county. For republicans on the other 
hand, they now had the opportunity to spread their influence and membership beyond their 
traditional narrow base and the significant resources and expertise of middle class 
professionals gave the movement the opportunity to bridge the rural/urban political divide. If 
the organisation made a tactical trade off, largely at the behest o f the national leadership, they 
lost some of their core strength in the process and the Volunteers reflected this conversion to 
‘law and order5 by losing many of their strongest companies. As will be discussed in the 
following chapter, the War of Independence was not to be fought in the traditional centre of 
secret society unrest, in the east of the county, but in the north, in the hinterland around Tuam.
Sinn Fein's success was aided by their devotion to an abstract image of a new Ireland. As 
Laffan notes, ‘It is probable that many Sinn Fein supporters regarded ‘the republic5 as a 
slogan or battle cry, rather than as a concrete objective which must be obtained.’134 This 
ambiguity was a crucial means to avoid the sectional political arguments which a detailed 
programme of reform might engender amongst the nationalist constituency. However, this 
‘common patriotism5 also involved reneging on seminal aspects o f what republicanism was 
popularly perceived to represent.
134 Laffan, The Resurrection o f  Ireland, p. 245.
Chapter Five: The War of Independence
This chapter examines the actions of the IRA and the Crown Forces during the War of 
Independence and analyses what kind of people fought on the republican side, what kind of 
communities active companies came from and to what extent local people supported them. 
The Crown Forces’ campaign is also analysed and in light o f recent research and the degree to 
which the force conformed to the traditional nationalist perception of indiscipline is 
considered.1 When one examines the actions of the Crown Forces and the IRA, coherent 
patterns o f action and reaction emerge, where local communtities were the subject o f reprisals 
following attacks by the IRA on the police and military. This is the only study of the War of 
Independence in the west of Ireland which informs the key debates concerning the regional 
dynamics o f political violence which has been pioneered by Rum pf and Hepburn, Fitzpatrick, 
Hart, Coleman and Augusteijn.2
The evolution of the IRA’s campaign is discussed in three distinct phases from January 1920 
until the truce in July 1921. Detectable patterns involving the reorganisation of resources and 
tactics emerge as the number of active IRA Volunteers contracts and the level of violence on
1 Joost Augusteijn, ‘Motivation: Why did they Fight for Ireland? The Motivation of Volunteers in the 
Revolution’ in idem, The Irish Revolution 1913-1923 (London, 2002), pp 103-20.
2 Ernest Rumpf and Anthony Hepburn, Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland 
(Liverpool, 1977); David Fitzpatrick, ‘The Geography of Irish Nationalism1 in Past and Present, Vol 
78, (1978), pp 113-44; Politics and Irish Life 1913-1921, Provincial Experience o f War and Revolution 
(Dublin, 1977); Joost Augusteijn (ed.) The Irish Revolution, 1913-1923 (London, 2002); Peter Hart,
T he Geography of Revolution in Ireland 1917 - 1923’ in Past and Present, Vol 154, (1997), pp 142- 
73, Peter Hart, The IRA and its Enemies, Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-1923 (Oxford, 1998);
Peter Hart, The IRA at War, 1916-1923 (Oxford, 2003); Marie Coleman, County Longford and the Irish 
Revolution, 1910-1923 (Dublin, 2003); Joost Augusteijn, From Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare. The 
Experience o f Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War o f Independence 1916-1921. (Dublin, 1996); Joost 
Augusteijn, ‘Accounting for the emergence of violent activism among Irish revolutionaries, 1916-21’ 
in Irish Historical Studies, Vol xxxv, no 139 (May 2007), pp 327-44; Tom Garvin, The Evolution o f 
Irish Nationalist Politics (Dublin, 1981); Charles Townshend, ‘The Irish Republican Army and the 
Development of Guerrilla Warfare, 1916-21’ in English Historical Review, xciv (1979), pp 318-45;
Charles Townshend, Political Violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance Since 1948 (Oxford,
1983).
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both sides escalates. The development of the republican campaign in the county largely 
conforms to the evolution of IRA violence witnessed in other active counties. In terms of the 
regional distribution of levels of support for the IRA, a key theme in the literature on political 
violence has been the disparate regional variations between active and non-active areas: not 
only between different parts of the country but also within counties themselves. Marie 
Coleman has noted the stridently militant nature of the IRA rank and file in north Longford 
which contrasted with their somewhat less enthusiastic comrades in the south of the county.3 
In Galway a similar spatial differentiation of violence emerges as the north of the county, in 
the hinterland between Tuam and Galway town, bore the brunt of the Crown Forces’ reprisals 
while the south and east o f the county remained considerably less violent.4 There were no 
active companies in any .of the towns and all the attacks on police barracks took place in rural 
areas, apart from one occasion when the IRA ventured into Clifden to attack the police.5 The 
decidedly less active nature of the urban IRA has been noted in Longford and Clare but the 
almost total absence o f republican activity is considerably more pronounced in urban areas in 
Galway than in other active counties.6
Whilst Galway was more active in terms of attacks on the Crown Forces than most counties in 
the east and north o f the country, it was some way behind Munster, Mayo, Belfast and Dublin. 
In terms of the intensity of the Volunteers’ campaign nationwide, the five most violent 
counties were all in Munster with Cork, Tipperary, Limerick, Kerry and Clare experiencing 
the highest levels of violence. Next came Dublin, Mayo and Antrim followed by Galway, 
Sligo and Roscommon.7 A total of fifty-eight people lost their lives in the county as a direct 
result o f the conflict, with fifty-one fatalities occurring in the east o f the county. Both Hart 
and Augusteijn have analysed the development o f IRA violence. This thesis examines the 
totality o f violence carried out by the Crown Forces, within which IRA activity evolved. The 
IRA attack on Castlehacket Barracks on 9 January 1920 marked the opening of the War of
3 Marie Coleman, County Longford and the Irish Revolutiont 1910 - 1923, p. 172.
4 See Appendix for ‘Map showing the distribution of fatalities during the War of Independence’, Map 
showing location of Crown Forces’ and ‘Map showing the main IRA attacks on the Crown Forces.’
5 The West Connemara flying column attacked the police in Clifden on 16 March 1921, killing two 
RIC men.
6 Fitzpatrick, ‘The Geography of Irish Nationalism’, p. 130; Coleman, County Longford and the Irish 
Revolution, p. 150.
7 Rumpf and Hepburn, Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland p. 40.
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Independence in Galway, with the first RIC man shot dead in the county in July and the first 
civilian killed by the Crown Forces in September.8 The campaign in Galway began at the 
same time as in other active parts o f the country, with the IRA leadership sanctioning attacks 
on the police for the first time in January of 1920. The IRA killed eighteen people in Galway, 
fourteen o f  whom were shot in the east of the county. Ten were members of the RIC who 
were killed whilst on duty, three were members of the Crown Forces and five were civilians. 
O f the civilian fatalities, three were believed to have been actively informing on local 
republicans, one was the wife of the district inspector caught up in an ambush and one was a 
civilian, accidentally shot dead in a raid for arms. The IRA also attacked six police barracks 
between January 1920 and the truce, five of which were in the east of the county, as well as 
carrying out fifteen ambushes where Crown Forces suffered either loss of life or serious 
injury. The police barracks attacked were at Castlehacket, Castlegrove, Bookeen, 
Loughgeorge, Spideal and Headford.9
Cumann na mBan is not analysed in this study as their role was peripheral to the campaign of 
the IRA in the county. Like most active areas nationwide, the organisation had a small 
number of hardcore members who were generally sisters or ‘sweethearts’ of active 
Volunteers.10 Their activities were confined to carrying messages to IRA members and 
reporting on the activities of the Crown Forces, in Galway town, a small number were 
involved in luring soldiers to Tover’s lanes’ where they were promptly relieved of their rifles 
by waiting Volunteers,11 Three prominent Cumann na mBan members had their hair shorn by 
the Crown Forces in Galway town in retaliation for a similar attack carried out by the IRA on 
a girl who had testified at a court martial against local IRA members in September 1920.12
Whilst the TRA’s campaign in the county was episodic, the actions o f the Crown Forces 
instilled terror in the general population. Augusteijn states that in many areas, the Crown 
Forces ‘did not behave according to the image portrayed of them by the local IRA’ and that
8 Constables Burke and Carey were killed by the IRA in an ambush at Gallagh, near Tuam on 19 July 
1920. The first civilian killed by Crown Forces was Joseph Athy shot dead in Oranmore on 17 
September 1920. See Appendix for full details.
9 See Appendix for complete list of dates, locations and details.
10 See Michael Hopkinson, The War o f Independence (Dublin, 2002), p. 108.
11 BMH, WS 1,682 (Mrs Margaret Broderick-Nicholson).
12 Irish Times, 25 September 1920.
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the wide acceptance o f this reputation, ‘represented a discrepancy between perception and 
reality which did not convince many in the Volunteers, their sympathisers and many in the 
general population/13 This study analyses the totality of political violence in the county 
including that of both the Crown Forces and the IRA in order to comprehensively discuss the 
development o f political violence and the evolution of public opinion.
The Crown Forces carried out ten reprisal burnings in towns and villages from July 1920 until 
May 1921 with seven in the east o f the county.14 The state’s most sustained campaign of 
violence took place in Galway town where a campaign o f arson, robbery, intimidation and 
murder lasted for over a month, becoming known locally as ‘the Terror’. The Crown Forces 
killed twenty-six people, all of whom, except one man, were unarmed. O f these twenty-five, 
thirteen were either members of Sinn Fein or associated in some way with the Volunteers. 
The remaining twelve were civilians killed at random or for no apparent reason. The bodies of 
some republicans killed in custody showed signs of extensive torture and Harry and Patrick 
Loughnane from Shanaglish had their skulls broken, grenades set off in their mouths and their 
bodies set alight.15 A number of girls in the Gort area were sexually assaulted by Crown 
troops during a period between 30 November 1920 and 20 February 1921 when the Crown 
Forces killed thirteen people in ‘reprisals’, without corresponding IRA attacks of any kind.16 
In terms of the destruction of property, loss o f life and general impact, the Crown Forces’ 
campaign had a much greater effect on people’s day-to-day lives than the -activities of 
republican insurgents. State violence had an immediate effect on the IRA campaign and the 
movement all but collapsed for several months from September 1920 until early 1921, as 
Volunteer officers refrained from carrying out attacks for fear o f drawing the Crown Forces 
into their districts.
Four groups were involved in killing people in the east Galway countryside: local agrarian 
secret societies; The IRA; Crown Force troops; and British military intelligence. Secret
13 Joost Augusteijn, ‘Motivation: Why did they Fight for Ireland? The Motivation of Volunteers in the 
Revolution’ in Augusteijn (ed.) The Irish Revolution, 1913-1923 (Basingstoke, 2002), pp 103-20.
14 See Appendix for ‘Map of reprisals carried out by Crown Forces’ and Appendix three for details of 
attacks
15 Harry and Michael Loughnane, Beagh, south Galway, see Irish Times, 7 December 1920.
16 Lennox Robinson (ed.) Lady Gregory's Journals, 1916-1930 (New York, 1947), entry for 20 
November 1920.
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agrarian societies killed two local men during the period, landlord Frank Shawe-Taylor and 
James Ward, a herd for Sir William Blake, both of whom were shot in March 1920. Secret 
societies were possibly also involved in a number o f murders carried out during the truce, 
between July 1921 and the shelling o f the Four Courts in April 1922. Three men lost their 
lives in mysterious circumstances on 15 March 1922, when two former RIC men and a farmer 
who had previously worked for the Congested Districts Board were murdered in a co­
ordinated attack in St Brides Workhouse, Galway town.17 A number of people were also shot 
dead in their homes during the conflict by unknown assassins and their bodies labelled with 
signs claiming they had been killed as spies by the IRA. The RIC Inspectors colluded in the
killings by inventing fictitious motives for their deaths and blaming their murder on local 
18people. The community at large believed these men had been killed by the Crown Forces 
and this view was publicly shared by the local press, the clergy and family members of the 
deceased.19 The degree to which many killings are shrouded in uncertainty is remarkable and 
it is unclear in many cases, which group was actually responsible, what their motive was, 
from whom they gained their information and why the particular victim was singled out.
Revolutionary theorists such as Fitzpatrick initially adopted a statistical approach to studying 
the factors which influenced the emergence o f political activists and political violence 
generally.20 This approach has been broadened by historians such as Augusteijn and Hart to 
encompass the interaction between revolutionaries and their environment. This study takes the 
latter approach following an analysis o f the social composition o f the IRA in Galway 
produced by Fergus Campbell, which has utilised census figures and other available data.21 It 
is not the intention o f this chapter to duplicate this process but to analyse the evolution o f the 
totality o f the conflict and contribute to the ongoing debates surrounding political violence.
17 See Irish Times, 18 March, 21 March & 25 March 1922.
18 See Cl monthly report, west Galway, May 1921, CO 904/115, for the case o f Thomas McKeever 
discussed later in this Chapter.
19 Connacht Tribune, 28 May 1921.
20 See, Fitzpatrick, ‘The Geography of Irish Nationalism’ and Hart ‘The Geography of Revolution in 
Ireland 1917-1923’.
21 Campbell, la n d  & Revolution, pp 260-1.
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I. The IRA Campaign in Galway
5.1 The Structure of the IRA
Until the summer of 1919, the Galway Volunteers, as in all counties, were structured as one 
brigade, under an eight-man county executive led by Seamus Murphy.22 The brigade was 
restructured as part o f a national re-organisation in 1920, with several new brigades formed 
and a new command structure put in place. The north of the county, excluding Connemara, 
became the north Galway brigade, consisting of two separate battalions, Tuam and 
Glenamaddy, with ten parish companies in each battalion. Galway, west o f the Corrib, was 
formed into the West Connemara and East Connemara brigades, with four local parish 
companies in each. The Galway Number One brigade consisted of four battalions and covered 
the countryside to the east o f Galway town from Castlegar along the banks of the Corrib as far 
as Kilcoona. In the south of the county, the Gort brigade consisted o f ten companies stretching 
from Ardrahan, along the coast to the Slieve Aughty mountains and the Clare border. There 
was also a south east brigade covering Ballinasloe and Portumna and an east Galway brigade 
consisting of the Athenry and Loughrea battalions. In reality, the former brigade existed on 
paper only after September 1920 and the latter was relatively inactive following the attack on 
Bookeen Barracks in July 1920.
The organisation’s formal structures became meaningless from September 1920 onwards, 
following the arrest o f most the leading officers in the county and the decision of many of the 
remaining senior Volunteers to go into hiding. Seamus Murphy, the commanding officer for 
the county fled to Dublin, leaving the organisation without any command structure. In theory, 
a brigade, battalion and company structure continued to exist, but no brigade O/C was ever 
appointed to replace Murphy, no centralised authority or communications system was ever put 
into place and areas were left to act on their own initiative with no over-arching strategy, 
leadership, co-ordination, training or objectives. This, more than any other factor, damaged 
the morale of local companies and led to a situation where the capacity o f the movement was
22 Details of Murphy’s life and career are difficult to trace. He was employed by the Lights 
Commission in Dublin following independence. Originally from Dublin, he worked for the Galway 
Express newspaper where, in his role as a reporter, he could travel around the county without attracting 
too much suspicion from the authorities.
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dependent on the initiative and ingenuity o f local leaders who managed to avoid 
imprisonment.
Whilst the internal organisational structure o f the IRA collapsed, the situation was 
exacerbated by the lack of interest taken by GHQ in Dublin in organising or directing the 
movement in the county. In common with other western areas, the IRA leadership were 
unwilling to commit resources to directing and organising the prosecution of the IRA 
campaign in Galway and this compounded the poor state o f the organisation. With an 
extremely limited supply of weapons, some IRA men genuinely set about ‘getting things 
going’ in their areas but this was limited to less than a dozen active officers by September 
1920 and most companies quickly ceased to function as distinct units or folded altogether. 
From this point on, individual Volunteers from neighbouring areas in more active parts o f the 
countryside came together to act as one unit in larger operations, such as an attack on a 
barracks, whilst carrying out more low-key duties, such as enforcing the rulings of republican 
courts in their respective areas. There were simply not enough active Volunteers in each area 
to maintain the fiction of an organisational structure based on the parish companies from 
September 1920 onwards.
Coleman has shown that GHQ in Dublin exercised considerable control over the activities of 
the IRA in Longford, giving a direct boost to the movement in terms of organisation, training 
and equipment.23 Similarly, Augusteijn has pointed out that direct intervention and control by 
GHQ was weaker in the west and that the low level o f training, organisation and support 
offered to the Volunteers in Connacht affected their capacity to prosecute their campaigns 
effectively. Ernie O ’Malley’s account o f his time organising the movement across Munster 
and south Leinster described a fundamentally more co-ordinated and consequently better 
motivated, centrally directed organisation, comprising a formidable hierarchical structure than 
existed in Galway.24 Whilst in Mayo, the lack of contact with the Dublin leadership was 
compensated for by the ability and resolve of a number o f determined local leaders like 
Michael Kilroy and Tom Maguire, in Galway, no such figures emerged. Seamus Murphy, 
who was in charge o f the county, was neither a popular nor an effective officer, and his 
leadership, and later his decision to flee the country in September 1920, became the source of
23 Coleman, County Longford and the Irish Revolution, 1910-1923, pp 164-5.
24 See Ernie O’Malley, On Another Man 's Wound, pp 329-42.
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much bitterness, with many officers subsequently blaming him for the failure of their 
campaign.25 Without another outside organiser operating in the role previously held by Liam 
Mellows, the movement was reduced to relying on the initiative o f local companies and many 
areas quickly became demoralised and dropped out. A number o f strong local officers did 
remain active but their influence, though considerable, was confined to their own localities.
The IRA nationwide was restructured in March 1921 and Galway’s inclusion into divisions 
dominated by neighbouring counties was indicative o f the low esteem in which the Galway 
IRA were held by GHQ. The whole of the county, south of the railway line from Galway to 
Ballinasloe was incorporated into the First Western Division, led by Michael Brennan. The 
division comprised county Clare with the addition o f south Galway and all its officers were 
from Clare. North-east Galway was subsumed into the Second Western Division dominated 
by Mayo and led by Thomas Maguire. Connemara became subsumed in the Fourth Western 
Division, comprising west Mayo and Sligo.26 The re-organisation was ultimately meaningless 
as it came so late in the campaign and it never made any practical difference. It did, 
nevertheless represent a humiliation for the local movement in terms of the rivalry with 
neighbouring counties and recognition of the failure o f the Volunteer leadership in the county.
5. 2 The Evolution of the IRA Campaign
The IRA campaign in Galway can be analysed in three distinct phases which broadly conform 
to the evolution of the movement nationwide. In each consecutive phase the pool of 
Volunteers involved became smaller as the less committed, the older, those with full time 
occupations and more responsible family men, increasingly dropped out. In their stead 
remained younger men, sons of small tenant farmers who were generally free from the 
constraints o f careers, property, regular working hours, dependant families or strict parental 
control. In January 1920, the IRA leadership officially sanctioned attacks on the Crown 
Forces in response to the suppression of Dail Eireann and the failure of Irish nationalists to 
have their case considered at the Versailles Peace Conference. In the first phase of their 
campaign in Galway, attacks were characterised by large-scale operations involving groups of
25 BMH, WS 1J37 (Patrick Connaughton).
26 Dorothy Macardle, The Irish Republic. A Documented Chronicle o f  the Anglo-Irish Conflict and the 
Partitioning o f  Ireland, with a Detailed Account o f  the Period 1916-1923 (Dublin, 1937), p. 964.
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between fifty and one hundred badly armed men attacking local police barracks in the hope of 
capturing rifles and ammunition, Castlehacket and Castlegrove barracks in the north of the 
county were attacked in January and March of 1920 respectively, and Loughgeorge Barracks 
in Claregalway and Bookeen Barracks in Killimordaly were attacked in May and July.27 
Neither the Volunteers nor the RIC suffered loss of life in any of these attacks and only a 
small number of policemen sustained minor injuries. The IRA failed to successfully seize any 
of the barracks and in all cases the police defended their barracks and forced their attackers to 
retreat. All the attacks were against rural barracks with no police stations attacked in any of 
the towns. (Throughout the War of Independence no barracks in any of the relatively larger 
towns of Gort, Loughrea, Tuam, Galway, Portumna or Athenry were attacked.) In addition to 
these incidents, the RIC barracks at Ballinagar was rocked by a bomb in March and the police 
were ambushed on three occasions, at Monivea, Caltra and Ardrahan. As part o f the 
Volunteers’ nationwide offensive, four customs and excise offices were also raided and much 
o f their contents destroyed during Easter Week 1920. Thirty evacuated barracks were also 
burnt down or otherwise destroyed between April and July after the RIC moved into 
centralised garrisons.28
In the second phase of their campaign, the IRA became more ruthless and their revised tactics 
proved more efficent. The impetus for the development o f the new phase of the campaign was 
the withdrawal o f the RIC to much larger fortified barracks in urban centres and the virtual 
abandonment of the countryside to the IRA, With the success o f the boycott o f the RIC, the 
IRA now set out to kill policemen for the first time and they could only achieve this by 
ambushing patrols on narrow rural roads. Most ambush attempts ended in failure when the 
Crown Forces did not appear as hoped, but a number o f successful attacks were staged for the 
first time. With much smaller units of men, armed with rifles and sufficient ammunition, 
specially selected units attacked the RIC at Gallagh Hill near Tuam in July, killing two RIC 
men; at Merlin Park near Oranmore in August, killing one RIC man; and at Castledaly, near 
Kilchreest in October, killing one RIC man.29 These attacks, although few in number, 
represented an increasing professionalism on the part o f the IRA as the rivalry between local
27 Castlehacket was attacked on 10 January 1920, Castlegrove on 25 March 1920, Loughgeorge on 25 
May 1920 and Bookeen on 2 July 1920. See Appendix of IRA Attacks for details.
28 See Appendix of IRA Attacks for details.
29 The police were attacked at Gallagh on 19 July 1920; at Merlin Park on 21 August 1920; at 
Castleday on 30 October 1920. See Appendix of IRA Attacks for details.
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companies was overruled by local officers who selected a handful of men from neighbouring 
areas to take part in attacks.
Augusteijn has noted how attacks on the RIC were generally unpopular in the early phases of 
the IRA’s campaign and an increasing differentiation between areas in the county began 
manifest itself in earnest at this juncture.30 Many Volunteers dropped out of the organisation 
rather than take part in these attacks, about which they may have had reservations, and which 
placed their own lives and livelihoods at risk. The company structure now only had meaning 
in relation to policing duties and the burden of fighting was placed on the few areas which 
were still willing to ‘go out’ against the enemy. The majority were content with local duties 
and sometimes played a supporting role such as blocking roads and disrupting 
communications when an ambush was imminent. There was also considerable opposition by 
Volunteer officers themselves to attacks taking place in this period. Patrick Connaughton 
remembered ‘the Leitrim company [Leitrim, county Galway] were intent on drawing us away 
from their own area to the Ballinakill company area. The Ballinakill company objected to any 
attack in their area and a row developed,’31 Michael Hynes o f Kinvara remembered calling off 
several attacks for fear of reprisals and noted that it was simply not possible to mobilise 
sufficient numbers o f local Volunteers to attack the RIC.32
Augusteijn has recognised the trend of accelerating cycles of violence in areas which were 
active early on in the IRA campaign nationwide.33 In Galway, self reinforcing ‘local wars’ 
developed in isolation from other districts as cycles o f violence stimulated reprisals and 
further IRA activity. A self sustaining process o f escalating violence is evident in north 
Galway, which subsequently became the most active part of the county with attacks on 
Castlehacket and Castlegrove RIC stations taking place early in the campaign, in the same 
area which was later to become the heartland of the Tuam flying column. The process of 
further radicalisation that active Volunteers underwent as they were initiated into the secretive 
violence of the IRA, clearly produced more determined and energetic fighters in these areas, 
with other districts, whose campaigns had started less enthusiastically, simply being left 
behind.
30 Augusteijn, From Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare, p. 85.
31 BMH, WS 1,137 (Patrick Connaughton).
32 BMH, WS 1,173 (Michael Hynes).
33 Augusteijn, From Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare, p. 343.
The indiscriminate reactions o f the Crown Forces and the atrocities they carried out led to an 
increasing radicalisation o f both the population at large and IRA fighters. In Galway, 
however, the Crown Forces5 campaign, though counter-productive in the long term, was 
extremely successful in the short term in destroying the Volunteer movement in a very brief 
space o f time. Following the introduction of several measures under the Restoration of Order 
Act in August 1920, combined with the arrival of the Black and Tans in the county throughout 
August and September, the expanded Crown Forces were able to arrest anyone suspected of 
‘criminality5 and entitled to hold them for an indefinite period. As a result the Galway IRA 
was practically inactive from October until January 1921. The Brigadier General of the 5th 
Division reported in early December that in the Galway Brigade area, practically all known 
leaders of the IRA, not on the run, have been arrested.34 In this phase of the struggle most 
Volunteers who still resided at home or who had children or dependants and who were not 
willing to leave their jobs and jeopardise their livelihoods, generally refused to engage in IRA 
activity. Joseph Stanford recalled, ‘except for the few who meant to see it through, the 
average company now dwindled down, in most cases to around ten men.535 The leadership of 
the IRA were distinctly aware of the failure o f the organisation in the west to match its 
counterparts in Munster but had little sympathy for their plight. According to An t ’Oglach:
In the west, the guerrilla warfare was not sufficiently energetic to greatly relax the grip of the 
old RIC on the countryside, therefore where the RJC were not broken, they gave greater 
assistance to Tans, hence greater Terror in quieter areas. The Volunteers of those parts of the 
West where this campaign of Terror is being carried out, have only themselves to blame for 
this.36
Reprisals now took two forms: the burning of villages when an IRA attack took place and 
secondly, more low key, but extremely effective attacks on the homes o f Volunteers who 
were believed to be active. With attitudes considerably hardened on both sides, only the very 
committed, who were free of social, professional or martial constraints now remained active. 
The organisation also became geographically limited to the more isolated districts o f the 
county as they could not operate in the more populated districts:
34 HQ 5th Division, WO 35/93A/2, TNA.
35 BMH, WS 1,334 (Joseph Stanford).
36 An tOglach, Vol xi, no 20, 15 September 1920.
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The IRA are now confined to the outlying, backward areas where Sinn Fein still lives. There is 
a bitter undercurrent of hatred against the government and Crown Forces. If the present 
pressure was relaxed, Sinn Fein would once again renew its old sway in a more rigorous and 
determined manner. It had such a reign of terror that it will take a long period to remove its 
evil and ruinous affects.37
The success of the Crown Forces in rounding up Volunteer suspects forced the organisation to 
fundamentally change its tactics. With the movement moribund for a number o f months, the 
final phase of the IRA’s campaign began in March 1921 with the formation o f three flying 
columns composed of men who were on the run and could not return to their homes. The 
columns acted independently of any IRA authority and had no contact with each other or with 
the IRA in other counties. In the north, around the Tuam countryside, in the south, in the 
region of the Slieve Aughty Mountains, and in West Connemara, groups o f between ten and 
twenty full-time Volunteers, all of whom were unable to return to their homes, formed flying 
columns and carried out a number of fatal attacks. Local IRA men sometimes joined the 
columns whilst they operated in their districts as the local companies which remained active, 
blocked roads, disrupted communications and provided food and shelter to the columns. The 
West Connemara column carried out three attacks, at Clifden, Muntir Owen and Screebe, 
killing three police men. The north Galway column was involved in four ambushes where two 
RIC men were killed. The south Galway column was involved in the Ballyturin ambush 
where three members of the Crown Forces and one woman accomplice were shot dead. 
During this period, local units also began to re-organise and carried out attacks on the RIC at 
Headford, Kilroe and Spiddal, wounding a number o f Crown Forces.38
It was a matter o f some disagreement nationwide as to how strong a position the IRA were 
throughout the country when the truce was called in July. Augusteijn suggests that most 
active areas would have been militarily unable to keep their flying columns in the field much 
longer.39 In Galway, despite the reorganisation in April, the IRA was not capable o f 
functioning at a high level for much longer. Daniel Ryan o f the south Galway column
37 Cl monthly report, west Galway, March 1921, CO 904/114.
38 The IRA attacked the Crown Forces at Kilroe on 19 January 1921, the RIC Barracks at Headford on 
30 April 1921 and Spideal RIC Barracks on 13 May 192. See Appendix for full details.
39 Augusteijn, From Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare, p. 184.
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reflected, 'we were more or less on the defensive... and it was no easy job. It was our hardest 
time, there was no enemy party coming our way small enough to be attacked with the arms 
available to us’.40
5,3 Factors Which Influenced the Emergence of Republican Activists
Why young men decided to join the IRA has been the subject o f considerable historical 
enquiry. Nonetheless, investigation into the process o f radicalisation has thrown up such 
strong variations as to suggest the futility o f extrapolating the findings o f studies based on 
research carried out in one part o f the country into nationwide assumptions. Why some areas 
were active and others inactive is not always as obvious as one might assume and in terms of 
motivation, a duality of focus is necessary to try and identify firstly, what type of 
communities the IRA drew strength from, and secondly, what kind of individual joined the 
IRA from these communities. The role o f ideology as a motivating factor has been 
problematic. Rumpf and Hepburn’s pioneering research into the factors motivating political 
violence in Ireland noted that whilst radical nationalism tended towards socialism, it usually 
remained distinct from socialist analysis of the existing social system.41 Peadar O ’Donnell, for 
instance, believed that small farmers and industrial workers o f Dublin and Cork were ready to 
channel their social discontent into support for the party and the republican leadership, had it 
not been held back by its lower middle class character.42 Sympathy with the downtrodden by 
rank and file Volunteers was a natural reflection of the proletarianism of the movement, as 
well as members’ view of themselves as liberators. Nationalism was also understood in a very 
general and romantic sense by ordinary Volunteers, with many noting in their Bureau o f 
Military History interviews that an interest in history had a significant impact on their 
political outlook. The leadership of the organisation, on the other hand, remained anxious to 
provide ‘responsible and respectable’ government and dispel the alarm created by IRA 
violence. The movement had an ambivalent attitude towards ideology: happy to court socialist 
support and echo vaguely socialist rhetoric, whilst implementing relatively conservative social 
policies and dampening down radicalism in its own ranks. As will be discussed in this 
chapter, this has often led researchers to assert the primacy o f materialistic motives, to
40 BMH, WS 1,007 (Daniel Ryan).
41 Rumpf & Hepburn, Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland, pp 24-5.
42 O’Donnell, Peadar, There Will Be Another Day, p. 36.
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account for what were, to a significant degree, ideological convictions.
This section examines the factors which influenced the emergence o f republican fighters in 
Galway and the salience of social, geographic and economic influences identified in other 
parts of the country. Campbell has accurately described the IRA’s roots in Galway amongst 
the young sons of small farmers. His analysis o f IRA membership shows that sixty-three per 
cent of IRA members in the south Galway IRA were farmers’ sons between 1919-21, with a 
further thirteen per cent listed as artisans and eleven per cent listed as labourers,43 When it is 
taken into account that a significant proportion o f those listed as labourers and artisans would 
also have been the sons o f small farmers forced to seek work outside o f farming, the overall 
character o f the movement is obvious. Only four per cent o f Volunteers were clerks or shop 
assistants, with an additional four per cent involved in business and three percent were 
students. The number of Volunteers between 1919 and 1921 whose address was listed in an 
urban area was eleven percent, compared with eighty-nine percent who lived in the 
countryside.44 The generational gap is as obvious as the rural/urban divide, with seventy-eight 
percent of those studied in the south Galway IRA in 1918 aged twenty-nine years old or 
younger with an additional twenty percent in their thirties. Only two per cent of fighters were 
older than thirty-nine.45
Hart has concluded that cultural nationalism and the teaching of Irish in particular played a 
key role in the development of radical republicanism. In this context, education by the 
Christian Brothers has been seen as a pivotal factor, with Hart concluding that ‘in teaching 
patriotism, the brothers created gunmen’.46 Interest in the Irish language and in cultural 
nationalism in general was negligible amongst Volunteers in Galway and the Gaelic League 
remained weak in the county throughout the era. Knowledge of Irish was not a serious 
aspiration amongst IRA members and very few attended classes or displayed any interest in 
cultural nationalism generally. In this regard, the Galway Express continually emphasised the 
need for republicans to take an interest in Gaelic culture and was continually at pains to stress 
the lack of interest amongst Galway nationalists in cultural nationalism.47
43 Campbell, Land and Revolution, p. 260, Table 22.
44 Campbell, Land and Revolution, p. 261, Table 26.
45 Campbell, Land and Revolution, p. 261, Table 26.
46 Peter Hart, T h e  Geography of Revolution in Ireland', p. 171.
47 See in particular, an editorial entitled T he Language-Dying After AH’ in Galway Express, 10 May
Whilst many Volunteers did play Gaelic games (football in the north of the county and 
hurling in the south), Volunteers were no more likely than other young men of their age to be 
members o f the GAA. Ballinasloe, which had the strongest tradition of recruitment to the 
British army in the county, were also the county Gaelic football champions for six years 
running between 1914 and 1919 -  a feat never again achieved. Furthermore, the GAA had 
split along political lines in 1914 in the county, with a Remondite faction breaking away and 
organizing a rival organisation in south Galway, in protest at the influence of prominent 
republicans on the county hurling board,48 Eight clubs continued to play in their own separate 
league for a number o f years and their stance required considerable support from grassroots 
supporters in the clubs to endorse such a radical schism. The GAA was heavily influenced at 
an administrative level by the IRB and active republicans. However, given the popularity of 
Gaelic games, it is not surprising that not all clubs shared the ideals o f Sinn Fein and players 
of all political persuasions joined its ranks. Thus, the role o f cultural nationalism as a 
formative experience influence on IRA Volunteers in Galway can be discounted.
As previously discussed, in order to remain active in the IRA, Volunteers needed to be free of 
parental control, or at least obtain some degree of sanction from their parents to spend long 
periods o f time away from their families. Cautious parents o f young men who placed firm 
restrictions on their behaviour could prevent any son from remaining active for very long. 
Secondly, the burning of homesteads belonging to Volunteers, along with attacks on their 
families and neighbours, deterred the most determined o f fighters, who were unwilling to 
leave their families to fend for themselves against the excesses o f Crown Forces which 
included rape, murder and arson. Thus, in the context o f the State’s campaign discussed later 
in this chapter, only the most determined o f fighters, generally free from parental control, 
without property, family dependants or the constraints of standard working hours, could 
realistically commit to being full-time IRA men.
Rumpf and Hepburn identified a number of key social and geographic features as important 
factors in preconditioning ‘republican areas’.49 They found that social unanimity was a
1919. (The paper noted that there was no Gaelic League branch in ten Galway towns.) See also, an 
editorial entitled ‘A Sickening Old City’, Galway Express, 9 August 1919.
48 This is discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
49 Ruinpf and Hepburn, Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland\ pp 41-57.
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significant factor in facilitating republican violence and where a considerable section of the 
population was indifferent or opposed to the IRA, the movement’s actions remained sporadic. 
In Galway, IRA activity was a purely rural phenomenon with ideological or adventure- 
seeking young men from the towns much more likely to join the British army. As the towns 
and large parts o f the countryside remained aloof from the national movement throughout the 
period, the IRA could only operate in those distinct parts of the countryside where local 
communities were willing to provide food and shelter. This urban/rural divide was not unique 
to Galway, with similar patterns observed in Tipperary, Longford and Clare, although the 
degree to which the IRA was exclusively rural in Galway is exceptional.50 Augusteijn believes 
that the presence o f a confrontational local population radicalised republicans and was a 
significant factor in directly encouraging the growth of the movement.51 This was the case in 
Galway and local opposition in the towns was so strong that the movement never developed 
in urban areas. Thus, Fitzpatrick’s conclusion that ‘Irish nationalism was above all else a rural 
preoccupation. Its most violent manifestations were concentrated in the countryside,’ 
conforms closely to the dynamics of republican activity in Galway.52
The presence of strong local leadership has been identified as an important factor in 
motivating a local company. Coleman has noted that in Longford, Sean MacEoin exercised 
considerable local authority and the respect with which he was held generated self-belief in 
his men.53 His strength of character partially explains the distinct variation in IRA activity 
between north Longford, where he was based, and south Longford, which remained less 
active. Rumpf and Hepburn concluded that local leadership was more important than the 
political and social climate in a region and that strong autonomous local leaders could activate 
a whole area.54 However, Fitzpatrick disagrees with this analysis, stating that ‘the prevalence 
of violence was not a function of the presence or absence of strong willed and bellicose 
leaders of men’,55 The evidence of this study suggests that more than any other single factor,
the presence o f strong local leadership, often comprising only a few tightly knit families, was
50 See Fitzpatrick, ‘The Geography of Irish Nationalism’, p. 130; Coleman, County Longford and the 
Irish Revolution, p. 172; Augusteijn, From Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare, p. 347.
51 Augusteijn, From Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare, p. 333-4.
52 Fitzpatrick, ‘The Geography of Irish Nationalism’, p. 423.
53 Coleman, County Longford and the Irish Revolution, p. 162.
54 Rumpf & Hepburn, Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland, pp 41-2.
55 Fitzpatrick, T he Geography of Irish Nationalism’, p. 117.
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the single most important factor in mobilising and motivating a company in Galway. The 
presence of local autonomous leadership, or more patently, the absence of it, generally 
overrode local social, economic or cultural conditions as motivating factors. In terms of 
engagements with the Crown Forces, the Tuam battalion was the most active, and also 
contained several committed officers, including Michael Moran, in particular and these men 
later went on to form a flying column in February 1921. The death o f Moran, who was shot 
by the Crown Forces in revenge for the Gallagh ambush in September 1920, was a massive 
blow and the Tuam brigade was subsequently inactive for four months following his death. 
Similarly, the murder of Louis Darcy, killed in police custody in early 1921, marked the 
immediate decline o f the IRA in Headford which had previously been involved in the attacks 
carried out by the Number One brigade. The killing of Joseph Howley from Oranmore, in 
reprisal for the Merlin Park ambush in December 1920 resulted in the immediate decline of 
the Oranmore company also, and they did not carry out any more attacks for the duration of 
the conflict.
Along with the Tuam Brigade, the Gort Brigade under Joe Stanford, the west Connemara 
brigade under Thomas O’Maille and the Galway Number One brigade which comprised the 
districts of Oranmore, Headford and Castlegar, led by Thomas Duggan and Brian Molloy, 
were the only areas that remained active throughout the conflict. The strength of a local leader 
was amply demonstrated in the conflict over Menlo Woods discussed in Chapter Four, when 
through force o f conviction and the threat of violence, Molloy was able to prevent the Galway 
County Council from proceeding with the purchase of the Wood and despite the support of 
Sinn Fein on the council, forced the owner to sell the estate for division amongst the tenants.
Rumpf and Hepburn identified economic factors which they found were responsible for the 
relative inactivity of the Volunteers in the west of Ireland. Noting that the most violent 
districts were not the poorest, but those concentrated in middling prosperous farming districts 
in the south, they concluded that the social aspirations of the rural poor in the west were not 
primarily reflected in the national struggle but in the land struggle.56 Rumpf is partially correct 
in this assumption, as discussed in Chapter Four, although he did considerably underestimate
56 Rumpf & Hepburn, Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland, p. 55. Conversely,
Rumpf s economic argument sought to explain the inactivity of the east and the north of the country in 
terms of their strong farming and economic ties with England, which generated a greater degree of 
sympathy for the maintenance of the union with England.
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the level of violence in counties Galway, Roscommon and Mayo. Furthermore, they 
somewhat contradict their own analysis by arguing that the lack of violence in the west of 
Ireland could be accounted for primarily by ‘a more Gaelic outlook generated by economic 
and geographic backwardness’.57 The presence or absence o f a prosperous rural middle class 
as a key factor in driving the violence of the IRA has been dismissed by Fitzpatrick, but 
Rumpf is correct in his assertion about the absence of both the upper and bottom echelons of 
rural society in the ranks of the IRA.58 (In his short story, The Road to Bright City, Mairtin 
O ’Cadhain, who was a member of the IRA in Galway, explained the absence of the very 
poorest section o f Galway rural society from the revolution with the simple remark, The poor 
as ever, had to struggle on’.59) In relation to the top tier o f rural society, Fitzpatrick has noted 
that those with property were extremely wary of being involved as the struggle progressed 
and a similar pattern is evident in Galway.60 The prosperous middle class that Rumpf refers to 
is absent in Galway but if his assertions are applied to the next tier of society, the small but 
not completely impoverished small tenant farmers, the picture in Galway is more accurately 
described.
Topography was frequently cited by combatants as a reason for the relative inactivity o f their 
areas whilst defending their record to their IRA superiors in GHQ. Augusteijn notes that in 
Wexford, which was an inactive county, topography was frequently cited as the main reason 
for the lack o f any functioning flying column and officers claimed IRA columns would have 
been immediately obvious to the Crown Forces due to the flat nature of the terrain. Whilst 
topography was discounted as an excuse by Volunteer leaders anxious to broaden the scale of 
their struggle, there is some validity in the argument. In Galway, there were three active 
flying columns, the west Connemara column, active from March 1921 until the truce, made 
their base in the Twelve Pins mountains, only venturing down to the coastal plains to attack 
the police. In south Galway, the flying column was based in the Slieve Aughty hills and only 
ventured down to ambush the military at Ballyturn in May 1921. The north Galway column, 
on the other hand, operated in the boggy undulating countryside around Tuam and managed to 
carry out a number o f fatal attacks without the aid o f mountain retreats. In other parts o f the
57 Rumpf & Hepburn, Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland, p. 62.
58 Fitzpatrick, T he Geography of Irish Nationalism’, p. 120.
59 Mairtin O ’Cadhain, T he Road to Bright City’ in The Road to Bright City and Other Stories (Dublin,
1981), p. 62.
60 Fitzpatrick, T he Geography of Irish Nationalism’, p. 115.
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country, the most successful columns operated in hilly countryside with the most aggressive 
columns in Tipperary and west Cork being the obvious examples. Thus, whilst hilly 
countryside helped the IRA, it was not an essential prerequisite.6'
The lack of proper weapons was the most often cited reason, along with topography, for the 
failure o f non-active areas to pursue their campaigns. Whilst it is clear that the IRA had a 
constant problem in keeping their Volunteers supplied with adequate arms and that the lack of 
ammunitions and other vital supplies was a major problem for the organisation in Galway, it 
does not explain the lack of IRA activity in many areas. Both Hart and Coleman have 
acknowledged that the IRA in Cork and Longford were chronically short o f arms but as their 
campaigns progressed, the more determined fighters managed to arm themselves sufficiently 
to be able to mount guerrilla campaigns and keep small numbers o f well-armed fighters active 
in flying columns.62 In Galway, even the west Connemara column, which was virtually cut off 
from the rest o f the country, managed to fully arm more than twenty men, which was more 
than enough to fight a short guerrilla campaign for a number of months before the truce. A 
relatively small number of weapons was required to arm a column sufficiently and shortage of 
arms was not a defining factor.
Hopkins has highlighted the importance a strong nationalist tradition as an important factor in 
conditioning support for the IRA.63 Similarly, Fitzpatrick has pointed out that the rhetorical 
affirming o f communal sovereignty over the ‘nation’s soil and all its reserves was a 
commonplace of radical nationalists’.64 Whilst not discounting the obvious importance of 
various versions of history in influencing the nature o f any revolution, the previous land 
struggle in Galway, whilst a seminal part o f folk history and featuring prominently in the 
political rhetoric o f the era, must be discounted as a motivating factor. The areas in Galway 
where the Land War and the Plan of Campaign had been most bitterly fought, the districts of 
Athenry, Loughrea and Woodford, had no active Volunteer companies during the latter phase 
of the IRA campaign and Woodford was completely inactive throughout the period.65 In this
61 Hart, T he Geography of Revolution in Ireland’, p. 158.
02 Hart, T he Geography of Revolution in Ireland’, pp 155-6.
63 Michael Hopkinson, The War o f Independence, (Dublin, 2002), p. 201.
64 David Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, 1912-1939 (New York, 1998), p. 30.
65 It is instructive to examine the volume of folk stories o f the Land War in the Galway volumes of the 
National Folklore Archive in comparison to the small number of accounts collected about the War of
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context Garvin’s assertion that, ‘the best discrimination between the two Volunteer 
organisations was the presence or absence of a Land War tradition in the area’ needs to be 
reassessed.66
The dynamics of revolutionary violence in east Galway display strong parallels to the IRA 
campaigns studied by Augusteijn in Tipperary and Mayo, Coleman in Longford and 
Fitzpatrick in Clare. Hart’s findings in Cork contradict many of the trends found in Galway. 
He found that the number of Volunteers who worked on farms was disproportionately low, 
given their share o f the working male population, with skilled workers, shop assistants and 
other typically urban trades overrepresented. These findings have led Hart to conclude that 
‘we can eliminate those explanations for violence based on wealth, class, occupation or 
rurality.’67 This directly contradicts Campbell’s findings on the social composition of the 
Volunteers in Galway and the evidence contained in this study on the profoundly rural nature 
o f the revolutionary experience. As previously discussed, towns were completely absent from 
the revolutionary struggle and whilst there are parallels in Clare and elsewhere, it was 
considerably more pronounced in Galway, where local men actually joined the Black and 
Tans. Fitzpatrick concurs that a cultural chasm existed between town and country noting that 
in Clare, towns were not socially conducive to producing Volunteers as ‘larger market towns 
had not developed a communal or political life comparable in intensity to that in the 
countryside’.68
II. Political Violence and the Wider Community 
5.4 Public Opinion
The ability of the IRA to exercise control over their communities and stifle dissent over 
republican activity was an important factor in active IRA districts. Hostility towards 
republicans from supporters of the UIL in urban areas was particularly pronounced in Galway 
where the polarisation of political opinion was more pronounced than in other counties. The 
urban population was sufficiently hostile to the IRA for information on the Volunteer
Independence.
66 Tom Garvin, The Evolution o f Irish Nationalist Politics (Dublin, 1981), p. 109.
67 Hart, ‘The Geography of Revolution in Ireland’, p. 173.
68 Fitzpatrick,‘The Geography of Irish Nationalism’, p. 131.
movement to be passed to the authorities on a relatively wide scale and this was a significant 
factor in preventing the growth of urban IRA companies. As discussed in Chapter Three, a 
considerable number of people in Galway town had previously mobilised against the IRA 
during the 1916 Rebellion and had worked closely with the police and military. Similarly in 
Loughrea, Turloughmore and Craughwell, the National Volunteers manned the local RIC 
barracks when news of the Rising spread. This urban/rural chasm was still an important 
phenomenon and as already noted, in January 1921 twenty local men actually joined the 
Black and Tan regiment stationed at Ballinasloe.69
Opposition to republicans was dependant on whether the IRA was in the ascendancy or in 
decline and an ebb and flow of support between the rival institutions o f the state and the 
revolutionary movement was apparent. The Sinn Fein land courts and the republican police, 
on the one hand, and the RIC and the state court system on the other, vied for the allegiance of 
the rural community. Support for the police was at its lowest in the summer of 1920, shortly 
before the arrival o f the Crown Forces, as the force was almost completely boycotted. In a 
revealing passage written in July 1920, the county inspector described the conditions under 
which his officers were working:
The life o f  the police is scarcely bearable. They are shamed and boycotted and for the most 
part cannot get the necessities o f life unless they com m andeer them. They are held up and shot 
at every opportunity. The order is to destroy them  and during July two young men were shot 
dead in circum stances o f cruelty and treachery. The people generally are out for a republic and 
they propose to get it.70
In this climate it was difficult for people who objected to the republican movement to make 
their feelings known and for many people it was prudent to keep one’s political opinions 
private. The boycott o f the police was enforced across the county, isolating both the RIC and 
the considerable portion o f the population who supported them. In these conditions:
The police have to take the necessities o f life by force. Their w ives are m iserable and their 
children suffer in the schools and nobody cares. The Sinn Fein arbitration courts adm inister 
justice, magistrates have resigned their com m ission, and lunatics are com m itted to the asylum
69 Connacht Tribune, 21 January 1921.
70 Cl monthly report, west Galway, July 1920, CO 904/112.
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by Sinn Fein m agistrates through the operations o f  the Irish Volunteers. Propertied classes 
who are able to do so, have left the country, the remainder have become Sinn Feiners. There is 
no other course open to them if they are to live in security.71
By the end o f the year the IRA had been successfully driven underground, however, and many 
people had the opportunity, which they were previously denied, to express their opposition to 
the movement. The police'now noted:
A good deal o f sympathy among people with a stake in the country is due to fear and there are 
indications o f  a return to sanity and revulsion against Sinn Fein on the part o f  the more 
respectable people, now that the government are beginning to get a grip on the situation. As 
far as Galw ay is concerned Sinn Fein has largely lost its power.72
By the end of 1920 the police reported to Dublin Castle that they were beginning to receive 
valuable information on the activities of the IRA:
The riding is in a peaceable state and nothing o f a serious nature has occurred. There is no 
agrarian agitation and the feeling toward the police is much better with the people inclined 
toward friendship and there is no attempt anyw here to boycott them. I have received bone-fide 
inform ation o f  tw o or three ambushes prepared for the police.73
British military intelligence nationwide was co-ordinated by five regional centres during the 
War o f Independence, with the western centre based in Galway town. The military sought to 
gain information through the interrogation of captured Volunteers, from sympathetic 
individuals opposed to the IRA and by the use of disguised officers sent out amongst the local 
population. In Galway, the military enjoyed obvious success in the intelligence war against 
the IRA, and as previously discussed, they were able to destroy the organisation in a matter of 
weeks, when they arrested practically all the leading officers in the county in October 1920. In 
response to Parliamentary questions in the House of Commons from Joseph Devlin MP, 
military intelligence had been warned not to discuss the use of civilians in intelligence 
gathering and to confine any replies to similar queries by simply stating that they were
71 Cl monthly report, west Galway, August 1920, CO 904/112.
72 Cl monthly report, west Galway, November 1920, CO 904/113.
73 Cl monthly report, west Galway, December 1920, CO 904/113.
pursing political crime in Ireland under the confines of martial law.74 (The Chief Secretary had 
been asked whether the government was conscripting the male population of west Cork to 
assist the Crown Forces in combatant service against the IRA.)75
John King, an IRA member from Clifden, recalled that in his district there were many ‘spies 
and touts and if Ernie O ’Malley had come to inspect the area, some of those miserable 
creatures’ carcasses would be found along the roadside.’76 Similarly, Joseph Stanford, a south 
Galway IRA officer recalled, ‘there were some in the Gort area who did not hesitate to give 
information to the RIC as late as December 1920.’77 From whom the police received their 
information on the IRA is not clear, however, there was a partial return to normal civic life in 
late 1920 and government agencies were increasingly able to go about their normal business
once more. In an important report, the police noted at the time:
As an instance o f steady improvement, I would m ention an interview I had a few days ago 
with the ch ief inspector o f the CDB. The latter, who is in close touch with the people,
informed me that that he finds an extraordinary change com pared to a few months ago. The
people now fully recognise the authority o f  the Board and there is no difficulty, as formerly, in 
collecting the money due. Among other important instances may be m entioned the completion 
o f  the audit books, the formation o f a ratepayers association in Galway, the auditors o f  which 
are keeping in close touch with the police. And finally, the surrender o f  arms in the Headford 
area and the resignation o f 17 IRA members and the disbandm ent o f  two com panies.78
The reference to the Galway Rate Payers Association is intriguing for a number of reasons. 
The Association was founded at the start of February on a ‘non-political basis’ with the added 
provision that religion and politics would not be discussed at meetings.79 The Clifden branch 
of the Association stated their determination to ‘protect the interests o f the rate payers 
generally, as well as for resisting and defending against exorbitant and malicious injury 
claims, now so common in the events of the district, and the county council refusing to do
74 ‘Enrolment of Civilians in Martial Law areas into Civil Guards’, WO 35 / 66, TNA.
75 ‘Enrolment of Civilians in Martial Law areas into Civil Guards’, WO 35 /66 , TNA.
76 BMH, WS 1,731 (John C King).
77 BMH, WS 1,334 (Joseph Stanford).
78 Cl monthly report, west Galway, February 1921, CO 904/114.
79 Connacht Tribune, 1 January 1921.
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so.580 The organisation was somewhat less clear about how they were going to bring down the 
level of compensation which people were increasingly making for damage and loss o f life 
sustained at the hands of Crown Forces. There was clear hostility to the IRA, thinly disguised 
in the Association’s rhetoric and members felt sufficiently secure to openly organise without 
fear of retribution from republicans.
Rate Payers Associations had been set up in Galway and Headford in February of 1921, 
during the same month in which the police made significant progress against the IRA in these 
areas. As previously noted, in February alone, the police foiled three IRA ambushes by acting 
on information provided by the public in Galway town. In Headford, where another 
Ratepayers Association had been set up, the local IRA collapsed after a significant arms find 
in the home of local IRA officer Louis Darcy. He was subsequently arrested by the military 
and shot dead whilst in custody.81 In a confidential report, British military intelligence, 
singled out the capture o f Darcy as an example o f the best possible use of information on the 
IRA gathered from local sympathetic civilians.82 The Crown Forces had been informed of 
Darcy’s movements in advance and it was also noted that the same source had been used to 
uncover the original arms find in Darcy’s home.
The reference to the Congested Districts Board in the RIC inspector’s report was significant 
also. The chief inspector for the CDB in Galway was Leslie Edmonds. He was an English ex- 
serviceman who had fought in the Boer War before moving to Ireland and joining the CDB. 
As previously mentioned, he was believed to have been aboard the navy gun boat, The 
Gloucester during East Week, helping the navy direct their shells on the Castlegar 
neighbourhood, where the local IRA were thought to have been gathered. Edmonds was shot 
dead in July 1922 when he was ambushed by the IRA in the Castlegar District. It was 
believed locally that he was an undercover spy and in the 1950s Bartley King, former TD for 
Connemara, deposited a letter in the History Department o f University College Galway 
stating his conviction that Edmonds had merely used his position in the CDB as a cover for 
covert surveillance.83
8tJ Connacht Tribune, 1 January 1921.
81 The murder of Louis Darcy is discussed in the final section of this Chapter.
82 ‘Report on the intelligence Branch of the Chief of Police, Dublin Castle’, WO 35 /214 , TNA, p. 32.
83 ‘Letterfrack/Leenane, Landing of arms at’, POL2, Hardiman Library, NUIG.
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There are a number o f intriguing aspects to King’s claim. He also deposited a letter, which he 
claimed the IRA had retrieved, written by Edmonds detailing the activities of local 
republicans in north Connemara and which had been addressed to military intelligence in 
Galway. Secondly, Edmonds was widely believed to have been responsible for the sinking of 
a small fishing vessel, The Pretty Polly, off the Galway coast in May 1918.84 He had been 
spotted at the scene by local people and the vessel was sunk shortly before the general round 
up of republican suspects for their alleged involvement in ‘the German Plot’. The authorities 
at the time claimed that the fishing vessel had been attacked by the German navy and that it 
corroborated their claims of a potential German invasion.
King’s claim about the CDB may also explain the killing of three men in Galway town in 
1922, in an attack which became known as the St Brides Workhouse killings.85 Two RIC 
men, Sergeant Gibbons and Sergeant Gilmartin, along with Patrick Cassidy, a farmer and 
former official of the Congested Districts Board were shot dead in a co-ordinated attack 
carried out by unknown gunmen on 15 March 1922. A third RIC man, Constable Patrick 
McGloin survived the attacks but sustained severe wounds. The attacks took place during the 
truce and it is significant that the dead men were terminally ill and were in the workhouse for 
that reason. McGloin had previously been warned by the IRA for allegedly acting as a spy and 
in May 1920 he received a letter in the post warning him to desist. It stated, ‘McGloin, we 
know you are a spy and an informer. Give up at once or your days are numbered. Final 
notice.’86 The murder o f three former government servants in such circumstances generated 
questions in the House of Commons at the time but no explanation was forthcoming for the 
attack.87 However, if  the IRA believed that there was an active spy ring operating under the 
cover o f the CDB, it explains their determination to kill three seriously ill men. The 
professionalism of the attacks and the level o f co-ordination involved also suggests that it was 
not the work of the Galway IRA and may have been carried out by Volunteers brought into 
the county by IRA GHQ specifically for the task.
Disgruntled people were, however, often willing to warn the military about the activities of 
republicans. The Crown Forces reported that they had received a written warning of an
84 ‘ Letterfrack/Leenane, Landing of arms at’, POL2, Hardiman Library, NUIG.
85 Irish Times, 18 March & 25 March 1922.
86 Irish Times, 10 May 1920.
87 Irish Times, 21 March 1922.
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ambush near Mountbellew on 2 December 1920 and as a consequence were able to avoid the 
attack and arrest Patrick Tully and John Loughnane of Ballinamore Bridge.88 Two weeks later, 
the military received details o f weapons hidden in the home of Thomas Mannion at 
Castlefrench and they subsequently raided his house and a small quantity o f weapons were 
recovered.89 During the same month, the military reported that they had received details o f ‘an 
outsider’ trying to organise the IRA at Laurencetown and an IRA officer, George Patten was 
captured due to information provided by another local source.90
The IRA killed three informers during the War o f Independence. William Joyce, a school 
teacher from Bama, Thomas Harmon, a land agent from Clonbern, and Tom Morris, a small 
farmer from Kinvara, were all kidnapped and shot in the head after receiving the final 
sacraments. Joyce was killed for passing information on local republicans to the Crown 
Forces and a number o f letters that he had written to the authorities about local republicans 
were produced at his ‘trial’.91 Hannon was believed by the IRA in north Galway to have given 
the location of Michael Moran, the leader of the Tuam battalion, to police in north Galway 92 
Moran, as noted above was subsequently arrested and shot dead in custody by Crown Forces 
in November 1920.93 Morris had been regularly socialising with the Crown Forces in South 
Galway and the amount of time he spent in their company convinced the IRA that he was 
passing information to them.94
William Joyce had made little secret of his antipathy towards the republican movement and he 
had actively campaigned to have Michael O’Droighneain, the republican leader from Spideal, 
removed from his post as a primary school teacher. His fate was sealed when letters he had 
written to the police outlining O’Droigneain’s movements, as well as allegations against other 
Volunteers, were intercepted by Patrick Togher in the GPO in Galway and subsequently 
passed to the leadership of the movement in November 1920.95 Joyce was taken from his
88 HQ 5th Division, WO 35/93A/2, TNA.
89 HQ 5th Division, WO 35/93A/2, TNA.
90 HQ 5th Division, WO 35/93A/2, TNA.
91 BMH, WS 1,718 (O’Droighneain).
92 BMH, WS 1,408 (Thomas Mannion).
93 The killing o f Michael Moran is discussed in the final section of this Chapter.
94 Connacht Tribune, 9 April 1920.
95 BMH, WS 1,718 (O’Droighneain).
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home by masked men and brought to east Connemara where he was tried by a three-man 
Volunteer court. Local people displayed little sympathy when he went missing and the police 
noted 4 we have, not alone received no assistance, but in some instances the attitude of those 
questioned has been insolent and defiant’.96 This rare show of communal solidarity over a 
local killing by the IRA was not typical of the attitude of the general community in Galway 
town and is more indicative o f disdain for Joyce, rather than the fear o f IRA retribution on 
anyone who assisted the police in their search.
Tom Morris, who was shot dead on 2 April 1921 near the village o f Kinvara in south Galway, 
was killed due to the belief that he was informing on the local community.97 Morris, 58, was 
an ex-Royal Irish Fusilier and an ex-RIC man and was taken from his house at night by 
masked men and later found shot dead at a nearby crossroads. His body was blindfolded and a 
notice hung around his neck claiming he was a convicted spy and shot by the IRA. The local 
press stated that he had been unpopular in the district and had been under threat locally.98 He 
was known to socialise with Crown Forces in the area and this marked him out from the 
community as a deviant. His house had previously been ransacked and he had subsequently 
fled the district and declared that he would not return. He came back to the area to convalesce 
after an illness and was staying with his sister. Giving evidence at the military inquest into his 
death, his sister stated that ‘it was thought at the time that he was a spy’.99
Thomas Hannon was a land agent for C.J. O’Rourke, near Clonbeme in north Galway. He had 
been ‘wanted’ for some time by the local IRA due to their belief that he was a police 
informer. He was unfortunate to wander into an ambush that had been set up in the area for 
the RIC and was taken away and administered the last rights by a local priest before being 
shot in the head. His employer, who stumbled into the ambush along with him and who was a 
large landowner and a Justice of the Peace, was released unharmed. It was stated by a leading 
member of the Tuam brigade that Hannon had tipped off the authorities about the 
whereabouts o f Michael Moran who was subsequently arrested and shot dead in December 
and for this reason he was shot.100
96 Cl monthly report, west Galway, October 1920, CO 904/113.
97 Connacht Tribune, 9 April 1921.
98 Connacht Tribune, 9 April 1921.
99 Connacht Tribune, 9 April 1921,
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In urban areas the IRA were unable to silence their critics, prevent local people from 
fraternising with the Crown Forces or convince the general population of the righteousness of 
their cause. In these circumstances the IRA could not operate in the towns as the population 
was too hostile. In rural areas opposition was less vocal due to the increased support for the 
IRA. The Galway branch of the Ex-Servicemen and Sailors’ Federation, who had a 
considerable number o f members in Galway town, were quite adamant about what needed to 
be done to defeat the IRA. At a meeting of ex-servicemen in the town in March 1921, M.J. 
Hennon, the National General Secretary of the Federation, told his audience to loud cheers 
and applause, ‘if the government cleared out of the country, it would be governed to the 
satisfaction o f all Irish men by the ex-servicemen. Let the government clear out and the ex- 
servicemen will deal with the people who are kicking up trouble in the country. It may be talk, 
but you [ex-servicemen] could do it if you had co-operation behind you.’101 The militant 
rhetoric o f the ex-servicemen concealed a considerable degree o f bluff but the tone and 
content o f their statements were unambiguous in their contempt for the IRA. Their members 
saw no compulsion to disguise their political sympathies and they had no fear o f IRA 
retribution. Furthermore, it is likely that Hennon’s remarks represented a moderated version 
of what was discussed at the meeting and which a responsible editor might subsequently print.
Ex-servicemen were always prominent at the funerals of the members of the Crown Forces 
killed by the IRA in Galway. Following the Ballyturin ambush in May of 1921, district 
inspector Cruise publicly forwarded a letter of thanks to Mr Montgomery, the honorary 
secretary of the Galway Ex-Soldiers Federation, noting that he ‘desired to return thanks 
through you, to the ex-servicemen who turned out in such great numbers at the funerals 
yesterday’.102 There was little hostility towards ex-serviceman in the towns and their sacrifice 
during the Great War was acknowledged by both local government and the community at 
large. In November 1921, at the height o f ‘the terror’ in Galway town, the Ex-Servicemen’s 
Association held their annual armistice parade despite the curfew in the town, in front of large
5.5 Ex-Servicemen
101 Connacht Tribune, 19 March 1921.
102 Connacht Tribune, 21 May 1921.
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crowds of cheering locals who lined the route o f their parade in a heavy rain storm.103 Notices 
had been placed around the town earlier in the week warning shops to stay shut on Armistice 
day 4 in memory o f the gallant lads who fell for the sake of dear old England and the R1C who 
were murdered by their own country men... Anybody that disobeys this order will have no 
roof over their heads in 24 hours.’104 A band and flag bearers from the 6th Dragoon Guard 
entered the quad at the University and forced seventy students and their professors to stand for 
a recital of God Save the Queen. Three students who refused to remove their hats were taken 
away and later publicly flogged.105 Businesses had been forced to shut for the day and 
following the procession, the four hundred or so ex-servicemen and their families were 
entertained at a reception at Earls Island army barracks courtesy o f Colonel Sadler. J.F. 
Goulding of the Galway Ex-Sailors and Soldier’s Federation later wrote an open letter to the 
Connacht Tribune claiming that ‘in no other town in the country, could there be a response as 
was given to the appeal to local people to turn out for the parade’.106 The army barracks at 
Earls Island was notorious for brutality and both Louis Darcy and Michael Moran were killed 
in custody there. The fact that so many local people were entertained at the camp whilst 
republicans were interned in the barracks, some of whom were tortured and killed, highlights 
the divided nature o f Galway society.
The Galway Urban Council was very active throughout the War o f Independence on the issue 
o f the welfare o f ex-servicemen and they took a number of steps to promote housing and 
employment opportunities for demobbed soldiers. The Council had considered a letter in 
November 1919 from the local Discharged Soldiers’ Association asking that their members 
get preference o f employment in connection with housing schemes.107 Whilst the council did
not implicitly state that it was in favour of this policy, it promoted a number of schemes to
provide housing and employment directly to the ex-servicemen of the town. They had hoped 
to provide direct employment by employing them exclusively on the erection of a new pier at 
Salthill, however, the plan was scuppered when no funds could be found to run the scheme.108
In February 1921, the council passed a motion stating that ‘the committee considers that every
103 Connacht Tribune, 13 November 1920.
104 Connacht Tribune, 13 November 1920.
105 Connacht Tribune, 20 November 1920.
106 Connacht Tribune, 11 December 1920.
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facility be given for the purpose of assisting the proposed scheme for erecting houses for ex- 
servicemen.’109 A scheme of grant-in-aid to Claddagh fishermen whose boats and equipment 
needed repair following their return from the War received the council’s backing in March
1919. The Council also proposed opening a motor engineering department in the town for 
local fishermen who had served in the army and navy.110 The Ministry of Reconstruction 
advised them that their proposals were being taken up by the CDB.m
In the towns, the Crown Forces continued to retain the confidence o f the local population and 
as there was no fear o f attack, they were free to carouse in local bars and hotels, with the 
officer class socialising with the local elite in the Galway Club in Salthill. In 1921, anti-Sinn 
Fein literature remained posted around Loughrea for some time with slogans such as 'Up the 
Rebels = To Hell with Ireland’s Prosperity.’112 However, a number o f brutal assaults on 
individual ex-servicemen in the county were carried out by republicans. On 28 November
1920, men broke into the home of an ex-serviceman named Fahey, beating him badly and 
breaking his front teeth. He had been known to be socialising with the Crown Forces in the 
area.113 An ex-serviceman, W.H. Dryden was kidnapped in Galway town on 9 December and 
taken to Moycullen where he was told he was going to be drowned for collaborating with the 
Crown Forces. He managed to escape before the sentence was carried out and made his way 
safely back to Galway town.114 In January 1920, an ex-serviceman was shot in the legs in 
Oranmore. He had received a number of warnings to resign from his old job as a postman,
which he had resumed after coming home from the War. The local man who had been
carrying out his duties had been let go to allow him to have his old job back, and for this 
reason, he was unpopular in the district.115
Patrick Thornton was killed by a group of men as he was leaving a pub at Loughanbeg near 
Spiddal, accompanied by his two brothers, on the night o f 2 February 1920. He was a 
demobilised soldier and the police noted that he had been unpopular in the area as he ‘was of
109 Minutes of the Galway Urban District Council, 23 February 1921, NU1G.
110 Minutes of the Galway Urban District Council, 3 April 1919, NUIG.
111 Minutes of the Galway Urban District Council, 8 May 1919, NUIG.
112 Connacht Tribune, 21 January 1921.
113 HQ 5th Division, ‘Hostile Acts or Outrages', WO 35/93A/2, TNA.
114 HQ 5th Division, ‘Hostile Acts or Outrages’, WO 35/93A/2, TNA.
115 Irish Times, 1 May 1920.
a bullying disposition’ and that 'he and his brothers were opposed to Sinn Fein’."6 The police 
alleged that the leader of the group was a local Irish teacher who shot Thornton in the 
abdomen after the three brothers were knocked down and beaten with sticks by a group of 
local men. Four men were later arrested and subsequently released without charge. It is not 
clear if  this was an official attempt to kill by the IRA and it is more likely that it was intended 
to be a beating, carried out by local republicans which suddenly escalated into murder.
Ex-servicemen were only part of a web of opposition to republicans in the county and they 
typified the attitudes o f many of the former supporters of the urban UIL, previously discussed 
in this chapter. Being an ex-serviceman did not yet have stigma attached to it and in the 
context of the considerable opposition to the IRA in the county, expressed by groups such as 
the Rate Payers Association, the Church hierarchy and the local press, they were simply one 
group amongst many, who were hostile to the IRA. This does not mean that ex-servicemen 
were targeted by the IRA more than any other group; the Crown Forces had no shortage of 
potential informers in urban areas and for this reason alone, there was no IRA activity in the 
towns. Ex-servicemen in urban areas were unlikely to be killed as informers, as there was so 
little IRA activity to inform on, or so few IRA men to carry out such threats.
In the countryside, being an ex-serviceman did not single someone out as a target for the IRA 
-  unless they were known to associate with the Crown Forces and believed to be passing 
information. In the case o f Tom Morris and Patrick Thornton, discussed in the next section, 
there was personal animosity towards both men for their vocal contempt for republicans. In 
rural areas, ex-servicemen recovering from the trauma of the War were potentially more 
brazen in their opposition to the IRA and it was their, public defiance, combined with the 
belief that they were informers, which led to these m en’s’ deaths. Although there were rural 
districts with few active IRA members in the county, unlike in the towns, fraternising with the 
Crown Forces was still stigmatised and it was this behaviour, more than any other factor, 
which singled these men out for retribution. Ex-servicemen were simply more likely than 
local farmers to defy convention as they struggled to rebuild their lives and many continued to 
seek the comradeship, danger and hard living experienced in the armed forces. Those who had 
remained at home and were more in tune with the tenor o f local feeling and the moral 
conventions surrounding associating with the military were naturally reticent to socialise with
1,6 Cl month iy report, west Galway, February 1920, CO 904/111.
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troops. In the case o f Tom Morris, it may simply have been the lack of company to drink with 
which led to his behaviour and ultimately his death. The role of alcohol in the death of 
Michael Thornton, discussed later in this chapter, must also be acknowledged and he was 
attacked after a night spent in a public house. He was also known for bullying local 
republicans, a fact which suggests a recklessness, fuelled by alcohol and the macho culture of 
army life.
5.6 Civilian fatalities
There were two civilians killed during the War of Independence in Galway for agrarian 
reasons, although the individuals responsible for the murders may have had connections to the 
Volunteers. James Ward was shot dead at the Gate Lodge at Menlo, where he lived as a 
caretaker and herd for Thomas Blake, in February 1920.117 Ward had been standing at his 
front door talking to a local man when he was shot from behind his garden wall. The local 
tenants had been agitating for the division of Menlo demesne for some time and for his 
association with the estate, Ward paid with his life. It is worth speculating whether this was a 
deliberate murder attempt or an outrage intended merely to intimidate, which then went 
wrong. Most shootings into homes tended to be carried out at night and houses were generally 
targeted through the windows. The fact that Ward was shot at close range whilst directly 
facing his attacker would tend to suggest a deadlier motive than a warning. A survey of 
attacks in Galway during the period would suggest that the local secret society, which 
generally sympathised strongly with, and membership with the IRA, was almost certainly 
responsible. As discussed in Chapter Four, the leader o f the agitation over the Wood was IRA 
leader Brian Molloy, and there was considerable intimidation involved in the campaign. It is 
unlikely that the attackers would have killed Ward without at least consulting with Molloy.
The problem in establishing culpability is again very much an issue in the murder o f Athenry 
landlord, Frank Shawe-Taylor, shot dead on the morning of the 2 March 1920. As discussed in 
Chapter One, he had been at the centre o f a long running boycott by tenants for a number of 
years to compel him to sell his farm. He was shot at point-blank range as he sat in his car, 
after the road in front of his estate had been blocked by a felled tree. As in the Menlo killing, 
a number o f local men were immediately arrested but subsequently released due to lack of
157 Connacht Tribune, 6 March 1920.
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evidence.118 There is no doubt that the Athenry secret society at Coshla was involved in the 
killing but the exact nature of republican involvement is difficult to establish. The Volunteers 
were not the secret society nor vice versa, but it is clear that strong overlaps existed and 
neither the Volunteers nor Sinn Fein locally made any public condemnation of the killing.
This was also the case in the shooting dead of Martin Cullinane, killed when armed men with 
blackened faces raided a house at Ardskamore, Corofin, on the night of the 4 March 1920.119 
Cullinane was shot whilst a group of up to fifteen intruders searched the dwelling for a 
shotgun they believed was concealed within. Raids for arms were rife in the county at the time 
and the authorities were quite certain who was responsible. Noting that twenty-two houses 
were raided and fifteen shotguns taken by masked men in the Loughrea, Athenry and 
Portumna, areas in January 1920, the police had ‘no doubt that the raids were organised by 
Frank Fahey MP, who was down here previous to the raids. They all took place in his 
division.’120 The IRA had earlier asked people to hand over arms to them, rather than the 
raiders and the relative accuracy of their information is bom out by the fact that in fifteen of
the twenty-two homes visited, they correctly identified that the occupiers possessed arms.'21
Cullinane was probably killed by accident by men from the community, acting on information 
that there was a shotgun in the house that the owner was unwilling to hand over to the local 
JRA.
Ill, The Crown Forces’ Campaign in Galway
5.6 Violence and Indiscipline
The actions of the Crown Forces in Ireland during the War o f Independence has received 
scant academic attention, despite the wealth of information which the War Office has 
maintained on the operation of its troops during the period.122 Whilst historians have
acknowledged that Crown Force’s reprisals played a formative role in conditioning the
1.8 Connacht Tribune, 6 March 1920.
1.9 Connacht Tribune, 7 February and 14 February 1920.
120 Cl monthly report, east Galway, January 1920, CO 904/111.
121 Cl monthly report, east Galway, January 1920, CO 904/111,
122 ‘General administration of the army in Ireland’, WO 35, TNA.
response of both the IRA and the community at large, a comprehensive examination of the 
dynamics of state violence remains a pertinent lacuna in the historiography of the Irish 
revolution. The role of the Crown Forces needs to be comprehensively examined for any 
conclusive analysis o f the totality of political violence to emerge. In this context, the 
following section discusses the actions of the Crown Forces in Galway and the impact which 
they had on both the IRA and the community at large. Augusteijn has acknowledged the 
pertinent role which the treatment of prisoners on hunger strike and raids and searches of 
private premises had on public opinion, but he also concludes that ‘the poor image of the 
Crown Forces and in particular the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries, was o f course, created by 
effective Sinn Fein propaganda.’123 He also concedes that whilst a negative perception of 
Britain was an important motivation for IRA fighters, this image o f the Crown Forces was 
‘fostered by the growing body of historical writing, which painted a very romantic image of 
an unscrupulous Britain violently oppressing an independent Ireland.’124
County Galway was covered by the Galway Brigade o f the British Armed Forces which 
formed part of the 5th Division during the War of Independence.'25 The 5th Division was 
commanded by Major General Sir H.S. Juedwine, whose headquarters was in the Curragh, 
from where he co-ordinated an operational area covering Roscommon, Longford, Leitrim, 
Galway, Mayo, Offaly, Kildare, Westmeath and Carlow.126 The Galway Brigade under Major 
M.O. Wilson had its headquarters in Renmore Barracks in Galway town. There were no 
troops permanently stationed in west Galway but the towns o f the east were heavily 
garrisoned due to the militancy of the IRA in the previous five years. Wilson had a number of 
different regiments under his control, stationed in six garrisons across the county. The Cl 
Royal Dragoons were based in Athenry and Ballinasloe; the 17th Lancers were based at 
Galway, Gort and Tuam; the 2nd Battalion Border Regiment were based at the military 
aerodrome in Oranmore; the 2nd Argyle and Southern Highlanders were based in Galway 
town, along with a small detachment o f the Connacht Rangers, the No 5 Section o f the
123 Augusteijn, ‘Motivation: Why did they fight for Ireland’, p. 106.
124 Augusteijn, ‘Motivation: Why did they fight for Ireland’, p. 109.
125 See map, ‘Distribution of Crown Forces in Galway in 1920 -21’ in Appendix.
126 The 5th Division was comprised of Cavalry, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Royal Corps of 
Signals, 13th Infantry Brigade, 14th Infantry Brigade, Royal Army Service Corps, Royal Army 
Medical Corps, Royal Army Ordinance Corp, Royal Army Vet nary Corp, Corp of Military Police and 
the Royal Army Chaplin Department. HQ 5th Division, Location of Troops, WO 35/93A/2, TNA.
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Armoured Car Company and detachments of the 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabineers).127 In 
December 1920, there were 453 troops in Galway town, 352 troops stationed in Ballinasloe 
and 135 in Oranmore with detachments o f 57 troops in both Gort and Athenry and 46 troops 
in Tuam.128 In addition to these permanently based troops, detachments from other parts o f the 
5th Division area were co-ordinated in larger sweeps of specific areas towards the end of the 
conflict.
The British military operated a policy of holding the civilian population responsible for the 
Volunteers’ actions during the War of Independence and subsequently punished local 
communities in reprisals following IRA attacks. Direct contact between the Crown Forces and 
the IRA in Galway was relatively rare, with the Volunteers carrying out only fifteen ambushes 
that resulted in loss o f life or serious injury. However, the vast majority of these attacks 
involved ambushes on small patrols of the RIC rather than the army and on only two 
occasions, at Kilroe in January 1921 and at Moylough in June 1921, did the IRA actually 
manage to engage British troops.129 Hence, the conflict was characterised by campaigns of 
attrition against the RIC by the IRA, and by the Crown Forces against the civilian population 
in general, including but not limited to, individual IRA members. The Crown Forces did not 
fight the IRA directly but attacked the communities which they believed, frequently 
incorrectly, supported the IRA, whilst trying to kill individual IRA men who they believed 
were involved in attacks on the RIC.
A total o f twenty-six people were shot dead by the Crown Forces in Galway between October 
1920 and May 1921, eleven of whom were republicans.130 Twenty-five of the victims were 
killed in the east of the county, including a priest, a pregnant woman, a serving RIC officer 
and a retired army major. Attacks against the civilian population and IRA members can be 
analysed in three categories. Firstly, there were a series of killings carried out by troops 
travelling into districts in large numbers, taking no care to hide their actions or their identity. 
A total of nine people were killed by rampaging troops in this fashion, i.e. simply being 
caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. A second series o f attacks were carried out by 
small units, usually numbering no more than five, who targeted specific individuals under the
127 HQ 5th Division, Location of Troops, WO 35/93 A/2, TNA.
128 HQ 5th Division, Location of Troops, WO 35/93A/2, TNA.
129 The IRA attacked the Crown Forces at Kilroe on 19 January 1921 and at Moylough on 5 June 1921.
130 See Appendix for map showing distribution of fatalities and a statistical analysis of fatalities.
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cover o f darkness, acting on intelligence about their victim’s whereabouts and habits. Nine 
men were taken from their homes at night and killed in this fashion and in most cases, their 
bodies were then labelled as spies to give the impression that they were killed by republicans. 
Finally, seven IRA members were killed after being taken into custody and subsequently 
described as being ‘shot whilst trying to escape5.131
Reprisals were also carried out by the Crown Forces in the towns and villages of Tuam, 
Oranmore, Ardrahan, Bama, Headford, Clifden, Screebe, Moycullen and Gort.132 In all cases, 
the attacks were carried out following IRA ambushes on the Crown Forces and involved the 
burning o f homes, shops, public houses and parochial houses, along with the shooting and 
beating o f random individuals. The fear generated by these attacks created a general dread at 
the prospect o f troops arriving in rural localities. Following an IRA ambush in May 1921, 
almost the entire population of Gort fled the town overnight in anticipation of the arrival of 
troops seeking revenge for the Ballyturin ambush. The military subsequently attacked at least 
twelve homes in the vicinity and shot dead a local RIC man whom they suspected was passing 
information to the IRA.133
The military’s behaviour had a profound affect on public opinion in a county which had 
previously been sharply divided between nationalists and republicans and where republicans 
had been subject o f intense hostility from many sections o f local society. More than any other 
factor, fear o f reprisals stopped all but the most determined groups of Volunteers from 
carrying out attacks. The military’s activity, however, completely discredited the force in the 
eyes o f many nationalists, who otherwise would have been content to support a tough 
approach against the IRA. Whilst Bishop O’Dea publicly held the IRA as ‘morally 
responsible’ for the murder of four local men shot dead in reprisals by the Crown Forces in 
Headford in January 1921, Church leaders also denounced the loss of moral authority which 
the behaviour o f troops represented.134 Archbishop O’Dea and Bishop O ’Doherty released a
131 John O ’Hanlon, Turloughmore, 2 November 1920; Michael Moran, Tuam, 24 November 1290;
Harry and Patrick Loughnane, Beagh, 27 November 1920; Laurence McDonagh, Inishmore, 22 
December 1920; J.J. McDonnell, Clifden, 17 March 1921; Louis Darcy, Headford, 24 March 1921. See 
Appendix for details.
132 See Appendix for full details of attacks and map showing the distribution of reprisals.
133 See Freeman ’ Journal, 18 May 1921.
134 The Archbishop condemned the IRA for the Kilroe ambush as ‘misguided criminals’. See, Irish
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statement condemning the actions of the military in September 1920:
We, who live amongst the people, see with our eyes, that not only is protection not given, but 
for m onths past, a systematic campaign o f terrorism, violence and destruction o f life and 
property has been tolerated, connived at, helped and encouraged, so that amongst the bulk o f 
the people, no life, liberty or property is safe any longer.135
Murder and arson were part of a wider campaign of violence carried out by the Crown Forces 
and as well as reprisals, constant low level violence, such as the burning of homes, the 
destruction o f property and the public whipping or beating o f groups of men were frequent 
occurrences. Lady Gregory wrote of her concern in her personal diary in September 1920 that 
the parents o f a number of girls in the Gort area had decided to keep things ‘hush, hush’ after 
their daughters were ‘interfered with’ by soldiers.136 Mock executions, with victims taken 
from their homes and led away to what they believed was their death, only be beaten after 
questioning, along with the shaving of young girls in their homes and random firing at work 
gangs also occurred on a weekly basis from September 1920 onwards. Troops arrived in 
Moycullen following Sunday Mass and separated the local men before marching them at gun­
point to a nearby field. They were told that the military were about to restore Richard Abbott, 
agent on the property o f colonel Campbell, to his home, and that ‘if a hair on his head was 
touched, six republicans would be killed5,137 Uniformed men visited the villages of Corofin 
and Cummer on consecutive nights in October and dragged twenty local men from their beds, 
stripping them naked and flogged them on the roadside.'38 In the Tuam area, council workmen 
were no longer willing to work on the roads for fear o f attack following an incident in which a 
group of local men had been taken from a public house at Turloughmore and publicly 
whipped by British troops.139 On the day of Terence MacSwiney’s funeral in Cork City, 
troops ran amok in Loughrea town, wounding three people.140 Following the incident, the 
Bishop of Clonfert, Dr 0 5Doherty wrote to Hamar Greenwood informing him that ‘a state of
Times, 25 January 1921.
135 Freeman's Journal, 18 November 1920.
136 Lennox Robinson (ed.) Lady Gregory's Journals, 1916-J930 (New York, 1947), entry for 20 
November 1920.
137 Irish Times, 28 September 1920.
138 Freeman's Journal, 19 October 1920.
139 Freeman’s Journal, 19 October, 1920.
140 Connacht Tribune, 31 October 1920.
alarm existed in the countryside between Ballinasloe and Athlone on the day of the funeral, 
with shots fired, men beaten and homes destroyed’.141 On the same day in Ballinasloe, a 
number o f young women had their heads shaven, in the first of a number of similar attacks.142 
Mock executions became a frequent occurance and Michael Fury was taken from his home in 
October 1920 and questioned about a recent ambush. He was then shot at close range and his 
house destroyed with grenades. Two other homes were visited on the same night and their 
occupants shot,143 In early December a series o f burglaries took place with whiskey and cash 
stolen by groups o f soldiers at four public houses in Loughrea and Athenry.144
5.7 ‘The Terror’ in Galway Town
Regardless of its anti-republican atmosphere Galway town was to witness a sustained period 
o f Crown Forces reprisals during September and October 1920.145 The only British soldier to 
be killed in Galway town during the War o f Independence was a Black and Tan named 
Edward Krum, who was shot dead at the railway station on 9 September 1920.146 His death 
and the subsequent actions of troops led to a five week long curfew in Galway town which 
became known locally as ‘the Terror.’ During this period people were subjected to a nightly 
campaign of violence and intimidation by Crown Forces. The atmosphere o f menace was 
heightened by the absence of street lighting, which the council had agreed to shut off, by a 
rigidly enforced stipulation that no lights could be turned on in any home or business after 
dark. Krum was an army taxi driver and was on duty at the Railway Station as the evening 
papers were being delivered.147 On the night in question, a number o f Volunteers were in the 
station, waiting for a container of explosives due to arrive from Dublin.148 People had gathered 
to collect the evening papers and when the train arrived the crowd rushed the platform. Krum
141 Irish Times, 6 November 1920.
142 Irish Times, 6 November 1920.
143 Freeman’s Journal, 18 October 1920.
144 ‘Hostile Acts or Outrages’, 5th Division War Diary, WO 35/93A, TNA.
145 See Irish Times, 11 September, 13 September and 15 September 1920; Connacht Tribune, 11
September, 18 September and 25 September 1920.
146 Irish Times, 10 September 1920. He is variously referred to as Krum, Krumm, Crom, Crumm and 
Crum in different newspaper reports.
147 BMH, WS 1,107 (Louis O’Dea).
148 BM H, WS 1,107 (Louis O ’Dea).
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instinctively drew his revolver and threatened the crowd.149 The Volunteers at the scene 
surrounded him and Krum shot Volunteer Sean Mulvey dead before being mortally 
wounded.150 Following the shooting Crown Forces went on the rampage across town, 
assaulting a number o f people and damaging property, including the Thomas Ashe Sinn Fein 
Hall, which was burned to the ground. Soldiers arrived at the lodgings of Seamus Quirke, a 
23 year old Volunteer who was originally from Cork, and dragged him to the docks where he 
was shot dead. Troops also arrived at the home of Volunteer Sean Broderick who was shot a 
number of times but survived by feigning death. They then shaved his young sister’s head 
before locking family members in an upstairs room and setting fire to the house. (Neighbours 
came to the rescue and managed to put out the blaze before the inhabitants were overcome.) 
Many other men around the city were pulled from their beds in a similar fashion and severely 
beaten. Soldiers also ransacked the offices o f the Galway Express and the paper was never 
printed again.151
On the following morning, the military imposed a curfew from nine at night until four in the 
morning and what the Connacht Tribune subsequently described as ‘fifteen nights of 
unexampled terror’ followed.152 In a letter to be read out to all his parishioners Bishop O ’Dea 
later denounced:
The persistent shooting and flinging o f grenades in the city and for m iles around, almost every 
night since curfew began, the systematic cam paign o f  house burning, destruction o f  property, 
eviction o f  families from their homes, dragging o f  people from their beds at revolver point and 
forcing them  to act as spies, violence against weak women and girls, and I don’t know what
149 BMH, WS 714 (Thomas Hynes) It is possible he may have been drunk as he had been seen earlier in 
the day drinking on Abbeygate street and he had also threatened a schoolteacher on the platform with a 
gun, who then ran off.
150 BMH, WS 1,107 (Louis O’Dea) Mulvey was then taken to the docks where he lingered for three 
hours, being ministered to by Fr. Griffin, before dying from his wounds.
151 County Solicitor Louis O ’Dea later questioned whether Crum had intentionally set out to stir up 
trouble, ‘in order to ginger up the RIC into hostile action’. He recalled that District Inspector Cruise 
had approached him at a social function and told him that his men had come to him in a body and said 
that they no longer wanted to do ‘this dirty work’. Cruise told O ’Dea that he had subsequently advised 
his men to circulate all RIC barracks in Ireland to look for support. BMH, WS 1,107 (Louis O ’Dea).
132 Connacht Tribune, 2 October 1920.
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The curfew was vigorously enforced by the military with troops clearing the streets at the 
stroke of nine and imprisoning anyone found on the streets. Three hundred Argyll and 
Sutherland Highlanders were transferred to Renmore Barracks and at least twenty houses in 
Dominick Street were commandeered to accommodate further reinforcements, with the 
original occupants ejected and provisions commandeered from local stores at gunpoint.154 A 
number of RIC men who had resigned in protest at events were badly beaten by fellow 
officers when they returned to barracks to collect their belongings.155
Following the first week of violence a citizens’ enquiry was organised at the Town Hall and 
notices were put up urging local people to come forward with testimony. Louis O’Dea acted 
as solicitor for the citizens o f the town and Monsignor Considine, John Conroy, solicitor and 
coroner, Professor Tom Dillon from the University and Tom Ray representing the ex- 
servicemen o f the town, acted as a panel of independent adjudicators. As the meeting was 
about to get under way, soldiers surrounded the building and district inspector Cruise ordered 
the crowd to disperse. A standoff ensued with the organisers refusing to stop the meeting until 
Fr Considine persuaded O’Dea to relent. His home and business premises were subsequently 
ransacked and set on fire, and their entire contents stolen. A black Cross was also placed at his 
home, similar to the ones also placed at the homes of Thomas Walsh and Fr Griffin, both of 
whom were subsequently shot dead.156
Low-level violence continued for a number of weeks as troops carried out an incendiary 
campaign against local premises. Incendiary fires, arson and burglary became a nightly 
occurrence as business premises and private homes were damaged in seemingly random 
attacks. Amidst the violence, the funerals of Sean Mulvey and Seamus Quirke were presided 
over by Bishop O ’Dea and were amongst the largest ever seen in Galway. All business 
premises and public houses in the town closed and all work was suspended in sympathy as 
‘even the employees of the county club drew all the blinds and went forth to attend the
other forms of terrorism.153
153 Connacht Tribune, 2 October 1920
154 Freeman’s Journal, 16 September 1920.
155 Freeman’s Journal, 15 September 1920.
156 Connacht Tribune, 17 September 1920.
requiem mass.’157 As the coffins wound their way up Mainguard street towards Eyre Square, 
the military on horseback forcibly dispersed the mourners sending panic-stricken crowds 
running down side streets in terror.
The vast majority of soldiers involved in attacks against the civilian population were never 
brought before a military tribunal but occasionally troops were court-martialed. Constables 
James Murphy and Richard Oxford were court-martialed in May 1921 for the attempted 
murder o f James Egan and J.P. Greene who had been taken from Reilly’s Hotel in Salthill. 
After a lengthy inquiry with numerous sworn witnesses testifying to seeing the men kidnap 
Green and Egan and then marching them into the sea before shooting them, the case was 
dismissed by the investigating officer as ‘a purely internal disciplinary matter’.158
5.8 Official Reprisals
The first official reprisal in the county was carried out in Tuam on 20 July following the 
Gallagh ambush in which two RIC men were killed.159 A number o f premises and homes were 
burned to the ground and shooting, looting and random violence was engaged in by troops for 
a number of hours.160 Troops visited the town again on two occasions in September and the 
Archbishop Gilmartin, described the second shooting up of the town as ‘terrorism by those 
who turned the restful hours of night into a time of torture.’161
Homes in Oranmore were burned out in a similar fashion following the IRA ambush on the 
RIC on the 21 August in which Constable Foley was killed.162 Two public houses in the 
village were burned down and a number o f other homes damaged on the night of the 
ambush.163 The military eventually killed two local republicans in revenge for the attack. On 
the evening o f 17 September, Joseph Athy was shot dead and his workmate, Patrick Burke,
157 Freeman’s Journal, 11 September 1920.
158 ‘Courts Martials of Civilians, ACT-BRO’, WO 35/121, TNA.
159 Irish Times, 21 July 1920. See Appendix for ‘Map Showing Location of Crown Forces Reprisals in 
county Galway’.
160 Irish Times, 22 July 1920.
161 Freeman's Journal, 27 September 1920.
162 Irish Times, 23 August 1920.
163 Irish Times, 23 August 1920.
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wounded by gunmen, as they travelled home from work near the village. Survivors of the 
ambush reported seeing men in army fatigues fleeing the scene.164 Volunteer Joseph Howley, 
whom police had been seeking for since the ambush, was eventually arrested at Broadstone 
station in Dublin as he alighted from the Galway to Dublin train.'65 Howley was a leading 
republican in the Oranmore district and was blamed by police for organising the ambush. He 
was approached by a group of men on the platform and shot dead in front o f other passengers. 
Police later recorded that he had been ‘shot dead whilst trying to escape’.
In reprisal for the ambushing of police at Drumhama House, near Ardrahan, five homes and 
the village hall were burned in the village on 25 September, as local people were terrorised by 
armed and disguised men who dragged inhabitants into the local fields.166 Following the 
Castledaly ambush, which resulted in the death o f Constable Horan, troops killed Eileen 
Quinn, who was shot dead from a passing lorry near Kiltartan, a short distance from the 
ambush site.167 At the court of military inquiry it was found that she was shot dead by one ‘of 
a number of shots fired as a precautionary measure and in view of these facts a verdict of 
death by misadventure must be brought’.'68 Fr Considine visited the dying woman and sent 
word to the police at Gort, who arrived at the scene accompanied by the military. When the 
priest asked the Inspector to interview her, he refused to take her statement. Soldiers later 
burned down a number o f homes in the vicinity of the ambush site .169
On 2 October John O’Hanlon, secretary of the Turloughmore Sinn Fein club, was shot dead 
by the military who arrived at his home in the middle o f the night.170 O ’Hanlon’s body was 
found in a nearby field. His body had been searched and he was shot in the head. Once again, 
the RIC reported that he had been ‘shot whilst trying to escape’.171 The month saw a general 
upsurge in violence following the abduction by the IRA on 15 October o f William Joyce, who 
was believed to be an informer. Following his disappearance, notices were pinned up by the
164 Freeman’s Journal, 18 September 1920.
165 Irish Times, 6 December 1920.
166 Freeman's Journal, 29 September 1920.
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police in Eyre square stating that if he was not returned, ‘somebody would be made to pay the 
penalty’.172 Rev Davis of Rahoon subsequently visited the military and pleaded that there be 
no reprisals, but was told that the people in the district had until the end o f the night for Joyce 
to be returned unharmed.173 On the night of 14 October 1920, unknown persons called to the 
parochial house shared by Fr Griffin and Fr 0 ‘Meehan in Galway town. Fr O ’Meehan had not 
been sleeping at the house for some time owing to threatening letters the two priests had been 
receiving.174 After, a conversation in Irish with the caller, Fr Griffin departed on what he
thought was a sick call to one of his parishioners.175 Local people believed he was being held
prisoner by the military in Lenaboy Barracks in revenge for the earlier disappearance of 
Joyce. Fr Davis described the two men as ‘rival protagonists’ and ‘it was feared that Joyce 
had a number of friends who were determined to avenge him and Fr Griffin appears to have 
used a string of language on the fourteenth of the month in which he told some of his 
congregation that they were as bad as the Black and Tans’.176
Fr Griffin’s body was eventually recovered after a large scale search organised by the clergy 
in the Bama district. A row of thatched houses was burnt out by the military after the body 
was recovered and the clergy refused to give possession of the remains to the Crown Forces. 
P.W. Joyce, who had been shot dead by the IRA, was from the village and the military, aided 
by some local people, left his body in Bama as a signal to the local community. It was widely 
believed that the caller who lured Fr Griffin to his death was a local man and the IRA was 
certain who was responsible. Joseph Togher later recalled:
We were convinced that the caller (a tout for the auxiliaries) was none other than William
Joyce ... I intercepted a letter from Joyce to an Auxie, which, after being broken down,
revealed that Joyce had the R.I.C. cipher which was in use that particular month. Michael 
Staines, our liaison officer, confronted D ivisioner Cruise o f  the RIC with this information, as 
Cruise had continually denied Joyce’s association with the RIC Had we had this information
172 Freeman’s Journal, 18 October 1920.
173 Freeman's Journal, 18 October 1920.
174 BMH, WS 1,034 (Mrs Mary Leech, nee O ’Meehan).
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William Joyce was well known in the town for associating with the Crown Forces and had 
been seen accompanying them on their raids, helping them navigate the small local roads and 
identifying local people. Shortly after Fr Griffin’s murder, he joined the 4th Worcester 
Regiment and departed with them to England.178
On 21 October, Volunteer Thomas Walsh was taken from his family business at the Old Malt 
Pub in Galway town by a group of partially disguised men. He was taken to the Eglington 
canal where he was shot in the head and his body thrown into the water.179 Two days later, 
another publican, Thomas Egan was shot dead near Athenry, when four disguised men 
entered his home.180 Egan’s pub was the centre o f the local community and yards from the 
spot where landlord Frank Shawe-Taylor had been murdered earlier in the year. He was not 
involved in the republican movement and his murder was viewed locally as retaliation for the 
killing o f Shawe-Taylor. The police and military denied involvement in the killing and 
claimed it was carried out by disgruntled locals who feared Egan was going to go to the 
authorities with information relating to the killing.181
November saw no let up in state violence and three republicans were killed in brutal 
circumstances in revenge for their participation in fatal attacks on the police. Michael Moran, 
27, who had been one of the most effective IRA officers in the county and had led the 
Volunteer attacks in the north of the county earlier in the year, was shot dead whilst in the 
custody of British troops in the Earl’s Island on 24 November.182 Moran was eventually 
picked up by the authorities after being on the run since the Gallagh ambush that resulted in 
two RIC men being shot dead. He was being taken by armed escort from Eglington barracks 
to Earls Island Barracks when he was shot. The military later claimed that he was ‘shot whilst
177 BMH, WS 1,729 (Joseph Togher). Despite the persistent popular belief, the informer P.H. Joyce and 
William Joyce, later Lord Haw Haw, who was believed to have lured Fr Griffin to his death in revenge, 
were not related. Joyce is a common name in the district.
178 He later achieved infamy as the Nazi propagandist Lord Haw Haw and was subsequently hanged by 
the British government for treason.
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182 Connacht Tribune, 27 November 1920.
earlier, Joyce would have been executed.177
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trying to escape’.183 Two days later, the Loughnane brothers, Harry and Patrick, from 
Shanaglish in south Galway, were picked up by troops near their home. They were taken to 
Gort Barracks where they were tortured and eventually killed. Their badly mutilated bodies 
were found nearly three weeks later in a shallow pool o f water at Umbriste, two miles from 
Ardrahan. They had their hands and legs broken, were missing fingers, had been set alight and 
had hand grenades exploded in their mouths.184 The men had taken part in the Castledaly 
ambush a few weeks earlier, where constable Horan had been shot dead by the IRA.
The final murder carried out by Crown Forces in 1920 took place on 20 December, during a 
naval search operation on Inishmore.185 Three Navy vessels landed simultaneously, with 
disembarking troops systematically searching homes on the island, creating pandemonium 
amongst the local population, who hid out on the Island’s rocks and caves. One man, 
Laurence MacDonagh, was shot dead whilst fleeing his home. He was unarmed and had been 
shot in the back with the authorities once again claiming that he had been ‘shot dead whilst 
trying to escape’.186
The killing continued in January and following the Kilroe ambush on 19 January, in which 
several Auxiliaries were injured, five men were murdered and the town of Headford partially 
destroyed by Crown Forces. Thomas Collins, 21, o f Keelkill, Headford was shot dead, only 
hours after the attack, as he worked in the local fields with his horse and cart.187 Throughout 
the following morning, lorry loads of troops roamed the narrow roads in the Headford district, 
firing indiscriminately into homes and fields. John Walsh, 30, o f Clydagh, Headford, was 
taken from his home and shot dead on his farm by a group of soldiers.188 An hour later, 
Michael Hoade was taken from his house near Caherlistrane and badly beaten before being 
shot dead.189 A third man, John Kirwan, 22, from Ballinastack, near Tuam spent all morning 
working with his horse and cart when Crown Forces arrived and shot him dead after chasing
183 Connacht Tribune, 27 November 1920.
184 A photograph of the men’s mutilated bodies appears in Marie McNamara & Maura Madden (eds.)
Beagh; A History & Heritage, (Galway, 1995), p. 123.
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188 Connacht Tribune, 22 January 1921.
189 Connacht Tribune, 22 January 1921.
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him through his fields.190 Three other men were seriously wounded on the same morning in 
Kilconly, Sylaun and Glenamaddy after being shot from passing lorries.191 Troops then 
proceeded to Headford town where a number o f shops and private homes, including the 
parochial house, were burned and looted. Revenge for the Kilroe attack did not end there 
however, and on 12 March, Thomas Mullins, of Killavoher, near Clonbeme, was picked up by 
a lorry load of uniformed men, shot dead and his body dumped a few miles from where he 
was working.192 He had been doing a day’s labour for a local farmer and had no connection 
with the IRA. Crown Forces had earlier raided local houses looking, they claimed, for men 
who had been involved in the ambush of troops.
The Crown Forces did manage to capture one of the key men involved in the ambush at 
Kilroe when they arrested Louis Darcy at Oranmore on the 23 M arch.193 Troops had 
apparently grown suspicious o f his claim that he was a labourer, during the routine 
questioning of rail passengers, due apparently, to his soft hands. When they eventually 
realised his true identity, he was taken away in a lorry and dragged from the back of the 
vehicle before being shot dead. Darcy had been a committed and competent Volunteer and 
had been on the run since a cache of explosives had been found at his home at Clydagh, 
Headford, where he was the local Volunteer Officer. Once again, he was officially listed as 
being ‘shot whilst trying to escape’.194
The military carried out three reprisals in west Galway in 1921. On 6 April, they burned down 
five homes in the vicinity of Screebe in south west Connemara following an IRA ambush 
where one policeman was seriously wounded.195 A number of homes in the Moycullen area 
were also burned out following an attack by the IRA on the RIC station at Spidall on 13 May. 
The co-operative store was ransacked and two employees stripped naked and beaten.196 The 
largest reprisal in west Galway took place in Clifden on St Patrick’s Day following an IRA
190 Connacht Tribune, 22 January 1921
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attack in which two RIC men were killed.197 The police burned down a number of homes and 
premises in the town and shot dead a former British army major J.J. McDonnell, who was 
killed whilst helping to put out a fire which the military had started in a hotel. The police later
198claimed he had been shot after being arrested and whilst attempting to flee custody.
The final reprisal carried out by state troops followed the Ballyturin ambush near Gort on 15 
May 1921. Constable Kearney, an RIC constable who had been passing information to the 
local IRA was shot dead by his colleagues, after he arrived at the ambush scene following the 
attack. Kearney’s comrades suspected that he was sympathetic to the IRA and he was taken 
into the woods near the ambush site and shot dead. It was subsequently alleged by soldiers 
that he had been shot by the IRA some of whom it was claimed, had remained at the scene. 
Local sources confirmed that troops had boasted about his death and the local IRA officer 
subsequently confirmed that he was passing information on troop movements and was not 
killed by the IRA.199 Following the attack, local people fled their homes in fear of reprisals as 
troops burned homes along the road from the ambush site into the town of Gort four miles 
away.
5.9 Targeted Assassinations
Following the murder o f a number of local people in the winter of 1920, Dr Gilmartin, the 
Archbishop of Tuam claimed in January 1921 that in Galway, ‘there are mysterious forces 
making for war’.200 If the IRA altered their tactics in the New Year, the Crown Forces 
developed their approach also, and new pattern of killing emerged which differed 
considerably from previous murders of local people carried out by the State. The earlier 
killings generally involved troops making no attempt to conceal their identity, with victims 
shot in broad daylight by troops. In 1921, the police inspector for Galway West Riding 
recorded a series of murders of local men allegedly carried out by the IRA in the county. 
Despite elaborate motives contained in the police reports, the evidence would strongly suggest
197 Irish Times, 18 March 1921.
198 Irish Times, 21 March 1921.
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that these men were in fact killed by Crown Forces and the motive and blame attributed to the 
Volunteers by the police to deflect attention away from the real killers. The six killings 
carried out in 1921 all bore strong similarities and were carried out by highly professional and 
competent groups of killers who, unlike previous shootings, worked in disguise, with 
considerable stealth and local knowledge, and their actions made to look as if they were the 
work of republicans.
On the night of 20 February 1921, John Geoghegan, 26, a Volunteer and Sinn Fein District 
Councillor from Moycullen was taken from his bed by unknown men and shot dead.201 His 
body was dumped at the back of his home and a notice pinned to his chest which read, 'yours 
faithfully, M Collins.’ The local community believed it was the work of the Crown Forces and 
not the IRA, as the notice on the body implied. The famil;y o f the deceased stated that the 
killers had irish accents and wore policemans’ caps. 202Geoghegan received a republican 
funeral and was included in the Galway Roll of Honour, which indicates that his death was 
not an IRA execution. The County Inspector gave his killing one line in his monthly report, 
stating that ‘a leading IRA officer was shot’.203
On the 6 April, another Volunteer, Patrick Cloonan, 27, from Maree, near Oranmore, was 
taken from his bed by a group of disguised men.204 He had been on the run for a number of 
months and was staying at the house of his aunt at Ballinacloughty, Oranmore. The killers 
went straight to his bedroom and led the victim from the house. His dead body was 
subsequently found on the seashore near Tawin Island. Despite a republican funeral and an 
annual commemoration, the police recorded that he had been killed by the local IRA as, 'he 
was at one time an advanced Sinn Feiner, but latterly it was reported that he was 
endeavouring to cut away from the movement and go to America. It is believed that some of 
the Sinn Feiners thought he was about to give them away before he left and therefore 
murdered him.’205
On 30 April, Patrick Molloy, 26, was taken from his bed at night by armed and masked men at
201 Irish Times, 21 February and 25 February 1921.
202 See Irish Times, 21 February 1921 and 25 February 1921.
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his home, which was close to the scene of the Kilroe ambush.206 He was shot dead and his 
body dumped in a nearby ditch with a notice pinned to his chest stating, ‘Beware, IRA’. Once 
again, local people believed that Molloy was an innocent man murdered by Crown Forces. 
The Connacht Tribune noted that he was ‘the fifth man in the area to be killed since the 
Kilroe ambush’.207 The county inspector once provided a more elaborate motive for the 
murder, noting that local people were behind the killing and that ‘the real motive would 
appear to be retaliation for a previous murder which Molloy is believed to have committed in 
connection with a land dispute,’208
Hugh Tully and Christopher Folan were both killed in their homes in Galway town, on the 
night o f 12 May. Like the previous murders, the killers all wore disguises and arrived at night, 
quietly singling out their victims for execution.209 In the case o f Christopher Folan, however, 
the assassins made a number of errors. According to his family, the men arrived at the Folan 
home at O’Donohue’s Terrace wearing waterproofs and driving goggles and asked for James 
Folan. James was Christopher’s brother and he had recently been released from Galway jail 
for IRA activity. James was not in the house, and when the killers realised that their intended 
target was not there, they took his two brothers into a room and shot them both, with 
Christopher dying instantly from his wounds.210 A short time later, disguised men made their 
way to another house in the area and asked for Hugh Tully.211 Tully, a railway worker who 
had no involvement in politics, came to the door and was instantly shot in the head. Tully had 
been lucky to survive an earlier attack when troops broke into the house that he had 
previously shared with Stephen Broderick on 9 September. On that occasion, Broderick, who 
was a member o f the IRA, was shot but managed to survive by feigning death.
Despite the horror in Galway over the two killings, the county inspector recorded that the men 
had been killed by local republicans. The motive for the Folan killing was recorded as ‘fear of 
the Sinn Fein party that Folan might give information’ and in the case o f Tully, it was claimed
206 Irish Times, 2 May 1921.
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he ‘was on good terms with the police and was probably suspected of giving information/212 
There is no indication that the police version of events had any credibility locally and the 
community accorded both victims large republican funerals.
A week after the murders in Galway town, Thomas McKeever, a shop assistant in Dunmore, 
north Galway was killed in a similar fashion to the previous five victims. He was taken from 
his lodgings by a group of disguised assassins who shot him and left his body in a local field. 
McKeever, a native of Cork, had no connection to politics. However, the county inspector 
incorrectly recorded that the dead man was a ‘Sinn Feiner, and alleged to be giving 
inform ation/213 Once again, the murder was made to look like the work of the local IRA and 
the body was labelled ‘Convicted Spy-Traitors Bew are/ As in previous cases, witnesses 
recalled seeing three men in waterproofs and goggles in the area acting mysteriously and even 
the Connacht Tribune noted that the deceased man lived an abstinent life and had no enemies 
in the area 214 The local priest publicly refuted the inference from the altar that McKeever was 
a republican or a spy or that he had been murdered by the IRA.215
These six killings, along with the murder of Thomas Walsh, who was led from the pub that he 
ran and shot dead in Galway town on 21 October; Thomas Egan, who was shot dead in his 
kitchen in Athenry on 23 October and John O ’Hanlon who was shot dead in Turloughmore on 
2 November; all bear striking similarities. All nine men were killed at night, by a small group 
of men who acted with stealth and poise and all the killings, except the O’Hanlon killing, 
were attributed to the IRA or local people by the county inspector despite the obvious 
involvement o f the Crown Forces. A number o f the bodies were also labelled as spies in an 
attempt to deflect attention away from the real killers. Furthermore, unlike the other killings 
carried out by troops, the perpetrators all wore disguises and many witnesses recalled that 
they wore long coats with the collars turned up and either driving goggles or caps pushed low 
over their faces to disguise their identities.
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In March 1921, Archbishop Gilmartin expressed his sympathy with the people o f Galway ‘in 
their feelings o f horror and indignation at the actions o f the Crown Forces.’ However, he 
warned his flock against channelling their anger into support for the IRA, as:
W hat is called the IRA may contain the flower o f  Irish youth, but they have no authority from 
the Irish people or from any moral principle to wage war against unequal forces with the 
consequence o f  terror, arson and death to innocent people.216
The Archbishop’s analysis underlines the fundamental problem facing the IRA in Galway: the 
absence o f popular moral sanction from the community, whom they claimed to represent, for 
their campaign against a superior military force, for which, not just republicans, but the local 
population as a whole were punished in violent reprisals. The young men who fought the 
Crown Forces in Galway were not adventure seekers who remained in the IRA for personal 
gain or social kudos; there was little to be gained from being involved in republican activity. 
Due to the amount o f intelligence which the military possessed, the level of commitment 
necessary to remain active was simply too great for those doubting in the righteousness of the 
republican struggle to remain active in Galway after October 1920.
The authorities’ success in arresting most active officers in the county in October 1920 
fundamentally altered the dynamics of the IRA’s war against the state which became solely 
reliant on the individual endeavour of isolated units. The shooting of a significant number of 
the remaining officers: Michael Moran of the Tuam battalion; Louis Darcy of Headford; 
Joseph Howley of Oranmore; Harry and Patrick Loughnane of Beagh; John Geogeghan of 
Moycullen and Fr Griffin in Galway town, reinforced the overwhelming danger facing active
2 ] 7IRA men. The remaining IRA leaders who avoided jail, such as Thomas Duggan and Brian 
Molloy of Castlegar, suffered serious loss o f property and potential income and both these 
men, along with many others, had their homes destroyed and were forced to remain 
permanently on the run until the truce in July 1921.218 The capture o f many IRA members was
216 Irish Times, 21 March 1921.
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218 Irish Times, 15 February 1921.
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facilitated by local people; British intelligence acknowledged that Louis Darcy was captured 
due to information from local informants;219 Michael Moran was widely believed to have 
been betrayed by a man, who was himself, killed by the IRA;220 Fr Griffin was led to his 
death by a caller known personally to him after he condemned members of his own 
congregation ‘for being as bad as the Black and Tans5. Many more men killed by the 
military are likely to have been informed upon by elements from within their own community.
Despite killing fourteen members of the Crown Forces, the IRA in Galway were defeated by a 
combination of the ferocity of the Crown Force’s violence, the accuracy of their military 
intelligence and the deep hostility of broad sections o f the local community. IRA fighters 
believed they represented their community in the fight against an oppressor; in reality, most 
people did not celebrate the killing of policemen and the consequences for the community as a 
whole greatly outweighed any residual sense o f disgust which the police may have generated 
by their activities.
The violence of the Crown Forces greatly exceeded that of the IRA, in terms of those killed, 
destruction to property and disruption to people’s daily lives.222 Why many of their civilian 
victims such as Thomas McKeever of Dunmore or Hugh Tully o f Galway town were taken 
from their beds and shot dead is not clear and many fatalities were neither republicans nor 
political in any way. Their killers were clearly acting on intelligence about their victims’ 
whereabouts and the IRA believed that there was organised collaboration with the military in 
the county. There is no concrete evidence that this was the case, but republicans acted on 
their conviction, killing a number of people they believed responsible and there is evidence 
which adds some substance to their claims.224 In contrast republican intelligence was poor 
and they relied on post office workers in the GPO in Galway to intercept suspicious mail en 
route to the military.225 Whilst a number o f informers were revealed in this manner, there
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were no major sources o f formal intelligence and the movement relied on the casual goodwill 
of local people to gain sporadic information on the military. Policemen were not immune to 
passing information in the same manner, and for warning the IRA in south Galway about 
troop movements, Constable Kearney was shot dead at Ballyturin in May 1921.226
The IRA in Galway did not target civilians and the movement fought a far less brutal 
campaign in the county, than that which Hart has described in Cork.227 There is no evidence 
of torture being employed against alleged informers, three of whom were shot dead after an 
IRA ‘trial’ in the presence of a priest. As discussed in Chapter Three, a number of big houses 
were burned for perceived military reasons by the IRA when they were about to be used as 
billets for troops but not simply for agrarian or vindictive motives.228 The terror inflicted by 
the Crown Forces in Galway was not unique and reprisals were a nationwide phenomenon. 
The assassinations carried out in the county occurred in other active counties, with a 
particularly high level of similar attacks in Dublin and Cork, which were also local centers of
* * 99Qmilitary intelligence. There have not been enough local studies o f other areas or sufficient 
academic focus on the campaign carried out by the Crown Forces to establish the degree to 
which the patterns described in Galway were common elsewhere.
The truce between the government and republicans in July 1921 was not greeted by either the 
IRA or the community as a whole as a victory for the republican movement or the Irish people 
generally; it was viewed as a welcome return to normality by most people and as a chance for 
a well-earned rest by active IRA members. Most people thought it would not last long and the 
negotiations would break down and violence erupt once more. The achievements o f the 
revolution in Galway are discussed in the following chapter. However, the notion that the 
military stalemate represented a victory for the armed forces o f the Republic would have been 
risible in Galway in July 1921, When Laurence Flynn, an IRA officer from Loughrea, 
eventually took control o f the RIC barracks in the town in 1922, the officer in charge was 
unaware of the momentousness of the occasion telling the barrack’s new hosts, ‘Hurry up and
226 Irish Times, 17 May 1921.
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Confining historical enquiry to the IRA’s campaign during the revolution, at the expense of 
the antagonism between conservative nationalism and radical republicanism conceals the 
undercurrents of insecurity and social conflict which the transient collapse of social deference 
temporarily evinced between 1916 and 1921. The creation of one political tradition required 
the destruction o f another, and the bitterness and hostility which this destruction generated has 
often been overlooked in the historical record. Before the rise o f militant republicanism, 
politics in east Galway had been fundamentally conservative and respectable, and to the local 
elites o f the National Party the IRA represented the deviance of the young, the rural and the 
poor. The militancy of the latter constituency was nothing new; it had been the bedrock upon 
which the campaigns o f the Land League and subsequently, the United Irish League, had 
shaped modem Ireland. The conservative instincts of local UIL elites barely masked the 
continuum of violent agrarian impulses which had continued unabated in the county since the 
beginning of the century. The crucial disjuncture which the emergence of the IRA 
represented, lay in their circumvention of the traditional paternal leadership of an older 
generation of nationalists and their consequent lack of deference towards perceived modes of 
political convention. The IRA were only sporadically active in the county after the arrival of 
further British regiments in August and September 1920, due primarily to the fact that large 
sections o f the community simply did not support their aims, feared their intentions and 
derided their capabilities. Galway was not unique in this respect. However, the extent to 
which east Galway was polarised by the conflict is exceptional and has no parallel in 
comparative studies.
Analysis o f the revolutionary era must be fully cognisant of the nuances o f local communities 
and sufficiently contextualise the many expressions o f civic nationalism which existed during 
the period. The IRA and political violence cannot be comprehensively analysed in isolation 
from the communities from which they sprang. The rhetoric of the Town Tenants’ 
Association or the Vigilance Committees o f east Galway, far from being of peripheral 
interest, were representative expressions of contemporary political opinion. When the gaze of 
historical enquiry is broadened to encompass, not only movements which served as engines of 
political change, such as Sinn Fein, but other civic associations, such as the County Galway
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Farmers’ Association, the degree to which revolutionary change was initially opposed, 
gradually resisted and eventually undermined by conservative nationalism, becomes apparent.
Republicans in east Galway were derided by their opponents because of their youth, their 
roots in the rural poor, their perceived lack of ‘manliness’ and for their political naivety. From 
1917 onwards, the UIL were attacked by Sinn Fein for being, elitist, urban, old and out of 
touch with the culture of the common people. The battle lines were clearly articulated by a 
partisan press, the speeches of local activists, and the nature of popular mobilisation and 
political organisation. A stark dichotomy of political and moral worth was expounded by rival 
nationalist and republican activists. In this respect, the nature o f political insult and petty 
humiliation is instructive. At a UIL meeting in Ballinasloe in 1917, J.P. Farrell described Sinn 
Fein members in the county as ‘fellows who the Land League had given a touch to in the 
past’.1 In the same month, at a meeting o f the Ballinasloe Board of Guardians, Mr Cahill told 
the members that, ‘he never saw them [Sinn Fein] carrying a Land League banner or anything 
else to advance the movement, except their straw hats; it is the landlord crowd that is behind 
them, they were in their swaddling clothes when we were fighting the land fight.’2
Rather than the nationalist solidarity o f the Land League struggle, which facilitated an ‘us and 
them5 mentality in relation to contemporary vested interests, an equally stark, but very 
different choice was presented to nationalist Ireland in the early decades of the twentieth 
century. Instead of focusing outwardly at a common enemy, nationalists were first required to 
confront each other and choose between the old and the new, or more accurately, ‘the old and 
respectable’ and ‘the new, the young and the unknown’. This thesis has analysed the 
uncertainty which the republican campaign generated and which, in east Galway, 
fundamentally exacerbated four key social antagonisms:
1. A generational cleavage between younger republicans and older generations of 
nationalists.
2. An economic cleavage between small tenants and stronger farmers.
3. A political chasm between the urban world o f the small town and its rural environs.
4. A sectarian cleavage between the small Church of Ireland community and the Catholic
1 East Galway Democrat, 8 September 1917.
2 East Galway Democrat, 1 July 1917.
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The Generational Aspect of the Revolution
Stephen Gwynn, MP for Galway Borough, observed at first hand, the generational aspect of 
the revolution in Galway:
Such men as these [veterans o f  the original Land War] who had been in jail half a dozen times 
for their part in the fight, were incapable o f  believing that the country would ever turn from 
them, or refuse to accept their guidance. Yet, already, in 1905, there was a generation, to 
whom the story o f  the Land War o f the eighties and their whole tradition, was only a story, o f 
which they were tired. They were weary also o f being put down by their elders, who told them 
that they had never known what it was to do a hard day 's work for Ireland.3
The IRA in east Galway conformed to nationwide trends as youth culture played a formative 
role in the movement.4 Ernie O’Malley observed this phenomenon in north Munster noting, 
‘often the mother would think I was leading her son astray or the father would not approve of 
what the boys were doing.’5 William O’Malley, MP for Connemara, believed that the 
coercion and thuggery o f gangs of young men played a key role in the eclipse of his party by 
local republicans ‘The old people as a rule hated Sinn Fein, but the young terrorised them into 
joining their clubs and certainly terrorised them on the day of the election.’6
Most individual IRA officers paid a heavy price for their involvement in the republican 
campaign. Those who were active from July 1920, faced the probability of death, 
imprisonment and attacks by the Crown Forces on their homes and families. The killing of 
leading republicans such as Joe Howley, Michael Moran, Patrick and Harry Loughnane, Louis 
Darcy and Michael Walsh sent a clear signal to those who had not gone on the run: few active 
officers could expect to live, should they be arrested by Crown Forces. In these 
circumstances, it was predominantly the young, the single, and those unhindered by
3 Stephen Gwynn, The Irish Situation (London, 1921), p. 11.
4 See Hart, ‘Youth Culture and the IRA in Cork’ in Fitzpatrick (ed.) Revolution, Ireland, 1917-1923.
5 Ernie O’Malley, Army Without Banner: Adventures o f  an Irish Volunteer (Boston, 1937), p. 143.
6 William O ’Malley, Glancing Back: 70 years' Experiences and Reminiscences o f  Pressman,
Sportsman and Member o f  Parliament (London, 1933), p. 138.
majority.
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conventional working hours or the provision of dependants who remained active.
The Rural Class Dimension of the Revolution
Resistance to the state during the period 1914-1921 did not run solely along the lines of 
nationalism. Fitzpatrick correctly recognised the continuity between the UIL’s harnessing of 
the potential for agrarian violence and the later manipulation of the same phenomenon by 
Sinn Fein, who effectively assumed the role of broker between the state and the ‘agrarian 
other’ in early 1918. However, there is much more that can be elucidated about larger 
processes of change when a coherent analysis o f the complexities o f agrarianism has been 
achieved. The small tenant agitations, though viewed by cosmopolitan urban elites as typical 
o f the lazy peasant, represented a continuum of struggle against the social inequality inherent 
in the dominant land tenure system in areas where the grazing system predominated. A range 
o f unsavoury and dishonourable incidents sheltered under the cloak of agrarian emancipation. 
Nonetheless, the campaigns against petty landlordism were also a claim to nationhood, albeit 
cloaked in under-articulated social grievance.
If subsequent generations of historians have failed to agree on the intersection between land 
hunger and political mobilisation, the authorities in Galway were equally divided on the 
consequences o f land purchase. District Inspector Clayton believed that the policy o f the CDB 
was directly responsible for rural unrest in the county as ‘some of the most worthless and 
disloyal have received farms from the CDB in preference to the worthy and loyal. This policy 
has had a bad affect.’7 District Inspector Rutledge, on the other hand, believed that the 
distribution o f large estates had a positive affect on unrest, as ‘when a man gets his land, he 
settles down and there is no one more conservative than an Irish small farmer. The day of the 
paid politician and agitator in this country will be over when the people have the land in their 
hands.58 Similarly, when questioned about larger farmers and their lack o f participation in the 
Rising in Galway, Rutledge told the Rebellion Commission, ‘they don’t care to lose money. I 
don’t think the farmers were ever better off. They are not too willing to be disturbed - that is 
so, the farming classes are never too willing to be disturbed.’9
7 Cl monthly confidential report, east Galway, October 1917, CO 904/104.
8 Cl monthly confidential report, west Galway, January 1917, CO 904/102.
9 The Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland; minutes o f  evidence and appendix o f  documents
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There was no contradiction between the Police Inspectors’ seemingly rival analysis. In respect 
of political violence, the crucial formative aspect o f the land question in east Galway was not 
simply the pressure or desire for land redistribution on the part of the small tenants. The sheer 
scale o f land transferred by the state from landlord to tenant in Galway was unprecedented 
nationwide, and was both a continuing result of, and a stimulus for, future communal agrarian 
violence. In the countryside, violence clearly worked; but this should not be extrapolated into 
a similar potential for political violence amongst the land hungry rural poor. In east Galway, 
both the urban and rural proletariat ultimately became a brake on revolution. The rural 
collectivities’ compulsion towards violence, their essentially diffuse and individualistic 
struggles, their impenetrability and localism militated against the formation of a broader, co­
ordinated, disciplined, associational movement, such as the Irish Republican Army. These 
disparate struggles could not ultimately be welded to a national movement encompassing 
broad social support. In this regard, Hobsbawm has similarly noted the problems that rural 
proletarian movements faced worldwide in forming national movements and has concluded 
that such agitations tend to remain scattered and regional.10 In east Galway, the potential 
power o f communal agitations was enormous, but their actual influence and effectiveness was 
ultimately much more limited.
The elites o f the national movement regarded the small tenant agitations as the debasement of 
the national ideal and their disdain has been noted. The lack of Volunteer activity in the heart 
of the grazier belt in east Galway was directly related to the activities o f ongoing communal 
agitations which became the real loci of violent belligerence against the status quo. Sinn Fein 
elites also came to perceive this violence as typical o f a lazy and cowardly tenantry and the 
language o f republican condemnation in the summer of 1920, closely mimicked that o f the 
authorities in both phrase and tenor. The refusal to comprehend and conform to the demands 
the national movement however, often reinforced by a functional stupidity, real or imagined, 
was a formidable force. The refusal of the tenant groups to refrain from agitation was both a 
survival mechanism and a powerful manifestation of social struggle.11 The tenants in the 
areas dominated by the grazing system had nothing to lose and everything to gain by agrarian
H.C. (1916), p. 77.
10 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Peasants and Politics’ in idem, Uncommon People, Resistance, Rebellion andJazi 
(New York, 1998), p. 157.
11 See, Hobsbawm, ‘Peasants and Politics’, p. 157.
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violence and unlike their urban counterparts, were keenly aware of the transforming potential 
o f violence. Thus, to be subaltern was not the same as being apathetic or powerless. The most 
seemingly submissive tenants were capable not only of working the system to their advantage, 
but also o f resisting and attacking those whom they perceived as their oppressors. Thus, for 
many small tenants during the revolutionary era, political confrontation could be quite non­
revolutionary and many rejected joining the IRA in preference to achieving their own 
economic independence.
The Political Chasm Between Town and Country
A higher level o f republican mobilisation in rural areas has already been noted in comparative 
studies.12 In Limerick, Mossie Hartnet, a local IRA officer, was conscious of the sectional 
nature o f republicanism, noting ‘the people in general looked upon us as madmen and the big 
farmers did not give us much support, our best friends being among the small farmers and 
labourers. Well-to-do shopkeepers in the towns derided our efforts and were hostile to us.513 
Thus, whilst a rural/urban divide was not unique to Galway, the visceral and pronounced 
nature of the cleavage was remarkable. In east Galway, the modes of popular urban 
mobilisation differed in form, character and allegiance from the militancy of popular rural 
mobilisation. Urban mobilisation, as evinced by the fortunes o f the Town Tenants’ 
Association tended to be conservative, episodic and dominated by an entrenched merchant 
elite. The towns produced the bulk of men for the British army with Ballinasloe providing the 
second largest number o f recruits, next to Roscommon town, in the whole o f Connacht. The 
urban UIL remained a significant presence in the towns following its official rural demise in 
the 1918 election. The craving for respectability and pronounced social deference which 
characterised urban political organisation was evident in the profound apathy towards trade 
unionism, the Ancient Order of Hibernians (which itself tended to be conservative) and the 
lack lustre state o f the Gaelic League in Galway towns. In contrast to the militancy of rural 
tenants, the urban poor rarely engaged in violent political confrontations. On the few 
occasions when they did, it was to attack local republicans, as happened in Galway town in
12 See Coleman, The Revolution in Longford, p. 172; Fitzpatrick, T he Geography of Irish 
Nationalism’, p. 130.
13 James H Hoy (ed.) Mossie Hartnett, Victory and Woe; The West Limerick Brigade in the War o f  
Independence (Dublin, 2002), p. 16.
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October 1914, in Loughrea in December 1918 and Ballinasloe in July 1918.14 Republicans’ 
main opponents in the towns came, not only from amongst the well-to-do, but as previously 
illustrated, from ‘the stone and bottle throwing types’ from the labourers’ cottages and the 
Claddagh fishing village.
The IRA never managed to gain any significant support in the towns and their campaign 
remained exclusively rural. Throughout the period, young men from the town who sought 
adventure and a living wage continued to join the British army. The armed campaign of the 
IRA was never conceived of as legitimate in places such as Loughrea and Ballinasloe and 
men actually joined the local Black and Tan regiments in these towns.15 Their equivalent from 
the countryside generally joined the IRA or became involved in anti-grazier agitation. Anti- 
Sinn Fein literature, rhetoric and violence was confined to the towns and Galway, Loughrea 
and Ballinasloe formed a trio of empire nationalist ‘garrison towns’. Galway Urban Council 
was the only city in the country which offered an official pledge of welcome to the King when 
he visited in 1903 and the craven welcome afforded Lord Wimbome in 1916. The bunting 
and banners proclaiming ‘One navy, One Throne, One King’ which adorned a thronged Eyre 
Square, typified urban political culture.16 The influence of the educated, urban, reactionary 
elites of the National Party in east Galway, their lack of practical links with the mass o f the 
rural people, combined with their social conservatism, represented a stumbling block, both to 
communal unanimity and social progress. The lobbying by local officers of the Town 
Tenants’ Association against the formation of co-operative stores in Galway town, the 
campaign to prevent a rent strike in Ballinasloe and the championing of a clearly corrupt 
allocation of land to a local MP in Loughrea, were indicative of the profound stasis in which 
urban political culture was immersed.17
A vote for Sinn Fein could reflect many different concerns, only one of which, may or may 
not have been, the desire for an Irish Republic. In this respect, the results of the 1918 elections 
and the local elections of 1920 demand close scrutiny. In the local elections o f 1920, the town, 
o f Portumna returned eight Sinn Fein candidates despite having no active cumann or any
14 See Connacht Tribune, October 1914, December 1918 and the East Galway Democrat, July 1918.
15 See Connacht Tribune, 21 January 1921.
16 See Senia Paseta, ‘Nationalist responses to two royal visits to Ireland, 1900 and 1903’ in Irish 
Historical Studies, xxxi (1999), pp 488-504.
17 See discussion on Town Tenants’ Association in Chapter Two.
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Volunteer company. However, the eight Sinn Fein representatives were actually returned 
unopposed with no other candidates standing. Similar scenarios recurred across the county 
and thus, election results can give a somewhat misleading impression of the depth of 
republican support. Galway Urban District Council was the only major council outside the 
north east that did not elect a republican majority, with the National Party retaining control 
with a majority o f a single seat. Had the old Galway Borough constituency that represented 
the town not been abolished before the 1918 election, it would undoubtedly have returned a 
Nationalist candidate. The siege mentality o f the ‘garrison towns’ was exemplified by an 
exchange at the Loughrea District Council in 1920, when local nationalist councillor Martin 
Ward, who had opposed a motion to rescind the original council resolution condemning the 
1916 Rising, was told by an angry opponent ‘Everybody knows you, you could not go five 
miles outside the town without getting your skull battered.” 8
Sectarianism, Ex-Servicemen and Public Opinion
The prevalence o f co-operation with the Crown Forces in towns was obvious and occurred 
through formal structures, such as the Ex-Soldiers and Sailors Federation and the Rate Payers 
Association, and casually, on an individual basis. The national Chief of Police, Military 
Intelligence Branch at Dublin Castle actually noted the use o f civilian informants in Galway 
as a model in combating the republican movement nationwide.19 As discussed in Chapter 
Four, ex-servicemen made frequent public statements condemning the IRA and even 
threatening to ‘clear them out of the country, if the government did not take a stronger line 
against them’. In Galway town, they were just one group in society with strong links with the 
military. The elite o f Galway society socialised with the officer class in the County Club in 
Salthill and the urban poor could not avoid them in the pubs o f the town. In the same period 
that the Crown Forces killed seventeen unarmed local people in the county, over two hundred 
ex-servicemen and their families were ‘treated’ in Earls Island Barracks by the 17th Lancers.20 
As discussed in Chapter Four, social convention in rural areas prevented local ex-servicemen, 
if they had so desired, from mixing with the military and the breaking of this taboo could have
18 Connacht Tribune, 6 March 1920. The East Galway Democrat also referred to Sinn Fein as 
‘nocturnal ramblers’ on 4 August 1917.
19 Report on the Intelligence Branch of the Chief of Police, Dublin Castle, WO 35/214, NA Kew, p. 32.
20 See conclusion of Chapter Four.
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deadly repercussions. In some cases, it was simply the want o f drinking companions and the 
camaraderie o f the armed services which singled men out for attack by the republicans. Thus 
ex-servicemen were targeted by republicans when it was believed they were informing on the 
IRA, but they were not disproportionately targeted as a group. In Galway town, considerable 
enmity between ex-servicemen and republicans had been ongoing since 1914 and both groups 
engaged in physical attacks on each other through out the period.
The IRA in east Galway did not target Protestants and all four informers killed by the 
movement were Catholic, Nonetheless, in Ballinasloe, one o f the few towns to have a small 
Protestant population, a number of Protestants left the area in fear for their property and 
livelihoods. They had been subject to a campaign of intimidation and local political 
representatives continued to make inflammatory statements, questioning the nationalist 
credentials o f the minority community. The campaign of low level intimidation was clearly 
carried out with the connivance o f local Sinn Fein and nationalist representatives. However, 
there was no active IRA company in the town, and local nationalists had continually shown 
deep hostility to the Volunteers. The base sentiment of sections o f the local community was 
not dissimilar to the resentments of rural communities at the privileged economic position of 
local graziers. The majority of those targeted in the town were from the local merchant elite 
and several shop fronts were damaged in attacks.21 The loyalist pogroms in Belfast merely 
provided the pretext for disgruntled locals to give expression to long simmering resentments 
against sections o f the merchant class, whose business depended on the facilitation of long 
standing credit to customers. The departure o f a number o f businessmen from the town was 
welcome news for some of customers.
The Evolution of a Revolution
As we have seen, the split in the Volunteer movement in 1914 lay behind numerous other 
disputes in the county including a damaging split in the GAA and violent disputes between 
semi-organised factions in Galway town, Turloughmore and Loughrea.22 Politics in Galway 
became remarkably polarised because of the Volunteers’ identification with violent 
communal agitations in 1914, the violence that followed the split and the events o f Easter
21 See discussion on sectarianism in Chapter Four.
22 See Chapter Two for discussion on the sectional nature o f local politics in east Galway.
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Week 1916. The mass mobilisation of both nationalist and republican Volunteers across the 
east of the county and the belief amongst many that ‘a peasant army’ was about to ’invade’ 
the towns of east Galway during Easter Week led. to an unprecedented level of popular 
mobilisation and the very real threat o f civil conflict. It also introduced what was to become 
an underlying well of suspicion for many republicans in the county: If so many nationalists 
were prepared to enlist in the Special Constables and work closely with the Crown Forces in 
1916, were they prepared to do likewise in 1920 and 1921 ?
Frantz Fanon has pointed out that anti-colonial struggles, for the most part, fail to fulfil their 
larger promise, as all too often the national bourgeoisie simply assume the mask of neo­
colonialism and independent states tend to be structured in accordance with the ideology of 
hegemonic elites created by the colonial enterprise.23 The irony of republicanism’s ultimate 
‘victory’ in Galway lay in the fact that they were forced to acquiesce to conventional 
conceptions o f property rights and labour relations in order to conform to traditional 
interpretations o f political legitimacy. The local republican newspaper, the Galway Express 
altered its social agenda in response to the direction of the national leadership generally, 
which was determined to clamp down on any socially divisive issues such as land 
redistribution, co-operatives and labour unrest. On a broader level, the movement simply had 
to reflect the innate conservatism of a rural society which continued to regard any social 
upheaval with deep suspicion and hostility. The collapse o f social deference which the rise of 
the movement in the county from March 1917 until June 1920 represented, allied to the 
agrarian campaigns of communal collectivities in the spring of 1918 and 1920, was ultimately 
a transitory phenomenon. The radical impulse within the new movement existed, but it was 
defeated by a combination o f the conservative instincts o f rural society, the reactionary 
character of local urban elites, the complacency of the urban poor, the brutality o f the Crown 
Forces and the lack o f co-ordination and leadership within the IRA itself. It is the evolution of 
the republican leadership’s battle for the hearts and minds of the more conservative instincts 
in Irish society which ultimately defined the course of the Independence struggle. How far the 
revolutionaries were prepared to compromise their initial ideals, in order to accommodate 
nationalist solidarity, and the degree to which this fundamentally altered the character o f their 
movement is of paramount significance in defining the nature o f the republican struggle.
23 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched o f the Earth (New York, 1965), p. 31.
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Whilst the campaign against the property rights of large landowners played a key role in the 
initial appeal of the movement, there were no obvious signs of any ideological identification 
with, or even a general cognisance of, socialist ideology, amongst republicans in Galway. The 
Galway Express presented the republican case in pragmatic, rather than ideological terms. In 
this sense, declaring support for the co-operative movement and labour generally, whilst 
condemning the merchant class in general was essentially a populist appeal for support from 
the mass of ordinary people, who could be roused by an appeal to perennial class resentments. 
James Connolly could be quoted as a martyr for Ireland but his socialist writings never 
penetrated rural political discourse. Thus, whilst the initial populist demands made by 
republicans represented radical aspirations, simply by virtue o f the fact that they supported 
wealth redistribution in the form of the break up of large farms, this should not be interpreted 
in terms of dialectally sophisticated social radicalism. Thus, the desire to appropriate ones’ 
wealthier neighbours’ land was not necessarily indicative o f a sophisticated class analysis of 
rural discontent on the part of a socially radical rural proletariat.
From 1919 onwards, the republican political trajectory in east Galway could be more 
accurately described as a coalition of the vested interests o f both nationalist and republican, 
support bases, rather than a political revolution of the radical forces o f social change. The 
boycott of the police and state courts became so successful that republicans were able to 
present themselves as the legitimate arbitrators o f justice and the new upholders of law and 
order. The new republican counter-state centred on arbitration courts and the republican 
police and was the movement’s greatest achievement in the county, as for the first time Sinn 
Fein began to win the approval of broad sections of local society, including those who had 
previously stood aloof from the organisation. Republicans now sought the legitimacy and 
support that the new institutions demanded by assuring conservative nationalists that the 
revolution would not involve radical social change, and in particular, any danger to property 
rights and established privilege. Consequently, a perceptible change occurred in the 
movement’s stance on the co-operative movement, land redistribution and a number of 
important local labour disputes.24 Thus, by jettisoning their commitment to social change in an 
effort to consolidate their support, Sinn Fein became increasingly indistinguishable from their 
predecessors in the United Irish League,
24 See Chapter Four for a discussion on ‘the retreat from revolution.’
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However, the achievements of the republican movement in Galway cannot simply be 
dismissed as a ‘so-called revolution’.25 The success of the republican movement in attracting 
the allegiance, albeit briefly, of the general population, to their alternative counter-state, 
should not be underestimated. Furthermore, the relative conservatism of the republican courts 
and the republican police testifies to the inclusive aspirations of the movement. O f the twenty- 
six victims of Crown violence, one was an armed Volunteer, with the remainder being 
unarmed republicans killed in custody or civilians simply killed at random. The Crown Forces 
also tortured men in custody, violated local girls and terrorised local communities with a 
succession of violent reprisals. The irony of Crown Force reprisals is that they were often 
carried out in towns where there was little or no support for the IRA, such as Galway or 
Tuam. In this context, the absence of widescale violence directed against those whom 
republicans, amongst others in society, had long harboured grievances: merchants, 
Protestants, large farmers and landlords, rival local politicians and leading businessmen, was 
clearly the revolution’s greatest achievement. Despite the labelling o f agrarian outbreaks as 
the anarchy of the peasantry, agrarian unrest consisted of a clearly understood sequence of 
escalating violence, carried out by recognisable categories o f collectivities which pursued 
their own logical progression. The fact that ethnic cleansing or widespread land seizures did 
not take place in east Galway was testimony to the ability o f individual Volunteer officers to 
restrain the potentially vindictive impulses of rank and file republicans.
Memory, History and Forgetting
Heather Laird has highlighted the problems non-nationalist organisations present for the 
historiography of post colonial states, when these groups have not been absorbed into the 
logic o f the new state.26 All too frequently such groups simply fall out the domain of history 
and this has been the case for many groups examined in this thesis. It is the Volunteers’ path 
from degeneracy to local heroes which presents critical questions about how the period 1914- 
1921 has been re-interpreted in the popular consciousness.27 As we have seen, most Galway
25 See Tom Garvin, ‘Revolution? Revolutions are what happen to Wheels’ in David Fitzpatrick (ed.) 
Revolution ? 1917-1923 (Dublin, 1990).
26 Heather Laird, Subversive Law in Ireland, 1879-1920; From Unwritten Law to Dad Courts (Four 
Courts, 2005), p. 121.
27 Following the 1916 Rising the Tuam Herald described the Galway rebels as ‘degenerate sons’, the 
Connacht Tribune printed a month-long series of articles commemorating the Rising in April 1966.
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people did not regard the IRA as heroic during the War o f Independence and they were held 
responsible by many for the atrocities of the Crown Forces. The revolutionary era left in its 
wake a society in east Galway which was fractured by the mutual suspicions, resentments and 
many perceived betrayals which the period fostered. As discussed in Chapter Three, many 
families who had played an active role in the movement remained bitterly dejected and utterly 
defeated following the outcome of the Independence struggle.28 With the coming of 
Independence in 1922, nationalists in east Galway were faced with the task of accommodating 
the level of antagonism toward the forces of the Republic, with the collective demand for a 
heroic national ethno-genesis. The only adequate solution was a collective silence which
permitted the complexities of the revolution to be quietly jettisoned from the popular
29narrative.
Paul Ricoeur has explored the popular historical phenomenon of the reciprocal relationship 
between remembering and forgetting, which can profoundly alter the perception o f historical 
experience and the production of historical narrative.30 At times of great historical moment, an 
excess o f remembering of some events, at the expense o f an excess o f forgetting about others, 
can profoundly influence the collective consciousness o f a nation. In east Galway, the 
necessity of forgetting aspects of the revolutionary era was paramount to the evolution of an 
imagined, functional and collective ‘historical’ experience. Whilst local memory became 
obligated and manipulated by a functional imperviousness to historical reality, the inauthentic 
could still occasionally be punctured by personal recollection.3'
The irony of the historiographical debates which have surrounded the narrative oT violent 
republicanism lie in the realisation that the suppression of the historical narrative which 
fostered the annihilation o f the rebel voice also facilitates the death of the conservative 
response.32 The dynamics of silence briefly facilitated the construction o f nationalist 
interpretations of history which removed the complexities of the revolution itself. The
28 The Fleming family of Clarinbridge are discussed in Chapter Three.
“9 The only account of the 1916 Rising in the county which existed until Desmond Greave’s Liam
Mellows and the Irish Revolution was a brief article by Mattie Neilan in the Capuchin Annual, 1966,
30 Paul Riceour, Memory, History, Forgetting (Chicago, 2004).
31 See, BMH, WS 714 (Thomas Hynes); BMH, WS 447 (Thomas Courtney); BMH WS 1,203 (Patrick 
Coy).
32 See, Ella O ’Dwyer, The Rising o f the Moon, The Language o f Power (London, 2003), p. 51.
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caricature o f revolution which briefly emerged in the decades after the founding of the state, 
however, should not simply be replaced with an equally simplistic interpretation.33 
Republicanism was not an expression of irrationalism or a conduit for anarchy. The IRA in 
east Galway did not live their lives as if they were a work of art or feel compelled to construct 
a consoling image of themselves as standard bearers for an ancient civilization.34 Their goals 
were infinitely rational and their campaign reflective of the dynamics of the conservative 
social milieu, with its profound complexities, prejudice and consequent potential for 
redemption.
33 Damian Kiberd, ‘The Elephant of Revolutionary Forgetfulness’ in Mairin Ni Dhonnchadha and Theo 
Dorgan (eds.) Revising the Rising (Derry, 1991).
34 See, William Irwin Thompson, The Imagination o f  an Insurrection; Dublin Easter 1916 (Oxford, 
1967); F.S.L. Lyons, Culture and Anarchy in Ireland I890-I939 (Oxford, 1979), p. 11.
Table 1.
List of casualties in County Galway, January 1920- July 1921
Name Date Location Status Perpetrator
Patrick Thorton 08/02/1920 An Spideall Civilian, ex-serviceman Local republicans
James Ward 06/02/1920 Menlo Civilian, herd Local secret society
Frank Shawe-Taylor 03/03/1920 Athenry Civilian, unionist, landlord Local secret society
Martin Cullinane 05/03/1920 Corofin Civillian, small farmer Local IRA
Constable Burke 19/07/1920 Gallagh RIC IRA, Tuam batt
Constable Carey 19/07/1920 Gallagh RIC IRA, Tuam batt
Constable Foley 21/08/1920 Merlin Park RIC IRA, Castlegar Coy
Private Edward Krum 09/09/1920 Galway town Crown Forces IRA, City batt
Sean Mulvoy 09/09/1920 Galway town IRA Crown Forces
James Quirke 09/09/1920 Galway town IRA Crown Forces
Joseph Athy 17/09/1920 Oramore IRA Crown Forces
PW Joyce 16/10/1920 Galway town Civilian, active loyalist IRA
Thomas Egan 24/10/1920 Athenry Civilian Crown Forces
Con. Timothy Horan 30/10/1920 Castledaly RIC IRA, Beagh Coy
Michael Walsh 19/10/1920 Galway Town IRA Crown Forces
John O’Hanlon 02/10/1920 Turloghmore IRA Crown Forces
Eileen Quinn 01/11/1920 Kiltartan Civilian Crown Forces
Fr Michael Griffin 15/11/1920 Galway town Civilian, republican Crown Forces
Michael Moran 24/11/1920 Galway Town IRA Crown Forces
Harry Loughnane 27/11/1920 Beagh IRA Crown Forces
Patrick Loughnane 27/11/1920 Beagh IRA Crown Forces
Joseph Howley 09/12/1920 Dublin IRA Crown Forces
Laurence McDonagh 22/12/1920 Inis Mor Civilian Crown Forces
John Kirwan 22/01/1921 Tuam Civilian Crown Forces
John Walsh 22/01/1921 Headford Civilian Crown Forces
Michael Hoade 22/01/1920 Caherlistrane Civilian Crown Forces
John Geoghegan 20/02/1920 Moyculen IRA Crown Forces
Con. Charles Reynolds 16/03/1921 Clifden RIC IRA
Con. Thomas Sweeney 18/03/1921 Clifden RIC IRA
J.J. McDonnell 17/03/1921 Clifden Civilian, ex-serviceman Crown Forces
Louis D'Arcy 24/03/1921 Oranmore IRA Crown Forces
Tom Morris 02/04/1921 Kinvara Civilian, ex-service man IRA
Patrick Cloonan 06/04/1921 Kinvara IRA Crown Forces
Constable John Boylan 23/04/1921 Connemara RIC IRA
Thomas Hannon 26/04/1921 Clonberne Civilian IRA
Hugh Tully 11/05/1921 Galway town Civilian Crown Forces
Thomas McKeever 20/05/1921 Dunmore Civilian Crown Forces
Christopher Folan 11/05/1921 Galway town Civilian Crown Forces
Capt. Cecil Blake D.l. 15/05/1921 Gort RIC IRA
Capt. Fiennes Cornwallis 15/05/1921 Gort- Crown Forces IRA
Eliza Blake 15/05/1921 Gort Civilian, wife of D.l. IRA
Con. John Kearney 21/05/1921 Gort RIC Crown Forces
Lieut. Robert McCreery 15/05/1921 Gort Crown Forces IRA
Patrick Molloy 30/04/1921 Kilroe Civilian Crown Forces
Sergeant James Murren 27/06/1921 Milltown RIC IRA
Con. Edgar Day 27/06/1921 Milltown RIC IRA
Atkins, A.M. 17/09/1920 Galway town Crown Forces Accident
Robert Bishop 06/05/1920 Galway town Crown Forces Accident
Herbert Thomspon 13/06/1920 Galway town Crown Forces Accident
Michael Mullins 30/12/1920 Galway town Civilian Crown Forces
Table 2.
Significant attacks on Crown Forces in County Galway 
Date Place Notes
10/01/1920 Castlehacket Barracks 
25/03/1920 Castlegrove Barracks 
Apr-20 Custums & Excise 
Apr-20 Evacuated Barracks 
25/05/1920 Loughgeorge Barracks 
24/06/1920 Monivea
May-20 Evacuated Barracks 
02/07/1920. Bookeen Barracks 
14/07/1921 Caltra 
19/07/1920 Gallagh Ambush 
21/08/1920 Merlin park Ambush 
30/10/1920 Castledaly Ambush 
12/01/1921 Kilconly Ambush 
19/01/1921 Kilroe Ambush 
16/03/1921 Clifden 
06/04/1921 Screebe, Connemara 
23/04/1921 MuitirOwen, Connemara 
30/04/1920 Headford Barracks 




Large scale attack 
Large scale attack
Galway Custum house and 3 income tax offices raided 
11 barracks burned across the county 
Large scale attack
RIC and civilian ambushed (agrarian motive)
19 barracks destroyed across the county 
Barracks destroyed
Police ambushed and two RIC wounded 
Two RIC men killed, Tuam burnt in reprisal 
One RIC man killed, Reprisals in Ornamore 
Ambush kills two RIC men
Ambush wounds two RIC men, coming out of public house
Large scale ambush, 9 Auxilaries wounded, reprisals follow
IRA kill 2 RIC men in Clifden, reprisals follow
IRA ambush RIC, one seriously wounded, reprisal
IRA kill one RIC man in ambush
Attacked by local IRA
RIC ambused, no casualties
Police attacked in ambush, 5 killed, reprisals follow
Crown Forces ambushed and nine seriously wounded
Police ambushed, two RIC men shot dead
Table 3.
Reprisals by Crown Forces in County Galway 
Date Reprisal
20/07/1920 House and shops burned and looted following Gallagh ambush.
21/08/1920 Reprisal burnings in Oranmore following Merlin Park ambush.
09/09/1920 Reprisals and looting in Galway town following shooting dead of soldier. 
25/09/1920 Homes burned in Ardrahan following shooting at police.
22/11/1920 Homes burned in Barna following discovery of Fr Griffin's body.
22/01/1921 Homes destroyed and 3 men shot dead in Headford following Kilroe ambush. 
17/03/1921 Homes and shops destroyed and one man shot dead in Clifden following ambush.
06/04/1921 Five homes burned down in vacinity of ambush site at Screebe, Connemara.
13/05/1921 Homes destroyed and locals beaten in Moycullen following attack at Spiddal.
15/05/1921 Homes destroyed between Gort and Kilbeacanty following Ballyturin ambush.
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